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2.
ABSTRACT
The thesis attempts to account for an apparently wide array of class-like entities 
in present-day capitalist formation, while remaining true to the spirit of Marxian 
theory, in which the relationship of exploitation implies a polarised, two-class 
society. It is argued that the efforts to solve this puzzle usually involve notions of 
class based on the division of labour. The fundamental concepts of the original 
theory, such as reproduction, subsistence, exploitation and class are then re­
examined and reconstructed. The idea of profit as based on surplus labour is 
defended, securing the basis for the Marxian understanding of class. The 
Transformation Problem of moving from labour values to prices of production 
is discussed and while the force of the Sraffian critique is admitted, a new 
interpretation of the problem is suggested, making it possible to see the Sraffian 
schema as a generalisation of the Marxian one. Labour Theory of Value is 
analysed as a ‘dual theory of exploitation and price’ and it is argued that only the 
latter part is vulnerable to the criticisms advanced. The Sraffian schema is 
interpreted as a clear explication of the concept of exploitation, throwing into 
sharp relief the disjunction between exploitation-based and division-of-labour- 
based views of class. An integration of the two concepts is attempted by 
proposing a new, generalised notion termed ‘complexploitation’ (complex 
exploitation) flowing from what is claimed to be the essential idea behind the 
concept of exploitation: that one group of agents is more oppressed by the 
constraints of the so-called ‘Sphere of Necessity’, just so that another group may 
enjoy more of the fruits of the ‘Sphere of Freedom’. Finally it is suggested that 
the concept of complexploitation makes possible a more fine-grained class map 
of society than the original two-class model.
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Chapter I
Introduction  
The Legacy and the Crisis
There are many ways in which a society can be split into classes. We could 
divide people into categories on the basis of income and wealth, power and status 
in a hierarchy, the kind of work they do, their level of education, their cultural 
characteristics such as tastes and accents, etc.
The classic Marxian conception of classes is often characterised as being 
based on the relation to the means of production. The relation in question is 
one of ownership: society is divided into classes depending on who owns which 
productive resources. However, this is only half of the Marxian story. Although 
private property looms large in this picture of the world, it should be always 
borne in mind that it is not significant in itself. If ownership as such were all that 
mattered, the relevant class division would be simply into the rich and the poor. 
This is clearly not the fundamental Marxian description. Instead, ownership is 
bound up with exploitation — that is, the production and the appropriation of 
goods beyond the needs of the direct producers; in short, of the social surplus. 
The particular property relations in a given society help define the way in which 
exploitation occurs, and thus delineate the exploiting and the exploited class. 
Ownership is not an end in itself within the Marxian explanation; it is only the 
means for describing the process of exploitation. Thus, it is not just that there 
are rich and poor people; the rich can only remain rich because the poor remain 
poor.
From this fundamental relationship, other significant features are supposed 
to follow: the exploiting class is also the ruling class, using a putative expression 
of the general interest, the State, to cement the exploitative relationship; and it is 
also the ideologically dominant class, producing ideas to legitimise that 
relationship in the eyes of the exploited.
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The general conception stems from the particular description of capitalism 
that Marx bequeathed his followers: on the one hand, there was the wealthy, 
powerful, high-status bourgeoisie, owning the means of production necessary 
for the production of subsistence goods; on the other hand, there was the 
poverty-stricken, powerless, low-status proletariat, owning nothing but their 
labour-power and thus forced to perform surplus labour in order to get access 
to the means of production.
This two-class description is of course not the only one that is to be found 
in Marx’s writing. It is by now a staple of the Marxist discussions of class that 
Marx used the word ‘class’ with a wide variety of meanings, depending on the 
context.1 In particular, in the more journalistic pieces, the word seems to be 
applied to an enormous array of social actors. In the more abstract works, 
however, the description tends to be restricted to the two classes mentioned 
above. At the level of abstraction of Capital, capitalism is thus seen as polarised 
between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.
The usual way in which the abstract model has been linked to reality was in 
terms laid down by the Communist Manifesto, according to which society is “more 
and more splitting up into two great hostile camps” (Marx and Engels 1967, p. 
80). In other words, the claim was that as time progresses, various ‘intermediate 
strata’ will gradually disappear. These intermediate strata were more or less 
explicitly identified with the ‘petty bourgeoisie’, that is, small producers owning 
their means of production, with at most a small number of employees aside 
from the members of their own family.2
1 Cf. Roberts (1997), Cottrell (1984).
2 In passing, let me note that such unproblematic acceptance of the employment of 
family members without further comment on exploitative relations is quite revealing o f  
the blindness of much of traditional Marxism towards the relations within the 
household -  chiefly but not exclusively in terms of gender.
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Two Problems for Marxian Class Analysis
The trouble for this traditional Marxist picture was that reality refused to 
co-operate. The problem was not that the small business owners did not accept 
the invitation to completely disappear (although they did). This would be a 
minor difficulty that could be dealt with, just as long as there was at least a long­
term tendency towards decline. Even stagnation would do, provided such petty 
bourgeoisie did not constitute a significantly large stratum of the society.
What was far more important, and far more difficult to deal with, were two 
developments that can be summarised under the headings of ‘the separation of 
ownership from control" and ‘the embarrassment of the middle classes". By 
these phrases I intend two phenomena that constitute a challenge for the 
Marxian picture from ‘the top" and ‘the bottom" respectively, as it were. The 
former refers to the fact that individual agents appeared who seemed to possess 
pretty much every superficially significant feature of the capitalists save for the 
actual legal ownership of property. The latter refers to the converse fact that 
other agents appeared who seemed to be propertyless and selling their labour 
yet otherwise possessed very few superficially significant features in common 
with the proletariat.3
Thus, the separation of ownership from control means that the individual 
protagonist of the early capitalism no longer plays a significant role in today’s 
society. Such an early industrial capitalist magnate can be characterised as the 
ideal type embodying the financier, the entrepreneur, the manager and the 
supervisor all at once. These characteristics have come apart, chiefly if not 
exclusively with the advent of the joint stock company. It has been argued that 
Marx himself was very well aware of these effects of the coming form of
3 Obviously, the way I have characterised these two categories, there is a possibility of an 
overlap between them. At these stage, no more precise descriptions are offered, for 
this is exacdy part of the problem: just where does the boundary lie between the two 
strata that are at least perceptually significantly different?
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capitalist property.4 To some extent, this is indeed the case; there are interesting 
insights about such ‘abolition of the capitalist mode of production within the 
capitalist mode of production itself5. Nevertheless, the proper theorisation of 
the implications for the class structure has not been worked out by Marx. The 
dominant notion of classes in his work remained the one based on the early 
structure of clearly distinct individual owner-managers and purely subordinate 
workers, occasional discussions of supervisory labour notwithstanding. To this 
extent, the proponents of the ‘managerial revolution’ were quite correct: the 
development did constitute a problem for Marxism. How are we to theorise the 
social status and the political interests of actors who, while superficially non- 
owners, exhibit far too many signs of ‘being on the side of capital’? The 
problem is perhaps not insoluble, but it is nevertheless a challenge that requires 
a response.
However, this was still more of an anomaly for the Marxist theory rather 
than an immediate problem for practice. Even absent a proper theorisation, it is 
not so difficult to amalgamate the capitalist owners and the high-level managers 
in real-life struggles. Indeed, the revolutionary socialist rhetoric, still in evidence 
among the political sects, solved the problem by simply talking about ‘the 
workers and the bosses’, not bothering with theoretical niceties about the subtle 
differences in the standing of the various strata of the latter. After all, ‘if it walks 
like a duck, talks like a duck.. . ’
The embarrassment of the middle classes, however, was precisely a 
problem par excellence for practice, and only consequently also for Marxist theory. 
The trouble was presented by the appearance of whole swathes of nominal 
wage-earners who did not identify themselves with the working class, socially or 
politically (while at the same time not clearly belonging to the category of the 
‘bosses’ either). In terms of practice, the persistence of non-proletarian, non­
4 See e. g. Carchedi (1977).
5 Marx (1966, p. 438).
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capitalist strata inevitably had a major impact upon the strategies of nominally 
working-class political parties. The seemingly inexorable slide of the initially 
Marxist Social Democracy towards ‘revisionism’ was informed by the realisation 
that an explicitly ‘workerist’ orientation and programme simply was not going to 
deliver the electoral success that these parties craved.
Hence also the challenge for the Marxist theorists, as well as for the class- 
oriented political activists. While Marx was predicting a ‘movement of the 
immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority’6, there is not and 
never has been any such movement. At least a part of the explanation lies in the 
fact that not all who prima facie sell their labour seem to have or to have had 
sympathies for the socialist project. If a class-based political strategy were ever 
to avoid the pitfalls of the social-democratic road, how then should the problem 
of the ‘middle classes’ to be approached? How to conceptualise their existence? 
How to appeal to those wage-earners who explicitly or implicidy identify 
themselves as ‘middle class’? How should their alliances with the putative 
working class be built — indeed, should they be built? Etc. etc.
Over the years, there were many attempts to deal with the theoretical 
problem. Some theorists have claimed that the existence of the middle classes 
was in effect an ideological illusion, that these strata — at least a portion of them 
— constitute simply the ‘new working class’ of capitalism (Mallet 1975, Gorz 
1967). On the contrary, Poulantzas (1975a) famously argued that the 
problematic strata constituted a ‘new petty bourgeoisie’, forming just one 
fraction of the single petty bourgeois class. The more radical alternatives 
proposed that these strata represented a ‘new class’ or a ‘third class’; this claim 
had a wide spectrum of supporters, each with their own slant on this notion, 
from the anarchists (Bakunin 1990) through the theorists of ‘managerial’ or 
‘bureaucratic’ revolutions (Burnham 1942, Rizzi 1985) to the New Left theorists 
(Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 1979, Albert and Hahnel 1991a) and beyond (Eyal,
6 Marx and Engels (1967, p. 92).
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Szelenyi and Townsley, 1998). Finally, there is a theory associated with Wright, 
according to which the problematic groups are indeed ‘strata’ rather than classes 
in their own right, representing as they do ‘contradictory class locations’.
The Soviet Mode of Production and the Fate of Marxism
A question might be asked at this; stage, if not already at the beginning: 
What exactly is the point of all this? After all, Marxism is dead — 'as any fule 
kno'.
Before I attempt the answer, let me describe another problem with the 
Marxist theory, one which came from an unexpected direction. Despite much 
initial enthusiasm for the Russian Revolution, independent-minded Marxists 
both inside and outside of the USSR o r the Eastern Bloc gradually came to 
perceive the Soviet system very critically. Whatever else it was, it could hardly be 
claimed even by its defenders as that which Marx had in mind when he talked 
about Communism — regardless of wheither we mean the ‘higher’ or the ‘lower’ 
stage (commonly identified nowadays with Socialism and ‘full’ Communism 
respectively).
Of course, as many people have noticed, it would be hard to expect a 
historical phenomenon to follow the exact contours of any one person’s idea7— 
in fact, it would be downright bizarre. Nevertheless, as is well known, Marx did 
not actually prescribe any very definite shape for Communism—he is famous for 
poking fun at ‘writing recipes for cookbooks of the future’. His views on 
Communism are thus few and far between and can be considered as the least 
conditions that a society would have to  fulfil to qualify as Communist in the 
Marxian sense. We can relax these condlitions even further, if need be. All that is 
necessary is to note that Marx’s Comimunism is a society where ‘associated
7 This is the argument used by Cockshott 6c Cottrell (1993) against the view of those 
left-wing critics who charge that the Soviert system was not socialist. Bahro (1978) 
similarly disagrees with ‘idealist’ critics of “actually existing socialism’, but derives a 
different conclusion: this kind of criticismi is correct as far as it goes, but is not a helpful 
guide to any politicalpractice.
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producers 'jointly decide on the future shape of production and life in general. 
Only a committed apologist for the Soviet system could through some 
tortuously sophist arguments come to a conclusion that this was true about the 
Soviet system.
Instead of a society of equality (subject only to differences in natural 
talents)8, true democracy, with every one producer’s voice being heard, and a 
true community where people have each others’ interests at heart, the Soviet 
system was characterized by domination, alienation and hierarchies of of 
privilege.9 The question is, can those characteristics be explained by reference to 
class? Is such an explanation illuminating in any way? And in particular, does it 
help to identify any ‘contradictions’ or ‘laws of motion of the Soviet system?
Now, there is no doubt that the collapse of what we now perhaps should 
call ‘historically existing socialism’ had an incredibly deep impact on the stature 
of Marxism — hence the question at the beginning of this section. It can be 
argued that this is deserved. After all, regardless of the fact that the official 
Communist interpretation of Marx was by no means the only one, and that 
there were more than enough Marxist critics of this type of regime — at the end 
of the day, if the test of a theory is social practice, then the Communist parties 
had a very strong claim to represent Marxism. For after all, they had achieved 
and kept power, while the dissident Marxists of all sort were being repeatedly 
defeated on both sides of the Iron Curtain. It is no use complaining that history 
did not conform to the wishes of those believing in a less authoritarian type of 
Marxism.
8 This is a reference to the slogan ‘to each according to their work’, meant to apply to 
the lower stage of Communism, which implies that the outcomes of the differences in 
natural endowments are not to be taxed away but kept by the individuals in question.
9 This is not an exhaustive description. On the one hand there were enormous crimes 
committed by the system; on the other hand,pace right-wing critics, there were genuine 
gains in the Soviet system. To say this is not to become an uncritical advocate. 
Capitalism brought genuine gains over what was offered in feudalism, as Marx was first 
to admit. That did not turn him into an advocate of capitalism, nor did it turn 
capitalism into a classless or a ‘good’ society.
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So perhaps there are good reasons why the defeat should have a deeply 
depressing effect on Marxists and socialists. However, even if these reasons are 
good, bad conclusions are often deduced from them. In particular, it is very 
easy to just dismiss the entire structure wholesale, to completely give up on the 
transformatory project.
This strikes me as an enormous waste. Granted, the collapse of the 
political-economic system may have exposed the bankruptcy of the thought 
system, too; but this in itself tells us nothing about which and how many parts 
of it were faulty. We do not need to throw away each and every individual nut 
and bolt. Instead, surely careful work is required to sort the wheat from the 
chaff.10
There is a difference between the spirit, the motivation, the general outlook 
on the one hand, and the particular theoretical structure on the other. The 
collapse of that structure undoubtedly does have a strong impact also on the 
spirit, but in the long run, the two can be disentangled. It seems to me that it is 
necessary to sort through the wreckage, discard what is rotten and broken, but 
collect the still-usable parts — and move on.
Hence the subtitle of this thesis, a post-Marxian exploration. I want to see 
how much mileage there still is in the Marxian concepts, to push them as far as 
they can possibly go — but no further. That is, no loyalty to the overarching 
theory nor to the particular writings should be expected. Hence the ‘post- 
Marxian’ nature of the project (even if the adjective is here used for the last 
time.) What I do find inspiring and what I am most impressed by is the general 
theory of reproduction, which seems to me to be the rational kernel of 
Marxism, and that will be the focus of the investigation.
Of course, re-examining the Marxist theory is a much, much larger project 
than can be contained in one thesis, or accomplished by one person. However, 
the question of class seems to me to be a suitable way in, not least because it is
10 Apologies for the mixing of metaphors.
15
Class, Surplus, and the Division of Labour (I)
politically urgent. What is class? Given the dissolution of the socialist working- 
class movement as it historically existed, is there any way in which class-based 
politics is still possible? And, although I will not touch upon the question of the 
nature of the Soviet system directly, I do hope that the result of the 
investigation might lead also to some clues for understanding its class 
composition. After all, if the historical obstacles that forced the liberatory 
energy into a dead end of a bureaucratic dictatorship are to be avoided in the 
future, such understanding is crucial.
Exploitation and the Labour Theory of Value
Yet another problem for Marx’s class theory has come to a head already 
quite a long time ago. The mature Marx based his understanding of classes in 
capitalism on the concept of exploitation. To summarise it briefly, the Marxian 
working class is a class of direct producers that, deprived of the necessary 
means of production, is forced to sell its labour-power to the capitalists in order 
to earn a living. The capitalists squeeze as much profit out of the working class 
as possible by means of paying only subsistence wages — wages which just allow 
the workers to reproduce themselves, i. e. to renew, ‘feed’ their labour-power so 
that they are as productive tomorrow as they were today.
The exploitation of the working class results from the fact that while it 
receives (under conditions of ‘equal exchange’, i. e. unrestrained competition) 
the exact equivalent for its labour-power — that is, the exact amount that is 
needed to reproduce it — it hands over to the capitalists not this labour-power, 
which is an intangible thing — a productive ability; but rather its labour,; which 
happens to be greater than that embodied in the goods received for labour- 
power.
Now if the problems mentioned above are to be resolved successfully, it 
had better be the case that this understanding of the fundamental class 
relationship of capitalism is in fact a solid enough foundation for the purpose.
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Yet, this foundation, usually termed ‘the Labour Theory of Value’, had suffered 
many an attack over the years — in fact, it was called ‘thoroughly over­
demolished’ already more than thirty years ago (Lerner 1972, p. 50).
This means that before even attempting to deal with the problems newly 
arisen, it is necessary also in this area to go back and thoroughly examine how 
much of the Marxian approach can actually be preserved, what needs to go, and 
what it should be replaced with.
In particular, since many of the critiques of the Labour Theory of Value 
were based on the development of so-called Sraffian economics, I will try to 
explore the issues at stake through Sraffian eyes. Aside from anti-Marxist 
Sraffians, there have actually been also pro-Sraffian Marxists, and it will be my 
contention that the analysis of the relationship between the two theories yields a 
less strictly contradictory results than is often thought. Although I cannot claim 
to have provided a new ‘solution’ to the so-called Transformation Problem, 
which was the fundamental starting point of many of the critiques, it turns out 
that such a solution is far less important than the very interpretation of the 
problem. For my analysis leads to a conclusion that rather than a rejection, the 
Sraffian system can be understood as a generalisation of the Marxian approach to 
political economy.
Sraffian Foundation
Indeed, I consider the work of Piero Sraffa, and input-output economics 
more generally, a very good foundation for consideration of many of the 
questions to which the traditional theory could not provide answers for the 
simple reason that the questions have not even been posed.
A somewhat technical description of the Sraffian approach will come later 
on, but since I will be referring to some concepts of this approach almost from 
the start, I would like to just very briefly describe how the basic schema of this 
theory works.
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The economy is here considered as undergoing cycles of production, 
during which inputs described on the one side of the schema of production are 
transformed into outputs on the other side. The crucial assumption made is that 
the amount of outputs must at least match the amount of inputs — if this were 
not so, the economy could not reproduce, or in other words repeat the cycle, 
since it would lack the requisite materials.
A simple example, taken from Piero Sraffa’s Production f  Commodities by 
Means f  Commodities (1960) and involving three sorts of inputs — wheat, iron, 
and pigs — and three production processes looks like this:
240 qr. wheat + 12 t. iron + 1 8  pigs = >  450 qr. wheat 
90 qr. wheat + 6 t. iron + 1 2  pigs = >  21 t. iron 
120 qr. wheat + 3 t. iron + 30 pigs = > 6 0  pigs
As can be easily verified, this is an example of the so-called subsistence 
economy, in which the amount of outputs produced exactly matches the required 
amounts of inputs. The more important sort of economy, however, is one which 
produces a surplus over the needs of production — augmenting the schema above, 
we might thus perhaps see something like the following:
240 qr. wheat + 12 t. iron + 1 8  pigs = >  600 qr. wheat 
90 qr. wheat + 6 t. iron + 1 2  pigs =>  36 t. iron 
120 qr. wheat + 3 t. iron + 30 pigs = > 8 0  pigs
Here, the economy produces a surplus of 150 qr. of wheat, 151. of iron and 
20 pigs. In capitalism, such a surplus takes the form of profit. This sort of 
economy will be described in more detail later; for the moment I would just like 
to make sure that the reader has an idea of what is meant by the term ‘Sraffian 
schema’, which I shall be using in the following chapters.
18
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The Plan and the Goal of the Thesis
I am going to proceed in the following way: the first part will be devoted to 
the views on the issues of class, division of labour and exploitation that have 
been advanced in the past. The first chapter will consider the various solutions 
suggested in the literature to the problem of non-capitalist, non-proletarian strata 
within capitalism, while the second chapter will critically examine the work of 
John Roemer on the notion of exploitation. The second part will then consist of 
a single chapter attempting to provide my own re-examination and 
reconstruction of the various basic concepts of the Marxian approach to classes.
In the third part, I will turn my attention to the problem of defence of 
Marxian theory of exploitation. I will try to show that without some sort of 
concept of surplus labour, there is no good explanation for the existence of profit 
in the capitalist economy. The rest of this part of the thesis will be devoted to the 
discussion of the genuine problems within Marxian economics that lead to the 
abandonment of the Labour Theory of Value in its commonly received form, 
while at the same time demonstrating that a sufficiently clear concept of 
exploitation is not threatened by this. Essentially, I will try to show that the 
Marxian theory consists of an intricate mixture of a theory of exploitation and an 
independent theory of the prices of production, and that while there are good 
grounds for abandoning the latter, this does not touch upon the value of the 
former.
Finally, in the fourth part of the thesis, I will attempt to integrate 
exploitation and those features of the division of labour that produce class-like 
effects under a unifying concept, which I call ‘complex exploitation’ (or 
‘complexploitation’ for short), and which in my view makes it possible to talk 
about classes within modern capitalist formation in a way rooted in Marxian 
thinking, while at the same time not falling into the trap of the two-class model.
My aim in the thesis is not to arrive at a precise description of the class 
composition of a particular mode of production or social formation, not to
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mention a particular society. Rather, I am trying to construct a set of conceptual 
tools which then can be used for such detailed analysis, both theoretical and 
empirical, which remains true to its Marxian origins and at the same times fits 
the intuitive idea of class that does, in my opinion, exist in people’s minds.
In other words, what I am attempting to do is to provide a certain sort of 
‘grammar of classes’. Let me explain. One of the basic tenets of linguistics is 
that when people learn to speak their native tongues, they go on speaking them 
for the most part without making any mistakes despite the fact that they have 
been taught no explicit rules of the language, and may never learn even of their 
existence. It is the task of the grammarian to try to observe the natural speech 
and then to abstract these rules from it. These rules might then well turn out to 
be quite surprising for the very native speakers of the language.
Similarly, I believe that people in their everyday lives have quite a good 
conception of class, in the sense that they tacitly ‘know’ to which class they 
belong, as well as which classes other people fall into. However, they would find 
it quite difficult to explicitly state the rules that govern such categorisation — the 
attempt would mostly be in terms of observable characteristics, which clearly do 
function as signifiers of class, but are not identical with the signified notion 
itself.
My project is to try to uncover the ‘hidden’ rules that govern these 
characterisations, such that while these rules themselves may well appear 
unintuitive and complicated, the categorisation they provide stays as close to the 
everyday conversation as possible. At the same time, these rules should help 
with the actual analysis of classes in the same way that explicit grammar rules 
can be used for analysing actual speech.
Ultimately, of course, I hope to contribute in at least a minor way to that 
current of history which, despite the failure of one grand attempt, will 
nevertheless perhaps one day lead to an overcoming of the division into classes, 
making it possible for the first time to fully appreciate that which despite and
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across the class boundaries and barriers we glimpse uncertainly in a myriad ways 
even today: that great sense of shared belonging, our common humanity.
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Chapter II
It’s N o t W hat You H ave, It’s W hat You D o  
Return of the Division-of-Labour 
View of Class
The alternative solutions to the problem of non-capitalist and at the same 
time non-proletarian class-like actors will be discussed in detail shordy. Before I 
do this, however, I would like to consider in more abstract terms why the 
theoretical problem arises at all.
Modes of Production, Exploitation, and Polarisation
As I have mentioned, the challenge to the simple two-class, polarised 
picture of the capitalist society arises because historically additional actors apart 
from the bourgeoisie and the proletariat seem to be present on the scene. But 
why was this such a problem for the Marxian theory? After all, an alternative 
stratification theory would not have nearly such difficult time with adding more 
social actors as conditions required. What is it about the Marxist picture that 
caused it such trouble?
The reason, of course, lies in the very different ways in which Marxism and 
the alternative theories conceptualise class itself. For the Marxists, class is 
fundamentally a relational phenomenon; groups of people are thought to be 
systematically tied together and yet at the same time are systematically in 
conflict.1 Actually, the relationship is even more specific: it is the relation of 
exploitation. To spell this out in full, classes arise when in a society, one group 
of people performs not only necessary labour to secure their own means of 
subsistence, but also, involuntarily, surplus labour to provide the means of 
subsistence and luxury to another group.2
1 See e. g. Poulanteas (1975a), Wright (1985).
2 This further specification is necessary, because there can be many types of systematic 
conflict in society, such as between authority groups. Indeed, Dahrendorf (1959)
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The relation of exploitation is intimately tied with the notion of the mode <f 
production. A widely shared understanding among various kinds of Marxists is 
that the mode of production is fundamentally characterised by the way in which 
the exploiting classes force surplus labour out of the exploited classes. It is also 
commonly seen as the highest level o f abstraction in the Marxist thinking on 
society (another two levels are the social formation, consisting of the various 
modes of production that may coexist at any one time in the society, and 
conjuncture, corresponding to an actual society at a particular point in history, 
whose shape is determined aside from the modes of production also by the 
various concrete historical events).3
Now, if we do accept that the mode of production really is characterised 
by a particular mode of exploitation, and if we do believe that the mode of 
production does represent the most fundamental description of the society, 
then the problem of ‘middle classes’ comes into a sharp relief. For we can see 
that Marx’s most abstract picture of the capitalist society as polarised between 
labour and capital is not accidental. If classes are the result of the mutually 
antagonistic, systematically conflictual relationship based on exploitation, then 
the society as described by the mode of production will always appear polarised. 
For exploitation is a two-place relation: there are the exploited and the 
exploiters. These are the two poles. Unless we can specify a way in which three 
or more classes could somehow be involved in the exploitative relationship, the 
mode of production level of abstraction will always produce such a polarised 
picture, quite regardless of the type of society we are talking about.
Of course, it may be suggested that there is room for the existence of the 
third class, aside from the exploiters and the exploited — namely those who 
neither exploit others nor are themselves exploited. However, if such a group is 
to constitute a class, that is, if its existence is to be jystematic rather than just
explicitly identified such groups with classes. What is specifically Marxist about the 
Marxist class theory is that it is tied to the materialist conception of history, whereby 
the fundamental features of the society are determined by the productive relationships.
3 The distinctions as found in Poulantzas (1975a).
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contingent, then by definition of the mode of production it must be that it 
comes from outside of the particular mode of production being described. For 
once we have accepted that the mode of production is characterised precisely by 
the mode of exploitation, of the expropriation of surplus labour, anybody who 
does not fall in either the category of the exploiter or the exploited must 
necessarily fall outside. In other words, we are no longer on the terrain of the 
modes-of-production; we have shifted one level down, to the social formation, 
which is a mix of various modes of production. Indeed, as regards the social 
formation of capitalism, Marxism does recognise just such a class of neither- 
exploiters-nor-exploited in the form of petty bourgeoisie, which is the relic of 
an older, surviving MoP — Simple Commodity Production.4
The problem, however, is precisely the existence of new ‘middle class’, 
which does not correspond to the old petty bourgeoisie. These people do not 
belong to any other mode of production than the capitalist one — this holds at 
least prima facie and at least for a significant proportion of them. Namely, for 
those members of the middle classes who are not significant owners of property 
and function on the basis of the wage contract inside the capitalist firms.
This is the real reason why the problem of the ‘new middle classes’ is such 
an enormously deep challenge for Marxist theorists. If they are to remain true to 
their theoretical heritage, they must insist that society is fundamentally 
characterised by the way in which surplus labour is squeezed out of the 
exploited class. Hence they must believe that the most fundamental description 
of the society, in terms of its mode of production, can only contain the two 
polarised classes, the exploiters and the exploited. Yet, if they are to remain true 
to the empirical reality, they must recognise that in terms of both self­
4 Actually, even this description is not completely consistent, because Simple
Commodity Production is not characterised by any type of exploitation. If that mode 
could exist on its own, with everybody owning their own means of production and 
trading their product in the market, we would have a seriously disturbing situation of a 
non-exploitative — and hence classless — market society. Well, disturbing from the 
Marxist point of view; this picture of literally ‘everybody being middle class’ is probably 
not far from the basic neoclassical vision of benign market society.
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identification and identification by others, there are middle classes which are an 
absolutely integral part of the real-world capitalism.
I am trying to pose this dilemma as sharply as possible, to make clear just 
what is at stake in trying to account in theoretical terms for the existence of the 
middle classes. For if we pose the problem in these abstract terms, we see at 
once that the most obvious solution is at the same time the least satisfactory. If 
we go the whole hog to defend the theoretical picture, we have to adopt the 
attitude that if the reality does not correspond to it, so much the worse for 
reality. This is the ‘ideological illusion’ approach, which proclaims that the 
mode-of-production picture of two polarised classes is the actual reality, with 
the ‘middle classes’ really being just a confused part of the working class.
Few theorists nowadays would be willing to disregard empirical experience 
to quite this extent. But if we do not do that, we are willy-nilly driven to tinker 
with the very basics of the Marxian model of the mode of production, and 
hence of the basis of the theory of history. The precise details in which this is 
done may vary. However, let no-one doubt that what is at stake is the very 
foundation of the Marxian theory.
Essentially, there are two approaches that can be adopted, if we are not 
willing to accept the dogmatic, ‘ideological illusion’ solution.
On the one hand, we could say that the existence of additional classes 
within the real life capitalism is the effect of the presence of other modes of 
production in the capitalist social formation. The idea is that a social formation 
is not just a mechanical combination of these various MoPs, simply stuck 
together like pieces of Lego, but that the confluence of these MoPs is 
something like a chemical mixture, where the very substance of the individually 
pure elements is affected by the presence of the others. This goes well with the 
anti-mechanical spirit of the Marxist mode of reasoning. I will refer to this as 
the many-modes-of-production solution.
On the other hand, we could try to further analyse the abstract pure mode 
of production itself, and come up with some additional features that ought to be
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relevant for differentiating the wage-earners into classes. This approach has 
sometimes taken the form of the analysis of the concept of ownership. In other 
cases, the analysis is functional. Sometimes it focuses on the question of 
distribution. However, I am going to argue that most of the time, all of these 
lines of thought reduce to the same basic approach: namely, the approach based 
on the division of labour. Accordingly, I will refer to such attempts as the 
division-of-labour solutions.
Marx and the Division of Labour
The originator of the division of labour approach is none other than Marx 
himself, even though this approach served quite a different purpose at the time. 
The young Marx did not yet hit upon the notion of exploitation; his early 
writings, some together with Engels — The German Ideology, Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, The Communist Manifesto — do not yet contain 
either the term or the notion of exploitation. It is quite clear that in these works, 
Marx had not yet arrived at the conception of surplus labour. Instead, the 
existence of classes is derived from the evolution of an increasingly complex 
division of labour.
This process is particularly well described in The German Ideology. Here, 
individual classes ‘split o ff  from the previously existing ones as productive 
technology develops, as it allows for and calls for increasing specialisation. 
Thus, ‘town’ splits away from the ‘countryside' — meaning that industrial- 
commercial activities split away from agricultural production, creating a class of 
peasants and a class of burghers; trade splits away from industrial production, 
creating a class of merchants and a class of artisans; and finally perhaps 
stockholding splits away from artisanship, creating a class of capitalists and a 
class of modern proletarians (Marx and Engels 1965, pp. 64-77).
Thus, there is here no notion that classes should be defined relationally, as 
complementary and at the same time mutually antagonistic camps. There is, of 
course, clear awareness of conflict and struggle, with the peasants in the
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countryside being oppressed by the feudal landlords, and with the proletarians 
struggling against the capitalists. In The German Ideology, this struggle is not yet 
understood as the driving force of history, as it becomes in the Communist 
Manifesto — in the sense that the evolution of the division of labour proceeds 
secularly, independendy of such struggles.5 However, even for the Communist 
Manifesto it remains true that the conflict is not yet based on the notion of 
exploitation and owes more to the Hegelian master-slave dialectic.
Rattansi (1982) argues that in The German Ideology, Marx conflates ‘class’ 
with the ‘division of labour’, and that it is only in his mature writings that he 
comes to distinguish between the two. But as I have just argued, it is more 
precise to say that in that work, Marx sees class as a consequence of the division of 
labour; and he understands it this way because he had not yet arrived at the 
conception of surplus labour and exploitation. The burden of the class division 
is seen in The German Ideology as following from the fact of a ‘natural’ division of 
labour, rather than a ‘voluntary’ one. The term ‘natural division of labour’ 
means that rather than the distribution of production tasks being determined 
consciously and rationally, it develops in a haphazard, inequitable way, without 
any regard for the consequences for the individuals who carry them out. This 
idea is broadly in line with the materialist conception of history, according to 
which the material technologies of production of the means of subsistence 
determine the basic outlines of the society. The realm of necessity will only 
finally be escaped when the society gains the power to govern itself consciously 
and rationally, thus arriving at an agreed-upon — ‘voluntary’ — division of labour. 
This will then allow us “to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt 
in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after
5 A somewhat tenuous unity of the two elements -  class struggle and the development 
of productive technology — is finally achieved in the famous 1859 ‘Preface to A  
Contribution to the Critique <f Political Economy’ (Marx 1951). We could read the preface as 
suggesting that class struggle, which develops according to its own dynamic, plays a 
decisive role at the moment of ‘social revolution’, where the old relations of 
production — which are necessarily social relations — no longer allow for the 
development of the forces of production.
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dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, 
herdsman or critic” (Marx and Engels 1965, pp. 44-45)
This quote is quite unfortunate, as it allows a vast scope for 
misinterpretation (Rattansi being a case in point). However, in the light of what 
has just been said, it should be clear that Marx is not talking about switching 
activities at a whim. Such an interpretation is quite silly, and we have 
independent grounds to believe that Marx was not a silly thinker. Thus, it makes 
sense to think that what he is trying to say here is that while the ‘natural’ 
division of labour condemns a person through an impersonal and 
uncompromising mechanism to a single occupation, perhaps for a lifetime, a 
conscious agreement of the producers and a conscious shaping of the 
productive abilities allows for a variety of productive tasks, without the 
individual being yoked to any of them. This does not imply that people can 
simply drop whatever they are doing at any moment and run away to do 
something else; it does imply that in the process of agreeing on the tasks to be 
performed, they can express their preferences and these will be properly taken 
into account.
In The German Ideology, Marx also makes the claim that the division between 
mental and manual labour is the first real division of labour: “Division of labour 
only becomes truly such from the moment when a division of material and 
mental labour appears. (The first form of ideologists, priests, is concurrent.)” 
(Marx and Engels 1965, p. 43). In line with his hypothesis that classes are a 
consequence of the ‘natural’ division of labour, this would seem to imply that 
the first class division occurs between the ‘mental workers’ and the ‘manual 
workers’; and indeed such a conclusion has been drawn, as we shall see later.
In the context of the division of labour, it is interesting to note Marx’s 
discussion of the ‘work of control and surveillance’ in Capital.
Marx makes two distinct points. First, he claims that capitalist profit 
cannot be explained by the wages of supervision and management — the 
(notional) existence of which he does not deny — since when there is an actual
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employee of the capitalist performing this work, their wages are comparatively 
low; they certainly do not exhaust the profit of the enterprise.6
Marx’s second claim is more interesting from the present point of view. He 
argues that although co-ordination and organisation are necessary in any society 
with an advanced division of labour, the particular form this takes under 
capitalism is not necessary. There are two possible meanings that could be 
attached to this claim; it is not entirely clear which if any Marx would have 
preferred. In the first place, we could understand it to mean that while co­
ordination is always necessary in a complex society, production itself might have 
different aims, in terms of its purpose, i. e. of what is actually being produced. 
Thus, to organise production with a view to achieving profit, as under 
capitalism, is qualitatively different from organising it to supply the human 
needs, as ought to have been the case under Marx’s Communism.
The second understanding of the claim is broader. It is not only the aim of 
production which is different under the different modes of production; the very 
structure of co-ordination must look differently if we expect labour to become a real 
human need. Under such understanding, it is the authoritarian aspect of co­
ordination under capitalism that must be eliminated, with production being 
organised along democratic, autonomy-enhancing lines. There are of course 
significant strands of ‘autonomist’, ‘workerist’ Marxism that endorse and 
develop precisely this view. We shall try to support this view by an argument 
from the general notion of reproduction.
But although I have argued that conflating mental labour with domination 
and manual labour with subordination is wrong, there is of course a sense in 
which both are the result of the division of labour, or at least a division of 
activity generally speaking. Since co-ordination of productive activities is a
6 This may seem somewhat less valid today, given what we know about the extremely 
large remuneration packages of the top executives of big corporations. However, this 
phenomenon is largely due to existence of very significant rents accruing to these 
positions, as will be argued below; besides, the point stands that the profits of the 
enterprise are far from being exhausted by the managers’ pay.
30
Class, Surplus, and the Division of Labour (II)
requirement for any complex society, and authoritarian direction is one form of 
such co-ordination, we can easily see the division between the dominating and 
the subordinated group as a result of the division of labour. This is true even if 
the dominating group, thanks to its elevated standing, takes on all sorts of 
activities that actually have nothing to do with production per se — such as 
hunting, poetry, wars etc.
What conclusions can we draw from the discussion so far? As we have 
seen, before Marx arrived at the canonical understanding of class as based on 
exploitation, he was conceptualising class as being based on the division of 
labour. My first main claim is that the move from division of labour to 
exploitation has never really been completely satisfactory. The tension between 
the two concepts has never really been overcome. As we shall see, to produce a 
richer picture of the capitalist mode of production, many theorists of classes 
consciously or unconsciously grapple back towards the division-of-labour 
concept of class, sometimes to use it as a complementary element, sometimes to 
completely supplant exploitation as the basis for the distinction between classes. 
By this I do not mean to suggest that they are pursuing any sort of ‘return to 
(young) Marx'. Rather, I see this as a reflection of the fact that there simply is 
something to the division of labour which has produces class-like features — and 
that these theorists, independently of — but similarly to — the Marx of The German 
Ideology, are trying to somehow deal with this fact.
Poulantzas: Ownership Versus the Division of Labour
For every theory that refuses to proceed to identify the whole wage-earning 
class with the proletariat, there are two fundamental problems.
The first one is that of identification: just who are the ‘middle classes'? What is 
their proper theoretical status? On the other hand, there is also the problem of 
demarcation. This refers to the question of boundaries within the grouping of the 
wage-earners. Given that the problematic ‘bosses' and ‘middle classes' are
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precisely those who belong to the wage-earning stratum, just where do the 
dividing lines between them and the working class lie?
O f course, if the identification of the non-proletarian wage-earners is 
achieved constructively, that is, by positively identifying the characteristics which 
divide them from the workers, then in effect both problems have been solved at 
once. It may be thought that this is in fact what we should expect from a 
successful Marxian theory of the ‘middle classes’. And yet, as we shall see, the 
work of Nicos Poulantzas, which has become a basic reference point in the 
debate on classes, is characterised by the fact that it approaches the two 
questions as separate issues.
Poulantzas* Dogmatic Motivation
Poulantzas uses quite a few theoretical innovations in order to accomplish 
his project. He distinguishes ‘economic ownership’ and ‘possession’; introduces 
‘ideological and political’ criteria to the determination of class status, and assigns 
a new interpretation to the traditional distinctions between ‘productive’ and 
‘unproductive’ labour, as well as ‘mental’ and ‘manual’ labour.
But for all these innovations7, the motivation for employing them is fairly 
straightforwardly a dogmatic one. Plus fa change, plus c'est la meme chose. In my 
opinion, the key to Poulantzas’ approach appears in the following quotation 
from his article ‘On Social Classes’ (Poulantzas 1973, p. 38): “Unless we 
consider that the capitalist mode of production has been superseded and that 
we are now in some kind of ‘post-industrial’ or ‘technocratic’ society which 
produces this new class, how can we maintain that capitalism itself produces a 
new class in the course of its development?” Obviously, the implied suggestion is 
that capitalism cannotpiodxszz such a new class. But if that is so, then the classes 
we are left with are at most those of the capitalist social formation — 
bourgeoisie, proletariat, and petty bourgeoisie.
7 For the most part, Poulantzas would deny that they are innovations, claiming that he 
was preceded by the classics of Marxism.
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Thus, the aim of Poulantzas’ theoretical enterprise is to show that despite 
all appearances to the contrary, the basic three-class Marxist model is essentially 
correct. O f course, once this theoretical choice is made, one is bound to try to 
reduce the wage-earning ‘middle classes’ to one of the ‘classical’ classes of 
Marxism. In other words, Poulantzas embarks on the solution to the 
identification problem first and independently of the demarcation.
Identifying the ‘middle classes’ with the proletariat amounts to the 
‘ideological illusion’ solution; this option Poulantzas rejects. Similarly, 
identification with the bourgeoisie would not do, since there is another 
candidate for this, namely the other problematic category of ‘the bosses’ -  and 
these are thought to be distinct from the middle classes proper. This leaves just 
one alternative: to amalgamate the wage-earning ‘middle classes’ with the petty 
bourgeoisie, giving rise to the expression Poulantzas is so well-known for, ‘the 
new petty bourgeoisie’.
Hence, it becomes imperative that the professionals, experts, teachers, 
bureaucrats, managers etc. be reduced to petty bourgeoisie, regardless of any 
possible divergences between the original class of this name and the variegated 
group to be reduced. The fundamental truth of the traditional Marxist viewpoint 
is taken as a given; it is all a matter of beating recalcitrant reality into shape so 
that it conforms to this viewpoint.
Of course, even if the motivation behind Poulantzas’ approach is 
essentially dogmatic, to state this cannot count as a critique of his theory. The 
reasons he gives for considering the wage-earning ‘middle classes’ a part of the 
petty bourgeoisie, and ‘the bosses’ as part of the bourgeoisie need to be 
considered in their own right, regardless of the motivation behind them.
To separate the two groups above from the working class, Poulantzas uses 
two different strategies. ‘The bosses’ are identified with the bourgeoisie through 
an analysis that, despite rhetorical asides, occurs essentially on the economic 
plane. O n the other hand, in the discussion of the ‘middle classes’, Poulantzas 
postulates that aside from the economic considerations, it is also the ideological
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and the political characteristics that are essential for the determination of class 
status. I will now take these two strategies in turn.
Ownership and the Division of Labour
In the first place, Poulantzas distinguishes the purely ‘legal’ ownership 
from the real ownership relation, ‘economic ownership’. This refers to “real 
economic control of the means of production, i. e. the power to assign the 
means of production to given uses and so to dispose of the products obtained”. 
On the other hand, he also points to a second ‘relation of production’ aside from 
the ownership, termed ‘possession’, which refers to “the capacity to put the 
means of production into operation”.
This analysis serves Poulantzas to describe that stratum of wage-earners 
which, despite appearances, belongs to the bourgeoisie. This corresponds to 
those agents who regardless of the legal ownership relations relate to the means 
of production in terms of economic ownership, possession, or both.
This is an important point in our discussion. Similarly to Poulantzas, other 
theorists also focused on the analysis of ownership as an important route 
towards a solution of the problem of non-proletarian wage-earners. I want to 
make two related claims. On the one hand, I believe that what is really intended 
by these theorists is the issue of the division of labour rather than of ownership. 
On other hand, it seems to me that the analysis of ownership is a dead-end, 
because it mistakes the property relations for the distinguishing characteristic of 
classes, whereas in reality these relations are just a formal expression of the 
underlying exploitation dynamic.
We can start by noting that for the early Marx, the division of labour and 
the private property were in some sense equivalent concepts, nothing but two 
aspects of the same phenomenon.8 We can interpret this, roughly, as saying that
8 “With the division of labour, in which all these contradictions are implicit, and which 
in its turn is based on the natural division o f labour in the family and the separation of 
society into individual families opposed to one another, is given simultaneously the 
distribution, and indeed the unequal distribution, both quantitative and qualitative, of
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just like the division of labour means an increasing differentiation in activities 
undertaken by different individuals, so the development of private property 
means an increasing differentiation in the distribution of products of these 
activities.
However, although the insight may be valuable, it is clearly not enough to 
sustain our interpretation. Instead, in sharp contrast to Poulantzas and several 
other theorists, I would like to argue that in a sense, there is no ownership other 
than legal ownership. Controversial as this may seem, it will be true as long as 
we adopt a sufficiently broad understanding of ‘law’. Nothing much hangs on 
this polemical formulation, as will become clear; but it is instructive to consider 
the question in its light. What really is the matter is the distinction between 
rights, formally legal or otherwise, and regular occurrences.
Rights are the stuff of which ownership is made. Recognised rights, that is. 
Perhaps the recognition is already necessarily involved in the term ‘right’, or 
perhaps not. No harm is done in emphasising that ownership means not only 
the option of exercising some powers, but some sort of legitimacy in exercising 
them.
Now, I have claimed that legal ownership is really the only sort of 
ownership there is. This bold claim requires some justification. This justification 
lies in the particular interpretation of the term ‘legal’. Under this interpretation, 
what is legal is not simply a matter o f what is written in the legal codexes of 
particular nation-states. Instead, any action is legal which is recognised, perhaps 
enforceably, by some wider community. To adopt this interpretation is to take 
into account that written law enforced by the repressive forces of the modern 
state is a comparatively sophisticated development. Historically the far more
labour and its products, hence property: the nucleus, the first form, of which lies in the 
family, where wife and children are the slaves of the husband. This latent slavery in the 
family, though still very crude, is the first property, but even at this early stage it 
corresponds perfecdy to the definition of modern economists who call it the power of 
disposing of the labour-power of others. Division cf labour and private property are, moreover, 
identical expressions: in the one the same thing is affirmed with reference to activity as is affirmed in 
the other with reference to the product of the activity.” (Marx and Engels 1965, p. 44 — emphasis 
added)
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important notion is the one explicated here, which coincides with the ‘law of 
custom* (still theoretically the basis of law even in a modern state such as the 
UK). Thus, as long as there is common knowledge and acknowledgment of 
certain rights, these rights can be understood as legitimate and legal, even if that 
understanding is just a tacit one.
Thus, ownership is a matter of such recognised rights. In particular, we can 
analyse the concept into the following:9
1. Utilisation:
2.Exclusion: 
Appropriation:
4 Alienation:
S.Destruction:
6 Final Authority:
Right to handle an item
Right to prevent others from handling an item 
Right to keep the income derived from an item 
Right to give up the item temporarily or permanently.10 
Right to destroy an item
Right to decide over the item in any circumstances not
covered by other recognised rights.
Doubdess other rights could be found in particular circumstances. 
Conversely, not all of these rights belong to an owner of an item always and 
everywhere; ownership consists of some combination of rights such as these, 
but that combination may well be more limited than the above.
Now, when Poulantzas (and others) tries to distinguish ‘legal* ownership 
from other, more ‘real* kinds, all that can be accomplished by such a procedure 
is to point to a distinction between the written law and the prevailing ‘law of 
custom*. Since ownership is a matter of rights, it would be to say that while the 
person X  has the right to perform some action bound up with ownership, in 
actual reality it is the person Y  who (also) has the right to that action, since this 
is recognised by some relevant community.
9 Cottrell (1984) criticises Poulantzas for using a too rough-grained distinction and 
quotes an analysis, similar to the present one, found in Holesovsky (1977), into custody 
rights, usufruct rights, alienation and destruction.
10 This is meant to include lease, exchange, donation, discarding the item, etc.
36
Class, Surplus, and the Division f  Labour (II)
Now this may be true. Indeed, it probably is. But it leaves completely 
untouched the point that is really significant for determining the class status of 
various actors.
Ownership concerns only what may be done, what is acceptable for the 
community that constitutes the universe of action. Yet, it is the division of labour 
that covers what in fact is done. It is one thing to say that somebody is, as a 
matter of right allowed to perform an action, and quite another to say that they as 
a matter of routine do perform it. A recognised power to wantonly destroy an 
item may be a legitimate part of the ownership rights relating to it, for example, 
but it is hardly something that is performed as a matter of course by the owners.
My claim is that it is not the matter of what actions a wage-earner is allowed 
to perform during their workday that is fundamental for determining their class 
status. It is what actions they routinely do perform. N ot only do ‘the bosses’ have a 
right (‘capacity’) to put the means of production into operation, say; it is the 
basic characteristic of their position that they actually do so. It is their particular 
‘job description’, that sets them apart from other workers — not any abstract 
right they might have. It is not just that they are entitled to perform certain 
actions; it is the fact that they routinely perform those actions as part of their 
daily duties.
It is for this reason that distinguishing between ‘legal’ and other kinds of 
ownership is almost irrelevant for determining the class status of various actors. 
Surely what Poulantzas and other similar theorists are actually aiming at is not 
what such actors might do, as a matter of recognised right of whatever sort, but 
what they actually do do. Which means that it is the place these actors occupy 
within the overall division of labour that matters, rather than the particular web 
of ownership rights. The ‘separation of ownership from control’ is not a 
problem for Marxism because the rights of the ‘legal’ owners have in practice 
been abolished; they have not been so abolished and could, if appropriate 
circumstances arose, be exercised. The real point is that while these rights
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continue to exist, the actual performance of acts that these rights allow has passed 
on to other agents.
Thus, my second, broader claim: the analysis of property (capitalist or 
otherwise), of who is allowed as a matter of socially recognised right to do what, 
is of very limited significance for the class analysis of society. In other words, on 
this point I think Marx is substantially correct when he writes that such matters 
are part of the ‘legal superstructure’. That superstructue only reflects the relations 
of production — and it is those that are significant. Recognised rights, whether 
written on paper or carried around in the heads of the individuals, are only the 
expression of legitimacy of the regular occurrences within a society. But it is 
those regular occurrences that matter, rather than whether they are recognised 
as legitimate.
The Demarcation of the ‘Middle Classes’
As mentioned above, contrary to the class demarcation of the bourgeoisie, 
Poulantzas’ attempt to distinguish the ‘middle classes’ from the proletariat is 
based not simply on the economic, but also the political and ideological criteria. 
We can understand this in terms of successive approximations. The first major 
delimitation is economic: Poulantzas separates the productive and the 
unproductive workers (understood in terms of Marx’ Labour Theory of Value), 
and excludes the latter from the working class, on the grounds that they do not 
belong to the fundamental capital-labour exploitative relationship, and hence 
cannot claim to be members of the proletariat. However, the process of 
demarcation is not thereby complete: within the remaining productive workers, 
a stratum remains which Poulantzas excludes on the grounds that ideologically 
and politically, it reinforces the domination of the working class, and hence 
cannot be considered a part of it. The way through which the exclusion is 
achieved is through the use of the distinction between mental and manual 
labour.
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However, both the ‘productive vs. unproductive’ and the ‘manual vs. 
mental distinction’ are given a specific twist by Poulantzas. Let us see why.
Poulantzas’ definition of productive labour is different from the one 
explicitly found in Marx. Poulantzas writes that productive labour “is labour 
that produces surplus-value while directly reproducing the material elements that serve as 
the substratum cf the relation f  exploitation: labour that is directly involved in material 
production by producing use-values that increase material wealth”. It is argued that this is 
not really an ‘addition’ to Marx’s views — which simply postulate the production 
of surplus-value, regardless of the actual content of the labour performed — but 
rather that it brings out what Marx must have assumed to be the case, on the 
basis of his reasoning regarding the capitalist productive labour.
As many critics have pointed out (Wright 1978; Cottrell 1984; Carchedi 
1987), this is in direct contradiction with Marx’s example of the ‘teaching 
factory vs. sausage factory example’:
“That labourer alone is productive, who produces surplus-value for the capitalist, 
and thus works for the self-expansion of capital. If we may take an example from 
outside the sphere of production of material objects, a schoolmaster is a 
productive labourer when, in addition to belabouring the heads of his scholars, he 
works like a horse to enrich the school proprietor. That the latter has laid out his 
capital in a teaching factory, instead of in a sausage factory, does not alter the 
relation.” (Marx, Capital, Vol. I, Chap. 16)
Yet there is a real contradiction in Marx’s thought here, and the most 
Poulantzas can be charged with is that he went wholeheartedly for one of the 
horns of the dilemma. For although formally speaking, Marx indeed insisted 
that the productive labour is labour producing surplus value, there still seems to 
be a residual identification of production with material production. For consider 
his discussion of the ‘sphere of circulation’ and the ‘sphere of production’. In 
order to identify the workers in the sphere of circulation as unproductive, we 
first need to have a notion of need to have a notion of circulation as distinct horn
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the notion of production. There is no way to consider whether surplus value is 
produced in one of these spheres, unless we actually can tell what sphere we are 
talking about. Indeed — just what tells us that circulation is not production? I am 
not denying that they are clearly distinct; I am just trying to point out that the 
very fact that the distinction is so obvious suggests that there is an intuitive 
notion of what production is and what it is not — after all, why should we 
otherwise stop at two spheres, instead of randomly divide the active economic 
world into three, four, five...? If there is to be a clear understanding that 
separates production from circulation, and does not separate other spheres, then 
it seems to me obvious that we do indeed need a notion of production which is 
prior to the notion of surplus value. Otherwise the claim that the work in a 
sphere other than the sphere of production is unproductive is simply a 
tautology.11
Thus, there is a lingering sense that we know what production is; and 
nothing is more natural than assuming that it is something that involves ‘getting 
one’s hands dirty’. The concept may then be extended to other activities via the 
theory of surplus value, but this is not done consistently.
Nevertheless, to criticise Poulantzas on the grounds of his failure to do 
justice to the concept of productiveness is in a sense of secondary importance, 
since even such narrowly circumscribed working class is still too large for his 
purposes. Hence the need for the additional criterion, the distinction between 
the mental and manual labour.
Now this distinction has nothing to do with the naive, straightforward 
division of labour between activities that prima facie appear to involve more 
mental than manual actions and vice versa. In fact, it could be argued that this 
terminology is actually quite misleading, if we take seriously what he says about
11 Moreover, coming back to the example of the teaching factory, the assertion that it can 
produce surplus value for the capitalist is just that — an assertion; there is nothing in 
the example that would prevent the ‘profit’ of the teaching capitalist being simply a 
share of the revenue. Unless we can demonstrate that new value is actually being 
produced, there is no way to decide whether that assertion is correct.
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this distinction. For “the division between mental and manual labour is simply 
the form taken by the political and ideological conditions of the [production] 
process within the process itself.” (Poulantzas 1975a, pp. 234 - 235). And so
“[w]e could thus say that every form of work that takes the form of knowledge 
from which the direct producers are excluded, falls on the mental labour side of 
the capitalist production process, irrespective of its empirical/natural content, and 
that this is so whether the direct producers actually do know how to perform this 
work but do not do so (again not by chance), or whether they in fact do not know 
how to perform it (since they are systematically kept away from it), or whether 
again there is quite simply nothing that needs to be known” (Poulantzas 1975a, p.
238)
This corresponds, roughly, to the ‘ideological’ portion of the pair 
‘ideological and politicaT; the demarcation between the working class and the 
‘middle classes’ is drawn in part by the ideology that portrays some of the 
members of the collective worker as performing work that is somehow more 
intellectually demanding than that of a proletarian.
On the other hand, the political nature of ‘middle class’ work is due to the 
authority relations that it embodies — relations arising from the nature of 
capitalism itself. Poulantzas starts from the premise that the social division of 
labour dominates the technical division. In other words, the requirements of the 
capitalist mode of production dominate the neutral general production 
requirements. Translated into a neoclassical language, it is not the 
technologically feasible set of productive relationships that is important; it is 
only the subset selected by its compatibility with the capitalist nature of 
production that is relevant.
“The work of management and supervision, under capitalism, is the direct 
reproduction, within the process of production itself, of the political relations 
between the capitalist class and the working class” (Poulantzas 1975a, pp. 227- 
228)
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Poulantzas explicitly rejects the approach a la Wright and Carchedi, the line 
of thought that concentrates on the ‘double nature’ of the work of management 
and supervision, since the ‘natures’ are not equivalent: the social division of 
labour dominates the technical. Otherwise, says Poulantzas, the same ‘double 
nature’ would have been exhibited even by the capitalists (at least the early ones, 
presumably), something he obviously regards as absurd (Poulantzas 1975a, p. 
228)
The ‘middle classes’ are thus characterised by being unproductive — hence 
living off the revenue created by the surplus labour of the working class — or if 
productive, by occupying a position deliminated by ideology as ‘superior’ due to the 
knowledge and mental abilities required, and/or a position of power vis-a-vis the 
working classes, performing the activities of control and surveillance.
Identification of the ‘Middle Classes’ with Petty Bourgeoisie
In order to identify the ‘middle classes’ with the ‘new petty bourgeoisie’, 
Poulantzas uses again the same concept as in the solution of the demarcation 
problem — namely, the ‘political and ideological’ criteria. It is only thanks to this 
consideration of the political and ideological factors that elements which appear 
disparate from the purely economic point of view can be unified into a single class.
We can further explicate how this is done by considering Poulantzas’ implicit 
answer to the most glaring objection to his account. This objection should be 
obvious from the terms of our discussion. It is simply this: how can the ‘new’ and 
the ‘old’ petty bourgeoisie form a single class, when they actually belong to two 
different modes of production — the capitalist one and Simple Commodity 
Production respectively?
Poulantzas’ answer is based precisely on the ideological factors. He argues that 
due to the ‘analogous’ position of the old and the new petty bourgeoisie vis-a-vis 
both capital and labour, analogical ideological features tend to develop. The reason 
for this is that the fundamental factor in the existence of classes is the class struggle; 
both the new and the old petty bourgeoisie occupy the same — ‘middle’—place in the
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struggle between labour and capital, and thus are shaped into a single (albeit 
necessarily heterogeneous) class.
This reasoning is singularly deficient. Anecdotally or even on the basis of 
empirical research it may well be true that the ideological and political attitudes of 
small shopkeepers/artisans and technicians, middle level managers, scientists etc. are 
quite similar. However, this fact, if it is a fact, does not explain anything; rather, it 
itself calls for an explanation. No theory that takes the existence of the middle classes 
seriously would attempt to deny that such an ideological and/or political 
identification exists, at least in some places and some of the time. But why is it that 
such diverse groups of people tend to adopt the same positions? What is it about 
their incomes, education, lived experience etc. that makes them do so?
The answer might seem to lie in the second part of Poulantzas *s 
explanation: the same ideological oudook arises from the same position in the 
class struggle between capital and labour. If this is correct, however, then the 
empirical ‘ideological* identification becomes superfluous as part of the 
explanation. If the interests of the two groupings are as a matter of fact 
structurally identical, then the ideological identification is at best a consequence 
of this fact. And even if such an ideological identification were lacking in a 
particular time and place, it would make no difference to the underlying 
structural position, and so there is no real reason to pay attention to it.
However, the position in between labour and capital is quite clearly not 
enough to unite the two groupings into a single class. For even if it is true that 
they do have structurally opposed interests to both labour and capital, how do we 
know that they do not have also structurally opposed interests to each other? There is an 
obvious argument that various groups within the Poulantzian ‘petty bourgeoisie* 
do have such opposed interests: wage-earning employees of capitalist 
corporations have a prima facie interest in the market expansion of these 
corporations at the expense of the market share of the ‘old* petty bourgeoisie; 
similarly, the members of state bureaucracy have an interest in an increasing tax 
share at the expense of both the ‘old* petty bourgeoisie and the wage-earning
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employees of the capitalist corporations. Why are these interests less relevant 
than the conflicts with the bourgeoisie and with the proletariat?
Moreover, the whole explanation fails because of a meta-theoretical reason. 
The whole point of the concept of class within the Marxist theory is to be one 
of the fundamental building blocks from which the explanations and even 
predictions of historical situations can be derived. Thus, the membership in the 
working class, or in the bourgeoisie, or any other class, should give us some idea 
of what to expect of the individuals in terms of their ideological and political 
orientation. But Poulantzas reverses this order. Instead of class being the 
exogenous variable, it becomes the endogenous one. We first need to know 
everything that is ideologically and politically interesting about the ‘middle 
classes’, and only from thato.2s\ we find out their class membership. But this is a 
pointless procedure; nothing would be lost by simply saying that there are 
groups of people whose interests lie between labour and capital and leaving it at 
that. Claiming that these people form a single ‘class’ is a way of creating the 
impression that an explanation was given where none in fact is forthcoming.
If Poulantzas were correct, however, and both the ‘new’ and the ‘old’ petty 
bourgeoisie were part of the single class, what would this imply in terms of our 
discussion above?
Recall that we have said that a polarised, two-class view is inherent in the 
concept of the mode of production. It is precisely Poulantzas himself who 
makes a distinction between such abstract description of the society and more 
realistic social formation, in which several different modes of production are 
combined. As he writes, this does not mean that we can simply mechanically 
‘add up’ the various classes of the abstract MoPs when considering a social 
formation. Instead, “on the one hand, their very existence [i. e. the very 
existence of classes] is affected by the concrete struggle that takes place within 
the social formation, and it is here in particular that we find the phenomenon of 
the polarization of other classes and class fractions around the two basic classes. 
(...) O n the other hand, the classes of one social formation only exist in the
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context of the relations of this formation with other social formations, hence of 
the class relations of this formation with other social formations.” (Poulantzas 
1975a, p. 23)12
This implies two things. In the first place, a social formation cannot be 
understood by a mechanical combination of the prior analyses of the various 
modes of production. And secondly, it is only at the level of the social 
formation that the existence of classes can really be understood.
Indeed, that is exactly what Poulantzas says in so many words:
“If we confine ourselves to modes of production alone, we find that each of them 
involves two classes present in their full economic, political and ideological 
determination -  the exploiting class, which is politically and ideologically 
dominant, and the exploited class, which is politically and ideologically dominated: 
masters and slaves in the slave mode of production, lords and serfs in the feudal 
mode of production, bourgeois and workers in the capitalist mode of production.
But a concrete society (a social formation) involves more than two classes, in so 
far as it is composed of various modes and forms of production. N o social 
formation involves only two classes, but the two fundamental classes of any social 
formation are those of the dominant mode of production in that formation.” 
(Poulantzas 1975a, p. 22)
At the abstract methodological level, these two points may be 
unobjectionable. And there is a sense in which the approach Poulantzas actually 
pursues in his analysis of the ‘new petty bourgeoisie’ is entirely consistent with 
them. Nevertheless, I would like to argue that there are two fatal weaknesses 
which undermines his particular application of this abstract methodology.
The first point is that according to this methodology, it is the non­
mechanical combination of the various modes of production that allows for the 
emergence of some classes, or parts of the classes. Yet, there is nothing about the
12 As the quote goes on to make clear, this latter point concerns phenomena such as 
imperialism, i. e. roughly speaking the way in which inter-state relations affect the 
respective domestic social structures.
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‘addition ’ cf Simple Commodity Production to capitalism that would compel the creation cf the 
‘newpetty bourgeoisie\ Poulantzas describes no mechanism whereby the fact that 
small-scale production induces the separation of the wage-earning class into the 
‘new petty bourgeoisie" and the proletariat. Yet it is precisely this that would 
have to happen if it was due to the co-existence of the various modes of 
production that the ‘new petty bourgeoisie" came to existence. Otherwise the 
existence of the ‘new petty bourgeoisie" is not due to the existence of the 
additional mode of production, and this ‘new petty bourgeoisie" turns out to be 
in fact an organic part of the capitalist mode of production itself. In order to 
reject this option, we would have to believe that if it came to pass that the ‘old" 
petty bourgeoisie were to completely disappear, and the social formation would 
thereby be reduced to the pure capitalist mode of production, the new petty 
bourgeoisie would have disappeared as well
But why should we believe that? What is the necessary connection between 
the existence of the small shop-keeper on the one hand, and the technician, the 
middle manager, the state bureaucrat on the other? There is none.
Of course, there is always ‘the struggle". Since within the Poulantzanian 
universe, the political and the ideological dimensions always matter, it might be 
claimed that the existence of the ‘old" petty bourgeoisie does not cause the 
appearance of the structural positions of the technician, the middle manager or 
the state bureaucrat; but that it does induce the common ideological and political 
attitudes towards the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.
Now this is actually where the second fatal weakness becomes clear. It 
appears prima facie that for Poulantzas, ‘struggle is everything": classes do not 
exist outside of it, or to put it in an apparently paradoxical way, class struggle 
exists before classes do. In this respect, the Althusserian Poulantzas is at one 
with the prominent anti-Althusserian E. P. Thompson, who put the same point 
in this way:
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“(T]he notion of class entails the notion of historical relationship. (...) 
Moreover, we cannot have two distinct classes, each with an independent being, 
and then bring them into relationship with each other. We cannot have love 
without lovers, nor deference without squires and labourers. And class happens 
when some men, as a result of common experiences (inherited or shared) feel and 
articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against other 
men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs.” 
(Thompson 1972, pp. 9-10)
This understanding of classes is commonly taken to be the major 
difference between the Marxist viewpoints and those of the Weberian 
‘stratification theories’13
But while this is a plausible claim, it is important to realise just why the 
struggle is so important for Marxism. In the first place, class struggle must 
necessarily be understood as systematic. It is not that classes ‘happen to’ be in a 
conflict; there is a fundamental conflict of interest between them, a defining 
conflict. But although this is important, it is not enough for a Marxist 
understanding. For such a general claim would equally apply to an ‘anarchist’ or 
a ‘Dahrendorfian’ reading of conflict, subject only to an additional postulation 
that ‘people love freedom’, or in other words that autonomy tends to be 
preferable to authority. Then there would be a systematic conflict between the 
ruling and the ruled, the commanding and the obeying — and yet, this would not 
in itself be a class conflict. An army is an authoritarian institution with many 
levels of obedience; yet even if the supposition of the generally freedom-loving 
human nature were true, while these levels of obedience would represent 
conflict groups, they would not thereby become Marxian classes.
No — the systematic conflict that Marxism talks about is rooted in the 
material reproduction f  the human life; it is the conflict represented by the 
exploitative relationship. That is why the ‘struggle’ that creates classes is in the 
first place ‘economic’, in the sense of concerning the parameters of the
13 A point often stressed by Erik Olin Wright, e. g. Wright (2005b).
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exploitative relationship: how much will the exploiters be able to get away with, 
under what conditions will the exploited have to provide the surplus? Only 
secondarily, once the consciousness of the conflict becomes sufficiently 
developed, can we talk about the political level of the conflict, where the very 
existence of the exploitative relationship is called into question, and thus the 
issue of the political order comes on the agenda.
Now the difficulty with Poulantzas is that he takes this second, more 
sophisticated level of conflict as definitive; or more precisely, that he conflates 
the two kinds of class conflict into one. Thus, the class struggle between the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat arises because of the fundamental exploitative 
relationship. Hence, it is a conflict relating to the extraction of the surplus from 
the exploited. Now, there is no reason why at the very least the ‘productive 
mental workers’ should have any interests fundamentally opposed to those of 
the proletariat at this level; the exploitative relationships applies to ^//productive 
workers. (At least Poulantzas has given us no reason to think otherwise.) 
Moreover, it is highly questionable why even the ‘unproductive’ workers should 
be anything but neutral at this point, rather than being opposed to the putative 
proletarians. It is only once we move to the level of the political struggle, the class 
struggle for power, that any significant differences of interest are plausible. But 
this is a weak reason for differentiating classes . For then the distinction 
between the ‘new petty bourgeoisie’ and the proletariat seems to turn on the 
intensity of this political conflict — and that is quite obviously a matter of a 
particular historical conjuncture rather than the characteristic of the social 
formation as a whole. Are we to deduce that just because at present, there is no 
longer any significant political force pushing for the fundamental change of the 
social structure in the Western countries, that there is now no ‘new petty 
bourgeoisie’? This would seem a strange sort of conclusion indeed!
Instead, it seems to me that the sort of conflict that is definitive of classes 
is more fundamental, and turns precisely on the question of exploitation. It is 
the struggle that directly emanates from the exploitative relationship that turns
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the exploiters and the exploited into separate classes. What happens in the 
various stages of that struggle may be very important and interesting, but cannot 
affect the basic social structure defined by the mode of production, or by the 
several modes of production combined into a social formation.
Thus Poulantzas’ understanding of the struggle which creates classes is in 
my view seriously faulty. However, even if we accept this understanding, his 
procedure of identifying ‘new petty bourgeoisie’ as the product of the capitalist 
social formation would not be saved. Recall that the claim would have to be 
made to the effect that it is the existence of the ‘old’ petty bourgeoisie that 
induces the conflictual position of the petty bourgeoisie as a whole. In other 
words, that the existence of ‘old petty bourgeoisie’ induces the conflictual 
position for its ‘new’ part as well — that this is the way in which the presence of 
Simple Commodity Production makes a difference within the capitalist social 
formation.
But such a claim, were it to be made, is scarcely believable. I/we do define 
classes on the basis of their systematic conflicts with other classes, then the 
existence of the ‘old’ petty bourgeoisie makes no difference at all to the 
existence of the ‘new’ one. The conflicts that Poulantzas identifies as arising, on 
the one hand, between the bourgeoisie vis-a-vis the petty bourgeoisie, and on 
the other hand between the petty bourgeoisie vis-a-vis the proletariat, would be 
just as prominent for the ‘middle class’ wage-earners quite regardless of whether 
the small shopkeepers and the artisans existed or not. Perhaps we might want to 
claim that it is precisely the ‘old’ petty bourgeoisie that is somehow structurally 
needed to formulate the ideological and the political position of the middle 
class. But such a claim would hardly make sense, at least prima facie: the ‘old’ 
petty bourgeoisie is defined primarily by its relation to its means of production, 
whereas the ‘new’ is defined by either being unproductive wage-labourers, or by 
falling on the side f  \'mental’ labour. However different this concept of ‘mental 
labour’ is from a purely technocratic one, it is clear that if any group has a claim
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to be necessary for the creation of ideology and political attitude, it is much 
more likely to be the ‘new’ rather than the ‘old’ petty bourgeoisie.
In other words, I am presenting the conclusion that even if the right level 
of abstraction for the conceptualisation of classes is the social formation, 
Poulantzas does not show Simple Commodity Production should make any 
difference. He does not show why the particular capitalist social formation that 
includes Simple Commodity Production gives rise to the existence of the ‘new 
petty bourgeoisie’. On the contrary, all the criteria he applies to separate out the 
proletariat and the ‘new petty bourgeoisie’ could be used whether the ‘old* petty 
bourgeoisie were present or not. If these criteria are correct, then contrary to Marx 
and to Poulantzas’ own claims, the new petty bourgeoisie is an organic part of 
the capitalist mode cf production itself — quite regardless of whether other modes of 
production are present or not.
This is not accidental. We have here the first example of the theorist who, 
in trying to devise a more realistic map of the class relations within capitalism, 
harks back to the same idea with which Marx had originally started — namely, 
the division-of-labour concept of class. This fact might not be immediately 
obvious, given all the talk about the struggle that Poulantzas makes. However, 
once it is realised that this concerns only the second of the two problems at hand, 
namely the problem of identification of the wage-earning ‘middle classes’ with 
petty bourgeoisie, it is possible to bracket these references and concentrate 
exclusively on the characteristics which, according to Poulantzas, divide these 
agents from workers. Then it is possible to see clearly that the way the ‘new 
petty bourgeoisie’ is actually defined refers exclusively to division-of-labour 
distinctions. For if we consider the various criteria that Poulantzas gives for 
excluding groups of wage-earners from the working class, we see clearly that 
they all refer, explicitly or implicitly, to the kind f  activity performed. Economic 
ownership and possession, mental and manual labour, and in Poulantzas’ own 
formulation even productive and unproductive labour — all these distinctions 
turn on what is being done by the agents in question, be it the activity of control
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over investments, direct physical supervision of production, activities involving 
‘secret’ knowledge, activities without such knowledge, direct material 
production or non-material activities. There is no way we can make these 
distinctions without referring to the actual ‘doings’. But then there is no way we 
can identify the Poulantzian classes without also referring to the types of activity 
performed. Which, of course, is precisely the hallmark of the division-of-labour 
approaches to the question of class.
My conclusions regarding Poulantzas are for the most part negative, but 
still significant. I would locate the crux of the many difficulties that I have been 
pointing out in the dogmatic decision to reject any innovation to the traditional 
conception of classes as being based purely on the two-place relation of 
exploitation. As I have argued, this in reality proved to be an untenable position 
for Poulantzas anyway, since in the process of describing the ‘new petty 
bourgeoisie’, in the end he still fell back on the division-of-labour concept of 
classes. However, due to the dogmatic decision at the beginning he was forced 
to do this in an ad hoc and unsatisfactory way. In fact, there seems to be a 
relation between keeping to the orthodox views on the one hand and the ad hoc 
feel that permeates much of Poulantzas’ work: without seriously examining the 
basic assumptions, there really is no other way to justify his views other than 
relying on ad hoc modifications.
The moral, then, is clear: second-order modifications will not do; what is 
necessary in a successful model of classes for today’s world is to deal with the 
very basic Marxian concepts themselves.
Wright: Contradictory Class Locations
Erik Olin Wright’s most famous innovation is the concept of 
‘contradictory class locations’. These locations are contradictory because people 
in them find themselves with contradictory interests — not just apparently, but
objectively so.
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Thus, the change Wright brings into thinking about classes can be 
explained as follows: the implicit understanding of classes seemed to have been 
something close to ‘equivalence classes’ in mathematics — the usual unstated 
assumption was that society is divided into classes neatly, with no overlaps and 
no leftovers, with everybody belonging to exactly one class. The boundaries of 
classes were thought to be at least conceptually clear-cut.
This seems to make sense, if classes are meant to be based on mutual 
conflict. And Wright, just like Poulantzas, does indeed put great stress on the 
role of conflict in the Marxian theories. It is one of the recurrent themes of his 
work that the difference between a Marxian theory and the theories of 
stratification lies precisely in the fact that for Marxists, classes are strictly 
relational categories; they are groups with antagonistic interests. No such 
consequence follows from the stratification theories, which divide society into 
layers completely independently of whether there are any particular relations 
between them, much less relations of conflict. Thus, although it may be a 
consequence of the Marxist theory that there is e. g. a stratification of incomes in a 
capitalist society — and perhaps there should be such a consequence, if this is the 
empirical reality which the theory is trying to capture — this is not a defining 
characteristic of classes, which would exist even if a re-distributive action by the 
state acted to reduce the differences in incomes.
Wright’s major innovation is to keep this conflictual definition of classes, 
but at the same time to turn them into sets that can overlap. People who find 
themselves in the intersections of these sets thus have two opposing interests at 
the same time.
This conceptual innovation is remarkably persistent in Wright’s writings. 
However, to concentrate too much on it (as is often done) would be to miss the 
much larger shifts that have occurred several times in Wright’s thinking. While 
‘contradictory class locations’ are indeed important in that development, it is 
necessary to bear in mind the context and the consequences of the particular 
way in which they are theorised, as will soon become clear.
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The Initial Formulation: Scope of Control
Wright’s initial formulation of the concept of contradictory was quite 
clearly based on an underlying division of labour conception. The reasons he 
offered for the emergence of contradictory relations with the contradictory 
relations of class were the loss of control over the labour process by workers, 
the differentiation of the functions of capital, and the development of complex 
hierarchies (Wright 1978, pp. 64 -  74). While these developments refer to quite 
different aspects of the overall social reproductive activity, it is quite clear that 
they all crucially depend on the gradual differentiation of tasks and increased 
specialisation. Taking the reasons described in turn: the loss of control over the 
labour process by workers, as conceived by Marxism, means that such control 
comes to be exercised by someone else, in early capitalism in particular by the 
capitalist class; this becomes one of the functions that is inherent in capital 
understood as a social relation. However, as capitalism develops beyond the 
bounds that were still operative in Marx’s time, these functions become 
differentiated and attach themselves to different structural positions: as 
mentioned above, no longer is the entrepreneur, the financier, the manager, the 
supervisor etc. united in the single person of the capitalist. This is what Wright 
refers to as the differentiation of the functions of capital, and in his initial 
discussion (Wright 1978), this is still conceived in essentially Poulantzanian 
terms, discussing both the gradual differentiation of economic ownership and 
possession and the partial dissociation between legal and economic ownership. 
It is clear that regardless of whether the functional differentiation of capital is 
conceived with the help of these particular distinctions or whether a more fine­
grained analysis is employed, the upshot is that structural positions are identified 
on the basis of the kind of activity routinely attached to them. Actually, Wright 
discusses such a more refined sort of analysis under the heading of the 
development of complex hierarchies, whereby the various dimensions of the 
capital functions are further internally differentiated. As a result, of course, what
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really arises is a fairly complex description of activities undertaken within the 
modern capitalism — that is, a description based on the division of labour.
The way Wright characterises this division of labour is in terms of control: 
control over the physical means of production, control over labour-power, and 
control over investments (Wright 1978, p. 73). Because such control is of course 
a matter of degree, this allows the conceptualisation of the ‘contradictory class 
locations’. The ‘proper’ classes are theorised as those positions within the 
overall productive activity that are characterised by a combination of ‘full’ or 
‘zero’ control along the different dimensions. Contradictory class locations are 
those which include fractional control along one or more dimensions — that is, 
‘partial’ or ‘minimal’ control.
Given that Wright includes the petty bourgeoisie as one of the three ‘basic’ 
classes, it seems that he is talking about a combination of various modes of 
production, i. e. a social formation. This would mean that just like Poulantzas, 
he involves both the division-of-labour and the many-modes-of-production as 
parts of the solution to the problem of the ‘middle classes’. However, this 
impression is mistaken. The concept of the mode of production actually plays 
no role at all in the characterisation. All three ‘basic’ classes — bourgeoisie, 
proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie — are described solely by using the 
dimensions of control described above. It follows that the concept of the mode 
of production, or equivalently of exploitation, does no work in Wright’s initial 
characterisation; it is entirely redundant. We would not need to know anything 
about exploitative relations, and we could still identify the three basic classes 
and the contradictory locations using just Wright’s dimensions of control. The 
division-of-labour concept of classes thus entirely displaces exploitation as the 
basis for the class relation in Wright’s initial formulation of his theory.
A Re-Formulation: Multiple Exploitations
Now it is precisely this fact that Wright came to consider a problem for his 
conceptualisation. In his Classes (1985), he characterises his earlier conception as
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at bottom resting on the notion of domination rather than exploitation (Wright 
1985, p. 56). As he realises, “ [t]his would lead class analysis firmly in the 
direction of Dahrendorfis analysis of classes as positions within authority 
relations” (Wright 1985, p. 57), an outcome Wright as a self-conscious Marxist 
is keen to avoid. Note that the subjunctive is entirely appropriate here: Wright’s 
conception would lead to such an outcome, but it is not yet identical with it. For 
unlike Wright’s conception, the Dahrendorfian conception of classes is not 
limited to production (unless we extend the concept of production to all activities 
undertaken through a hierarchical sort of organisation). Thus, Wright’s 
conception overlaps with Dahrendorf s, rather than being coextensive with it; in 
Wright’s theory, authority relations are a token of the more general 
characterisation of Wright’s conception, which is that it is a division-of-labour 
concept of classes.
The approach that Wright adopts in Classes (1985) is to keep the 
explanation of ‘middle classes’ in terms of contradictory class locations, while 
changing the sphere of relevant contradictions from domination to exploitation. 
Wright himself describes this second approach as follows: “the basic strategy I 
adopted for moving from the abstract to the concrete is to see concrete class 
structures as consisting of different combinations <f class re/ationsvnihm abstract class 
structure concepts. Thus, for example, we can abstracdy define the class 
relations of capitalism and feudalism and then describe a concrete class 
structure as a particular form of combination of these abstractly defined 
relations.” (Wright 1989b, p. 277; emphasis added)
What this implies in terms of our discussion should be clear. It represents a 
move away from the division-of-labour solution towards the many-modes-of- 
production solution. For if we accept, as Marxists commonly do, that the type 
of exploitation is definitive of a mode of production, then multiple types of 
exploitation represent multiple modes of production. Thus, Wright effectively 
admits that classes are really only defined at the social formation level of 
abstraction, rather than at the mode of production one. Unlike Poulantzas,
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though, Wright in his second conceptualisation of the contradictory class 
positions applies this solution consistendy. Both the demarcation and the 
identification of the ‘middle classes’ are achieved in one fell swoop, by 
construction: the ‘middle classes’ are defined as the locus of those who are at 
the same time exploited and exploiters, thereby establishing the dividing line 
from other wage-earners, which at the same time provides the means of their 
identification as the occupiers of contradictory locations.
However, for this solution to work, a concept of exploitation is needed 
which allows a single person to be a participant in multiple exploitative 
relationships at the same time. This is extraordinarily difficult, if the positions 
selected as the contradictory ones are to largely coincide with those that the 
earlier, division-of-labour concept designated as such. N ot every kind of 
contradictory positions will do for that purpose. It is not enough, for example, 
to be a ‘part-time’ exploiter and a ‘part-time’ exploited. For example, we can 
envisage a relatively well-off farmer in a poor rural environment, who can afford 
to employ and does in fact seasonally employ a number of labourers to work on 
his fields and to help with the harvest. Nevertheless, while the farmer is 
relatively rich compared to his neighbours, he still nevertheless cannot afford all 
the industrial products he needs simply from the proceeds of his agricultural 
activity — and thus he is forced to spend a few months during wintertime 
working in a factory. Such a person might represent a problem for the Marxist 
theory, in that he is neither an exploiter nor an exploited consistently; but this is a 
different problem from the one of the wage-earning ‘middle classes’. This is 
simply a combination of two different class positions, rather than a single 
contradictory position. Nor is it enough to require that the contradictory 
exploitative relations occur ‘at the same time’, as it were. This would the case for 
a worker who happens to own some shares in a corporation (whether their own 
or another one makes no difference). Such a worker might of course have 
contradictory interests, in a sense. But although their position may in the real 
life appear to be a ‘middle class’ one, in case sufficient income is generated from
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these shares, it is not really this sort of position that was problematic to begin 
with.14 There is nothing preventing a wage-earner from being at the same time a 
capitalist in this sense; earlier Marxists might want to deny that such a stratum is 
historically significant, or to argue that the development of capitalism leads away 
from the possibility that such a stratum is stable or increasing. But conceptually 
there is nothing very difficult about its existence. The problematic strata are 
those wage-earners who do not prima facie appear to be capitalists in this 
straightforward way, due to the fact they are not owners of capital in an obvious 
sense — and yet on the immediate naive view seem to be ‘middle class’.
The concept of exploitation that Wright uses for his purposes originates 
with John Roemer. In my view, this is not accidental.
It is, of course, possible to use the original Marxian conception to define 
multiple, mutually overlapping types of exploitation (in fact, two such cases 
have just been described). Recall that according to that notion, exploitation is 
the appropriation of surplus labour. As I have just pointed out, the relevant 
problematic positions are the ones that involve wage-earning activities. It could 
be said that these positions are associated with distinct periods of exploiting and 
being exploited.15 This would be closer to the kind of intermittent exploitation 
described above than to a genuine contradiction, however. Moreover, it does 
not really seem possible to actually distinguish such periods on a principled 
basis, at least not as far as the vast majority of ‘middle class’ positions are 
concerned.
The alternative, then, is to consider the wage-earning activity itself simply 
as labour. Then all wage-earners are prima facie exploiters or exploited, 
depending on whether they are consuming goods embodying more labour time 
than they have given in, or vice versa. However, we could treat the magnitude 
of their surplus labour — positive or negative — as notional net surplus labour. 
Thus, the candidates for the contradictory class positions would be those who,
14 Although such a type of contradictory class location can also be identified, and indeed 
has been identified by Wright at a later stage (Wright 2005b, p. 17).
15 Such a view has been proposed by Carchedi (1977) and will be criticised below.
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regardless of this net result, notionally first provide their own surplus labour, as 
it were, and then appropriate surplus labour of others.
This is not a straightforward notion, but perhaps we could try to make 
sense of it by explaining that the ‘contradictories’ are exploited vis-a-vis the 
capitalist employer, while at the same time somehow exploiting others. This 
effectively means that ‘contradictories’ belong to two different, albeit 
overlapping, modes of production.
While already at this point the conception strains credibility, we have not 
yet arrived at its greatest difficulty. This is that if the notion described is to 
work, we must be able to describe two independent ways of appropriating 
surplus labour — two mechanisms which are capable of functioning independently 
of each other. Otherwise there is no real sense in which the ‘contradictories’ 
both provide and appropriate surplus labour; no ‘netting’ of it actually occurs, 
and the whole description is just a meaningless game of mental accounting. 
Unless we can really say that the two amounts of surplus labour are somehow 
embedded in different exploitative relations, we cannot really identify the two 
different quantities in the first place — other than by arbitrary assignment.
Now, postulating such different exploitative mechanisms within what 
appears to be a straightforwardly capitalist relationship is in itself hard to 
imagine. But suppose it were possible: that just means we face the other horn of 
the dilemma. If the two forms of exploitation are really independent of each 
other, then this description of mutually overlapping modes of production is just 
that — a description of overlapping modes of exploitation. There is no inherent 
contradiction of the relevant sort involved here.16 The supposed contradictories 
do have different sorts of interests — but vis-a-vis groups that are mutually 
independent. There is no reason why these supposedly ‘contradictory’ interests 
could not be happily satisfied at the same time, as they depend on separate 
mechanisms. The supposed contradiction evaporates.
16 Perhaps we could say there is a moral contradiction, but this has nothing to do with 
contradictory material interests.
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Thus, if we used the original, Marxian labour-transfer approach to 
exploitation, the ‘contradictory class locations’ would collapse into a 
straightforward many-modes-of-production notion. Straightforward in the 
abstract, of course; as pointed out above, it is very difficult to see how what 
mechanism we could invoke that would be different from the capitalist one, 
while co-existing with it in the guise of the wage-labour relationship.
Thus, it is not surprising that it was only after the alternative Roemerian 
notion of exploitation came into existence that the re-formulation of Wright’s 
theory in terms of exploitation could occur. We shall have an opportunity to 
discuss Roemer’s concept of exploitation later on in detail. Here, let me just 
anticipate by using one of the issues in this discussion to explain why Roemer’s 
conception ‘succeeds’ where Marx’s ‘fails’: the Roemerian notion of exploitation 
is not a relation. Wright does amend it in such a way that it does become one, 
admittedly. However, the resulting definition is precisely of the sort that allows 
Wright to have his cake and eat it, too: there is enough of a relation to bind the 
various strata together, but it is not this which then defines the ‘contradiction’. 
The contradictoriness of the contradictory class positions is thus still an illusion: 
where the strata are related, they are not related in a contradictory way; and 
where contradiction is postulated, no relation between them is actually specified.
Let us now look at Wright’s reformulation in detail, in order to substantiate 
these claims as well as to bring out its other relevant features. The definition of 
exploitation in the Roemerian approach used by Wright is a ‘property rights’ 
one, dr alternatively a ‘game-theoretic’ one. According to this definition, a 
coalition S of agents from a society N  is exploited if these two conditions are 
satisfied:
“(1). There is an alternative, which we may conceive of as hypothetically feasible, 
in which S would be better off than in its present situation.
(2). Under this alternative, the complement to S, the coalition N  -  S = S’, would 
be worse off than at present.” (Roemer GTEC, p. 194).
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We also need to append at least one further condition — to rule out cases in 
which there is no interaction between the two coalitions, for example. Roemer 
discusses a ‘dominance’ condition in order to do this — the requirement that the 
coalition S’ dominates S. Even so, as it stands this is a definition-schema rather 
than a definition. What we need is some way of specifying the ‘hypothetically 
feasible alternative’, which can be done in ‘silly’ or ‘interesting’ ways.17 In his 
original formulation, Roemer interprets the feasible alternatives as a ‘withdrawal’ 
of a given group from society with some share of productive assets (broadly 
speaking), including land, capital goods, or skills.
Wright departs from Roemer’s approach in two ways: first, in what are 
considered the relevant hypothetical alternatives, and second, in appending an 
additional condition to the definition-schema, requiring that the exploited 
appropriate the fruits of labour of the exploited (Wright 1985, p. 74). Without 
this additional condition, Wright argues, Roemer’s criteria define only 
‘economic oppression’, but not exploitation. Thus, for example, the 
unemployed are economically oppressed rather than exploited, since if they 
withdrew from the society (presumably with their per capita stock of capital?), 
they would become better off; however, they cannot be said to be exploited, 
since they do not transfer any labour to anyone. It is at this precise point that 
the Roemer-style definition changes from a non-relation to a relation.
Exploitation vs. Econom ic Oppression
But why be interested in exploitation rather than economic oppression 
anyway? Wright argues that an exploitative relationship differs from pure 
economic oppression because it is something like a dialectical unity — while the 
exploiters have antagonistic interests to the exploited, they are also bound to 
them in a way in which the pure oppressors are not. The exploiters need the 
exploited, whereas the oppressors “would not be hurt if all of the oppressed
17 Roemer GTEC, p. 197
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simply disappeared or died” (Wright 1985, p. 75). Let me pause here to note 
that while there is some truth in this argument, which Wright used to defend the 
importance of the concept of exploitation also in later writings (Wright 2005b), 
it is not generally valid. It assumes that the only way in which a group of people 
may serve to make another group of people ‘better o f f  is by supplying labour. 
But that is clearly false, as can be demonstrated precisely on the paradigm case 
of the unemployed.
The unemployed, on the very traditional Marxian grounds, serve a very 
important purpose for the capitalist class. And if they disappeared, it is by no 
means certain that this class would not be hurt — on the contrary, we have good 
grounds to deduce the opposite. It is certainly true that the capitalist taxpayers 
would much prefer to not have to finance the unemployment benefits18. But this is a very 
different statement from saying that they would prefer for the unemployed not to 
exist.
The difference comes out clearly from Marx’s discussion of the ‘reserve 
army of labour’. If it is true to say that the existence of the unemployed pushes 
down the wages of the employed workers, then there is an obvious reason why 
the first statement might be true and at the same time the second would be 
false. The higher are the unemployment benefits, the less punishing is the threat 
of unemployment, and hence the higher is the wage which the workers can 
negotiate with the bosses. So lowering the unemployment benefits has a clearly 
beneficial effect for the capitalists. However, the disappearance of the unemployed 
would convert the situation to one of fu ll employment — i. e., suddenly the 
bargaining position of the workers would not be weakened, but on the contrary, 
massively strengthened. This is /zo/what the capitalists would devoutly wish for.
I think the mistake Wrightsaythat makes here is that he uses the fully 
abstract two-place exploitation relationship in a connection where the 
abstraction is too great and bound to lead us astray. In particular, what the 
example shows, in my opinion, is that for the exploitative relationship to exist,
18 Absent unpleasant consequences, such as an increase in crime.
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various conditions have to be satisfied, and this may mean that various functional 
roles may need to be fulfilled — roles which correspond neither to the position of 
the exploited nor the exploiter. In the case discussed, while surplus labour is not 
being extracted from the unemployed, their existence is an important 
contributory factor to the possibility of its extraction. I believe this sort of 
functional considerations is very important, when it comes to trying to come up 
with a more precise picture of the class structure of today’s capitalist social 
formation.
Wright’s Kinds of Exploitation
Let me now return to Wright’s first correction of Roemer, that concerning 
the formulation of alternatives. Instead of Roemer’s counterfactuals, which will 
be examined below, Wright proposes his own, which correspond to the feudal, 
the capitalist, the ‘statist’ and the socialist exploitation respectively. One reason 
for the change is to describe the rules of withdrawal consistendy as leaving with 
a per capita share of the relevant assets, in contrast to Roemer’s varying 
postulations.
Feudal exploitation is caused by the differential ownership of labour- 
power: feudal bondage is described as partial ownership of other people’s 
labour-power. Thus, feudal lords effectively own more than one unit, while the 
serfs own less. If the serfs withdrew with their per capita share of labour-power, 
they would be better off. Capitalist exploitation, in contrast, is caused in the 
familiar way by the differential ownership of the material means of production, 
and need not concern us here.
Organisation exploitation, the way Wright understands it, is an attempt to 
capture the class position of the managerial strata using the Roemerian concept. 
Wright argues that aside from labour-power, the material means of production, 
and skills, there is a factor of production which he terms ‘organisation’. The idea 
is that aside from all these separate elements, there is some contribution to the 
output made by the way in which they are put together. This is the organisation,
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and differential access to it can be made a basis of exploitation. Since managers 
have privileged access to this ‘good’, they are beneficiaries of this sort of 
exploitation.
Finally skills exploitation is based on the differential ownership of skills, 
due to either an unequal distribution of natural talents, or to the artificial 
restriction of the supply of ‘ratified’ skills, which turns this into a credentials 
exploitation. The point is that the owners of these naturally or artificially rare 
skills appropriate rents, in other words incomes above the value of their own 
production.
Note that, as Wright admits, it is impossible to really talk about 
withdrawals with the per capita share of organisation or skills. Instead, the 
counterfactual must be understood in terms of an analogy; what the re­
distribution of ‘ownership rights in organisation’ means is democratisation of 
control (Wright 1985, p. 84), while regarding skills, such re-distribution means 
that no-one is appropriating higher incomes simply on the basis of skills (Wright 
1985, p. 84).
Exploitation and Domination
Guglielmo Carchedi criticised Wright for allegedly using a non-Marxist 
notion of exploitation (Carchedi 1989), since as he says, Wright writes about 
exploitation that it is “an economically oppresive appropriation of the fruits of 
the labor of one class by another”(Wright 1985, p. 77) As against this, Carchedi 
quotes Lucio Colletti: “In other words, (...) capitalist appropriation is not 
exclusively or primarily and appropriation of things, but rather an appropriation 
of subjectivity, of working energy itself, of the physical and intellectual powers 
of man.” (Carchedi 1989, p. 108). This is actually a fundamental point of 
disagreement. Wright is consciously or unconsciously echoing the writings of 
John Roemer, on whose game-theoretic notion of exploitation Wright’s later 
work (Wright 1985) is based.
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Both Roemer and Wright perceive exploitation purely in terms of consumption. 
Issues such as domination within the labour process, or the appropriation of the 
surplus time, seem to be entirely irrelevant for them. As a matter of fact, Roemer 
repeatedly argued that ‘petty domination’ occurring within the labour process is not 
at all essential for capitalist exploitation (see Roemer 1982, pp. 93-94; Roemer 
2008).
The relation between domination and exploitation is, in my opinion, one of 
the crucial issues in the discussion of class. There is no getting away from the fact 
that the issue of classes is not simply the one of poverty, or more generally 
consumption inequality — both of which could be ascribed to exploitation — but 
also of oppression. The precise nature of that oppression and the precise way in 
which it is related to exploitation is something to be clarified; but it is clear that an 
exclusive focus on consumption is not going to help with this clarification. We 
shall have more to say about this issue in further chapters.
Are Multiple Exploitations Contradictory?
Above, we have already alluded to a different problem with Wright’s account. 
Recall that from the discussion of the Marxian notion of exploitation, we 
concluded that it is not really possible to derive contradictory class locations on its 
basis. All we can achieve using that concept is to characterise some individuals as 
being party to multiple exploitative relationships, without however the relevant sort 
of contradiction arising.
Now, the argument can actually be generalised. For its essence is simply this: 
if someone is to be exploited and an exploiter at the same time, it has to be the case 
that they are party to (at least) two different, mutually independent exploitative 
mechanisms — unless, that is, it is possible to specify a threeplace (or even more) 
exploitation relation. Since no such notion has been suggested as yet and on the 
first glance does not even seem to make sense, multiple modes of exploitation are 
unavoidable. However, once we grant this conclusion, there is no way that we can 
get contradictory interests arising from such multiply-determined positions. For if the
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two mechanisms of exploitation are independent, there is nothing that forces their 
occupants to entertain mutually contradictory wishes: from independent 
mechanisms, independent interests arise. Thus, the multiple modes of exploitation 
cannot really be used to underpin the notion of the contradictory class relations. 
And as none of the links in the argument use the notion of the transfer of labour, 
this line of reasoning applies just as much to the Roemerian notion of class as it 
does to Marxian.
Whence then the impression that contradictory class positions can in fact 
by supported by recourse to Roemer? I would like to argue that the reason lies 
in the fact that the Roemerian notion, as amended by Wright, comes in two 
parts. The first part is Roemer’s own counterfactual criterion for assigning the 
terms ‘exploited* and ‘exploiters*. This part, as has already been suggested, does 
not specify any relation between the two groups. Such a relation is supplied by 
Wright*s addition, namely the criterion of the transfer of the (product of) 
labour.
Wright in his Classes (1985) never actually spells out the way in which he 
uses the combined criterion — he asserts that some positions are both exploiters 
and the exploited, but does not show how the conditions demanded by the 
criterion are fulfilled. This is exactly why the impression arises that the positions 
are actually contradictory. What happens is that the labour-transfer criterion 
appears to tie all the supposed contradictory class locations as well as the 
working class to the capitalist. This is why it seems that on the one hand, a) they 
are all exploited and b) they all are part of the single relation. On the other hand, 
the status of these ‘middle strata* as exploiters is determined solely on the basis 
of the Roemerian counterfactuals. For although Wright wants to say that these 
exploiters appropriate the fruits of other people’s labour, the most he really 
achieves is showing that they earn more than the value of their labour-power19. 
Because of course, no way in which a labour transfer to these putative exploiters
19 This point — that the newly-proposed kinds of exploitation really only amount to the 
lessening of exploitation — will be further considered below.
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occurs is specified. N or can it be, since in order to exploit the working class, 
there would have to be a separate relation between that class and the occupants 
of the contradictory class positions, distinct from the capitalist wage-labour 
relation. And surely enough, Wright does not postulate any such relation.
Thus, it is the inconsistent application of the two-part criterion that allows 
Wright to have his cake and eat it, too. Thanks to this inconsistent application, it 
appears as though there was only one relation tying all the various strata together, 
thereby ensuring that there will be a genuine contradiction, but at the same time 
it seems that there are multiple relations, which ensure that some people can be 
exploiters and exploited at the same time.
As a concrete example, let us take the contradictory position involving the 
organisation exploitation. The managers are in the position of the exploited on 
the conventional grounds that they supply the surplus labour to the capitalist — 
this is the labour-transfer part.20 But they are exploiters on the grounds that if the 
asset they ‘own’ were re-distributed, or in other words, if the organisational 
structure were democratised, they would be worse off. It is not shown that 
anyone transfers their labour to them, nor how this is done independently of the 
capitalist mode of exploitation. In other words, the managers are exploiters on 
the original Roemerian grounds alone. It is not and cannot be suggested by 
Wright that they also appropriate someone else’s labour by a mechanism 
different from the capitalist wage-labour. If it were, then our argument against 
contradiction would apply, and such people would be party to multiple modes 
of exploitation without any contradiction in their own interests.
I think that Wright was nevertheless on the right track when he appended 
his labour-transfer’ condition to Roemer’s definition of exploitation — even 
though I believe that this inadvertently defeats the whole point of Roemer’s 
game-theoretical approach. As I shall argue below, that point was to try to avoid
20 They might also be exploited on Roemerian grounds, but that is irrelevant, since 
Roemer’s notion is not relational and therefore by definition would not specify the 
relation required.
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at all costs the bothersome notions involving labour and labour transfers; as I 
shall also argue, this was misguided.
Wright’s Self-Criticisms
On the basis of his conception of exploitation Wright proceeds to identify 
classes and contradictory class positions. However, he also describes unresolved 
problems, some of which in fact later on (Wright 1989) led him to draw back 
from this conceptualisation.
Two of these problems are significant, in my opinion: the organisation 
exploitation and the skills/credentials exploitation.
First, Wright worries that there may not be any such thing as ‘organisation 
exploitation’. ‘Exploitative’ incomes of the managers may be due to their special 
‘managerial skill’; or they may be the result of the strategic nature of their jobs, 
which are difficult to monitor yet essential for good running of the organisation, 
and hence attract large rewards. In the later writings, Wright (1989) adds 
another worry that finally put paid to the notion of organisation exploitation 
and hence the contradictory class location that was based on it. Wright’s theory 
leads to an expectation that their particular form of exploitation would lead the 
exploiters to favour the social formation in which that form of exploitation was 
dominant. Yet, capitalist managers seemed to be little enamoured by the ‘state 
bureaucratic socialism’, or ‘statism’, which according to Wright’s theory was the 
social formation based on the organisation exploitation.
This objection is indeed significant. However, there is always the possibility 
that Wright simply misidentified the exploitation mechanism of ‘statism’, which 
might have nothing to do with organisation exploitation as conceived by him. 
However, there is an independent reason why the notion of organisation 
exploitation is deeply suspect, and which again comes from the thinking based 
on the Sraffian input-output surplus economics.
Wright claims that ‘organisation’ is a factor of production in addition to 
labour, the material means of production (to which should be added raw
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materials). There is an obvious intuitive sense in which this is true: a crowd of 
workers standing beside an assortment of machinery and raw materials is not 
production — in fact, it sounds quite like the description of a strike, i. e. the 
stoppage of production. Furthermore, it is clear that the value of a functioning 
capitalist firm is greater than the sum of the values of its individual material 
capital assets and the wage bill (even if we do not take the stock market 
valuation as the relevant measure of value). Despite all that, it is nevertheless 
questionable to what extent the organisation of production can be 
conceptualised as a productive resource in its own right.
To begin with the last point: clearly, a functioning firm involves on the one 
hand certain types of ‘know-how’, organisational in the wider sense including 
both the structures of relations between people and the technology; and on the 
other hand the work of organisation — ‘putting the knowledge into practice’. 
Now there is no reason, at least within Wright’s framework, why we should 
consider such work anything other than type of labour. Thus the only candidate 
for the productive resource is the organisational knowledge involved. But while 
such knowledge can attract a scarcity premium, both because of artificial 
scarcity cause by the proprietary defensive measures (patents, secrecy etc.) and 
because of its partially ‘subjective’ and ‘localised’ nature (see e. g. Hayek 1945), i. 
e. its embodiment within particular individuals which prevents its wide 
dissemination, this still does not imply that it is actually a productive resource.
In fact, within the Sraffian input-output economics, where knowledge is 
implicitly treated as a public good, there is neither a price tag nor a particular 
factor of production called ‘knowledge’. Production processes are here 
characterised by their inputs and outputs; but no more sophisticated description 
of technology is required. In a world described by Sraffa, individual firms might 
exist; yet their value would be no different from the sum of value of their assets. 
This is because the value of these assets is itself determined (partially) by the 
prevailing technology. In other words, things are valuable depending on how 
they are being used. But if this is so, then putting a price tag on technology
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separately, aside from the very inputs that define it, amounts to an instance of 
double-counting. If we take everything that goes into production and that 
comes out of it into account, and if we abstract from artificial and natural 
barriers to knowledge production (attracting rents), then there is nothing more 
to be talked about; the technology/knowledge/organisation has been fully 
accounted for. Hence, there is no such thing as organisation in Wright’s sense, 
and so no such thing as organisation exploitation.
Regarding the second problem, Wright was uneasy about describing 
relations based on ‘skills exploitation’ as relations of class.21 To this, many critics 
added an even more serious charge: ‘skills exploitation* is not exploitation at all; 
achieving a higher income on the basis of the possession of rare skills is a 
lessening of exploitation of the skill possessors, rather than the result of these 
possessors’ exploitation of others.22 Wright became convinced of the 
correctness of this criticism — which was one of the reasons why he abandoned 
the approach based on exploitation — and in his later writings, he instead refers 
to the rents earned by the possessors of the rare skills.23
I would argue that the reason why Wright could ever consider rents 
accruing to skills as the result of ‘exploitation’ is his reliance on the neoclassical 
theory of distribution. In his discussion in Classes (1985), he tried to justify the 
concept as follows: “To appropriate the fruits of someone else’s labour is 
equivalent to saying that a person consumes more than they produce. If the 
income of a person with skill assets is identical to their ‘marginal product, as 
neo-classical economists like to argue, how can we say that they are consuming 
‘more’ than their own contribution? ... When credentials are operating, 
employers will bid up the wages of the owners of the credential above the cost 
of producing the skills.” (Wright 1985, p. 77) Now, of course, the whole point 
of the Marxian Labour Theory of Value is that the wage is not the ‘whole 
product’ of the worker. Wright of course is very sceptical of the LTV; however,
21 Wright (1985), p. 95
22 See e. g. Carchedi (1989), pp. 110-111
23 Similar understanding of the ‘middle class’ incomes is found in Carchedi (1977).
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instead of the alternative school of surplus economics, the Sraffian one, from 
which stem many criticisms of the Marxian theory, he opts for the neoclassical 
view. Had he adopted the Sraffian standpoint, it would be easy to see that the 
wage can stillhe. understood as the cost of reproduction of labour-power, while 
profit is equivalent to the surplus product produced by the (collective) labour- 
power; this clearly implies that above-standard wages need be in no way the 
result of <exploitation,, but rather the lessening of it, precisely as required.24 
However, even under the purely neoclassical approach Wright's reasoning is 
faulty. The marginal product of labour is the notional measure of the 
effectivness of additional labour, not the product of any actual workers (which 
might be better measured by the average product).
Contradictory Class Locations Today: Eclecticism
Be that as it may, on the basis of his own self-criticisms, along with the 
objections of other critics, Wright gave up on the project of identifying the 
contradictory class locations on the basis of different forms of exploitation. The 
direction in which he headed instead can be described as backwards and 
sideways’: on the one hand, he returns to the original concept of contradictory 
class locations, on the other hand, he adds several interesting considerations 
which, however, are barely embedded in the wider Marxian theory. Among 
these are the mediated class locations and temporal locations.
The concept of the mediated class locations results from reflecting on the 
fact that many individuals may be in significant relationships with others, whose 
class position is different from their own. The paradigmatic case is that of 
housewives, whose class position is understood as the mediated class position of 
their husbands. In general, differing class positions between spouses will have 
an influence on each of their class positions; if such ‘cross-class’ marriages are 
common in a society, this can be expected to have a significant effect when
24 These points will be argued at greater length in later chapters.
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compared to a society where households are class-homogenous. Similarly, 
mediated class positions are relevant for the status of children, etc.
The temporal locations refers to the fact that individual class location at a 
point in time might not be a very good indication of the individual agents’ 
‘overall’ class position, so to speak. A student taking a summer job at a building 
site does not thereby become working class, despite occupying a working class 
job. Wright thus comes to the conclusion that it is the temporal trajectory 
through the class space that is significant, rather than the location at a particular 
moment in time.
The version of the ‘contradictory class positions’ that is currently on offer 
underscores the fact that Wright seems to have abandoned the effort at 
theoretical synthesis and is now content with exploring different facets of class 
as and when they seem to appear significant. The latest description of the 
‘contradictory class locations’ of the sort that we are interested in comes in 
terms of the different bundles of ‘rights and powers’:
“If the rights and powers associated with class relations are really complex bundles 
of decomposable rights and power, then they can potentially be partially 
unbundled and reorganized in complex ways. This can generate class locations 
which I have referred to as “contradictory locations within class relations’^ ...) 
Managers within corporations, for example, can be viewed as exercising some of 
the powers of capital — hiring and firing workers, making decisions about new 
technologies and changes in the labor process, etc. — and in this respect occupy 
the capitalist location within the class relations of capitalism. On the other hand, 
in general they cannot sell a factory and convert the value of its assets into 
personal consumption, and they can be fired from their jobs if the owners are 
unhappy. In these respects they occupy the working class location within class 
relations. The assumption behind this analytical strategy for understanding the 
class character of managers, then, is that the specific pattern of rights and powers 
over productive resources that are combined in a given location define a set of 
real and significant causal processes.” (Wright 2005b, p. 10)
71
Class, Surplus, and the Division cf Labour (II)
From this description, several things are clear. First of all, Wright has 
moved on from the simple two-part analysis of ownership found in Poulantzas. 
However, he still erroneously identifies the significant feature with the ability to 
do X rather than the actuality of doing X — that is, with ownership/power rather 
than with the division of labour.25 But most importantly, what is clear is that 
there is now almost no reason to call the class locations in question 
‘contradictory’. If we leave aside the rhetorical mention of ‘occupying a 
capitalist/working class location’ in the above quote, there is nothing in the 
description of the actual actions of the managers that would cause them to 
entertain any actually contradictory interests. The fact that they may hire and 
fire while themselves capable of being hired and fired, for example, puts them at 
best into the middle of some sort of hierarchy; however, there is nothing 
inherently contradictory about such a position.
Indeed, Wright’s own insistence on the relational nature of classes should 
have suggested to him that the contradictofiness is illusory. He characterised 
some positions as contradictory on the basis of the fact that they share some of 
the characteristics of both the capitalist and the working class. However, this 
would seem to suggest that such characteristics somehow embody the ‘essence’ 
of what it means to be a capitalist or a worker — that they define these class 
positions. But that is clearly false on Wright’s own understanding of classes: the
25 “The rights and powers in question are not defined with respect to the ownership or 
control of things in general, but only of resources or assets insofar as they are deployed in 
production. A capitalist is not someone who simply owns machines, but someone who 
owns machines, deploys those machines in a production process, hires owners of labor 
power to use them, directs the process by which the machines are used to produce 
things and appropriates the profits from the use of those machines. A collector of 
machines is not, by virtue of owning those machines, a capitalist. To count as a class 
relation it is therefore not sufficient that there be unequal rights and powers over the 
sheer possession of a resource. There must also be unequal rights and powers over the 
appropriation of the results of that use. In general this implies appropriating income 
generated by the deployment of the resource in question.” (Wright, 2005b, pp. 6-7) 
Notice that there is a discrepancy between the concrete description of the capitalist 
and the general characterisation of class relations as consisting in ‘unequal rights and 
powers over the appropriation of the results of that use’. The concrete description 
includes references to activities within production, absent from the general 
characterisation.
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capitalist class is capitalist because of the relationship it enters into with the 
working class, not because of any characteristics that it may possess 
independently of that relationship, or even as a result of it. Wright’s procedure 
is rather like observing that blood relatives tend to look similar and deducing 
that such similarity is the essence of the relation. Similarly to Roemer, whose 
case will be considered below, Wright confuses the consequences of the 
exploitative relationship with its essence.
Thus, in the end Wright’s attempt to theorise the middle classes must be 
judged unsuccessful in Marxian terms. This is not to say that there is nothing 
interesting in the concepts developed by him; far from it. However, the theses 
offered could be just as much accepted by a (left-wing) Weberian, and in a sense 
Wright admits as much.26 The difference he traces between the Weberian theory 
and his sort of Marxism centres on exploitation, which according to him forms 
the centrepiece of the Marxist approach. In contrast to the less specific 
Weberian theory, within Marxism exploitation is the ‘anchor’ that delimits the 
kinds of possible class mechanisms, which means, according to Wright, that 
“the Weberian strategy of class analysis is nested within the Marxist model” 
(Wright, 2005b, p. 19) This would seem to imply that the Weberian strategy is 
more specific than the Marxian one; however, Wright himself says almost 
immediately that the methodological openness of the Weberian approach allows 
it to include concepts such as exploitation as need be. Moreover, his Own 
researches and most innovative concepts are by now fairly eclectic and seem to 
have little to do with the putative conceptual ‘anchor’, i. e. exploitation. It would 
seem that beside the rhetorical protestations, Wright is no longer doing 
Marxism — albeit he probably continues to share at least some of the underlying
26 “This nesting of the Weberian concept of class within the Marxist means that for 
certain kinds of questions there will be little practical difference between Marxist and 
Weberian analyses. This is especially the case for micro-questions about the impact of 
class on the lives of individuals. ... Frank Parkin once made a well-known quip in a 
book about class theory that “Inside every neo-Marxist is a Weberian struggling to get 
out”. The argument presented here suggests a complementary proposition, that “Inside 
every leftist neo-Weberian is a Marxist struggling to stay hidden.” (Wright 2005b, p.
19)
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Marxist motivations. Tongue in cheek, we might want to say that Wright is a 
Marxist — it is just that his theory is not.
Carchedi: A Functionalist Account of Exploitation
Notable among the attempts to solve the problems of the ‘middle classes’ 
is the functionalist approach of Guglielmo Carchedi.
Carchedi’s starting point is Lenin’s definition of classes, which uses a 
fourfold distinction in terms of productive status, ownership, function, and 
‘consequently’ wealth (the share of it, the mode of acquiring it, etc.) The last 
criterion, however, does not play a real role in the determination of class status, 
since it is contingent upon the other ones. Thus, first, there are the producers 
and the non-producers; secondly, the owners and the non-owners; and finally, 
there are those performing the function of labour and the function of non­
labour (capital).
However, as Cottrell (1984, p. 83) points out, in practice it is really only the 
two distinctions in terms of ownership and function that actually matter for the 
understanding of the capitalist, the working and the middle class. For while 
Carchedi understands the distinction between the producers and the non­
producers in ‘orthodox’ Marxist terms as the distinction between those who 
produce surplus value and those who do not, this is not used to exclude the 
non-productive workers from the proletarian along Poulantzanian lines. 
Carchedi identifies the possibility that while the non-productive workers do not 
themselves create new values, the labour-time they put in production may 
nevertheless be greater than that embodied in the goods they consume. This 
possibility he terms ‘economic oppression’, and allows for the inclusion of the 
economically oppressed among the working class. It is really only the ownership 
and the function that are relevant in his discussion.
Obviously, the understanding of economic oppression just mentioned 
differs from the Wrightian one above. Recall that Wright labelled as 
economically oppressive those situations where some group would have been
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better off under a hypothetical alternative and its complement would have been 
worse off. The Wrightian understanding is obviously far wider than Carchedi’s. 
For this reason, I would suggest that a better name for Carchedi’s concept 
would be ‘quasi-exploitation’. This makes sense, since from the point of view of 
the unproductive worker themselves, there is no difference between their 
position and an exploited one; and then the broader term could be reserved for 
a greater variety of situations. Although it is not entirely fair to the author, I will 
at times use this new designation, in the interests of the ease of expression.
In Carchedi’s terms, the capitalist class is then defined as the group of 
owners, (quasi-)exploiters, and non-labourers, while the working class 
correspondingly consists of non-owners, (quasi-)exploited and labourers. Since 
the second of the three distinctions drops out from view, the trouble really 
arises when ownership is ‘misaligned’ with the function. This misalignment 
allows of degrees: there are some agents who are non-owners, yet perform 
solely the function of capital; other non-owners, however, may perform a 
mixture of the functions of labour and capital. It is important to note, however, 
that these are seen as temporally distinct: it is possible to perform either of the 
two activities, but not at the same time (Carchedi 1977, p. 8).
What exactly is non-labour? It is the activity of ‘control and surveillance’. 
Carchedi believes that this is distinct from the activity of the organisation of the 
labour process — and not just logically, but as we have just pointed out, also in 
practice, temporally. In effect, two processes are going on within capitalism, not 
simultaneously but intermittently: one is the actual process of production of 
use-values; the other is the process of production of surplus value. To the first 
one corresponds the activity of organisation of production; to the second one, 
the activity of control and surveillance.
Cottrell (1984, pp.84 — 86) charges that this understanding is different 
from Marx’s, but more importantly, that Marx’s version is more convincing. 
According to this view, the authoritarian workplace relations are the form which 
the co-ordination of production takes under capitalism. Surveillance and control
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are not activities separate from the organisation of production; they are the 
organisation of production, under the capitalist conditions.
However, this criticism is far less strong than it seems at the first sight. For 
suppose we admit that it is impossible to distinguish the ‘work of control and 
surveillance’ from the ‘work of co-ordination and unity’ (the terms are from 
Carchedi 1977, p. 63), and so it is impossible to distinguish the ‘function of 
capital’ from the ‘function of labour’ along the lines Carchedi wishes. What of 
it? Granted, some of the things Carchedi wants to say are now unutterable: his 
‘theory of proletarianisation’ of the new middle classes, according to which the 
share of the function of labour increases in the work of these strata and the 
share of the function of capital correspondingly declines, is now impossible. But 
the basic strategy of distinguishing the ‘new middle classes’ from the proletariat 
proper is untouched. If we really accept that control and surveillance are an 
integral part of the capitalist co-ordination, then those who perform this work 
without possessing any capital can still be identified as the ‘middle classes’. Here 
is what Carchedi says: “This fact, that the new middle class performs the global 
function of capital even without owning the means of production, and that it 
performs this function in conjunction with the function of the collective 
worker, is the basic point for an understanding of the nature of this class” 
(Carchedi 1977, p. 89) Now as long as there is any sort of work other than 
supervision and management, and we identify this other work with the ‘function 
of the collective worker’, this quote could stand despite the sort of criticism 
advanced above. It would no longer be the case that the ‘new middle class’ is 
necessarily involved in both ‘labour’ and ‘non-labour’, but it would be possible; 
and crucially, it would remain true that the function of capital were performed 
without the ownership of capital.
Whether Carchedi would accept such a modification or not (and he 
probably would not), it is clear that in our terms, Carchedi represents yet 
another attempt to combine the exploitation, surplus concept of class with the 
division-0f-labour concept. We can of course accept his reasons for calling the
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activity of surveillance and control ‘non-labour’; nevertheless the point remains 
that the division within the stratum of wage-earners is being made on the 
grounds of activity performed. It is in many ways an attempt quite similar to 
Wright’s, who indeed explicidy identifies it as ‘essentially the same insight’ as in 
the case of the contradictory class locations (Wright 1989, p. 302) — although of 
course there are also some important differences. Unlike Wright, Carchedi bases 
his approach explicidy on the labour theory of value. And secondly, Carchedi’s 
views are far more orientated towards the division-of-labour pole than to the 
ownership-rights pole, which is the main locus of interest for Wright. In that 
respect, he is close to the relevant realities.
What makes for a major difference between the two theorists, and what 
renders Carchedi’s work interesting indeed, is the effort he makes to fuse the 
exploitation and the division-of-labour concepts. As should be clear from the 
discussion, the division of labour that is relevant for Carchedi is based on 
exploitation: the function of capital is to extract surplus labour. Thus, it is really 
the activity cf exploitation, exploitatlon-as-work that is the relevant sort of ‘labour’ (or 
as he puts it, ‘non-labour’) for determining the status of the ‘middle classes’. 
Basically, Carchedi attempts to postulate that authoritarian production relations 
form (part of) the essence of exploitation. This would mean that when such 
authoritarian activity becomes separated from the appropriation of the surplus 
product, it nevertheless still ‘inherits’ the characteristic of being exploitative.
This is an intriguing idea, but unfortunately it fails. First of all, it is clear 
that we can observe authoritarian relations in many areas other than production 
— the army, the school, the church, for example. Should we consider these 
relations also ‘exploitative’? It seems to me that we are damned if we do and 
damned if we do not. Suppose we go for the first option: this means we would 
have to extent the notion of ‘production’ to just about any hierarchically 
organised activity. And even if we swallowed that, we would have to believe that 
these relations are ‘exploitative’ even if no exploitation in terms of surplus 
labour occurs. And such situations are quite clearly possible, as having authority
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over someone does not imply that this someone supplies surplus labour. To 
believe in exploitative relations without any surplus labour, however, really 
stretches belief too far. It does not seem possible to argue that all authoritarian 
relations are exploitative in this way.
But going for the second option and accept that in spheres other than 
production, authoritarian relations are not identical with the ‘activity of 
exploitation’ is not much better. For why should the essentially same activity of 
supervision and control inherit the characteristic stamp of exploitation in one 
area and not in the others? And if it does not, which does make sense, is this 
not a reason to doubt that such activity is in any sense ‘fundamentally’ 
exploitative? It seems to me that it is quite plausible to claim that the ‘work of 
surveillance and control’ within production is but one token of the genus that 
occurs in very many guises in human societies. Indeed, it is much more plausible 
than the alternative claim that it constitutes a fundamentally exploitative activity 
within production and not so in other areas.
For these reasons alone, it does not make much sense to identify ‘work of 
control and surveillance’ with the activity of exploitation. There is, however, 
another argument, which is in my opinion even more decisive, since it does not 
rely on us leaving the sphere of production.
The argument is simply that authoritarian organisation of production can 
occur even without any surplus being produced, and thus without any surplus 
labour being appropriated. There is no logical reason why a subsistence 
economy could not be organised along authoritarian lines. It is, of course, 
possible to argue the other way and claim that the presence of authoritarian 
work relations indicates the presence of the surplus — whereby those who order 
others are really consuming the surplus product. However, this implies that they 
are parasites that the rest of the society could do without. But there is no 
independent reason to believe this to be the case. There is no necessary logical 
connection between the subsistence economy and an egalitarian division of 
labour. It may well be that under some circumstances, in certain geographical
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areas and with a certain set of known technologies, there is simply no way of 
organising production in an egalitarian way and ensuring survival. No reason has 
ever been given why this ‘primitive authoritarianism’, as opposed to primitive 
communism, should not be a logical possibility.
But if so, if authoritarian relations are even in some case necessary simply 
for subsistence rather than for the production of surplus, then the whole idea of 
identifying them with the activity of exploitation comes crashing down. For 
otherwise we would have the absurd situation of exploitation without any 
surplus labour! That is clearly an untenable position.
A possible response to this argument would be to say that the Carchedian 
identification of the ‘work of control and surveillance’ with the exploitative 
function was never meant metaphysically; that it cannot be understood 
ahistorically as valid outside the capitalist mode of production. Such references 
to historically contingent ‘laws’ are indeed a common sort of defence among 
Marxists. Moreover, Carchedi himself never claims that the distinctions made 
have any validity outside of the capitalist mode of production; thus it could be 
argued that in identifying the ‘work of control and surveillance’ with the activity 
of exploitation we are erecting a straw-man.27
This objection amounts to saying that while the ‘work of control and 
surveillance’ happens to coincide with the ‘function of capital’ within capitalism, 
this is contingent on the capitalist mode of production. However, the trouble is 
that unless we do believe that there is something more fundamental about 
authoritarian relations that welds them to exploitation, there is simply no reason 
why we should identify the two! Granted, without such activity, surplus labour 
would not be produced. But then, neither would it be produced without the 
‘function of labour’ itself. Why should we focus our attention on just this particular 
sort of activity, unless we believe that there is some intrinsic characteristic which
27 It should be noted, however, that limiting the theory of classes to capitalism seriously 
weakens the claim of Marxism to be a theory of history; thus some sort of extension of 
Carchedi’s theory would be required to safeguard this claim, even if not the particular 
extension we have been considering.
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makes it a candidate for being identified with the exploitative function? If there is 
no such characteristic, then the ‘work of surveillance and control’ is just one 
activity of many — very, very many — that happen to be performed within a 
capitalist enterprise, and its identification with the function of capital is completely 
unmotivated.
Thus, I believe that Carchedi’s attempt to fuse the exploitation concept with 
the division-of-labour concept of class ultimately fails. This is not to say that 
authoritarian division of labour does not matter for capitalism, or for exploitative 
systems generally — quite the contrary. What I am saying is simply that the 
conflation of the two concepts is illegitimate. Authoritarian relations cannot be 
subsumed under exploitation, and vice versa. There may be a certain sort of 
relation between them, and indeed I shall argue that this is so. But they are not 
identical.
Nevertheless, Carchedi’s approach remains inspiring, in that instead of 
focusing simply on the content of the activities within the division of labour, as is 
common among the theorists of class, he directs our attention also to their function. 
That function is important for the determination of dass is a valuable insight, and I 
shall be using it in later chapters.
Bahro: Mental vs. Manual Labour Again
Rudolf Bahro’s Alternative in Eastern Europe (1978) is not a work explicidy 
concerned with the notion of dass. It is, as the German subtide suggests, a 
“contribution to the critique of the actually existing sodalism”. It is an extensive 
work dealing with the origins, the nature of, and the transcendence of the Soviet- 
type regimes. However, it contains many important passages concerning the 
question of nature and significance of classes.
First of all, although the book was written while the author was a citizen of 
the former German Democratic Republic and a (dissenting) member of its ruling 
party, there are some striking resemblances between its themes and some of the 
features of the so-called Western Marxism. In particular, for our purposes it is
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significant that Bahro is in agreement with a prominent strand of Western Marxism 
that emphasises the integration of the working class into Western capitalism, rejects 
the belief in its revolutionary character, and in effect abandons class as a central 
explanatory concept.
Bahro’s work represents an extension of this de-emphasis from capitalism 
to the ‘actually existing socialism’ or ‘proto-socialism’ (Bahro’s term), attempting 
to demonstrate that the ‘working class’ is not a significant player in the politics 
of the system. He goes as far as claiming the concept ‘inapplicable’ to this type 
of society in the tide of one of his chapters, although the actual point made in 
the chapter is less strong, arguing simply that no transformative activity can be 
expected from this class qua class. Bahro claims that instead of the proletariat 
being a revolutionary class within the ‘proto-socialist’ society, members of all 
classes are to be drawn towards a revolutionary project. Thus, the buds of the 
political ecology of the future founding member of the German Greens can 
already be seen through the swathes of Marxist rhetoric.
Such an un-Marxist approach is perhaps more easily understood if we 
realise that Bahro was writing in a context of the society without property-based 
classes, and thus the meaning of an alliance of the members of ‘all classes’ is 
quite different to what it appears to be from the Western perspective. The social 
context in which Bahro’s work was written is decisive in other respects as well. 
While the essential tenor of Marx’s work is the singular importance of private 
property and its development, with the state hovering in the background 
sometimes as the mystified and alienated expression of common interest (Marx 
and Engels 1965, p. 45), sometimes as the tool of the ruling classes, Bahro 
effectively reverses the importance of the two phenomena. Writing under a 
nominally ‘socialist’ regime, Bahro relates the existence of that regime to the 
‘Asiatic’ mode of production, analogically to Wittfogel (1957), though never 
mentioning him by name; and claims that the state-organised production existed 
on a far wider geographical scale and for a far longer period of history than was 
the case with private property. On Bahro’s account, it seems that the state as the
81
Class, Surplus, and the Division cf Labour (II)
essential organising force of the economy was the rule for millennia, in 
comparison to which the development of private property is an accidental blip 
occurring only on a comparatively tiny area of the small continent of Europe.
Given this view, and given the character of the society he is in the main 
analysing, it is natural that for Bahro, the important source of class 
differentiation does not lie in the direction of property. Instead, he focuses very 
much and quite explicitly on the division of labour, in particular the division 
between mental and manual labour. Bahro claims that this division was the first 
basis of class division according to Marx, basing this on The German Ideology}*
However, Bahro does not conceive of the distinction between the mental 
and manual labour in straightforward terms. In this respect, he is similar to 
Poulantzas, although the exact explication of these terms is quite different in the 
two cases. It would be more correct to say that for Bahro, the division between 
mental and manual work is at the root of the far more complex modern day 
problem, which can be summed up under the heading of ‘subalternity’.
Subalternity, in Bahro’s terms, is “the mentality and behavior of dependent 
“little people” alienated from the overall totality” (Bahro 1979, p. 195). The 
opposite of subalternity is that mode of individual existence which enables to 
consciously shape the total social reality—to participate in planning, in strategic 
thinking, in the general development of the higher intellectual functions in the 
service of grasping ‘the overall totality’. To overcome subalternity, and thus to 
eliminate the division between the rulers and the ruled, as well as the 
intellectuals and the non-intellectuals, was to be, according to Bahro, the main 
task of the movement for the transcendence of the ‘actually existing socialism’.
28 As we have seen, this claim is not literally correct (recall that what Marx and Engels 
actually said was that “the division (f labour only becomes truly such from the moment 
when a division of material and mental labour appears”, Marx and Engels 1965, p. 43, 
emphasis added). Nevertheless, there is a case to be made that such an interpretation, 
or at least such a direction of development of Marx’s thought could be made to stand.
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Authoritarian Organisation Is N ot the Same As Mental Labour
In this context, I believe that it is important to bring out the difference 
between ‘mental’ and ‘manual’ labour on the one hand, and ‘domination’ and 
‘subordination’ on the other. At times Bahro gives the impression of conflating 
the two distinctions; yet it is quite easy to show that such a conflation is 
illegitimate.
It is true that domination cannot be exercised as ‘manual labour’, in the 
trivial sense that commanding human beings does not mean literal manual 
manipulation of them. Brute physical force may involve such manipulation, of 
course; but while domination may be based on such physical acts of violence, it is 
not identical with them. In this sense, domination cannot be identified with 
manual labour, and thus it may seem ‘natural’ to understand it as primarily 
mental labour.
Nevertheless, at least in the direct, personal, face-to-face sense, domination 
is not really well understood in this way either. While the activity of 
commanding others may require the use of the powers of conception, so does 
most if not all manual labour; only the most routinised manual processes could 
plausibly be thought to be devoid of such conceptual work.
Thus, the exercise of domination does not imply mental labour as a 
separate category. The dominating group need not be a group involved 
primarily in mental labour at all. A caste of warriors may well be ruling a sea of 
peasants without thereby becoming ‘mental labourers’.
Conversely, there are many kinds of unquestionably mental activity, from 
philosophy through theoretical physics to artistic creation, which involve no 
direct personal domination whatsoever. The fact that the working activity is 
occurring inside someone’s mind does not imply anything for their relationship 
towards others.
The conclusion seems to be that the two distinctions are simply on a 
different plane. Differentiating between mental and manual labour means that 
the focus is the nature of the activities of the individual in question, quite
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separately from any social context in which those activities may be performed. 
In other words, it does not matter what social interactions are occurring; what is 
important is simply the kind of doings of the individual in question.
On the other hand, domination vs. subordination are intrinsically social 
concepts, indeed this is immediately seen from their ‘dialectical unity’. We 
cannot have domination without subordination and vice versa for the precise 
reason that no individual can be either dominating or subordinated on their own. 
The relationship requires precisely social interaction, a relationship between two 
or more individuals. The precise nature of their activities is immaterial in this 
context.
Thus, while mental labour and domination may often coincide within the 
same person, and manual labour might correspondingly coincide with 
subordination, the two pairs of concepts nevertheless refer to quite different 
aspects of reality. Their empirical correlation is a matter for explanation, not a 
reason for identification.
Bahro’s work is important for the present purpose, because it focuses very 
clearly on one of the most important characteristics of the division of labour — 
namely the impact it makes on the individual performing a given sort of labour. 
I do not believe that it is really possible to build the concept of class simply on 
these sorts of effects, as Bahro seems to intend at least some of the time. But 
this is not to deny their importance, nor the salience of the concepts that he 
uses to analyse them, all of which will come to the fore at the appropriate 
moment.
Albert and Hahnel: Exploitation and the Division of Labour
Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel represent the radical theorists of the 
erstwhile New Left, who in their analysis of historical development and class 
eventually broke with Marxism precisely over the questions of the division of 
labour.
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Albert and Hahnel identify three basic classes within capitalism — as 
opposed to classical Marxism, which only admits two capitalism-produced 
classes (with petty bourgeoisie belonging of course to a different mode of 
production). For Albert and Hahnel, the three classes of capitalism are the 
capitalist, the working class, and the co-ordinatorist class. Just as the capitalist class 
is distinguished by the fact that it monopolises the (material) means of 
production, the co-ordinatorist class is characterised by the fact that it 
monopolises skilled, empowering, creative and pleasant positions within the 
social division of labour. Among the co-ordinatorist class, we would thus find 
the state bureaucrats, company managers, doctors, lawyers, etc. In the broader 
theory, Albert and Hahnel see the co-ordinators as the class that got into the 
saddle in the countries of the ‘actually existing socialism’, and they regard 
Marxism as the ideology of this class. For these authors, part of the evidence for 
this notion is the very fact that Marxism fails to acknowledge the existence of 
this class; in their view, this means that it obscures the relevant features of 
reality and prevents the working class from recognising its own interests, which 
are objectively divergent from those of the co-ordinators.
Albert and Hahnel’s recipe for abolishing classes is described in their 
various books on ‘participatory economics’ (Parecon for short) — c. f. Looking 
Forward (Albert and Hahnel 1991 a), The Political Economy of Participatory Economics 
(Albert and Hahnel 1991b), Parecon (Albert 2003),, Economic Justice and Democracy 
(Hahnel 2005) Aside from employing a co-ordinating mechanism based on a 
sort of decentralised planning, the authors place great emphasis on the existence 
of ‘balanced job complexes’. This means that instead of specialising in a 
particular branch of production, every worker is assigned a set of tasks which 
contains both empowering, creative elements, and tedious, routine and menial 
ones. This is done in such a way that everybody in the society experiences all 
aspects of production roughly equally — hence the term ‘balanced’ — although it 
is of course not being suggested that everybody is involved in exactly the same 
activities. The objective is to break up the monopoly of the co-ordinatorist class
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on the ‘luxury’ activities, enable equal access to them and thus an equal 
opportunity for development.
With the proviso that (parts of) the co-ordinatorist class have significant 
power over their own remuneration, and thus cannot be precisely characterised 
as being party to the wage-labour relationship with capital, we might want to say 
that Albert & Hahnel use two different analytical knives to carve out classes 
from the society as a whole.29 In the first place, society is divided into the 
owners of capitalist property, who constitute the capitalist class, and those 
without such property. This latter group is then further divided, using the ‘knife’ 
of the division of labour, into the co-ordinators and the working class proper.
There are obvious similarities between this conceptualisation of classes and 
that of Bahro, for example -  as indeed are the recipes that are suggested for the 
elimination of the existence of classes. The main criticism we may want to 
advance is that while the picture is extremely suggestive and admirably close to 
empirical reality, there is very little suggestion of a wider theory justifying the 
use of just these tools for the identification of classes. The proposition that it is 
the co-ordinatorist class that vies for power with the capitalists, achieving it in 
the Soviet-type regimes, is hard to take seriously, given what we know about the 
political preferences of co-ordinators within the Western countries. (One might 
refer here to Wright’s self-criticism above regarding the wishes of these strata.) 
While there is no denying that some sections of this stratum might welcome the 
extension of state power, if it represents the extension of their own power, there 
is little suggestion that there is a stable preference for the overall social planning 
along Soviet lines, much less for a Soviet-style dictatorship — among whose 
victims the ‘co-ordinators’ were all too often over-represented.
Bourdieu: Life Experience and Forms of Capital
While Pierre Bourdieu is in part clearly inspired by Marxism, the 
distinctivness of his theory is equally clear. To characterise the social world,
29 In private communication, Michael Albert has endorsed this picture.
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Bourdieu uses a whole series of concepts of his own invention. As Weininger 
(2005, p. 119) says, these concepts for the most part arose within the context of 
actual empirical investigations, rather than on the basis of entirely self-contained 
theoretical work, and hence it is not easy to describe Bourdieu’s approach in 
context-free abstract terms. However, I shall do my best to try to sketch the 
essentials of Bourdieu’s thinking, albeit it should be borne in mind that much of 
its richness is by necessity going to be left out.
The consideration of the existence of social classes, then, might start with 
one of Bourdieu’s specific concept, that of social space.
This social space is multidimensional, and characterised by Bourdieu in a 
variety of ways. There is, for example, the following description: “The “social 
reality” which Durkheim spoke of is an ensemble of invisible relations, those 
very relations which constitute a space of positions external to each other and 
defined by their proximity to, neighborhood with, or distance from each other, 
and also by their relative position, above or below or yet in between, in the 
middle” (Bourdieu 1986, p. 16) Sociology is then understood as ‘social 
topology’, an analysis of positions and their spatial relations. On the other hand, 
since these positions are associated with ‘active properties’, ‘powers’, the social 
space can also be described “as a field of forces, i. e., as a set of objective power 
relations that impose themselves on all who enter the field” (Bourdieu 1985, p. 
723) Both the topological and the field descriptions, however, are to be taken 
more as metaphors, rather than serious attempts to impose a mathematical 
structure on the social research, and are used as such.
What distinguishes the various ‘planes’ of the social space are the kinds of 
capital that are relevant on them. Bourdieu generalises this economic concept, so 
that spheres of social existence other than the economic one can be 
characterised in terms of capital as well. Thus, there are in his thinking four 
kinds of capital — or better, three plus one. Aside from the classic case of 
economic capital, there are also the cultural and the social kinds; and finally also 
something called the ‘symbolic’ capital.
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Capital in general is characterised as “accumulated labour (in its 
materialized form or its ‘incorporated,’ embodied form) which, when 
appropriated on a private, i. e. exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, 
enables them to appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labour” 
(Bourdieu 1986, p. 46) Here, capital is understood as a material good, whether 
existing outside of the human body, or accumulated inside it. This fits the usual 
usage within neoclassical economics, at least to some extent. However, 
sometimes Bourdieu takes more of a Marxist tack and talks about capital as a 
social relation, the relation of power: “Capital... represents a power over the [social] 
field (at a given moment) and, more precisely, over the accumulated product of 
past labor (in particular over the set o f instruments of production) and thereby 
over the mechanisms tending to ensure the production of a particular category of 
goods and so over a set of incomes and profits” (Bourdieu 1985, p 724). The 
immediate identification of the ownership relation and the good owned is however 
more common in his writings.
Economic capital, then, is the straightforward material wealth, “which is 
immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalised in the 
form of property rights” (Bourdieu 1989, p. 47). Cultural capital in its embodied 
form consists of accumulated knowledge, acquired intellectual as well as aesthetic 
abilities and sensitivities, etc.; in the objectified form, it consists of the various 
material objects (“pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc.”) 
viewed from the point of view of the symbolic/mental content embodied in them, 
rather than from the point of view of immediate material properties; and finally in 
the institutionalised form, it consists of various ‘official’, i. e. recognised tides 
confirming the possession of the embodied cultural capital (educational 
qualifications being the paradigmatic case of this). Social capital is an attempt to 
theorise in terms of capital the wealth of ‘connections’, that which is acquired by 
‘networking’, gaining implicit or explicit membership in groups, etc.
Finally, there is symbolic capital, “commonly called prestige, reputation, 
renown, etc., which is the form in which the different forms of capital are
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perceived and recognized as legitimate’’ (Bourdieu 1985, p. 724). This last notion 
seems a litde odd, in that it can hardly be thought to be on the same ontological 
footing as the other three, given that it is the form these other three take. It would 
make more sense to say that such symbolic capital attaches to a person who is seen 
as having acquired some other form of capital in a recognised and legitimate way— 
if that is indeed the intention of the term.
With the help of these notions, it is possible to construct neighbourhoods in 
the social space, positions with relatively similar amounts of the various sorts of 
capital. Assuming that these amounts o f capital are conditioning factors, and that 
their effects are continuous, we might agree with Bourdieu that “consequently they 
[the agents] have every chance of having similar dispositions and interests, and thus 
of producing practices and representations of a similar kind” (Bourdieu 1987, p. 5) 
These conditionings, dispositions and interests are summarised in Bourdieu’s term 
‘habitus’, which according to him is literally inscribed in the body.
The habitus can perhaps best be understood as the source of pre- 
conscious responses (‘practices’) to situations; as Weininger (2005, p. 124-125) 
remarks, these responses have nothing to do with either the compliance with 
norm or with rational calculation. This is why habitus is a set of dispositions: it 
shapes the way in which we are inclined to act, without the conscious direction 
of our behaviour. But the habitus is not identical with ‘habit’: it might be 
perhaps said that while a habit designates the exact same response, the habitus 
generates a response which, even though it might be unique in itself, is of the 
same family of responses.30
As stated above, according to Bourdieu groups possessing similar amounts 
of capital develop similar habituses, thus the whole ‘styles of life’. Now given
30 Although note that “we must begin by acknowledging that, for Bourdieu, the process 
through which the habitus is constituted is not situated— or at least not primarily 
situated— at the “point of production.” In other words, although the occupational system 
comprises the institutional core <f the “class structure”for Bourdieu, it is neither the labor market nor 
the shop floor (or office cubicle) which functions as the site in which the causalprocesses giving rise to a 
class-specific habitus u n fo ld (Weininger 2005, p. 125, emphasis added) Instead, it is 
basically the ‘lived experience’, as Wright (1989b, pp. 288) puts it.
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these similarities, we might be tempted to identify these groups with classes. 
Such a temptation should be resisted, says Bourdieu. These are just ‘classes on 
paper’. They are theoretical constructions, artefacts of the sociologist’s intellect. 
They are at best ‘potential’ classes, which might become real if mobilised, but 
that need not ever happen. For this reason, Bourdieu claims that such potential 
classes are different from both the Marxist classes-in-themselves and classes- 
for-themselves. The main objection seems to be that the transition from one to 
the other is described “in terms of logic that is either totally determinist or 
totally voluntarist” (Bourdieu 1985, p. 726). The former option makes the 
distinction conceptually redundant, even if important historically. The latter 
amounts to a ‘sleight of hand’, which removes ‘the most essential questions’: 
who gets the members of the potential class to realise their commonality? And 
what is the relation between the theoretical ‘class’ and the representations that 
agents independendy and constantly produce within their own consciousness?
Thus, Bourdieu sees classes as just one instance of a ‘group’, where group 
is understood as a mobilized, self-conscious entity. Since groups do not have 
real collective consciousness, this implies that the individual members of the 
group are aware of their mutual connections, act in some basic solidarity with 
each other, interact together etc. Classes, then, are such mobilized groups, 
characterised by the closeness of position in social space — which means, by the 
closeness in the particular amounts o f capital of various sorts that they hold.
It should be pointed out that one of the theoretical virtues of Bourdieu’s 
conceptualisation is that he does not get seduced by the Siren call of property 
relations, the view that what matters for the determination of class membership 
is ownership.31 However, at the same time it seems that Bourdieu leans too far
31 “(...) it must be recognized that for Bourdieu, the notion of a class structure
encompasses the entirety of the occupational division of labor. This implies that he 
grants the notion a considerably wider purview than do Marxian theories, which 
restrict its scope to a system of positions defined in terms of ownership of and/or 
control over the means of production. Consequently, Bourdieu is not confronted by 
the problem upon which so many Marxian theories have foundered— namely, that of 
determining how to cope with all those positions in the division of labor which cannot
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in the opposite direction — despite the superficially Marxian language he 
sometimes uses, he fails to do justice to the concept of surplus production and 
exploitation.
It seems clear that while he chooses the term ‘capital’ to designate a 
particular feature of social reality, this is not capital in the Marxian sense of the 
term, even if a nod is given in the direction of ‘accumulated labour’. For 
Bourdieu’s analysis focuses on the status of the possessors of capital, rather than 
on any production going on. This should not be confused with the dogmatic 
objection that there really is only the economic capital. There may well be good 
reasons to try to extend the concept to other areas. However, if there is an 
essential characteristic of capital in the Marxian sense, it is that it is a means of 
production; it is used in order to enforce and appropriate surplus labour, and 
thus to increase the overall social wealth. It is hard to see how equivalent claims 
could be made about Bourdieu’s ‘cultural’ and ‘social’ capital. An increase in 
one’s level of education or culture is not achieved by employing the existing 
level in order to force someone else to produce a surplus; the same goes for the set 
of networking connections one ‘possesses’.
Rather than ‘capital’ in the Marxian sense, the obvious connotation of 
Bourdieu’s term seems to be simply ‘riches’ or ‘wealth’. To be sure, these may 
be used in productive processes. But the way they are used seems far closer to 
how an artisan utilises the means of production they own — to work with them 
oneself. There does not appear any straightforward concept of exploitation 
attached to Bourdieu’s novel kinds of ‘capital’.
Furthermore, the putative ‘cultural’ and ‘social’ capital lacks another 
essential characteristic of the concept, whether in the Marxian or neoclassical
be characterized in terms of the canonical division between “owners” and “workers” 
(or which cannot be characterized “adequately” or “satisfactorily” in these terms).
Thus, his model effectively encompasses not only the “middle class” occupations that 
have been the source of so much grief in the Marxist tradition, but also those which 
have hovered at the fringes of most class analytical schemes, including positions in 
public administration and the state “apparatus,” the so-called “professions,” and— not 
least of all— intellectuals, artists, and other “cultural producers”.” (Weininger 2005, p. 
122)
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understanding: it is not alienable. In this respect, it is far more akin to the land 
under feudalism, which was also tied to the person of the landowner by birth, so 
to speak, than to the capitalist form of private property. Given the essential 
inalienability of cultural/social capital, it cannot be exchanged for anything, and 
thus there can be no market for it (although there certainly can be a market for 
its products)?2
Perhaps relatedly, it is not clear from Bourdieu’s writings what the precise 
relationship is between the various social fields he identifies. Lumping all the 
disparate elements under the unifying term ‘capital’ seems to imply an essential 
equality in the ontological and practical status of the various spheres, in the 
sharp contrast to the orthodox Marxist picture, in which the ‘superstructure’ is 
subordinated to the economic ‘base’. We do not need to go that far to feel 
uneasy about postulating such full equality, however. Bourdieu does seem to 
suggest at times that the economic does have primacy in some sense, but it is 
not specified what this means, and at any rate for the most part he talks about 
the reproduction in the various fields as if it were able to proceed 
autonomously. This seems a serious drawback, as any real-world experience 
with the question of financing higher education, for example, would suggest.
Bourdieu’s writings present a far richer picture of the real experience of 
class than most that we have been considering, and the concepts of social field, 
habitus and — despite the criticisms above — even the extended notion of capital 
clearly merit much further attention.
32 Bourdieu does talk about ‘converting’ one form of capital into another; however, this is 
quite woolly language. Granted that money can perhaps buy connections, but it can 
hardly buy culture -  at best, it can buy the opportunity to gain culture, but labour is still 
required. Moreover, and more importantly, getting income by gaining access to well- 
paid positions through educational credentials and/or networking does not mean that the 
latter disappear, that they ‘get used up’, as would be the case with money capital. Thus, 
the analogy does not work.
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Conclusion
What have we learned? The existence of the wage-earning ‘middle classes’ 
poses a fundamental challenge to the Marxian concept of class based on 
exploitation, for the exploitation relation recognised only two possible classes: 
the exploiters and the exploited. I have tried to argue that the various solutions 
that have been advanced to deal with this problem consist mostly in falling back 
to an alternative, division-of-labour conceptualisation of class — sometimes 
supplementing, other times supplanting the exploitation concept. While I have 
tried to probe and criticise the various solutions proposed, most contain 
valuable elements that should certainly be a part of a sophisticated theory of 
classes. However, none seems to adequately theorise the nature and the need for 
the division-of-labour concept; for the most part, it is an ad hoc addition without 
a deeper theoretical justification. In the next chapter, I will therefore try to 
clarify the notion of exploitation and what mileage we can get out of it, and in 
the process specify the general theory of reproduction that I take to be the 
illuminating kernel of Marxism.
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Chapter III
Exploitation Is N o t a Game 
A Critique of John Roemer
In Chapter IV, I will try to reconstruct and clarify a concept of exploitation 
on which a theory of class can be based. But in order to present my own views, 
I would first like to critically discuss the theoretical work of John Roemer. 
Roemer is an important reference point in the modern debate on classes. His 
methodology, adopted explicitly as an import from neoclassical economics, as 
well as many of his conclusions, made him a target of criticisms of a wide range 
of more classically-minded Marxists, who find his work unacceptable. 
Nevertheless, Roemer has had some influence on other theorists — Erik Olin 
Wright, as mentioned above, being probably the most prominent among them.
Ethical Egalitarianism vs. Historical Materialism
It is by now a well-rehearsed point that Roemer is not and probably never 
really was a Marxist in the sense of developing historical materialism. Instead, his 
project as a whole can now be seen to be one of ethical egalitarianism} I think it is 
fair to say that Roemer is not so much concerned with the positive issue of what 
exists, but rather with the normative issue of what should be the case. Thus, unlike 
Marx, Roemer focuses not on analysis of existing affairs, but rather on the 
questions of justice and injustice. In particular, his ethical concerns are bound 
up with a strong commitment to equality as a guiding principle.
While there is a long-standing tradition of left-wing egalitarian thinking (cf. 
Crosland 1956, Bobbio 1995), it is instructive to note that this tradition comes
1 Roberts (1997) uses the term ‘ethical socialism’ more frequently than egalitarianism in 
characterisation of Roemer’s positions. However, if we take socialism to mean 
common ownership of the means of production, then I do not think Roemer is 
necessarily a socialist. When socialism in this sense is considered in his work, it tends 
to be as a means to an end, and the end is one of equality.
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from the non-Marxist, right wing of Social Democracy. Arguably, equality was the 
goal that was adopted in contrast to the Marxist stress on common ownership 
of the means of production.
Marx himself was certainly no ethical egalitarian. First, it is well known that 
Marx rather tended to eschew the issues of morality, despite the arguments that 
there was an ethical theory underlying his views (Popper 2002, Cohen 2000). 
Secondly, equality makes hardly any appearance in his work, whose main focus 
is on the issues of class struggle, exploitation, and (the elimination of) private 
property of the means of production. And finally, if we look at Marx’s 
description of communism, we can see that in his view this ‘ideal society’ would 
not really be concerned with equality either.
The familiar slogans summing up the lower and the higher stage of 
communism respectively are ‘From each according to their ability, to each 
according to their contribution’ and ‘From each according to their ability, to 
each according to their need’ (Marx 1951, p. 23)2
The first slogan expresses still a ‘bourgeois right’, taking as it does for 
granted that differences in natural talents are grounds for differential reward 
(Marx 1951, p. 22). Thus, both the highly talented and the untalented will work 
as much as they can, but far from being rewarded equally, the highly talented 
will be better off just thanks to their natural gifts.
This sort of inequality is meant to be eliminated in the higher stage of 
communism, where the rewards will be on the basis of need rather than 
contribution. However, just as with contributions, needs differ from person to 
person. There is thus no assumption that the rewards will be equalised. Those 
with greater needs will receive more, those whose needs are more modest will 
receive less.
As we can see, the fact that equality was Roemer’s guiding principle meant 
that he was developing a different line of inquiry from Marx’s from the very
2 Only the second slogan actually makes an appearance in the Critique of the Gotha 
Programme; the first is implied by the immediately preceding passages, but not actually 
stated in the now-familiar form.
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beginning. Nevertheless, the issues he was ostensibly concerned with — 
exploitation and class -  are the same ones that we are focusing on. For this 
reason, it is important to discuss his views, even if our conclusions can be 
expected to be quite different from the ones Roemer arrives at.
I will concentrate on Roemer’s General Theory cf Exploitation and Class (1982) 
— from now on referred to as G T E C -, although the discussion will also bring in 
his important article ‘Should Marxists Be Interested in Exploitation?’ (1985)and 
occasionally touch upon some other of his writings.
The Ostensible and the Real Purpose of the GTEC
Roemer’s ostensible purpose in GTEC  was to provide a concept of 
exploitation that would account for the continuing existence of various 
undesirable features of the states that were claiming to be socialist. Roemer 
claims that, in line with the general materialist conception of history, the 
phenomena resembling the previous class societies must be explained on the 
basis of the theory of exploitation. However, to cope with an unexpected task — 
explaining exploitation under socialism - this theory needs to be re-formulated, 
generalised. This is illustrated by drawing a parallel with Marx’s approach. 
Marx’s problem, according to Roemer, was how to explain “the persistent 
accumulation of wealth by one class and the persistent impoverishment of 
another, in an economic system characterized by voluntary trade” (Roemer, 
GTEC, p. 6), as opposed to the previous system, where the reasons for 
accumulation and impoverishment consisted quite obviously in the “coercive 
institution of labor exchange”. To solve this problem, “Marx constructed his 
theory of value and exploitation” (Roemer GTEC, p. 6) Now,
“[i]n the transition to socialist society, the institutional culprit responsible for 
capitalist exploitation has been eliminated.... The institutional dimension which 
we are now required to vary is the one labelled “ownership locus of the means of 
production,” not the one with which Marx was concerned, labelled “coerciveness 
of the institution of labor exchange”. The formal problem, however, has the same
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abstract structure for us as for Marx. He required a theory of exploitation which 
was robust even when one relaxed the coerciveness of its institution of labor 
exchange; we require a theory of exploitation which is robust even when one 
relaxes the institutional specification concerning the private locus of ownership of 
the means of production.” (Roemer GTEC, pp. 6 -7)
I believe that in this quote and the passages preceding it, Roemer confuses 
two quite different aspects of Marx’s work. These are, on the one hand, the 
concept of exploitation, and on the other, the theory of (capitalist) exploitation. 
Although the confusion may appear slight at a first glance, in fact it has some 
very serious consequences.
What Marx did, in the first place, was to identify surplus labour as the 
source of accumulated wealth. In effect, he explained the accumulation of 
wealth with the new concept of his own invention — namely, exploitation.
Now this concept and the explanations based on it are quite independent 
from any particular institutional setting. That is why all class societies could be 
characterised as societies based on exploitation (which is the common Marxist 
understanding). This does not mean, o f course, that there is any exploitation ‘in 
abstract’, aside from the particular mechanisms through which it is being realised. 
Indeed, the way in which surplus labour is squeezed out of direct producers, 
Marxists generally concur, is the basic characteristic of a mode of production. 
Yet, the notion of exploitation can be understood completely without the need to 
postulate any one of such institutional mechanisms.
Marx’s other achievement was to examine the institutional structure of 
capitalism and provide an explanation of how exploitation occurs even under the 
conditions of ‘free exchange’. Correct or not, this is what his theory of capitalist 
exploitation was doing.
To sum up, the concept of exploitation was the basis on which Marx 
explained the general accumulation of wealth, while the theory of capitalist exploitation 
explained the way in which it occurred under capitalism.
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Now, Roemer identifies a problem for Marxism, in that the ‘actually existing 
socialism’ did not appear to eliminate phenomena associated with class societies. 
There is not much to fault in that diagnosis. His cure, however, diverges distinctly 
from that suggested by Marx’s example.
To provide a Marxian explanation of the class-like character of nominally 
socialist societies would be to take the concept of exploitation invented by Marx 
and try to devise a theory of how exploitation is possible in these societies. In other 
words, it would be to consider the structure of ‘actually existing socialism’ and try 
to explain how the institutional settings of that society allowed exploitation to 
occur even under the conditions of ‘no private property’.
And indeed, this is precisely what a slew of Marxist dissidents in Eastern 
Europe had been doing for years, from Djilas (1957) through KuroD and 
Mocbelewski (1965J through to Bahro (1978), Bondy (2002) and Kagarlitsky 
(1988). Given that all of these writers were — at a certain point of their intellectual 
trajectory at any rate — both critical of the system and relying on the Marxist 
scheme of thought, they could not help but try to look for ways in which the 
‘actually existing socialism’ was in fact a structure based on exploitation. Given 
the nature of the problem, this is logical and consistent with the Marxist mode of 
thinking. But this is not what Roemer does.
Instead of devising a theory of how exploitation occurs within the ‘actually 
existing socialism’, he takes to task the very concept of exploitation invented by 
Marx. And instead of examining the actual structure of the Soviet-type society, 
he makes exploitation-concepts of his own devising jump through hoops of 
examples with institutional settings that have nothing to do with the structure of 
such a society.
There may of course be reasons for such a procedure. What I am claiming, 
however, is that the ostensible reason for Roemer’s approach does not justify 
his actual methodology. Marx’s original concept of exploitation is already 
‘general’ in Roemer’s sense, in that there is no reason why it should not be able 
to explain the accumulation of wealth in any society under consideration,
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including ‘actually existing socialism'. The effort to ‘generalise' it thus 
completely lacks motivation. The only reason why one might want to do this is 
if the varying fictional settings show this concept to be wanting by a different set 
of criteria from the one it was originally judged by. And this is indeed the case 
with Roemer.
What Roemer actually does, as opposed to his proclaimed intention, is to 
try to see under what conditions do phenomena which share some of the 
features of Marxian exploitation (but are not identical with it) arise in a market 
economy. As it happens, Roemer’s work does turn out to be useful for my 
purposes, in that in order to integrate the notions of exploitation and division of 
labour, it is necessary to generalise the former notion, and some of Roemer’s 
ideas do point a way towards such a generalisation. However, it is clear that 
there will need to be a parting of ways, too, for as I have already pointed out, 
Roemer is not actually interested in the materialist conception of history;instead, 
he examines concepts that allow him to develop his views of justice. It is hardly 
surprising that methodology suited for the former purpose is not the same as 
the one fashioned for the latter.
Roemer’s ‘H eresies'
In the course of his work, Roemer ‘proves’ various results that appear 
‘heretical’ from the point of view of orthodox Marxism. I will now list those 
issues on which I would like to concentrate my critical analysis.
In the first place, Roemer shows that ‘Marxian-like exploitation’ can occur 
in a subsistence society, i. e. one in which no surplus is produced beyond the 
needs of production. Second, this phenomenon furthermore occurs in a market 
economy which is ^-capitalist, that is, it contains no labour market.3 Third, 
Roemer shows that the labour market and the credit market are ‘functionally 
equivalent’, in the sense that if two otherwise identical economies possess a 
labour market and a credit market respectively, exactly the same amounts of
3 Nor a credit market — the significance of which will be seen immediately.
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exploitation will result. Fourth, Roemer provides a definition of exploitation 
which excludes any talk of transfer of labour altogether, presenting it as the 
‘general’ definition of exploitation. Finally, in his later work he disposes of the 
notion of exploitation altogether, claiming to show that it is not relevant for any 
of the reasons usually advanced; most importantly, he claims exploitation is not 
a good explanation of the existence of profit.
Subsistence as Necessary Compensation
The first two results are actually tied together: what Roemer shows is that 
‘Marxian-like exploitation’ can occur within a subsistence pre-capitalist economy. I 
would like to unbundle the two issues, however. There are separate things to be 
said about subsistence and about the possibility of exploitation purely through 
exchange of commodities. In particular, I believe that the first issue illustrates 
how Roemer misunderstands the concept of subsistence and what role it plays 
in Marxist thinking, while the second issue is to do with his faulty conception of 
exploitation.
Let us then concentrate on the first of Roemer’s ‘heresies’, the 
identification of ‘Marxian-like exploitation’ in a subsistence economy, that is, in 
an economy where no surplus is being produced.
Roemer proves his result using a neoclassical-style optimisation model, 
which is the hallmark of his approach. The model describes a society where 
everybody produces for the market, having access to the same set of techniques; 
where production requires an initial stock of resources (circulating capital), and 
the resources are unequally distributed among the producers.
The optimisation problem is based on some further assumptions, most of 
which are unobjectionable and need not concern us here. There is, however, one 
assumption that Roemer makes for all of his ‘subsistence economy’ models, and 
this assumption is objectionable indeed. It is the statement to the effect that all 
producers require the same basket of subsistence goods to survive.
100
Class, Surplus, and the Division cf Labour (III)
I claim that the counter-intuitive result of ‘exploitation’ without surplus labour 
is partly due to this assumption. For the correct interpretation of this premise 
reveals that Roemer fails to understand the Marxian concept of subsistence, and his 
model shows nothing contrary to usual Marxist thinking. For Roemer seems to 
believe that identical consumption baskets for all producers, regardless of the 
amount of work performed by them, represents subsistence. In this I think he is 
mistaken.
The Marxian notion of subsistence needs to be fleshed out as part of the 
whole notion of individual reproduction. Subsistence is that amount of 
consumption goods which allows the producer to just reproduce themselves — that 
is, to be tomorrow substantially the same in all the relevant qualities as they are 
today. In production, the worker ‘runs themselves down’; in order to ‘build 
themselves up’ again, and thus achieve (simple) reproduction, they need the 
subsistence amount of goods.
It follows that there is no single basket of subsistence for any and all 
producers, even if we assume them to be identical. The amount of subsistence 
depends crucially on the amount of work performed. This is a completely intuitive 
notion: a layabout Peter, who does nothing but stare into the wall all day long, 
hardly requires the same amount of sustenance as his identical twin lumberjack 
Paul, who chops and lugs and tugs from sunup to sundown.
Thus, Roemer’s model in fact tacitly involves surplus labour the moment he 
derives that the amount of work performed by different producers is different. If 
some work less than others, but consume the same, this means that part of what 
they consume is unnecessary for their reproduction. Thus, they are receiving above­
subsistence income, which in a technical sense is a luxury—and hence part of a surplus 
in which surplus labour of other producers is embodied.
That this is so can be further seen from the fact that Roemer only seems to 
distinguish two types of economy: a subsistence one and an accumulating one. If 
there is any surplus/surplus labour, then in his understanding it must be given over 
to building up capital, come what may.
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But this is obviously wrong. There is clearly a third possibility: an economy 
where surplus is being produced, but instead of being accumulated, it is simply 
consumed. Indeed, this is precisely the sort of economy that Sraffa describes in his 
Production cf Commodities by Means cf Commodities (1960), from which a whole 
tradition of critique of Marxism derives — a tradition to which has Roemer 
contributed at times. Thus it is a wonder that he failed to notice the basic fact 
about the Sraffa model — namely that while there is no accumulation in it, there 
is certainly production of the surplus.
Conversely, the Sraffian model of subsistence economy shows clearly that 
Roemer’s characterisation does not apply to such an economy. A description of 
Sraffa’s model was already provided in Chap. I; here I just want to remind the 
reader of some of its relevant features. Sraffa uses an input-output schema in 
which labour inputs are not represented directly, but only through the 
subsistence requirements of labourers; thus instead of X  hours of labour, Y  
baskets of food are included in the equations.4 Implicit here is the same idea as 
was already propounded above: that there is a one-to-one relationship between 
the amount of subsistence required and the amount of labour performed. 
Roemer breaks the correspondence; for him the amount of subsistence is given 
exogenously and independently of any labour. This is one reason for Roemer’s 
‘heretical’ result.
As a counterargument to Roemer’s ‘p ro o f of the existence of exploitation 
in a subsistence society, however, this is a relatively minor point. For it is 
exposed to an objection that after all, subsistence is not just compensation for 
labour performed. There is something which we could call an ‘absolute’ or 
‘reserve’ level of subsistence, which is required simply to survive when no effort 
is being performed. If Peter and Paul need each other in order to survive, yet 
Paul is doing the lion’s share of the work, then even if Peter actually only 
consumes the exact amount necessary to survive (rather than the same as Paul),
4 Sraffa (1960) does not literally use ‘baskets of food’, but that is immaterial; the basic 
point still stands.
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even so it is clear that in some sense Paul is feeding his co-worker. For both 
Peter and Paul need at least the same ‘absolute subsistence bundle’, which 
requires labour to be produced; it is only on top of that that each receives 
compensation for labour performed.
In my opinion, Roemer’s misconception of subsistence throws some light 
on his misunderstanding of Marxism, which is quite possibly bound up with his 
neoclassical methodology. For the notion of subsistence is closely tied to that of 
necessity (and thus also its counterpart). The notions of the ‘realm of necessity’ and 
the ‘realm of freedom’ are in my opinion paramount for Marxist thought They are 
an embodiment of the fundamental Marxist tenet that the history of humankind is 
shaped by material forces, i. e. forces of material necessity, far more than by the free 
decisions of human beings — at least until the classless society finally arrives. In any 
class society, the primary producers are constrained by the need to produce their 
means of subsistence; and it is precisely this constraint that allows for the existence 
of exploitation.
The existence of ‘absolute subsistence level’, corresponding to what in biology 
is called the ‘basal metabolic rate’, the amount of energy that the organism requires 
for survival in its most inactive state, is in my opinion undeniable. Even when no 
work at all is performed, this physiological minimum must be supplied, otherwise the 
organism will fail to reproduce itself.
Yet, neoclassical economic models tend to leave out the necessity of this basic 
level of consumption, as if it were an unimportant complication. But it is only 
because the necessity of basic absolute subsistence is not being addressed that the 
neoclassical model of labour supply can treat the problem as one of a trade-off 
between ‘labour’ and leisure’. The pedestrian necessity that a worker has to work for 
a living, which of course is the starting point of Marxism, tends to be left Out of 
consideration altogether.
The logic of the neoclassical approach itself would in fact dictate that this 
necessity should be modelled as an additional constraint for the utility-maximising 
agent Such a constraint, however, is not part of the standard exposition of the
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neoclassical notion of labour supply. The possibility suggests a way of modelling 
Marxian (rather than Roemetian) exploitation within the neoclassical model: if, given 
the subsistence constraint, we find that the subsistence bundle can only be purchased 
after X hours of labour, given the necessity of selling labour-power, and yet the 
productive possibilities allow for the production of the bundle after Y<X hours, 
then the agent is being exploited.
Exploitation Through the Price Mechanism?
Now, before turning to the issue of ‘absolute subsistence’, let me examine 
Roemer’s claim that he produced ‘Marxian-like exploitation’ purely through 
exchange of commodities, without labour becoming a commodity itself, i. e. without 
a labour market, and also without a credit market, whereby producers could hire 
capital.
This claim is very interesting. Effectively, what Roemer seems to be saying 
is that the existence of price mechanism is under some circumstances sufficient 
to force some producers to work more than is necessary for their own needs.
Roemer first proves that as long as commodities exchange at their labour 
values, everybody in the society works the same amount of time, namely the 
social average; and that the converse also holds (G T E C p. 36). Next, he shows 
that there are also sustainable long-term situations (reproducible equilibria) 
where agents do not work the socially average labour time. This is the situation 
he terms exploitative, since the poor producers work more than the social 
average, while the rich producers work less; and in fact the rich work less than 
they would have done had there been no trade.
Now, by the previously mentioned theorem, the fact that agents do not 
work the socially average labour time means that prices diverge from labour 
values. This is the situation classically called ‘unequal exchange’. Yet, this should 
be worrying. For as it notoriously well-known, the challenge Marx set himself 
was to provide an explanation for the extraction of surplus labour without 
unequal exchange. As he was well aware, it is quite easy to point out that
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somebody is being ‘exploited’, in the sense of being taken advantage of, when 
the commodities they exchange with others are not traded at their values. What 
Roemer does is verify this insight using fairly sophisticated mathematical 
techniques, but otherwise it would be correct to say that he does not even arrive 
at Marx’s starting point.5
Moreover, consider that while Roemer’s description assumes some sort of 
mutual dependence of the rich and the poor, this is hardly enough to claim that 
he is describing a single society. For his description would easily apply to two 
tribal, unequally endowed, geographically separated communities, who 
nevertheless need each others’ produce, and whose representatives met at 
certain times of the year in order to barter. It would be true that if we averaged 
the labour inputs over the two communities, the poorly endowed one would 
turn out to work more than this ‘social average’, whereas the well endowed one 
would be working less. However, in what exact sense would this really be a 
‘social’ average? Are the couple of meetings a year enough to make these two 
tribe a single society, such that it would make sense to ascribe a set of 
productive possibilities to it?
Surely a far more intuitive picture is that these are two societies, one of 
which through luck or otherwise happens to be in a better position than the 
other. If that better position allows the wealthier community to throw its weight 
about in trade negotiations, this may be in some sense unjust. But that injustice 
has nothing to do with a fictitious ‘socially necessary labour average’. If there is 
exploitation here, it is exploitation of the bargaining position. This is clear if we 
consider a pure exchange economy, where no production is going on, and the 
two communities simply happen to find  the various precious resources. The 
poorer community would still end up with the terms of trade being against it, 
purely due to its bargaining strength; but there would be no deviation from 
‘socially necessary average labour’ to blame this on.
5 From a different point of view, this is also a remark made in Roberts (1997).
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This can be clearly seen from the real-world interpretation Roemer offers 
for his results. He says that his construction can be used to model unequal 
exchange between the poor and the rich countries. But, as the apologists for the 
existing trade regime are always quick to point out, free trade would not occur 
unless it were to the advantage of both parties. It would serve no purpose for the 
critics of the current regime to pretend that this is not the case. Instead, the 
rejoinder should be that while Tree trade’ may be preferable to no trade, the rich 
countries exploit their position (note the word!) by forcing the poor countries to 
accept terms which are unjust. The injustice lies in the fact that the distribution 
of benefits of trade is skewed towards the party that already possesses more 
wealth. But it is hardly an instance of labour exploitation, since without trade, 
not just the rich country would have to perform more labour (as Roemer 
suggests), but the same would apply also to the poor country — it too would be forced to 
perform even more labour over the ‘average socially necessary’ level (i. e. averaging 
over the productive possibilities of both parties regardless over whether they are 
trading or not).6
Roemerian and Marxian exploitation
What this suggests is that while Roemer may well have aprimafacie case for 
having identified an unjust situation, it is far from clear that he has discovered an 
instance of exploitation. Partly the argument will turn on his understanding of this 
concept, which is interesting in its own right.
Let me say once again that Roemer calls the situation ‘exploitative’ because 
the poor producers work more than is on average socially necessary to produce 
the subsistence bundle, while the rich work less. He justifies calling this 
‘exploitation’ in two ways. First of all, he provides a little story about ‘murder
6 The no-trade possibility is excluded in Roemer’s formal model under consideration, 
since there the rich and the poor are part of the same subsistence society, i. e. without 
trade neither party could survive. Nevertheless, the point is still important and would 
presumably stand out should the model be modified to include a possibility of surplus 
production (and thus also survival without trade).
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and theft’. If the rich producer killed the poor one and took their possessions, 
they would now have to work more than before. In other words, in some sense 
the poor producer is working ‘for’ the rich. On the other hand, if the poor 
producer killed the rich one and appropriated their capital, they could now get 
away with working less than before. Hence — Roemer claims — we cannot simply 
say that the two are both benefiting from social co-operation; for the 
disappearance of the rich producer makes the poor one better off, which could 
not be the case if they were both gaining from (or at least not losing out on) co­
operation.
The second ‘justification’ is really just a promise of one, for it refers to the 
‘general’ game-theoretic notion of exploitation provided by Roemer later in the 
GTEC, which has to be justified in its own right. I shall leave that aside for the 
moment, since there will be an opportunity to discuss this general notion in 
more detail later on.
Is the murder-and-theft story a convincing one as a justification for calling 
the phenomenon identified ‘Marxian-like exploitation’? Let us put the classical 
and the current Roemerian notion side by side. According to the classical 
concept, exploitation exists when one group of people, aside from performing 
labour necessary for their own subsistence, also produces subsistence and 
possible luxuries for another group of people. According to Roemer, 
exploitation exists when one group of people works more than is on average 
necessary to produce their means of subsistence, while another group of people 
works less.
Now clearly, if one group of people works to feed themselves and another 
group, and we assume that this other group is not doing any work7, then clearly 
the former are working more than is on average necessary to produce their
7 A justifiable assumption in this context, since the exploiters do not need to do any work 
for their own subsistence — it is provided by the exploited — and since we need to 
compare the definitions under identical circumstances, i. e. without direct coercion or 
supervision, and so we should assume the exploiters need not perform these activities 
either.
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means of subsistence, while the latter are working less. So the exploited and the 
exploiters in the classical sense are also the exploited and the exploiters 
respectively in the Roemerian sense.
The opposite, of course, does not necessarily hold: the poor producers in 
Roemer’s example are ‘exploited’ in his sense, and yet it is impossible to say that 
they provide ‘more labour than is necessary for their survival’ — since they 
themselves do not provide all such necessary labour, part of it being supplied by 
the rich producers.
I think that the way to think about the two concepts is to see the Marxian 
one as the extreme special case of Roemer’s. If we start from the situation 
where two groups of workers supply equal amounts of labour and then vary it 
by adding to the burden of one group and lightening that of the other, we have 
Roemerian exploitation. Then in the limit, the first group will perform all the 
labour necessary for its upkeep as well as for the survival of the second group, 
while this second group will perform none — which is precisely the situation of 
Marxian exploitation.
Thus Roemer generalises the Marxian notion in the direction of inegalitarian 
division of labour. What I mean by this is that he takes the relevant characteristic 
of exploitation to be the differential amounts of labour performed. In other 
words, again this is looking at exploitation primarily from the point of view of 
justice.
I do not necessarily have a quarrel with that, but I would like to point out 
that aside from Marx’s jaundiced view of ‘justice’, his notion of exploitation was 
significant, because it allowed the development of a dynamical theory of history: 
if there is surplus labour in the canonical sense, then surplus can be accumulated 
and used for expanded reproduction of the society, thus moving the society 
forward. This is not exactly the case with Roemer’s concept.
Furthermore, there is an important problem with this concept: it fails to 
include any notion of causality. It is of course true that in the actual example, a 
type of causal mechanism is specified which explains why the amounts of labour
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performed are different. However, this is no part of the definition of 
exploitation itself.
Why is this significant? Consider the following example:
Suppose there is a classically exploited working class, providing necessary 
labour for its own subsistence, as well as surplus labour to a capitalist class. For 
the sake of the example, let me also make the following unrealistic assumptions: 
1) There is a clear difference between the wage goods supporting the working 
class and the luxuries that the capitalists live on. Thus, both classes need food, 
but say that while the workers make do with bread, the capitalists consume 
caviar. 2) All workers are involved in production of both the wage goods and 
the luxuries, with the work-time equally split between the production of both 
types of goods. 3) There are constant returns to scale in the production of wage 
goods, but increasing returns in the production of luxuries.
Now suppose a group of workers through successful organisation wins a 
decrease of the working day, from 12 hours to 10, let us say. The capitalists do 
not want to reduce their profits, and hence their consumption of luxuries. Since 
there are economies of scale in the luxury production, they need the lucky trade- 
unionists to spend the same amount of time in that production as before. It 
follows that if nothing else changed, there would be a reduction in the 
production of wage goods, since this is where labour expenditure of the trade- 
unionists will go down. But since there is no decrease in pay, the deficit of wage 
goods must come from somewhere. In order to make up for it, the capitalists 
force the unlucky unorganised workers to increase their labour time from 12 
hours to 14.
Now, since the amount of time spent on luxury production has not 
changed for any worker, it is clear that every one of them is still putting in the 
same amount of surplus labour, if that is defined as labour over that necessary 
to reproduce the worker. For none of the labour time spent on the production 
of luxuries is necessary for that reproduction. Thus, all the workers are still
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being exploited and still put in exactly the same surplus labour. There is an 
obvious division between the working class and the capitalist class.
On the other hand, there is now clearly unequal division of labour within 
the working class. While the working class as a whole still supplies both th t 
necessary and the surplus labour, the shares of necessary labour performed are 
unequal. Internally, the class is divided. The successful trade-unionists have 
become a ‘labour aristocracy’ — they perform less necessary labour than the 
unorganised workers, and are better paid. Now, we might believe that the 
position of labour aristocracy makes it less revolutionary. We might even want 
to say that that positions is unfair, with regard to other workers. But what we 
would certainly not say is that the labour aristocracy exploits the other workers.
And yet the description fits Roemer’s condition precisely: the labour 
aristocracy performs less than the average amount of the socially necessary 
labour, while the rest of the workers perform more.
The trouble is that in the example given, while the labour aristocracy can 
be said to be a beneficiary of exploitation, it is certainly in no sense its originator. 
That is precisely what is wrong with Roemer’s concept: since it does not in itself 
require that there is a specific type of causal relationship between the 
‘underworked’ and the ‘overworked’ group, it is vulnerable to the sort of 
challenges where the causal relations are different from what we intuitively 
expect to be the case with exploitation. As will be seen, this feature is inherited 
by the later, still more general Roemerian concepts.
D oes Unequal Ownership Really Cause Exploitation?
Finally, let me note that despite rhetorical flourishes, Roemer does not 
actually prove that unequal ownership of capital implies even his own notion of 
‘exploitation’. What he shows is that inegalitarian solutions exist under unequal 
ownership, not that they are the only solutions. Hence, unequal ownership 
makes it possible that unequal labour expenditure occurs; but there is no proof 
that it forces such unequal expenditure. Nor can this be proved, in my opinion.
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For Roemer’s proof of existence requires an implied condition that different 
techniques are differently capital- and labour-intensive, and that capital is 
distributed in such a way that the rich can operate a set of techniques which 
overall is stricdy more capital-intensive than the one available to the poor. It is 
this which allows the ‘rich’ producers to work less than the poor: since in 
aggregate the society just manages to reproduce itself, anything produced by the 
rich will find a market (the poor would not be able to do it themselves) and thus 
they can concentrate on the capital-intensive production, safe in the knowledge 
that the poor have no choice but exert themselves in labour-intensive 
techniques. If capital were distributed equally, this could not work, for if anyone 
tried to just go for capital-intensive techniques (instead of the average mix of 
techniques), not enough would be produced, as there is no mechanism to force 
the rest of the society to supply extra labour.
However, even under unequal ownership the unequal expenditure of 
labour need not be the case. If all possible technologies embody have the same 
‘organic composition of capital’ - that is, require an equal ratio of labour to 
capital - then clearly it does not matter how much capital is owned by whom. 
Using a lot of capital equipment would imply using a lot of labour; if the aim is 
to minimise labour, then everybody will use the minimum capital they can get 
away with. The possession of this minimum is guaranteed by Roemer’s 
condition that every producer has enough (financial) capital to guarantee the 
production of the (value of) the means of subsistence. Thus, everybody will 
perform exactly the same minimum of labour necessary.
Finally, we need not require that all possible technologies are equally 
capital-intensive. It is enough to postulate that although there are differences in 
intensity, the unequal distribution of capital still gives a chance to all to use the 
exact same set of technologies. Thus, although some people will have excess 
capital, they do not possess enough of it to access any highly capital-intensive 
technologies not available to others; conversely, although there are some very 
labour-intensive technologies, nobody is forced through lack of capital to use
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them. The situation then is exactly equivalent to the one of equal ownership. 
Which is precisely the point: what Roemer really shows is not that ownership of 
capital matters, but that access to productive technology matters. If that access 
is restricted, then unequal expenditure of labour is a possibility, even if the 
distribution of capital is equal - such as when there are non-market restrictions 
in place (for example racist laws which allow ‘whites only’ to use their capital in 
a particular way). Conversely, if access is equal, then the distribution of capital is 
irrelevant — such as the case described above, where differences in wealth do 
not prevent everybody from using the same set of technologies.
Domination and Exploitation
Let us now consider Roemer’s isomorphism between the ‘Labour Market 
Island’ and the ‘Credit Market Island’.
Similarly to what is the case about the work as a whole, Roemer has two 
targets in this chapter. Here, the secondary one is the neoclassical contention 
that in a perfectly competitive economy, Marxian exploitation does not exist, 
since it is claimed that it does not matter whether capital hires labour or labour 
hires capital. An equal-size profit, or rather ‘return on capital’, exists either way, 
the neoclassicals argue. Hence it is not true that profit (interest) is due to the 
capitalists exploiting the workers, since there are no capitalists of the relevant 
sort in a scenario where workers hire capital.
Roemer does not deny that there is no fundamental difference between the 
labour market scenario and the credit market scenario. However, he subverts 
the argument to show that since exploitation demonstrably does exist under the 
labour market scenario, and since the Labour Market Island and the Credit 
Market Island are isomorphic, logically it necessarily also exists under the credit 
market scenario. Instead of proving the non-existence of exploitation, the most 
the neoclassical story shows that it does exist even absent the hiring of labour.
This is precisely what constitutes the attack on Roemer’s other, primary 
target: the Marxist contention that exploitation under capitalism relies on the
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subordination of the worker to the capitalist in the labour process. Given what 
has just been said, this contention simply cannot be true. Of course, this does 
w /m ean that the difference between the labour market and the credit market is 
empirically and historically unimportant, and Roemer says as much. Instead, the 
point is that there is no essential difference between them when looked at from the 
point cf view <f exploitation. That, according to Roemer, can be accomplished 
equivalently in both situations.
The differences arise on a lower level of abstraction. These include issues 
such as enforcement costs — for the labour market, supervision of hired labour 
is necessary, whereas for the credit market Roemer postulates the existence of 
collateral as an equivalent necessity. If there are increasing returns to scale, and 
we do not abstract from the organisational and informational problems, then 
labour market will be favoured, since it represents a form of overcoming those 
problems in itself. Thus, Roemer concludes that the explanation of the 
prevalence of labour markets over credit markets must be due to the 
imperfections mentioned — transaction costs, economies of sale, information, 
risk — rather than to exploitation per se.
Now there is a theme here which recurs in Roemer’s later writings. 
Namely, it is the contention that, in our terminology, exploitation and the 
authoritarian division of labour are two separate issues, which are joined 
together at most contingently rather than logically.
A case in point is the iconoclastic ‘Should Marxists Be Interested in 
Exploitation?’ (Roemer 1985). The structure of Roemer’s argument in this paper 
is to enumerate the reasons why exploitation might be thought to be an 
important issue and then to argue one-by-one against these justifications. Thus, 
he tries to show that neither the existence of profit, nor domination, nor 
alienation, nor inequality give good grounds to be interested in exploitation.
I take it that the most important argument in this connection is the one 
against exploitation as the explanation of capitalist accumulation. I will present 
my own take on this question in the next chapter. At this point, however, I
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would like to concentrate on Roemer’s claims regarding ‘domination’, which are 
bound up with the issue we have been considering.
Roemer distinguishes between two types of domination — the ‘overall’ 
power structure that protects the existing pattern of ownership of the means of 
production, and the authoritarian division of labour — the “hierarchical and 
autocratic structure of work” (Roemer 1985, p. 39). Roemer terms these two 
concepts domination1 and domination2. In the interests of greater clarity, 
however, I shall take the liberty to refer to them as ‘power’ and ‘supervision’ 
respectively.
As regards power, Roemer argues three points. It may have a role in 
determining values under imperfect competition, but that means it is 
“characteristically non-capitalist”. It implies exploitation, in the trivial sense that 
if there is power, protecting unequal distribution of property rights, then there 
will be exploitation; however this is no reason to look at exploitation, for if 
power is evil, we should be looking directly at it. Finally and relatedly, if 
exploitation flows from the unequal distribution of property rights, and if power 
is needed to protect them, then exploitation does imply power — but 
exploitation is only a ‘transmission channel’, so to speak, and the relevant 
problem is the unequal distribution itself.
Now, Roemer does not actually specify that what he is referring to here in 
this discussion is not exploitation as such, but exploitation in a (competitive) 
market economy. I think this is significant. For the market mechanism of course 
is not the only way through which exploitation can be accomplished; far from it. 
The obvious example of direct coercion, which played the major role in 
exploitative modes of production for millennia, cannot be discounted. Now as I 
have already noted in the previous chapter, there is an argument that private 
property of the means of production is not the defining characteristic of such 
modes of production. There is the Wittfogel-Bahro argument that for long 
periods of history in many parts of the world the dominant mode of 
exploitation did not rest upon private property at all. Rather, exploitation rested
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on direct coercion, which developed at first from the necessity of accepting the 
hierarchical division of labour simply in order to survive.
What this implies is that Roemer’s argument that power is only needed to 
protect inequalities in private property is false. We could stretch the meaning of 
‘property’ to include any instance of direct coercion, but that would turn the 
whole argument into a tautology. I f  we reject this option, it is perfectly 
imaginable and quite possibly historically accurate to say that power was used to 
protect the existing mode of exploitation, without protecting inequalities in the 
ownership of property as such.
In general, it seems to me that Roemer achieves his result only because he 
assumes what is to be proven. For if the assumption is that exploitation can 
only exist as a result of the unequal ownership of property, then obviously 
whatever exploitation can do for us, unequal ownership of property can do 
better. It could be argued that the assumption is Marx’s rather than Roemer’s, 
for as has been noted already, Marx and Engels in their The German Ideology do 
talk about the development of class society as the development of ‘private 
property’. O f course, Marx could simply be wrong about that, as the above 
Wittfogel-Bahro thesis suggests. But even if not, it would seem to me to be 
clearly quite alien to the spirit of Marx’s writing to assume that private property 
thus means one and the same thing in all periods of history. In particular, it 
hardly means the existence of competitive markets, which is one of Roemer’s 
constant assumptions. Indeed, Marx’s ‘development of private property’ 
suggests a Hegelian ‘unfolding’, under which new features of property are 
revealed as history progresses, with the capitalist competitive markets 
representing its highest stage. Thus Marx arguably would say that far from 
simply protecting the inequality of ownership, power exists primarily to protect 
the nature of ownership itself — for example, to protect the possibility and 
actuality of ownership of human beings under slavery. It is doubtful that this 
would fit very well under Roemer’s ahistoric notion of ‘property’.
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The real issue thus becomes whether we can equate the existence of 
exploitation with the unequal distribution of property rights the way that 
Roemer does. On the basis of what has been said so far, I would rather claim 
that it is the mode of exploitation that defines both the nature of property and 
the role it plays (if any) in the society. In that case, an argument can be made 
that power exists not simply to protect property, but to protect the existing 
mode of exploitation itself against the revolts of the exploited. Hence, 
exploitation does imply the existence of power (Roemer’s domination1), and so 
Roemer is wrong to try to argue exploitation away.
Regarding supervision, Roemer refers precisely to the argument from 
G TEC  discussed above: since exploitation can exist in a market economy even 
absent the labour market, it cannot be the case that exploitation implies 
supervision. He further mentions the case of exploitation even under Simple 
Commodity Production, when capital is distributed unequally. Roemer’s 
conclusion is by now familiar: the existence of the authoritarian supervision 
under capitalism is not due to capitalist exploitation per se, but rather to the 
market imperfections, in particular the fact that “labor contract is not costlessly 
enforceable, nor can it be perfectly delineated” (Roemer 1985, p. 44)8
In his dictionary entry for ‘Socialism’, Roemer expresses the same point 
again, and to drive it home, he uses the following example: “Imagine that the 
worker and capitalist could contract about every eventuality that might occur 
during production. If, in addition, the contract were costlessly enforceable 
(imagine an omnipotent arbitrator who is at hand to deal with any disagreement), then there 
would be no petty coercion at the point of production: capitalists would not try 
to speed up assembly lines, force workers to work overtime, cheat them of their
8 In response to a possible objection that his previous model do not take account of the 
preference for non-authoritarian work, Roemer claims to have constructed a model 
which does take this preference into account, with the result that subordinated agents 
are exploited and superior agents are exploiters, but the ‘petty bourgeois’ self-employed 
agents can be either exploiters or exploited. Hence it is still the case that domination 
implies exploitation, but not vice versa, as in the original model.
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wages, discipline them in demeaning ways, and so on.” (Roemer 2008, emphasis 
added)
I believe that the passage just quoted, and in particular the part I 
highlighted, make it clear that there must be something wrong with Roemer’s 
views. For imagine the following analogy: if we first described a theocratic 
dictatorship where there is much ‘petty domination’ by the priests to punish any 
divergence from the holy creed, and then compared it to a world where the 
omnipotent deity was at hand to lay down the punishment instandy themselves, 
then we would hardly say that the second case is one of ‘no coercion’. On the 
contrary, surely we would be inclined to call it a world of perfect coercion. Of 
course such perfect coercion makes ‘petty domination’ superfluous. But that is 
hardly reason to believe that the arrangement is somehow non-coercive in itself.
Lest it be thought that the argument applies only to Roemer’s unfortunate 
analogy, let me extend it to his original claim. What he says is that authoritarian 
division of labour is solely due to ‘imperfections’ that have nothing to do with 
exploitation as such. However, what is exploitation, if not appropriation of 
surplus labour?9 The claim that under perfect foresight and costless 
enforceability, the exploited could contract for every eventuality that occurred 
while working for the exploiter may be true. But does that not seem to imply 
pe feet subordination to the will of the exploiter? It does not much matter whether 
the exploiter enforces their will during the time of exploitation or beforehand. 
And the only difference between cosdess and cosdy enforceability is that the 
second case — the one that empirically occurs — is one of less subordination.
Thus, if exploitation implies that the exploited provides some of their time 
to the exploiter, this does seem to be connected to the issue of surrendering 
autonomy, i. e. to accepting the authoritarian division of labour. Now, there is 
an interesting wrinkle in the argument: it may be the case that under some
9 Roemer of course does say that exploitation can be many other things -  he uses quite a 
few different definitions of the term, including some that have nothing to do with 
labour at all. However, at this stage in the proceedings this is an acceptable use of the 
term.
117
Class, Surplus, and the Division cf Labour (III)
circumstances, it is actually beneficial for the exploiter to provide space for a 
certain amount of autonomy on the part of the exploited. However, the 
important point to note is that whether the exploited will work autonomously Is 
not up to them. The very decision on the amount of autonomy at work is not the 
worker’s to be made. In terms of Roemer’s examples, the autonomous sphere 
would be precisely specified in the perfect and costlessly enforceable contract. 
Thus even if empirically some of the exploited are not largely subject to 
somebody else’s will, the fact remains that this is so only at the say-so of the 
exploiters. Thus in a larger sense, it is still the exploiters who are in the position 
of authority, even if it happens to be in their advantage not to use it for ‘petty 
domination’.
Finally, to return to the issue of the isomorphism between the Labour 
Market Island and the Credit Market Island, it is instructive to note the 
experience of the Yugoslav economy, in which enterprises formally belonged to 
the workers who were employed by them, while these enterprises were relating 
to each other through the market. Despite the fact that in this case, ‘labour was 
hiring capital’ — since ownership is formally equivalent to a permanent hire — 
there was hardly any difference in the hierarchical relations inside the enterprise. 
True, the workers had been formally electing their managers; however in 
practice, the relations in the workplace were indistinguishable from the situation 
in the capitalist market economies.
What this suggests is that the authoritarian organisation of labour is a very 
‘efficient’ means for the production of the surplus — and thus may well emerge 
even under the regime of the Credit Market Island. Formally speaking, it might 
be the case that the workers would in a sense impose such organisation on 
themselves, in the recognition of the fact that otherwise the surplus required for 
the payment of interest would not be produced. But there should be no doubt 
that the supervisors — who might well be elected — would be performing a role 
in the interest of the creditors; what in the last chapter I mentioned Carchedi 
suggestively describing as ‘the function of capital’. Thus, it might well turn out
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that the Yugoslav experience was not accidental, and that the Labour Market 
Island and the Credit Market Island are not only isomorphic, but in practice 
actually indistinguishable.
Roemer’s Generalised Definition of Exploitation
As I have said at the beginning of this discussion, Roemer’s procedure is 
not to try to devise a special theory of how exploitation occurs under various 
institutional settings, but rather, designing a new concept of exploitation. 
Moving along this path, Roemer uses three different notion of exploitation in 
GTEC. According to the first notion, exploitation exists when one group of 
people performs more than the average socially necessary labour to obtain its 
subsistence bundle and another group of people performs less (the inegalitarian 
expenditure of labour mentioned above). According to the second exploitation 
exists if the one group of people cannot possibly purchase a consumption 
bundle which contains at least as much labour as they had worked, while 
another group cannot possibly purchase a bundle containing at most the labour 
they had provided. And finally according to the third, ‘general’ definition, 
exploitation exists if under a hypothetically feasible alternative, one group of 
people become better off and the complementary group becomes worse off.
I will now attempt to provide a critique of the third, most general of 
Roemer’s definitions. In full, this definition states:
“A coalition S, in a larger society N, is exploited if and only if:
1. There is an alternative, which we may conceive of as hypothetically feasible, 
in which S would be better off than in its present situation.
2. Under this alternative, the complement to S, the coalition N — S = S ’, would 
be worse off than at present.
The formal analysis in this chapter will take exploitation to be characterised by (1)
and (2), although a third condition is also necessary to rule out certain bizarre
examples, namely:
3. S ’ is in a relationship of dominance to S.” (Roemer GTEC, pp. 194-195).”
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The first problem is that the definition as it stands does not actually define 
‘exploitation’ — instead, it only defines the exploited and the exploiting group. But it 
does not specify any actual relation between the ‘exploited’ and the 'exploiting'group. 
(This is precisely the reason why Roemer feels compelled to attach the 
condition of ‘dominance’ to his definition. It is only that condition that ensures 
that the two groups are even part of the same society, not to mention that one 
‘exploits’ the other.)
Roemer himself would not actually be overly worried by the fact that his 
definition does not cover any relations. For even when he later, for the sake of 
example, used the labour-transfer approach to exploitation, he was quite explicit 
that this did not involve any relations between classes:
“It is important to note that exploitation is not defined relationally. The statement 
“A exploits B” is not defined, but rather “A is an exploiter” and “B is exploited”. 
Exploitation, as I conceive it, refers to the relationship between a person and 
society as a whole as measured by the transfer of the person’s labor to the society, 
and the reverse transfer of society’s labor to the person, as embodied in goods the 
person claims.” (Roemer 1985, p. 31)
But he should be worried, I think. For Marx, all exploitation is the 
appropriation of surplus labour; its various forms only differ in how this 
appropriation occurs. Thus, Marx is giving us a definition of a relationship 
between two groups in a society, which can play itself out through various 
possible processes. All Roemer’s approach is telling us, however, is how to assign 
a name to a particular group within a society; there is no suggestion that the 
same kind of relationship is binding this group to its complement in each case.
This is significant, because Roemer in this definition has completely 
severed any sort of link between the considerations of justice and the 
description of how the society actually works. His definition might be important
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from the former point of view (although he himself came to doubt it). It has 
nothing to tell us about the latter issue, however.
I think that Roemer is basically here bending over backwards trying to 
avoid saying that there is a transfer of labour from one group of people to 
another (recall that ironically, this was precisely what Wright thought was missing 
from Roemer’s account). Most likely this is due to his deep awareness of 
problems with what is usually called ‘the Labour Theory of Value’. Granted that 
such problems exist — I will consider them in a later chapter. However, Roemer 
goes so far that he ends up sacrificing all talk of even a causal connection between 
the status of the putatively exploited group and the putatively exploiting group. 
Instead, he falls back on its observable consequences — or in other words, on a 
correlation between the low status of one group and the high status of the other 
group. For that is precisely what the idea of ‘withdrawals’ amounts to: the 
common existence of groups A and B is correlated with the worsening of the 
situation of A and the improvement of the situation of B (without loss of 
generality), compared to their separate existence. And while Roemer does realise 
that at least some connection between the two groups is necessary and tries to 
supply it by postulating that one group dominates the other, this is far from 
enough, because domination is not necessarily the connection of the relevant 
kind — that would be only exploitation itself, but Roemer refuses to consider it 
causally.
Thus, his account suffers from all the usual flaws of the attempts to avoid 
the causal talk. Since correlation is not causation, the three conditions specified 
by Roemer would classify as exploitative the states of affairs where the result 
occurs by coincidence, the ones where there is a third cause of the situation, and 
finally, where the causation is reverse to what we would call exploitation.
It might not be particularly likely that a society would exist to which 
Roemer’s three conditions applied, and yet the better position of the dominating 
group B over the group A was simply a coincidence. Certainly it is unlikely that 
such ‘happy’ coincidence could persist for any length of time without collapsing
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into either a more egalitarian state of affairs or more straightforward 
exploitation. But regardless of the likelihood, conceptually it is clear that the 
satisfaction of the three conditions really mightbt coincidental. Since there is no 
causal talk in Roemer’s definition, there is no way to exclude this possibility.
On the other hand, it is not too difficult to imagine a situation in which the 
three conditions apply, yet there is no real exploitation of one group by another 
going on, and instead, a third cause is responsible for that situation. Consider, 
for example, a society consisting of two tribes, which has been colonised by an 
outside power. Whether it be a natural occurrence or a result of a conscious 
divide et imperapobcy of the colonising power, tribe B happens to dominate tribe 
A socially, perhaps on the basis of religion.10 Now, say that both tribes are 
actually forced to work for the colonists, being left with next to no subsistence 
— but with the crucial proviso that the colonists redistribute part of the surplus 
acquired. O f course, they do this in a lopsided way, favouring the dominant 
faction.
Now if the dominated tribe managed to withdraw from this situation with 
its per capita share of productive resources, then obviously it would become 
better off. Equally, since the dominant tribe B would no longer be receiving that 
part of the surplus which was produced by the dominated tribe A, it would 
become worse off. The condition of domination is satisfied by assumption.
And yet, I think it is obvious that we would hardly call this a situation of 
exploitation. It would of course be a situation that is unjust, there is no doubt 
about that; but the source of the injustice is clearly the presence of the 
colonising power, which both causes the production of the surplus and its 
unequal distribution among the tribes.11 Thus, Roemer’s definition clearly fails 
by producing a false positive.
10 Apparently the relative position of the Tutsis and the Hutus in colonised Africa was 
something along these lines — though not bound up with religion — with the 
differential status encouraged by the colonial power.
11 This is of course an analogy of the ‘labour aristocracy’ example above — again, we have 
here beneficiaries of exploitation, who nevertheless are not themselves exploiters
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It is also possible to construct an example where the definition fails due to 
causation being the reverse of what we expect to see in an exploitative situation. 
Imagine a society of hunters-gatherers (for simplicity, let us say that the ‘hunts’ 
are limited to very small mammals, like rodents). This society happens to be 
divided into two groups: the very skilled and the very unskilled. The skilled also 
happen to dominate the unskilled, again perhaps mainly in a religious sense, 
being looked upon in awe as the clearly blessed. Now the skilled are by 
definition much better at gathering food than the unskilled. In the area that 
both groups share, they are therefore always first in finding the ‘low hanging 
fruit’ and also they manage to get more of it — with the unskilled having to work 
harder and with less success.
Now if the unskilled ‘withdrew’ with their fair share of resources — or 
rather, if the area was proportionately divided between the two — then they 
would become better off, since they would now have guaranteed access to some 
of the spots to which the skilled usually beat them; and conversely, the skilled 
would become worse off for the very same reason. Again, the domination 
condition is also satisfied, by assumption.
But again, I think it is clear that this situation is emphatically not what is 
normally meant by ‘exploitation’. Perhaps in some very loose sense it could be 
said that the skilled ‘exploit their position’, or more precisely, ‘exploit their 
abilities’. However, they very definitely do not exploit the unskilled. We may 
again find the situation unjust, if we believe that the genetic lottery should not 
be determinant of one’s life chances — as I do happen to believe. But again, the 
source of injustice is not exploitation — if it is injustice, then it lies in abuse of 
one group’s abilities, at the expense of the other group. And so again, Roemer’s 
definition produces the intuitively wrong result.
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Chapter IV
Back to Basics 
Reproduction, Subsistence, 
Exploitation, Class
Having criticised John Roemer’s conception of exploitation, I would now 
like to present my own reconstruction of the notion of exploitation and its 
significance. Along the way, several other important Marxian notions will also 
be analysed.
Reproduction
The most valuable element of the Marxian theory, its conceptual core, is 
that it is a theory of reproduction. Reproduction in the Marxian sense means 
simply ‘renewal’, with the further distinctions between simple, extended and 
expanded reproduction.
Simple reproduction refers to a process whereby some object undergoes a 
transformation such that at the end o f it, it is in the salient aspects the same as 
in the beginning.
Extended reproduction is a process whereby the object is changed through 
the transformation, but only quantitatively. That is, while the salient 
characteristics have numerically increased under some measure, the object is still 
essentially characterised by them.
Finally, under expanded reproduction, the object undergoes a 
transformation at the end of which it has developed, grown, or in other words 
changed qualitatively. The assumption is that this change was progressive 
(degeneration does not count as expanded reproduction, but rather as failure of 
simple reproduction).
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Production and Compensation
A human being is a process. In other words, people, just like animals and 
other living organisms, are constandy engaged in the process of renewal.
A simple picture of individual reproduction is as follows. The reproductive 
cycle is divided into two phases: the productive one and the compensatory one. 
In the productive one, a person is involved in external metabolism (Bahro after 
Marx) with nature, transforming natural materials into means of consumption. 
These are consumed in the compensatory phase, involving the internal metabolism. 
In order to reproduce themselves completely, both phases are required: during 
the productive phase, the stock of working ability (labour-power) is being run 
down; during the compensatory phase, it is being built up again. For simple 
reproduction, there needs to be a balance between the two phases: too little 
production relative to compensation results in atrophy, whereas too little 
compensation results in degradation of the organism.
These two phases are of course distinct logically rather than temporally. 
On the biological level, the reproduction cycle occurs continuously, literally with 
every intake and outflow of breath. It is also correct to say that many if not all 
activities have their productive and compensatory aspects. However, it is clear 
that at different points in time, either production or compensation dominates — 
it is either the external or internal transformations that occupy the greater part 
of the organism’s capacities.
This simple picture is indeed only the first approximation to reality, if for 
no other reason, then because it contains no reference to types of activity other 
than material transformations; yet human beings are involved in many activities 
of other kinds. These will be incorporated into the picture later.
Simple Reproduction: A Society of Humanoid Robots
Let us now imagine a very simple society allowing us to grasp the essential 
notions of surplus production and surplus appropriation—in short, exploitation.
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I will assume that the individuals in our simple model society exist on the 
basis of simple reproduction. I am thus postulating that the individuals need to 
produce their means of subsistence; but given these means of subsistence, they 
can completely reproduce themselves, so that they at the end of the productive 
cycle they are exactly the same as at the beginning. Furthermore, I am assuming 
that the process of reproduction is not just individual, but social — in other 
words, there is division of labour between the individual agents, which is being 
reproduced just as much as is their individual existence.
Now this picture is of course vastly simplified, akin to abstract economic 
models. However, many discussions of class do not explicitly involve many 
more elements than the above, especially if they are focused on exploitation. To 
make clear how much is abstracted from when the model is specifed as above, 
let me make the restrictive assumptions explicit.
What I have described above is really a society of some sort of humanoid 
robots. They have never been born, and assuming sufficient means of 
subsistence, they will never die. Neither do they get old, nor ill, and they have 
full physical power, knowledge and skills (mental and physical) required to 
perform any task within a possible division of labour, given the existing 
knowledge of the techniques of production. On the other hand, they never 
acquire any more of either power, knowledge, or skills.
While these restrictions may seem outlandish, really they are doing no 
more then specifying all the features of real human societies that are being 
abstracted from. Thus, what is being done is assuming away the whole process 
of sexual reproduction and socialisation of the new human beings — which 
amounts to saying that the agents are immortal and eternal. Equally, I am 
assuming away the process of education, and this must mean that all the 
knowledge required is already present in the agents' heads. Similarly, there is no 
need to provide for their physical maintenance (health), other than through the 
production and consumption of the means of subsistence. Finally, the 
assumption of individual simple reproduction must mean that no particular
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activity can have any effect on the agents’ bodies or minds: given that the 
individual is exactly the same in all the relevant respects at the beginning and at 
the end of the productive cycle, it must follow that the activity performed in the 
meantime has no lasting effect on them. Even if one agent spends the whole 
day solving equations of particle physics while another one spends the whole 
day digging ditches, at the end of the day the slate gets wiped clean, so to speak, 
and the two could swap places without any difficulty.
This picture may seem so far removed from reality that it may well be 
asked whether it can be of any use in discussing human societies. There are two 
answers to the question. First of all, the restrictive assumptions will obviously 
have to be dropped later on, in order to come closer to a realistic view of the 
society. In the meantime, however, they serve as in any similar conceptual 
endeavour to clarify our vision, to ‘reveal what was hidden’, to allow us to focus 
on the essential features of the reality.
But secondly, it is very important to realise that while spelling out these 
conditions makes the picture appear far, far removed from reality, many 
discussions of class in fact occur on the level very close to the one just 
described. In particular, if the discussion of class ignores the issues of 
socialisation and sexual reproduction, proceeding exactly as if people were never 
born and did not need to be brought up. To the extent that such discussions 
abstract from the issue of education and acquiring skills and knowledge, they 
tacitly assume that everything necessary to take part in production is already 
present; and so on. Thus if our picture is to be thought to be too unrealistic to 
allow us to come to any significant conclusions, the same must be the case for 
all discussions which make the same assumptions implicitly. Contrariwise, if we 
can derive significant results about classes despite the austerity of the 
description, it will be clear that their existence does not in fact depend on the 
complicated features of reality.
I do believe that the austere picture is in fact sufficient for deducing the 
most interesting characteristics of class. The reason is that what is being
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abstracted from are essentially all features of biological reproduction, while what 
remains is the process of material reproduction. It seems clear that the issue of class 
arises primarily in the latter sphere, and although there will be of course 
significant interactions with the other reproduction process in real life, these 
constitute the next, more complex level of analysis. Accordingly, for the most 
part I will be using the simple model, always specifying if in some respect it is 
being supplemented by more realistic assumptions.
Subsistence
In the description I have just given, I mentioned the term means (f 
subsistence. The intuitive meaning of this phrase is clear. However, it is worth 
spelling it out, since its precise import is a point of some controversy.
In the Marxist description of the working of capitalism, workers are often 
said to be earning subsistence wages. If this is true about capitalism, then it is 
probably justifiable to say that subsistence level of compensation is probably the 
rule for the exploited in all modes of production.
This view is often used as a counter-argument against the Marxist theory. 
Workers in the Western capitalism, or at any rate the majority of them, live at a 
level that is far above simple ‘subsistence’.
Against this, it is pointed out that Marx’s concept of the wage included an 
‘historical and moral element’ (Marx 1954, p. 171); and as is well known, Marx 
also insisted on the expansion of needs (rather than just wants) with the 
development of productive technologies.
I believe we need to distinguish between two different meanings of the 
term. On the one hand, we have what can be called the social subsistence, which 
is nothing more than the social implicitly defined minimum ‘standard of living’. 
This is a notional poverty line, implicitly present in people’s minds; whoever is 
at or falls below this standard is generally seen as ‘poor’. This corresponds 
closely, with Marx ‘historical and moral element’ of the wage.
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On the other hand, there is also ‘subsistence proper’, that is ,physiological 
subsistence. This is the level of compensation which is needed for ‘bare 
survival’. In other words, the subsistence level of compensation is the bundle of 
goods and other means of recuperation (sleep etc.) which are required for the 
simple reproduction of the human being.
One difficulty often mentioned in connection with the concept such as the 
above is that there does not seem to be any particular level of compensation 
that can be seen as the level of subsistence. Human beings are capable of 
surviving under an enormous range of adverse circumstances, from 
concentration camps to Arctic expeditions, and so the notion of a ‘minimum’ 
seems meaningless.
However, this objection does not pay enough attention to the notion of 
simple reproduction. It is one thing to say that a human being may survive, for a 
time, in extremely adverse circumstances. It is quite another to say that they may 
be able to completely reproduce their relevant capabilities under such circumstances. 
Indeed, it is quite clear that most extreme conditions imply the failure of simple 
reproduction, a gradual degradation of the organism, which if continued would 
eventually lead to death. Thus, what subsistence level of consumption implies is 
that such degradation does not occur, that the person is capable of performing 
exactly the same way ‘tomorrow’ as they are ‘today’.
Now of course, followed through to its logical conclusion, such a notion 
of subsistence turns out to be vacuous in the real world. For we are not 
immortal; eventually, all of our bodies will run down and die. This means that no 
level of compensation will literally guarantee that we are capable of the same 
things ‘tomorrow’ as we are ‘today’.
There are several possible answers to this difficulty. On the one hand, it 
might be said that the discussion is confined to the short run, in which the 
abstraction more or less holds. However, such a conception would not take us 
very far, since what is required is a theory of class reproduction that holds over 
long historical periods of time.
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Another possibility is to model the situation by separating the issue of 
immediate reproduction from the reproductive capability. This is to say that people do 
indeed reproduce themselves, but in doing so gradually run down their stock of 
reproductive capability. So, it is as if the total reproduction consisted of two 
processes: on the one hand, perfect simple reproduction, to which is on the 
other hand added the effect of their reproductive capability: when young, the 
effect is positive, with the final result being expanded reproduction; while after 
maturity, the net result is less than simple reproduction, as the reproductive 
capability gradually declines.
I think that something like this might be quite a good model for questions 
concerning individual agents — for example, for studying the differential effects 
of nurturing and deprived conditions. However, for the most part I prefer yet 
another interpretation, which is that the concept of reproduction should be 
understood collectively rather than individually. Thus, individual workers will get 
ill and old, and eventually die. However, there is a level of physical subsistence 
that just allows the simple reproduction of the exploited class, whereby the old 
and ill workers are gradually replaced by the young and healthy ones. I think we 
will get all the mileage we need from this notion of subsistence. So overall, it is 
the whole group of people that can be said ‘never to have been born* and to be 
‘immortal’.
However, there is another point that needs to be made. The objection that 
there is no specifiable ‘minimum’ of compensation needed to keep a person 
alive is incorrect, once we postulate that the person needs to be completely 
reproduced. Nevertheless, in a different sort of sense it is true to say that there 
is no single level of subsistence. This is so for at least two reasons.
In the first place, since the subsistence level is what is needed to exactly 
reproduce the present state, it obviously depends on what the present state 
actually is. Presumably, less compensation is required to reproduce an 
undeveloped body or mind than a developed one. Thus, subsistence is always 
relative to what standard has already been achieved, in some sense.
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Far more importantly, however, from the discussion of production and 
compensation above it follows immediately that subsistence is also relative in 
another sense. This is due to the varying amount of exertion that is required by 
the assorted possible engagements. Different sorts and amounts of productive 
activities will require different sorts and amounts of compensation goods to 
recuperate the run-down bodies. Chopping down trees for twelve hours a day 
will presumably require a higher level of compensation than walking through 
the woods and picking wild berries.1
Thus, it is important to realise that the physiological level of subsistence is 
always relative to the activities performed. An ‘absolute’ minimum would presumably 
have to refer to something like the compensatory requirements of a person 
resting in complete peace, whose every need is taken care and whose body thus 
performs no activities at all, save for the actual compensation itself. As 
mentioned before, this is close to the biological concept of the ‘basal metabolic 
rate’. This, however, is clearly not the idea of subsistence that would be very 
useful in discussing production. Therefore it is always necessary to bear in mind 
that the subsistence level of compensation also implies a definite level of 
productive activity.2
Thus, the notion of subsistence I shall be employing is one of the pure 
reproduction level. Given a certain level of development of human capabilities, and 
given a certain amount of exertion, it is just what is required to bring up the 
human being back to the initial level. Any compensation beyond the pure 
subsistence is, in a particular technical sense, a luxury.
In what follows, I shall be focusing initially precisely on the level of 
physiological subsistence. This is in line with the very simplified picture I am 
using at this moment. O f course, human beings are not really the biological
1 This is of course one of the morals of the discussion of John Roemer’s views in the 
previous chapter.
2 It may be impossible, even conceptually, to specify one single bundle of goods that 
corresponds to compensation at any productive level. But this is hardly a serious 
problem; even if there is a somewhat fuzzy range rather than a single point in the space 
of bundles, this will do for our purposes.
132
Class, Surplus, and the Division f  Labour (IV)
automatons described; they live in a society, with its corresponding culture; they 
are influenced by the activities they are performing, etc. Thus the level of their 
social reproduction is far beyond the simple biological requirements of 
subsistence. These matters can be dealt with; however, in terms of the 
explication of the existence of classes, they are secondary, as we shall see.
Necessary Labour
Given this notion of subsistence, I am now in a position to define necessary 
labour This will be understood as the total amount of productive activities that is 
required to produce the means cf subsistence, given technology and the existing state f  human 
capabilities.
This definition requires some further discussion. First of all, it refers to 
total amount of productive activities, rather than to labours of individuals.3 This 
is unavoidable. Since I am assuming a division of labour in the simple society, it 
automatically follows that necessary labour is collective. Under division of labour, 
no individual is capable of producing everything that is necessary to renew 
themselves. Their individual activity of course may form a part of necessary 
labour; conversely, it may make sense to refer to that portion of their activities 
which is contained in the total subsistence productive activities as their 
‘individual’ necessary labour. However, generally speaking, the concept is a 
social one; given specialisation, such necessary labour of an individual 
presupposes the social necessary labour.
Secondly, it may seem that the definition above is circular. I have said that 
the means of subsistence depend on the amount of activity performed; yet here 
I claim that the necessary activities are determined by the amount of the means 
of subsistence.
However, the impression is false. This is because the definition does not 
actually require that the same agents perform the necessary labour and consume
3 To begin with, we shall subsume under ‘labour’ all activities which are form a part of 
the process of social production, whatever their nature.
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the means of subsistence (although in real societies this will be the case). 
Instead, what is being said is something like the following. Given the existing 
state of human capabilities — the level which needs to be reproduced — and 
given some amount of activity of our agents, whatever that activity happens to 
be, that is, regardless of whether it is productive in any sense or not — given 
these two things, a certain amount of the means of subsistence is required to 
bring these agents back to the original state. Secondly, now that we know this, 
we can specify, given technology, what amount of productive ability is needed 
to produce these means of subsistence. That amount is necessary labour.
The impression of circularity arises because, if the society is to reproduce 
itself, there needs to be an equilibrium between the amount of productive 
activities performed and the necessary labour needed to supply compensation 
for those activities. If out of the 16 active hours, only 2 are spent producing the 
means of subsistence, whereas given this expenditure of energy 4 hours are 
needed to produce the means of subsistence, reproduction will fail. In order to 
achieve precisely simple reproduction (without any luxuries), the time of 
subsistence production must match the amount of necessary labour—namely, 4 
hours.
Surplus and Exploitation
The lowest level of human development can be defined as that stage of 
history at which necessary labour and the corresponding necessary 
compensation fully matched all available capabilities for action. In other words, 
technology was so undeveloped that just to arrive at the same level of capability, 
human beings had to use up all available energy in subsistence production, or in 
necessary compensation.4 Even the apparent periods of ‘leisure* were in reality 
just a necessary counterpart of the previous expenditure of energy. The human 
life was occurring fully in the realm of necessity.
4 In other words, the productivity was only just developed enough so that all the 
available capability had to be devoted to the necessary reproduction.
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It can be doubted whether such a period of history really existed; and if it 
did, whether the beings described did not have more in common with animals 
than modern humans. However, this is a useful benchmark of what it means to 
talk about a pure subsistence society.
If we now allow technology to develop,5 necessary labour and necessary 
compensation shrink relatively to the total time available. Instead of taking up 
the whole of the available time, they only cover a part of it. Thus we see the 
appearance of something never previously seen in the world history: genuinely 
free time. This is fundamentally qualitatively different from the simple ‘leisure* 
mentioned above. The necessary compensation may be far more pleasant than 
necessary labour; however, both are firmly placed on the terrain of necessity. In 
contrast, the time neither spent in subsistence production nor in compensation 
for that production is genuinely liberated; it is the time which belongs to the 
realm of freedom and in which autonomous activities could be performed.
This conclusion is enormously important, because it allows us to see 
exploitation as essentially the appropriation of the living individuality, regardless 
of a particular institutional mechanism used for this purpose. This allows for the 
resolution of the debate over whether exploitation is primarily the appropriation 
of goods, regardless of domination within production, or primarily the 
appropriation of the power to produce goods. What seems to be the case is that 
it is necessary to distinguish between an actual, personal, one-to-one 
relationship of domination (or authority or subordination), such as between the 
master and the servant, and a broader, class relationship of domination of the 
whole way of life. Roemer may well be right when he says that ‘petty* 
domination in production is not necessary for the capitalist mode of production. 
It may well be, after all, that at least in some industries the most efficient way of
5 There is a slight problem here, in that if all the time available was taken up by
necessary activities, how were the technological improvements ever thought of ? But 
perhaps we could just assume that the initial improvements occurred simply randomly, 
and the consequent reduction in necessary labour allowed for others to come in their 
wake.
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organising capitalist production will under some historical conditions turn out 
to be a target-based organisation of largely autonomous teams. However, in the 
broader sense, there is an essential aspect of domination contained in 
exploitation, in that for exploitation to exist, the exploiting class must take over 
the genuinely free time of the exploited, and turn it into a surplus labour time. 
Now it may be that this is done through an apparently impersonal mechanism, 
such as the marketplace; and in that sense the exploiting class might not be 
dominating the exploited ‘in person’, so to speak. However, the existence of the 
exploitative surplus implies that the liberated time has been taken over for alien 
purposes, and in that sense the exploited do remain subordinate, regardless of 
how immediately obvious that reality appears.
So when Carchedi charges that Wright’s concept of the ‘appropriation of 
the fruit of labour’ of others is unsatisfactory, because it would allow the 
‘elimination’ of exploitation by the simple means of redistributing the surplus 
product, he is right. Exploitation results from the fact that the surplus product 
has been produced in thefirst place. It is ‘too late’ to do anything about this when the 
time for redistribution comes around. The ‘free’ time had already been taken 
over and subordinated to the requirements of the exploiters. Redistributing the 
surplus may be some sort of compensation for this, but it cannot do away with the 
fact.
On the other hand, if the charge is that exploitation, capitalist or any other 
sort, demands the direct involvement of the exploiter in production, and hence 
personal appropriation of the living individuality, then the charge is false. The 
exploited might be forced to produce the surplus through a variety of 
mechanisms, some of which need to involve little face-to-face authoritarian 
interaction within production. Class domination is not ‘petty domination’. In that 
sense — but in that sense alone — it is Wright and Roemer who are right on this 
score.
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Exploitation and Poverty
From what has been said so far, it appears that the chief evil of 
exploitation is that it constitutes a species of unfreedom. It is the appropriation 
of the very life itself that is at the root of the exploitative relations.
Yet, historically speaking, the notion of exploitation was bound up with 
the existence of poverty, rather than with unfreedom. Lack of freedom certainly 
played a role in some class societies, such as under slavery or serfdom. But that 
sort of ‘political’ unfreedom, that is, lack of freedom sanctioned by the legal and 
political structure of the society, appears to be a separate issue from the very 
basic fact that almost all class societies were predominantly divided into the rich 
and the poor. Can our explication of exploitation account for that?
First of all, I would argue that stressing the domination aspect of 
exploitation is in fact a virtue rather than a vice. The concept sketched out 
above does allow for the consideration of poverty, as will be seen shortly. 
However, the significant point is that it also allows for an identification of an 
exploitative relationship even when superficially nobody seems to be particularly 
poor. It will turn out that exploitation appears in different guises at the opposite 
ends of the spectrum, so to speak. Under certain conditions, at one extreme, 
exploitation manifests itself as material poverty. At the other extreme, under 
different conditions, material poverty is not in evidence, however the lack of 
autonomy is still significant.
This is singularly important. Much ink has been spilt over the question 
whether Marx’s Capital argues that capitalism will progressively impoverish the 
working class in absolute or only relative terms. I believe that the way the 
concept of exploitation has been spelled out here allows for the possibility that 
in absolute material terms, the working class may be getting progressively better 
off, and yet this constitutes no theoretical concession with regard to 
exploitation.
First of all, it the difference between absolute and relative poverty should 
be stressed. It seems to me that a good way of making the distinction is by
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referring to our earlier concepts of physiological and social subsistence. 
Absolute poverty could then be seen as a living standard which just allows the 
physiological reproduction of the individual, a bare survival level. Anyone above 
this level may still be poor, however in quite a different sense. The poverty is 
now relative — relative to the socially accepted average standard, i. e. the social 
subsistence.
Now absolute poverty obviously predates exploitation (of course if we 
believe that there were societies without exploitation). A subsistence society 
whose technology did not allow anything but physiological subsistence would be 
poor in this absolute sense.
Thus, being poor and being exploited are not co-extensive concepts under 
many circumstances. Obviously, in a pure exchange economy, for example, 
there is no exploitation, but there may easily be ‘the rich’ and ‘the poor’.
Similarly, in a productive economy, if the productivity of labour is low — as 
it generally was up until the emergence of capitalism — everybody can be poor 
even in the absence of exploitation. Poor from our present point of view, that 
is; in other words, unable to acquire much of what we have come to regard the 
basic necessities of life.
In the above discussion, exploitation has been described in its limiting, 
extreme case. In that limit, the necessary labour is defined as labour needed for 
producing the subsistence bundle of goods, where the relevant concept of 
subsistence is the physiological one. This implies that in theory all the time 
liberated from the work for physiological subsistence is ‘up for grabs’ for the 
exploiters.
But of course, this need not be the case. Here, the distinction between 
physiological and social subsistence comes into play. It may well be, and 
historically indeed it was the case, that the generally accepted standard of living 
was somewhat higher than the pure physiological minimum. Given this 
accepted standard of living, the necessary labour was also greater and thus the 
time available for exploitation lower.
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Now, if we believe that up until the emergence of capitalism, the 
productivity of labour was generally fairly low, this inclines us to believe that 
there was quite consistent pressure on the exploiters to push the living 
standards of the exploited as low as possible, to allow for the increase in the 
supply of surplus labour. Obviously, this is a sweeping generalisation which 
would likely to be qualified in various ways in most of the historically existing 
societies. Nevertheless, it seems correct to recognise that the conflict over the 
living standard of the exploited was one of the major parts of the exploitative 
conflict overall. The various peasants’ revolts, for example, tended to be 
precipitated by the increases in the demands of the feudal lords that had been 
felt to be intolerable.
Once productivity started rising signiflcandy, as happened chiefly with the 
development of capitalism, the pressure on the exploiters to extract the 
maximum possible surplus labour eased significantly. This is not to say that 
there was none; but unlike before, it was the consequence of the social rather 
than material necessity.
This is the reason why we can expect that in societies with a relatively low 
level of development, exploitation will mean that the standard of living of the 
exploited will be closer to the absolute physiological level of subsistence than in 
highly developed societies. Hence, exploitation will manifest itself as poverty or 
as unfreedom depending on how far the productivity of labour has progressed 
in a given society.
Now it is of course true that exploitation-as-unfreedom may be far less 
salient as a motive force of social struggles than exploitation-as-poverty. This is 
indeed a very important issue. I would say that one of the main reasons why 
class and class struggle fell in significance in developed capitalist societies is 
precisely because exploitation lost much of its salience.
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Level of Reproduction, Activity, Environment
However, there is actually much more that can be said about the issue of 
poverty, freedom and exploitation. The discussion above already suggested that 
there is more than one dimension in which exploitation can manifest itself. This 
leads to the idea that in order to investigate properly how it affects the lives of 
human beings, it is necessary to first determine what are the relevant aspects of 
their lives that might be so affected.
I would like to claim that these can be summarised under the headings of 
capability, activity, and environment.
The notion of capability I am of course borrowing from Amartya Sen (e. g. 
Sen 1985), although I do not claim that my use is exacdy the same as the 
original. In particular, the idea of capability becomes useful when considering 
what the ‘level’ in the ‘level of reproduction’ actually means. While above this 
was left unclear, it is now possible to say that the level at which a human being 
reproduces themselves corresponds to the set of capabilities that they possess at 
the beginning of the cycle of reproduction. In other words, someone who is 
pable of accomplishing much with their endowment of capabilities is better off, 
ceteris paribus, than someone who can do very little.
However, although Sen similarly uses this notion in considering the ‘quality 
of life’, I believe this is too little to completely describe its relevant aspects. 
Another important issue is what is actually being done during the process of 
reproduction, and how low or high does that process take the individual.
Taking the former claim first, it is relevant not only what the agent is 
capable of potentially doing, but also what they actually do do. Regardless of the 
reasons for their action, it will have some impact on the organism itself. And 
similarly, since the agent does not act in a vacuum, but in the midst of a natural 
and later also social world, the environment in which they act also matters for their 
actual experience. That experience of action in an environment may be a 
pleasant one or an unpleasant one, and may take differently long times. In other
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words, the quality of life depends, on the one hand, what the agent actively 
does, but on the other hand, also on what they passively enduref
Finally and relatedly, aside from the immediate impact of actions and 
endurance of the environment, there is the issue of the ‘inner homeostat' of the 
agent. Since the world in which we live is one of uncertainty, the agent will be 
experiencing different levels of ‘tension', depending on how safe or unsafe they 
consider their situation to be, what actions they expect themselves to be called 
upon to perform, etc. In short, the ‘inner peace' is also a very relevant 
consideration; almost nothing among the other aspects can compensate for an 
extremely heightened sense of tension in the agent.
In effect, it is possible to state that for all three elements — capability, 
activity, and environment — there is an external and an internal aspect. Internal 
capability includes those accumulated capacities which have been or have 
become part of the organism itself, while external capability refers to those 
options provided by the existence of outside resources — including productive 
technology. External activity requires no special remarks; internal activity refers 
to those processes going on inside the body — part of the ‘beings’ in the ‘beings 
and doings'. Finally, aside from the external environment, there is also the 
internal state, another sort of ‘beings'7
Now it is possible that since Sen defines capability as a set of functionings, 
and functionings are to be thought of as ‘beings and doings', the impact of 
actions, endurance and tension might be considered to have been already 
included in the notion of capability. For reasons that will become apparent later, 
however, I prefer to explicitly spell out these different aspects of the experience 
of life and reserve the name ‘capability’ for the set of available actions.
6 Similar sort of reasoning led Cohen (1989) to develop the concept of 'mid-fare' as the 
focus for an egalitarian theory of justice.
7 I realise that it may well be difficult to distinguish between internal activities and 
internal environment; however, this question might be resolved in practice, here I find 
it convenient to use both terms for reasons of theoretical elegance.
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Of course, all of these aspects can be applied just as much to the time 
spent in necessary labour as they can be to the ‘liberated time’. So for example, 
not only is it relevant what actions are performed and what has to be endured 
during labour-time, but also, what options one possesses and to what extent can 
one feel relaxed during the ‘free’ time. This is what it means to say that both the 
amount of liberated time and its quality matter — an agent with heaps of free 
time but few capabilities is not necessarily better off than one with less free time 
but more options (cf. an unemployed worker vs. a high-income professional in 
capitalism).
Now we can see that the issue of poverty is essentially one of the level of 
reproduction, that is, the possibilities available, while free time is an issue of self- 
determination vs. necessary labour. Both are relevant and both are to do with 
exploitation. And in fact, I will in the end try to demonstrate that in a sense, all 
of the different aspects of quality of life can be subsumed under a kind of 
exploitation.
Technology
Let me now briefly turn to the question of technology. In the discussion 
above, I have only used a vague expression, ‘given technology’. This is not 
accidental.
There are at least four different ways in which we could understand what 
this phrase means. Every society could be characterised by the set of 
technologies which is actually currently in use. But this is not the only set that 
might be relevant for our purposes. For there may be other ways of producing 
that are known, even if they are not actually used. On the other hand, not all 
these technologies may actually be available, in the sense that not all the inputs 
required are currently present (nor can they be produced within some definite 
time-horizon). Finally, some technologies might be ‘available’, in the sense that 
everything required is present, yet they remain unknown.
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Thus, we arrive at the question of the meaning of ‘necessity’ in necessary 
labour. Each of the four ways of viewing technology has their claim on being 
the right explication of ‘necessity’.
The first understanding is the one that Marx actually used in defining 
labour values under capitalism. As is well known, according to Marx the value 
of a commodity is the amount of socially necessary labour that goes into its 
production, where ‘socially necessary’ means the average amount of labour 
currently used to produce it. The justification of understanding the ‘given 
technology’ in this way is fairly clear. If  we are looking at exploitation, we need 
to consider the labour actually performed. It is not much use saying that i f  other 
technologies were used, a different amount of labour would be necessary. It 
might be true, but it is not relevant to the world as it stands. And exploitation is 
meant to play an explanatory role in that actual world; it is meant to explain its 
actual workings.
However, to say that it is the known technology which is relevant has the 
merit of being more ‘morally important’, if that is what we are after. The 
oppression resulting from exploitation is far worse if technologies that do not 
minimise the use of labour are used. Apparendy, the ancient Romans were 
familiar with the principles of the steam engine, but since slave labour was far 
cheaper, preferred the production using the slaves;8 this was clearly to the 
detriment of the slaves themselves.
Nevertheless, if we are concerned with the workings of the actual world, 
we may want to focus our attention not just on the technologies that are known, 
but those actually available. N ot everything that is logically and physically 
possible may also be economically feasible; the inputs required might simply not 
be there. As a simple example, consider a group of people washed up on a 
desert island. Even if they do possess the knowledge of fairly advanced 
productive techniques, this is likely to not be very much use to them. More 
seriously, while various technological possibilities are known to the inhabitants
8 De Ste. Croix (1981).
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of many poor countries, they may be beyond the bounds of possibility within 
some definite time horizon, if the inputs required are simply not available to 
them.
Finally, there is a sense in which only that labour is necessary which is 
using the best possible technologies, regardless of whether they are actually 
known. If we were solely concerned with the meaning of necessity, such a view 
could be justified. From the point of view of a more advanced society, much of 
the past suffering was, stricdy speaking, unnecessary. For centuries, it was well 
within the bounds of possibility, for example, to prevent the spread of disease 
by the simple expedient of washing hands. We would hardly like to say that 
many of the preventable deaths were ‘necessary’; but if they were not necessary, 
then given simple Aristotelian logic they must have been unnecessary. Hence, 
what we seem to be regarding as necessary is only that utilising the best available 
approach, regardless of its availability at the time.
Since each of these notions of ‘technology’ has its uses, is there a 
principled way in which it can be taken in the discussion of class? I would argue 
that the technology should be strictly understood as that which is actually in use. 
The reason is because, on the basic Marxist grounds, the mode cf exploitation at least 
strongly constrains and at most forces a particular division f  labour. This idea can be 
understood roughly as follows (using a ‘neoclassical’ sort of language): given the 
existing sort of resources, both produced and natural, and given the state of 
general knowledge, there is a set of feasible technologies. However, not all of 
these technologies are consistent with the existing social relationships between 
groups of people — in particular, the relationship of exploitation. If this 
relationship is to be preserved, only a certain subset of the feasible set of 
technologies is selected. In the limit, there is only one possible technology 
consistent with the mode of production. This is what it means to say that 
exploitation constrains or forces the choice of technology.
Of course, if we now abandon the neoclassical description, a question 
arises as to what mechanism causes only exploitation-consistent technologies to
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chosen. A naive sort of answer would be that the exploiting class is not stupid 
and makes sure that only those techniques are chosen which do not threaten its 
power. This view can sometimes be found in Marxist writings, and although 
naive, it is not entirely without merit. It is true that at the level of particular 
person-to-person relations, the exploiters can see which techniques lead to the 
preservation/strengthening of their position, and contrariwise which undermine 
that position. However, while this point is undoubtedly part of the answer, it is 
not the full answer.
This is because the naive view does not take into the account that 
putatively rational actions at the local level may not have intended consequences 
at the global level (and/or other levels in between). To illustrate this, we might 
imagine a scenario in which an over-regimented factory regime leads to such an 
increase of resentment that a working-class organisation outside the factory gates 
arises that threatens the mode of exploitation globally. Thus, what we need is an 
explanation of how the mode of exploitation forces the division of labour by 
itself, not through self-conscious actions of the exploiting class trying to preserve 
its position.
This would seem to lead us in the direction of methodological holism, on 
the one hand, and teleology, on the other. However, neither is really a necessary 
path to be taken. First of all, there is a difference between the historical process 
of the development of the mode of production and its theoretical reflection in a 
model. For the model, we can postulate an absolute mechanism of selection of 
the appropriate division of labour. In the empirical reality, there will be constant 
local deviations, fluctuations, changes — the selection mechanism will manifest 
itself as the famous ‘law of tendency’. This is simply to say that those techniques 
which have undesirable consequences for the exploiting class will not 
necessarily be identified in advance; instead, they will sometimes be eliminated 
only as a result of the process of learning, other times their effects will be 
neutralised through other means (mainly political). Finally, it is not only 
possible, but indeed necessary that at the moment of epochal transition, the
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division of labour is not straightforwardly functional for the receding mode of 
exploitation — which is the meaning o f another famous claim, that the embryo 
of the new society is carried within the womb of the old.
The postulate that the mode of exploitation forces the division of labour is 
thus the property of the model rather than of the historical reality. It is being 
made to emphasise that while the mode of production continues to reproduce 
itself, doing so over a whole historical epoch, the division of labour cannot be 
directly contradictory to it. So the point is that on average, the technology chosen 
will be functional for the existing mode of production, not because of a 
teleological ‘puli’ of the optimal goal, but because of a ‘push’ of both the 
independent technological development within the mode of production and 
social struggles accompanying it. How exactly this happens, however, is not a 
matter for abstract theory, but for detailed empirical examination.
The claim that the mode of exploitation forces the division of labour is 
crucial from the present point of view. This is because if the division of labour 
has particular consequences for the class structure of the society, this is 
ultimately tied to the mode of exploitation itself, even though it is not a direct 
effect of it. If a mode of exploitation requires a particular authoritarian division 
of labour, for example, then although the direct effect of this mode is simply the 
division into the exploiters and the exploited, the indirect effect is also the 
division between the rulers and the ruled.
Physiological vs. Social subsistence — Parasitic vs. Functional 
exploitation
To the distinction between physiological and social subsistence, another 
pair of concepts can now be related. This is the distinction between functional 
and parasitic exploitation. Functional exploitation can be defined as that 
exploitative relationship which increases the level of social subsistence above 
physiological subsistence. In other words, while the direct producers are indeed 
exploited, it is also true that they do reap certain benefits from their position.
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This may well seem quite counter-intuitive. After all, as the old radical 
trade-union song goes,
Is there ought we hold in common 
With the greedy parasite 
Who would lash us into serfdom 
A.nd would crush us with his might?
This short stanza encapsulates a view of exploitation that is fairly common 
in the Marxist literature. Arguably, it is also the intuitive picture of exploitation, 
regardless of whether one believes it actually exists or not. Under this picture, 
the exploitation is a parasitic relationship: on the one hand, there are the toiling 
multitudes straining to survive, who, on the other hand, also have to feed the 
deadweight mass of their exploiters.
Under this conception, getting rid of exploitation could be understood as a 
logically simple operation of ‘cutting o ff  the exploiting layer, leaving all the 
other relationships within the society essentially unchanged. Historically, we 
could understand Lenin’s approach during the Bolshevik revolution as 
embodying this view. All that ‘the end of exploitation’ entailed was getting rid of 
the coupon-clippers; everything else was to remain practically the same. While 
the absentee owners were done away with, in contrast the ‘specialists’ and the 
‘directors’ inherited from the ancien regime were seen as indispensable for the new 
society. If not literally as persons, then certainly in terms of structural positions, 
with Lenin coming out very strongly in favour of ‘one-man management’ (e. g. 
Lenin 1965a, pp. 211-213) and the use of such specialists (Lenin 1969, pp. 76 — 
81).10
9 I was of course inspired to include this extract from Solidarity Forever by a similar 
passage in Cohen (2000).
10 Later, the ‘cutting o f f  of the ‘parasites’ was implemented in Stalin’s ‘elimination of the 
kulaks as a class’ in a horrifically literal way.
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I take it for granted that the resulting type of society was certainly not what 
we would like to call ‘a classless society’. If classes are based on exploitation, and 
if the ‘abolition’ of the expropriating stratum did not eliminate them, then this 
suggests that the simple picture of exploitation as a parasitic relationship is not 
the whole story. And indeed, there are strands of Marxism which provide hints 
for the more sophisticated understanding, which makes space for the notion of 
functional exploitation.
The pride of place should of course be given to Marx’s own idea that 
capitalist exploitation is necessary in order to develop the productive forces of the 
society, mainly in terms of the constant improvement of the productive 
technologies:
“The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created 
more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding 
generations together. Subjection of Nature’s forces to man, machinery, application 
of chemistry to industry and agriculture, stearh-navigation, railways, electric 
telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalisation of rivers, 
whole populations conjured out of the ground —  what earlier century had even a 
presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labour?” 
(Marx and Engels 1967, p. 85)
In fact, under at least one interpretation of the Marxist general theory of 
history this functional view of exploitation would be regarded as canonical.11 
According to this interpretation, society moves through the stages of the class 
societies due to the development of the productive forces, where first the 
relations of production serve as the forms of development of these forces, only 
to turn into their fetters. Thus, a change in the class structure — that is, a change 
in the mode of production — arises because the old class structure, involving the
11 The most detailed defence of this interpretation is provided by Cohen (1978); however, 
we need not subscribe to this particular explication of it in order to see that it is a very 
prominent strand of Marx’s thinking.
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old forms of exploitation, is no longer conducive to the development of the 
productive forces.
But, of course, that must mean that at one point, the old mode of 
exploitation was so conducive. Thus, Marx’s view of the bourgeoisie should in 
fact be seen as just one instance of the general phenomenon, whereby the 
exploitative class is functionally necessary to secure material progress for 
humankind — without thereby invalidating the claim that their relationship is 
exploitative.
Thus, when Nozick (1974) defends private property on the grounds that 
with private property, the standard of living is higher than without it, this could 
be admitted by Marxists without much cause for concern. Indeed, it is precisely 
what the Marxist theory itself is saying. If we understand private property as a 
shorthand for exploitation, then the productivist interpretation of the Marxist 
theory would be saying something like the following: a class society represents 
progress over primitive communism, because the existence of exploitation 
allows for the development of the productive forces and thus an increase in the 
standard of living of the exploited classes. Up to the point where the existing 
class structure — i. e., the existing mode of exploitation — is still beneficial for the 
development of the productive forces, exploitation is functionally necessary.12
However, this of course does not mean that it will eternally remain so; 
when further productive progress is impeded by the existing exploitative 
relationships, these will be overthrown.
Up until that point, there may have been both a parasitic and a functional 
element to the actually existing exploitative relationship. But during the specific 
periods of history, those when the old exploitative relationship turns into a 
fetter on the development of the productive forces, the old exploitative class 
ceases to be functionally necessary at all. It might still be contingently functional, 
since it is possible that under the existing technological arrangements, the 
activities of the exploiting class are needed — but at the same time, alternative
12 This point arose from a discussion with David Ronnegard.
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technological arrangements, under which the same living standards would be 
secured without the old exploiting classes, are already known. The other 
possibility is that the old exploitative class plays no functional role whatsoever 
any more and thus turns into a purely parasitical addendum to the social 
organism. This is when the ‘epoch of social revolution’ is due.
This understanding of functionally necessary exploitation is, of course, 
closely tied up with the expansionary possibilities of society. Does it follow, 
then, that if the structure of the society remains essentially unchanging, 
exploitation is necessarily parasitic? I would say that there is at least a logical 
possibility of functional exploitation even under these circumstances.
Under the view just mentioned, exploitation is functional because the 
development of the productive forces is viewed as ultimately beneficial for 
humankind. When human society finally passes through the last stage of its class 
phase of development, it will have at its disposal the accumulated productive 
forces from the past. However, this says nothing about the usefulness of 
exploitation during the process of development.
I would suggest that it is possible that exploitation may have beneficial 
effects even while it is actually happening. Instead of just suffering for the 
greater good of later generations, the exploited classes might be enjoying some 
of the fruits of their forbearance, in the guise of the beneficial effects of 
productive progress.
If this were the case, exploitation would be functional in a second sense. 
While the exploited classes would be performing surplus labour in order to 
‘feed’ the exploiting classes, the existence of those exploiting classes would not 
be purely parasitical, nor would they be necessary simply for the future 
production possibilities. Exploitation would be functionally necessary, because 
its existence would guarantee that the living standard of the exploited is higher 
than in the previous stage of the class society.
Now it needs to be stressed that just because exploitation isfunctionally necessary 
rather than parasitical, it does not cease to be exploitation. This is quite obvious in the
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first sense of the functional necessity. One can hardly accuse Marx of being an 
apologist for capitalism; yet the stress he places on the functional role of 
bourgeoisie in the development of the productive forces is unmistakable. There 
is nothing contradictory in believing that a repugnant process is necessary in 
order to achieve beneficial results.
But, obviously, the same goes for the second sense of functional necessity. 
The fact that a better alternative than a repugnant one is currently unavailable 
does not stop the latter from being repugnant. In fact, it is precisely what makes 
exploitation such a deeply contradictory phenomenon. While an exploitative 
class society may be necessary in order to secure material progress, it is at the 
same time a fundamentally conflictual society for the precise reason that the 
exploitative relationship is one of domination, repression, surplus extraction etc. 
Thus, the exploited class under these conditions is in a ‘double bind’ — it needs 
the exploiters for its own standard of living, but at the same time it is oppressed 
by their very existence and thus constantly involved in a systematic conflict with 
them, whatever its actual intensity at any point in time.
Once we understand the concept of functionally necessary exploitation, 
more light is also thrown on the alternative, parasitic exploitation. For it is now 
possible to see that even purely parasitical exploitation does not necessarily imply 
that the exploiting class need do literally ‘nothing’ — meaning that it does not 
need to perform any sort of exertion. For example, we could have a class society 
in which the tensions between the exploiters and the exploited run so high that 
the exploiters need to spend a great amount of their time practising the art of 
war and designing new weapons in order to keep the exploited in check. 
However, exploitation may well be purely parasitical in the sense that if the 
exploiting class were to disappear, this would in no way adversely affect the 
material standard of living of the exploited. Thus, it is possible that the 
exploiting class performs a lot of activities which they find subjectively 
necessary, and which are also objectively necessary if the system is to keep 
reproducing itself as a class society, but which nevertheless contribute literally
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nothing to the labour necessary for the exploited class. Thus the criterion for 
whether exploitation is parasitical is not whether the exploiting class can simply 
‘creams o ff  the surplus without any exertion, but whether any exertion it might 
be making is in any way beneficial to the exploited class.
In fact, from the above we can derive quite a different pair of distinctions. 
Exploitation may be either active or passive, depending on the behaviour of the 
exploiting class. In the scenario just described, much activity is necessary. 
Similarly, in the trade-union song at the beginning of this section, the ‘greedy 
parasite’ needs to employ a lash to get his or her way.
However, it is possible that the exploiters delegate all their activities further 
down, and become pure ‘rentiers’ or ‘coupon-clippers’. Apparently something 
like this was the case with the great slave-owners of antiquity (De Ste. Croix 
1981). This would be a passive exploiting class, whose activity is limited to 
coming along and creaming off the surplus, as mentioned above.
Finally, there is one last distinction we can make, between expansionary 
and stationary exploitation. This, of course, refers to the question of 
reproduction of the society as a whole. If an exploitative society is in the state of 
simple reproduction, i. e. just managing to exactly reproduce all the relevant 
relationships, we have stationary exploitation. This is not the same as parasitic, 
nor the same as passive exploitation though: the exploitative relationship may be 
functional, for it may be bringing current benefits to the exploited; and it may 
be quite active, in the way was described above, for example. O n the other 
hand, expansionary exploitation may mean that the productive possibilities of 
the society as a whole constantly increase, yet if no benefits of these increases 
go to the exploited, it remains a parasitic relationship. Similarly, if the expansion 
is due to the existence of exploitative class, but all the activities are delegated 
down to the exploited, it is quite possible that exploitation is expansionary and 
at the same time passive.
Now, what we were doing up to now was playing with some sort of 
undefined, intuitive concept of exploitation, trying to see whether our intuition
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could generate some characteristics that we can generally apply to the concept. 
However, exploitation is not an intuitively primary concept. It originates with 
Marx as quite a specific sort of notion with its specific uses. Thus, it is 
important to spell out just what we will exploitation to be, at least in the first 
approximation. Only then we can judge whether the various distinctions we 
have described make any sense; and also, how do other views that are to be 
discussed later compare with the classical concept.
Thus, I take it that the canonical notion cf exploitation refers to the situation 
where one group of people engages not only in necessary labour to provide the 
means cf subsistence for itself, but also in surplus labour that provides the means of 
subsistence and possibly means f  luxury for another group of people. Thus, 
exploitation is a relationship between these two groups of people, the former of 
which is called the exploited class and the latter the exploiting class.
Of course, in order to understand this definition, we still need to clarify all 
the italicised terms. This task will be undertaken later on. For now, let me just 
point out that our distinctions indeed make sense.
The exploitative relationship is parasitic if the surplus labour given over to 
the exploiters makes no difference in the status of the exploited, now or ever; it 
is functionalif the its existence raises the standard of living of the exploited over 
the subsistence level, either now or for the future generations. It is active if the 
exploiters have to make sure surplus labour is given over, and passive if they can 
delegate any necessary supervision and/or enforcement to the exploited. Finally, 
it is stationary if surplus labour makes no difference to the structure of the 
society, and expansionary if it is invested in further expansion of the economy.
As we can see, the existence of exploitative relationship may have quite 
distinct effects on both the division of labour within the society (depending on 
its active/passive nature), as well as on the division of income (with the fruits of 
exploitation being distributed differently depending on the parasitic/functional 
role of exploitation). Thus, these distinctions will be relevant for the discussion 
of class and how it is related to exploitation.
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From Class Structure to Class Agency
Within the analysis of class relations, there is a certain distinction that has 
been made many times in many different guises: class as a structural feature of a 
particular society and class as a more-or-less cohesive group of actual people. 
When Marx talks about a mass that in the struggle ‘constitutes itself as a class 
for itself (Marx p. 158); when Wright talks of ‘class structure’ and ‘class 
formation’ (e. g. Wright 1985 p.6, p. 14); when Giddens described ‘structuration’ 
as a process whereby ‘economic classes’ become ‘social classes’ (Giddens 1983, 
p. 105), and when Bourdieu talks about ‘classes on paper’ and ‘actual classes’, 
these concepts do differ in many important respects; but they share the facet of 
distinguishing between the ‘analytical’ and the ‘lived’ entity. My preferred way of 
formulating this distinction is as one between ‘class structure’ and ‘class agency’, 
with ‘class formation’ as a process whereby the movement from one to the 
other occurs.
In what follows I want to concentrate on class structure. I perceive this as 
the more fundamental of the two: once we understand class structure of a 
society, we may then try to follow the ways in which the manifestations of this 
structure influences the formation of class as agency.
However, this process is a vast topic in itself, and I cannot hope to cover it 
within the confines of this work. What I can do is to suggest a simple 
hypothesis of how this process may frequently work.
It seems obvious that the mediating term between structure and agency is 
class experience. Now this experience is not a simple thing; it may be experience 
of many different aspects of the class relationship. For example, the experience 
of life in, say, a working-class neighbourhood, or contrariwise, the regular 
experience of expensive sporting activities, such as yachting; the experience of 
power and responsibility at the top of a large capitalist corporation, or 
contrariwise the experience of a ‘cog in the machine’ in a sweatshop-style 
factory; the employee’s experience of a row with their manager — and the 
manager’s experience of a row with their subordinate. While all of them inform
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the process of class formation, they are quite distinct and arising from different 
aspects of the class relations. In particular, I would like to distinguish between 
the
a) experience of production
b) experience of consumption
c) experience of conflict
For both of the first two terms, the relevant factors are things like the 
environment in which they occur, the objects that are used, activities that are 
performed with these objects, etc. The experience of conflict, in contrast, is the 
direct experience of the antagonistic class relation (regardless of whether this is 
seen as such by the participants). It has been suggested that it is this experience 
of conflict which is the determinant one for the class formation13.1 think that 
while this is undoubtedly an enormously important factor, it would be a mistake 
to leave out the other two sorts of experience. One’s productive and 
consumptive activities are directly dependent on one’s standing in the existing 
class relations. Bourdieu’s approach, for example, could be seen as 
concentrating strongly on the experience of consumpton14 rather than any overt 
conflict — and yet it is an examination of class par excellence.
In fact, it can be suggested that without such class experiences outside of 
the direct conflict, the process of class formation would be much more difficult. 
Revolutionary Marxists like to stress the role of the conflictual situations in 
forging bonds among the members of the working class; yet solidarity and 
realisation of the common interest are much easier when people already 
perceive others as being in some sense similar to themselves — even if this sense 
is perhaps quite vague.
13 See e. g. the already quoted passage in E. R Thompson (1972), pp. 9-10.
14 Bourdieu (1984).
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This brings me to another link in the chain: the emergence of class 
awareness. This very useful term is due to Giddens (1983, p. I l l )  and it is subtly 
different from the more widely known concept of class consciousness. The idea 
is that individuals can become aware of certain fundamental commonalities on 
the one hand, and certain fundamental differences on the other, without 
necessarily being able to consciously articulate them in terms of class. Giddens’ 
example is the type of middle class whose members believe that they achieved 
their positions in life through their own efforts, rather than any sort of class 
membership. I would stretch the concept to far greater lengths, however. It 
seems to me that a clear sense of TJs’ and ‘Them’ can often be observed to exist 
in many different types of societies, such that a focused analysis would reveal 
strong, if not absolute correlation with class relationships — although such 
analysis is hardly ever undertaken by the members of the society themselves. In 
other words, class awareness is in my view a pervasive phenomenon, far more 
so than class consciousness.15
The awareness of class may then give rise to the development of a 
particular class identity, which is a further step towards a conscious articulation of 
class relationships. If the class identity leads to the realisation of interests that all 
members of the given class share, this can be properly called class consciousness. 
And finally, such consciousness may — although does not have to — lead to 
actions in the class interests, thus constituting class agency.
I do not claim that the sequence
structure — experience — awareness — identity — consciousness — agency
15 Visitors to Britain can sometimes be heard to express incredulity at the solid contours 
of the class relationships in this country, often implying that such a phenomenon is 
absent in their homeland. While this may be true in the sense of greater ‘social 
mobility’ in these other countries -  or in other words, far smaller extent of intra-class 
reproduction (see below) -  some of that amazement should be taken with a pinch of 
salt. The difference is mainly in how strongly the class awareness is openly articulated 
in term of class, rather than in the underlying relationships themselves; if pressed, 
most foreigners would be hardly likely to deny that they very well understand who 
‘Us’ and ‘Them’ are in their own country.
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is some sort of necessary or linear progression — in fact, the empirical reality 
around us would be quite enough to disprove such a claim. It is more of an 
‘ideal-type’, paradigm notion of the process of class formation. The exact 
conditions under which each stage gives rise to the next one is a matter for 
empirical sociological research. I simply believe that the sequence described 
might be a useful guiding thread for precisely that sort of research — and 
perhaps even for groups of types other than classes.
Class as a Fundamentally Conflictual Relationship
Although, as I have said, the experience of conflict is not the only sort of 
class experience available to individuals, it is a basic Marxist tenet that the class 
relationship does arise from conflict. In what follows later in this chapter, I will 
try to present a fairly detailed hypothesis regarding the nature of the class 
relationship. Before I get to the main argument, however, I would like to sketch 
out a preliminary picture of its contours. It is not meant to be particularly 
original; on the contrary, what I would like to do is to describe clearly what I 
take to be, as far as Marxian theorists are concerned, relatively uncontroversial 
features of the class relationship.
These features can be in my view expressed by the following statement:
Structural class relationship arises from the systematic conflict between two groups f  
agents that are bound together by the particularform f  the material reproduction f  the given 
society.
Every clause in this statement counts. I will go through them one by one, 
to clarify their importance.
First of all, as has been said already, in this view classes are based on 
conflict. This is quite clearly in contradiction to stratification theories, which 
arbitrarily divide society into ‘classes’ according to the theorist’s whim. But even 
more importantly, it is also a challenge to the Weberian view that the existence 
of class is due to differential economic chances of individuals on the market.
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That formulation sees no essential conflict between classes — some individuals 
may be better off and others worse off, but while that may be a cause for envy, 
there is nothing that says that this may not be altogether an accident, and that in 
fact, there may be an inverse relationship between the life-chances of particular 
groups.
Secondly, the conflict needs to be systematic. Obviously so — there are 
hundreds, perhaps millions of conflicts and conflictual situations occurring 
every day, but not all of them give rise to classes. Classes arise from a conflict 
that is in some sense fundamental for the given society, in other words, it is 
large-scale, influencing more or less everybody in society, playing itself out again 
and again in countless encounters — in short, it is a systematic feature of the 
given community.
Thirdly, this systematic conflict must be to do with the material 
reproduction. This is because there may be more than one source of such 
systematic conflict within a society — gender and age come to mind immediately. 
As I have said before and will soon have an occasion to repeat again, these are 
among the features of human society that I consciously abstract from. Such 
different conflicts have their own dynamic, which may interact with the class 
relationship, but in themselves they are distinct from it. The bond with material 
reproduction is precisely what gives the class relationship its specificity.
Next, I claim that this systematic material conflict actually ties the two 
parties together. This is meant to express the old idea that the class relationship 
is ‘dialectical’ — that while the classes are mutually hostile, at the same time they 
cannot avoid living with each other, within a given mode of production. This 
postulation may perhaps be quite controversial after all; if we take it that 
exploitation is purely parasitical, then it is quite true that the exploiters need the 
exploited — but it is by definition untrue that the exploited need the exploiters. 
As it happens, I will later on argue that such a situation is the exception rather 
than the rule within exploitative societies; however, for the moment let me just 
make clear that the point is somewhat different: the idea is that the two classes
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mutually define each other — that they are necessarily part of the same society. This 
is to distinguish class conflict from other types of systematic conflict that might 
conceivably arise from the process of material reproduction — conflicts in which 
the two parties basically have nothing to do with each other. Military conflict 
over a scarce productive resource, such as oil, comes to mind.
One final clarification: when I talk about ‘conflict’, this does not at all 
require an actual open skirmish between any two parties. Instead, the conflict 
is structural, which can be understood as saying that in some dimension, the 
two parties play a zero-sum game within the given mode of production. They 
may or may not be aware of this; they may or may not consciously strive to 
change their position; they may or may not be attempting to change the rules 
of the game. However, it is clear that if the rules stipulate that one party’s 
gain is the other party’s loss, then conflict is inscribed into the very structure 
of the society. It may remain latent — people may well ‘suffer in silence’, even 
for very long periods of time. But the point is that as long as another group 
benefits from that, they m il be suffering. Thus, the existence of classes 
implies this sort of fundamental conflictual situation even if there is no 
observable conflict whatsoever.
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Chapter V
If Profit Is the Answer, 
W hat Should Be the Q uestion?
Income from Capital and the 
Labour Theory of Value
In this chapter, I will attempt to show that no alternative explanation of 
profit to the one provided by the Labour Theory of Value — or in other words, 
no explanation which attempts to avoid the unpalatable idea of exploitation— is 
in fact adequate. The next chapter will then be devoted to the Marxian theory of 
prices, the Sraffian critique of it and the precise relation between the Marxian 
and the Sraffian approaches to the economy.
What is Profit?
There are many different possible answers to this question.1 For example, 
‘profit is the reward for sacrifice of waiting’. Or, ‘profit is the incentive needed 
to induce the entrepreneur to enter production’. Or ‘profit is the interest earned 
on capital invested’. Or ‘profit is the marginal product of capital’. Or finally, 
‘profit is the surplus labour appropriated by the capitalist class in the form of 
surplus value’.2
N ot all these answers are mutually exclusive. In fact, I would like to argue 
that for the most part, these answers are compatible for the very simple reason 
that they are answering different questions. In a sense, these propositions are 
literally speaking past each other.
1 My initial inspiration for the approach employed in this chapter came from van 
Fraasen’s pragmatic account of explanation (van Fraasen 1991).
2 It must be noted that ‘interest’ and ‘profit’ are in general quite distinct terms, the 
former referring to the income acquired under particular institutional arrangement by 
refraining from consumption, while the latter corresponds to the income arising from 
the difference in the costs and revenues of goods for sale (usually but not necessarily 
newly produced goods). However, I phrase the claim above due to the fact that under 
a particular, Austrian view of the economic world, profit essentially is nothing but 
interest.
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The reason is that the question, ‘What is profit?’ is really multidimensional. 
When we ask it, we could be implicitly after a justification of profit. And the 
notion of justification itself could be understood in two ways: a moral one or a 
pragmatic one. A morally justificatory answer to the question ^What is profit?’ 
involves trying to somehow present profit as something that is a result of desert, 
something that the profit-maker ought to receive. Thus, ‘profit is the reward for 
sacrifice of waiting’ could be understood as such a moral answer to the question 
of profits. On the other hand, a pragmatic justification of profit would leave the 
deservedness or otherwise of profits aside, and would concentrate on why it is 
generally better for everyone that profits exist rather than not. Thus, if we believe 
that it is better for society to produce than not to produce, we can take the answer 
‘profit is the incentive needed to induce productive use of capital’ to be a pragmatic 
answer to the question of profits.
Another way to understand the question of profits is to demand to know 
what determines the si%e of profits. Again, there is a fork in the road as to how we take 
that question. It could be that we want to know the actual causal factors that 
determine the magnitude of profits — without necessarily asking to be told the 
actual practical way of finding a numerical result. Thus, we could say that ‘profit is 
the marginal product of capital’ is just such an answer; while we may not know 
what the actual marginal product is, we might believe that this is in some sense the 
determining factor. But we could also take the determination of the size of profits 
as an epistemological issue. We might be after the variables that would allow us to 
determine the size of profits, without necessarily claiming that these variables 
themselves are the ‘deep’ causal factors that fix this magnitude. We could choose to 
understand ‘profit is the interest on capital invested’ in this way.
Finally, there is what I would like to call the ontological dimension of the 
question of profits. The ontological answer to the question of profits reaches in a 
sense far deeper than any of the other ones. Just like the most fundamental 
question of ontology generally can be thought of as ‘Why is there something rather 
than nothing?’ the ontological question of profits asks, ‘Why are there profits rather
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than there not being profits?’ Regardless of whether whoever gets profits is 
justified in getting them, and regardless of whether it is somehow good for the 
society that they get them — how come there is anything that might be thought of 
as an object of justification? Regardless of the causal factors that fix the size of the 
profit share, regardless of what variables there are that help us to find out this size 
— how come there is this thing which happens to have a particular size at all? To 
spell it out fully and unambiguously, how come that when a particular socio- 
technological process occurs, there is at the end somehow more of what we at this 
stage shall call valuable stuff than there was at the beginning?
It will be my contention that neoclassical theories of profit are unable to 
provide an answer to the ontological question. From the point of view of ideology, 
in fact the neoclassical answers tend to be used in order to avoidit, by substituting a 
different question altogether, one of the above. I shall argue that only the Marxian 
approach can be seen as attempting to answer the ontological question at all.
I would like this discussion to be as unprejudiced as possible. That is, I 
would like to allow the neoclassical/Austrian theories as much space for the use 
of their own concepts as possible, without judging them on the basis of the 
alternative Marxian conception. In other words, what I am attempting is closer 
to an immanent rather than a transcendent critique. For this reason, I will try to 
avoid a judgement between the subjectivist and the objectivist views of value. 
This is in line with the effort to save the discussion of prices and their nature 
until the next chapter. We will therefore say nothing about whether the value of 
things comes from their subjective utility, or the objective characteristics of the 
production process. Therefore the understanding of ‘goods’ in this chapter will 
simply be ‘things of value’, whatever value happens to be; or ‘valuables’ for 
short.
However, it is not really po ssible to conduct this sort of examination 
without having some intuitive idea of the object of our discussion — in this case, 
profits. For fairness’ sake, let us spell out this intuitive idea at this point. Profit, 
in our conception, has at least two essential characteristics. O n the one hand,
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profit is disposable income of a particular group of people, which can be used 
either for consumption, or for commanding goods and labour in order to 
produce more profit (investment). This, of course, is the capitalist class, but 
since I am trying not to prejudice the issue, as well as because ‘class’ is the very 
notion under discussion, globally speaking, I prefer not to use the term here. 
However, the point that I do want to stress is that there is indeed a group of 
people who receives profit as (part of their) income and that this group is free 
to use it for any economic purpose they like. The fundamental nature of these 
profits is goods and services rather money; as is quite common, money is to be 
seen only as claims on goods and services.
The second major characteristic of profits is that these goods are new 
goods, they are additions to the mountain of already-existing valuables; and they 
are also something over and above whatever erosion of the existing mountain of 
goods occurs (i. e., they do not simply cover depreciation). So, profit, apart from 
being disposable income, is also characterised by the fact that it is constituted by 
an an essential increase in the stock of valuables. In other words, I am always at 
least implicitly talking about the capitalist profit rather than profit in general — in 
the sense that unlike the so-called ‘merchant profit’, capitalist profit is not 
simply the result of re-distribution of the existing goods and services; it is always 
necessarily an outcome of production.
Compatibility of Various Answers
Now I have claimed that there are logically distinct answers to the question 
of profits, and that, therefore, at least some of these answers may be compatible 
with each other. However, as the answers are commonly understood, neither 
statement seems completely correct. To begin with the latter, if we for instance 
accept the Marxian claim that profit is a form of surplus value, then the size of 
the profit is determined by certain objective causal factors, those determining 
the degree of exploitation. On the other hand, if we believe that profit is a
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marginal product of capital, then the causal factors in question are different — 
most significandy, they are subjective.3
Similarly, the claim that profit is the marginal product of capital is usually 
taken to be not a statement of pure causal relationship, but also an 
epistemological and under some interpretations even a moral one — this is how 
we could find out what the size of the profit actually is, at least hypothetically; 
and given that the profit maker advances X amount of capital into production, 
perhaps the marginal product of this X is what they are entitled to.
It seems to me that both of these common impressions are mistaken. In 
the first place, the whole discussion of profits has from the time immemorial 
been full of implicature.4 Usually purposely so. If Marxists use terms such as 
‘exploitation’, ‘appropriation’, or ‘squeezing out the surplus labour’, this carries 
very clear moral overtones.5 Conversely, if neoclassicals talk about each factor 
of production achieving its marginal product, there is equally an ethical purpose 
here, albeit in an opposite direction.
Logically speaking, though, such understanding is unjustified. We can 
‘purify’ each answer to the question of profits in such a way that it is clear which 
dimension of the question is at stake. What usually happens in a discussion, 
however, is that the different aspects are not clearly distinguished; and thus 
instead of a single solution, the answers to the question of profits come in 
clusters. These are the implicatures mentioned earlier. What this means is that
3 I mean here of course the value concept, rather than the physical marginal product of 
capital. As the neoclassical theorists realized, the ‘income’ and thus also the ‘product of 
capital’ that is relevant in the neoclassical theory must necessarily be just as subjective a 
notion as the utility derived from particular material goods — indeed, the income is a 
form of utility. Thus ‘psychic income’ of Fisher (1930). Income, just like cost, is only 
identified with money quantities in neoclassical economics as an approximation; the 
‘true’ theory is in terms of the subjective quantities.
4 'Implicature' -  as opposed to 'implication' — refers to the pragmatic notion that 
depending on the context and the way in which words are used, they may suggest 
additional meanings which are not part of their semantic meaning, nor are they 
logically implied by constructions in which they are contained. For the full explication, 
see Grice (1975).
5 Marx was of course famously cool towards the notions of ‘morality’ or even ‘injustice’; 
however it seems to me that the sense of moral outrage in his works, even if expressed 
indirectly precisely by means such as implicature, is inescapable.
165
Class; Surplus, the Division of Labour (V)
although the different aspects of the question are often conflated and ran together 
in an argument, they clearly can be distinguished — and should be, if we are to make 
any progress with an analysis.
As to the question of compatibility, clearly it does not arise for those answers 
that do tend to cluster together; it is already obvious that they are compatible. But 
what about those that seem clearly at each others’ throats, such as the neoclassical 
and the Marxian answers? I believe that the answer here lies in dissolving the 
confusion between the causal and the epistemological aspect of the question. For if 
we take our theories to be primarily epistemological devices, we see that both the 
objective and the subjective approaches can be ‘right’ in a certain sense. That is, 
they might both be routes to a numerically identical result. Part of the reason why 
this is usually not seen is that economics does not, as a matter of course, achieve 
any particular numerical results; thus when the rate of profit, say, is expressed in 
terms of different variables, it appears that different results have been arrived at. 
Which, obviously, is not necessarily the case.
This is the claim that I will argue for in a later chapter. I will argue that for all 
its flaws, the neoclassical subjective approach is not necessarily faulty under all 
possible circumstances. It just so happens that the Marxian, or more generally 
surplus approach, is for many purposes the superior one.
At this point, what I would like to concentrate on is a critique of the 
neoclassical, and along the way also the Austrian theories of profit. I would like to 
show that these theories fail to do justice to the notion of profit, and that the only 
appropriate theory is one which stresses and can explain the existence of a surplus 
of commodities.6
6 For the moment, I will regard the Marxian and the Sraffian versions of surplus 
economics as interchangeable and complementary. This approach will be justified in 
the next chapter. At this point may it suffice that broadly speaking, both are 
expressions of the same Classical tradition in economics.
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Neoclassical and Austrian Theories of Profit
There is no single neoclassical theory of profit. Among neoclassical theorists, 
there are major differences in understanding the concept. In the first place, is profit 
to be understood as some sort of residual payment, or as a return to a factor of 
production? And if it is the latter, is profit really a sort of wage/rent for some sort 
of productive activity of a living person, or is it a bona fide return on capital?
In some sense, the most natural way of understanding profit is as the 
difference between revenues and costs. This is also the basis of the ‘profit as a 
residual* point of view. In a capitalist enterprise, after all the various ‘factors of 
production* have been paid, whatever remains is profit. This profit is thus a 
‘non-contractual payment,* not being fixed in advance.7
However, as it stands this is only the so-called accounting profit. To arrive 
at pure economic profit, the neoclassical view postulates that we need to impute 
a value to all those productive services which have been used up, but which 
have not been bought in the given period of production — either because they 
have been purchased by the enterprise in the past, or because they are 
inalienable properties of the living person representing the enterprise. Only 
once these imputed costs have been subtracted from the accounting net revenue 
do we arrive at the economic ‘pure profit*.
The difficulty is that economic textbooks show as an incontrovertible 
mathematical fact that in the static, perfectly competitive, perfect certainty 
Walrasian general equilibrium model, such pure profits are zero. Indeed — at the 
equilibrium level of production, the total cost is equal marginal cost times the 
number of units produced; and since perfect competition reduces prices to the 
level of marginal costs, this is also precisely equal to the total revenue.8
7 “Factors are hired on a contractual basis, whereas an entrepreneur receives a residual 
income” (P. R. G. Layard and A. A. Walters, Microeconomic Theory, New York : 
McGraw-Hill, 1978; quoted in Shand 1984).
8 It does not matter that payment for some productive services is not contractual; since 
we are in a timeless equilibrium, the value o f  such services can be determined precisely 
by the payment they would otherwise attract on the market.
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Now of course, an age-old concept that stems from the actual social world 
of economics and in fact shows remarkable persistence in the minds of both the 
public and the businesspeople cannot be eliminated purely by a piece of 
mathematical reasoning. Thus, the neoclassical theorists have over decades 
come up with various ways of accounting for profit. The four major ways of 
dealing with it which we will consider below can be listed as follows: abolish 
certainty, turn profits into wages, turn it into a price, or let time flow.
Profit as a Reward for Uncertainty-Bearing
The first way out was pursued by Knight in his Risk, Uncertainty, and 
Profit (1933).9 Knight’s formulation is a development of the theory of profit 
as a risk premium. Knight points out (correctly, at least within the world of 
neoclassical competitive equilibrium) that if risks are calculable, then they are 
also insurable; and hence they would have to be factored in in the cost 
calculations. Thus profit cannot be a reward for calculable risk, since 
factoring in risks as costs means we are still imprisoned in the Walrasian 
zero-residual universe. The only risks which are not so factorable into costs 
are those that cannot be calculated even in principle. For these, Knight 
reserves the name ‘uncertainty’.10 Profits are then understood as that part of 
income which results from such unpredictable ‘good times’. As Weston 
(1954, p. 154) puts it, “ |p]lanned total product and planned total costs, 
however, are likely to differ from those actually realized. If expectations are 
not realized, residuals will arise. These residuals represent an income-flow 
element contained in payments to owners of productive services..”
9 See also later restatements by Weston (1950,1954).
10 This concept of radical or deep uncertainty had in fact been already employed in an 
economic context by Keynes (1936), who first formulated it in his Treatise on Probability 
(1921). There are interesting echoes of this idea of incalculable uncertainty in the 
writings of thinkers so disparate as Marx (uncertainty as a result of the ‘anarchy of the 
market’) and Hayek (market results unknowable due to being outcomes that were not 
intended by any particular actor). Such frequent occurrence of a concept, or at least of  
a family of concepts, seems to suggest that something very real about the capitalist 
economy is being described.
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This last quote should be sufficient to make it clear how singularly 
unsatisfying this is as a theory of profit. For although profit is a residual sort 
of income in one sense — in the sense that it is that which remains when all 
the other factors have been paid off — it is very much not a residual from the 
intentional point of view. And it is precisely the intentional point of view 
which is relevant when considering the functioning of a capitalist entreprise. 
Profits are not just lucky ‘left-overs’; they are an required return on capital 
invested. Profit is the goal of capitalist production, its very telos; yet the 
Knightian theory turns it into an after-thought, despite the fact that without a 
reasonable expectation of profit, no capital will be expended at all.
Weston (1950), developing Knight’s theory, in fact comes to the very 
logical conclusion that, given that profit is seen as the fruit of uncertainty, and 
therefore is fundamentally unpredictable, it makes no sense to talk about it 
being ‘maximized’. But how could we take seriously a theory which asserts that 
profit is actually a completely unpredictable variable, literally a fluke, a stroke of 
super-random good luck? Are we really expected to believe that vast sums of 
money have been invested again and again over the past several hundred years 
simply in a pious hope that occasionally a nugget or two of gold may turn up as a 
result? Such a thought seems absurd. The occasional income from unecertainty 
would hardly merit the lofty designation ‘profit’. We can hardly do better than to 
paraphrase what Gottlieb (1950) has Marx say about production with no 
expectation of profit at all, by simply adding the word ‘random’: “To engage in 
business (buying and selling) and to come out only with occasional random profit 
seems no less purposeless than absurd” (Gottlieb 1950, p. 173, fn. 2). There is 
clearly a regular expectation of profit in the capitalists’ investment; this expectation 
may and often does fail to be realized; but it is certainly there.
This defect of the ‘uncertainty’ theory is somewhat remedied in various 
‘Austrian’ theories of profit. There are certain similarities between the Knightian 
notion of uncertainty and the Austrian ideas about the dynamic nature of the 
market process. The difference between the two viewpoints lies in the Austrian
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emphasis on the active engagement w ith uncertainty; profit is not just the occasional 
piece of good luck, but precisely the motivating element for setting sail towards the 
unknown shores of the future.
The Austrian emphasis on entrepreneurial activity can take more than one 
form. For example, there is the Schumpeterian theory of profit as reward for 
innovation. This is a theory of purposely introduced unexpected changes whose 
outcome is unknowable in advance. The Schumpeterian entrepreneur introduces 
innovations into the production process (widely understood), thus attempting to 
gain advantage over the competitors and to reap the rewards in the form of profits.
Of course, in the final analysis this is hardly adequate as a theory of profit, as 
it is really only a story about a temporary monopoly advantage; the innovator has 
monopoly access to superior technology. It is instructive to note that a similar story 
appears also in Marx in the guise of the explanation of technological progress 
under capitalism — the individual capitalists introduce technological changes in the 
attempt to save on labour costs and thus undercut competition. Marx, however, 
correctly identifies the resulting profits as supernormal rather than normal profits (as, 
actually, does Schumpeter himself). Due to their competitive advantage, the 
innovator is capable of commanding a greater amount of profit with the same 
amount of capital as competitors; but while this explains the extra profit received, it 
does not explain the normal profit of all those technologically less advanced 
competitors.
Another version of the Austrian theory is the Misesian-Kirznerian one, in 
which the entrepreneur acts not as the ‘creative destroyer’, but as the arbitrageur 
that brings things into balance:
“There is an interesting contrast between Schumpeter’s and Kirzner’s views of 
profit. Both see profits as the incentive which stimulates entrepreneurship, 
however, Kirzner’s entrepreneur acquires his profit through a kind of arbitrage 
whereas Schumpeter’s is the result of innovation. The latter saw entrepreneur as a 
destroyer of existing productive entreprises by his introduction of new products, 
and the creator of disequilibrium (‘creative destruction’). Furthermore,
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Schumpeter saw monopoly not as an obstacle but as a spur to efficiency. Kirzner’s 
entrepreneur, by contrast, is not a destructive element but more in the nature of a 
catalyst, in the absence of which the competitive market economy would cease to 
function properly; entrepreneurial action is viewed as tending to promote 
equilibrium rather than to upset it, as in the Schumpeter theory.” (Shand 1984, p.
85)
Kirzner’s entrepreneur is ‘alert to opportunities’ for arbitrage: 
“Entrepreneurship does not consist in exchanging (or physically converting) 
owned assets of low value into assets of higher value. It consist in exploiting the 
difference between two sets of prices for the same goods. It consists in buying 
at the low price and selling at the higher price.” (Kirzner 1979, p. 95)
The difficulty with the Kirznerian view is that it fails the essential test for 
an adequate theory of profit: it contains no explanation at all of the ontological 
origin of profits. The role of the arbitrageur is, clearly, to bring about the ‘proper’ 
allocation of the existinggoods. While they may be making a profit in the process, 
this is akin to the merchant profit of the pre-capitalist era. It does not matter 
whether we believe in the subjective or the objective theory of value; the fact is 
that without a theory where profit is closely tied to production of new values, no 
explanation has in fact been provided. At best, the Kirznerian entrepreneur can 
help themselves to a greater portion of the existing goods that would be the 
case without their being alert. In no way do they, however, make it possible for 
new goods come into existence.
Moreover, the Austrian view of profit in all its versions is a fundamentally 
disequilibrium one. This is one more reason why it does not really serve as the 
explanation of the general phenomenon of profit. For an individual 
entrepreneur, profit may be a result of a ‘lucky bet’. But the capitalist production 
could not go on at all unless there was a general expectation that some capital- 
owners will be rewarded for investing capital. The market game may be a 
lottery; but even in a lottery some will be guaranteed prizes. There is thus the 
need to explain a deeper phenomenon of equilibrium profits. It is child’s play to
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generate profits when there are obstacles to competition, or when there is no 
equilibrium. The problem Marx faced and overcame is how to generate profits even 
when both parts cf the term \competitive equilibrium * actually hold. Thus one of the major 
differences between the Marxian and the neoclassical/Austrian theories can be stated 
in a few words: the existence of steady-state positive profits.
In seeing profits as rewards for activity Austrians are in fact also quite close to 
the Wage/Rent Theory of Profit — despite their claims to the contrary, due to the 
fact that “there is no demand for entrepreneurial services and they cannot be hired 
for example, like capital or managerial sldlT (Shand 1984, p. 85)11. The underlying 
similarity of these views, as well as their fatal flaw, will be considered next.
Profit as Wage
The explanation of profit as a reward for managerial /  supervisory /  
entrepreneurial activities is quite an old one. In fact, it is so old that in part it was 
already rebutted by Marx’s pointing out that these activities are not properly to be 
understood as part of the capitalist’s role, since they can be ‘contracted out’:
“The labour of supervision and management (...) is directly and inseparably connected, also 
under the capitalist system, with productive functions which all combined social labour 
assigns to individuals as their special tasks. The wages of an epitropos, or regsseur, as he was 
called in feudal France, are entirely divorced from profit and assume the form of wages for 
skilled labour whenever the business is operated on a sufficiently large scale to warrant paying 
for such a manager (...)
The capitalist mode of production has brought matters to a point where the work of 
supervision, entirely divorced from the ownership of capital, is always readily 
obtainable.” (Marx 1966, p. 386)
Of course, the Austrians would object that while this may apply to more-or-less 
routine managerial activities, characterised as ‘Robbinsian economising’ (Kirzner
111 think the latter part of the quote can be interpreted as true only under a very narrow 
interpretation of ‘hiring’ -  for what else is the role of venture capitalists, if not to find 
and finance promising entrepreneurs?
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1979), it certainly does not apply to the activity of the entrepreneur. This is because, 
on the Austrian view, there is no market for entrepreneurial abilities, entrepreneurial 
income is not contractual, and entrepreneurs are employers rather than employees.12
O n the other hand, this notion would be quite compatible with the 
Walrasian neoclassical theory, under which ‘normal profit' is understood as one 
of the costs of production — it could be seen as the income earned by whoever 
is organising production, whether we understand that person to be the 
‘entrepreneur', the ‘manager', or the ‘supervisor'.13 If the Austrians object that 
the services of this agent are not contracted for, the neoclassical approach has 
no such qualms: the income may be a residual, but from the point of view of 
production it is a cost and as such must be accounted for, whether contracted 
for or not.
There is, however, one thing which all theories of profit as a reward for 
‘capitalist’ activities have in common: they are not theories of a return on capital. 
This is really quite fundamental, and the reason why all such theories are 
necessarily inadequate.
There is an essential difference between payments which constitute 
compensation for activity and those which do not. The first sort of payment is on 
par with wages, whether they are formally contracted for or not. By the very 
subjectivist logic itself, unless the payment for entrepreneurial activities at least 
compensates for the ‘internal' costs incurred by the entrepreneur, such activities 
will not be undertaken. If the payment exceeds the level necessary for 
compensation, then we are moving into the territory of rents; but these are still 
rents on actual human services performed rather than on anything else.
Profit, however, is not this sort of compensatory payment. As a return on 
capital, it is potentially present whether the owner of a particular set of capital-
12 “[A manager] is not quite the Kirzner entrepreneur, who is depicted not as managing 
but as employing managers to implement the exploitation of profit chances which he 
alone in the firm perceives.” (Shand 1984, p. 86)
13 The other possible interpretation of these ‘normal profits’, according to which they are 
a compensation for the sacrifice of ‘waiting’, will be discussed below.
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goods involves themselves personally in production or not. In practice, it may 
well be that various income elements are all mixed together, such as was the 
case with the early capitalists, who embodied the entrepreneur-manager- 
supervisor (perhaps partially even the worker) and the capital-owner in one 
person. But that does not mean that these elements are not conceptually 
distinct.
From the present point of view, any human being engaged in an activity 
which is necessary for production partly ‘spends themselves’ or ‘uses themselves 
up’ in that activity. The agent needs to reproduce themselves — that is, literally 
renew themselves so that they are as capable of performing their duties the next 
day as they are today. This means that all such duties necessary for production 
need to be ‘compensated for* or ‘rewarded’ (here obviously without any moral 
undertones).
However, this is very clearly distinct from profit as a return on capital. 
That sort of profit does not require any sort of actual exertion by the profit- 
maker. ‘Make your money work harder’, a financial industry advertisement used 
to say — and that is precisely all that profit as a return on capital requires. 
Anybody with a penny to their name in the bank is a ‘capitalist’ in this sense, as 
long as their money is earning interest, despite the fact that they themselves take 
no part at all in the productive activities which that money allows to be 
performed. Clearly, then, return on capital is nothing to do with whatever 
human services the capital-owner may happen to be performing.
This is clearly fundamental to the existence of profit. If all profit was just 
compensation for actual personal involvement in productive activity, there 
could be no notion of the principal-agent problem, for example, as it would be 
impossible to delegate the task of profit-maximization. Profit would only be 
accruing to whoever was actually involved in the running of the enterprise, and 
thus there could be no principals whatsoever. Whatever profit is, it is distinct 
from compensation for services performed.
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The fact that the Walrasian general equilibrium cannot capture this does 
not mean that there is no element of profit beyond wages and rent, only that 
Walrasian economic theory is inadequate. Similarly, just because the Austrians 
focus on exploiting disequilibrium situations, whether by creating them or by 
eliminating them, does not detract from the larger point that this only goes on 
on the background of general certainty that capital as a whole will be earning 
returns (with the exact distribution of these returns being unknowable in a 
disequilibrium situation).
Profit as the Marginal Product of Capital
The equation of profit with the ‘rental price of capital’ is nowadays rarely 
made explicitly. It is not clear whether this is because the neoclassical theorists 
are embarrassed to be using the concepts discredited in the so-called Cambridge 
Capital Controversies, or on the contrary, because such an equation is 
understood to be self-evident.
Nevertheless, it remains the fact that the textbook expositions normally 
include the so-called ‘neoclassical theory of distribution’. Its essential idea is that 
the price of each ‘factor of production’ is equal to its marginal product (in terms 
of value rather than physical amounts). The mathematical statement of this 
theory demonstrates this by showing that under perfect competition, i. e. when 
all firms act as price-takers, the optimum point of production occurs when the 
marginal product of each of the inputs is just equal to its market-determined 
price. If we can then take the whole economy as being represented by one giant 
‘production function’, with constant returns to scale, then at the optimum point 
of production the whole social income is exhausted by the sum of the marginal 
products of the individual inputs.
This simple relationship is accorded the title of the ‘theory of distribution’, 
because the variety of inputs into production is reduced to only two categories, 
namely labour and capital (historically speaking, the categories would of course 
also include the third ‘factor of production’, namely land). Tacitly this is
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understood to mean that each of the 'three great estates’ receives the share of 
income that is determined by the ratio of its actual income (the marginal 
product times the amount of the factor of production in use) to total output.
This neoclassical understanding was intended as an answer to the Classical 
idea that distribution of class incomes is logically prior to the determination of 
prices of individual goods. The neoclassical theorem neatly demonstrates that 
actually, class income is itself a kind of price. It thus allowed the theorists to 
have their cake and eat it: while it confirmed the basic intuition of the general 
equilibrium approach that 'everything depended on everything else’, or at least 
all prices were dependent on each other, at the same time it provided a way of 
determining the class incomes - despite the fact that the Classical notion of 
income distribution being prior to price determination did not even make sense 
within the neoclassical paradigm.
The 'moral’ content of the theory was forcefully stressed by one of its 
originators, J. B. Clark (1899). Later neoclassical theorists were not so full of 
hubris, being aware of the simple point that there was no reason why the 
marginal profit of capital should constitute income of a separate class of capital 
owners; from the point of view of marginal productivity theory, it is entirely 
irrelevant whether the marginal products of the capital goods are received by a 
class of capitalists, by the state, or by the 'owners of labour’, i. e. workers. In 
fact, in the full description of the general equilibrium, it turns out that incomes 
are in a sense morally arbitrary, since the supply of individual inputs, including 
of course the labour supply, depends on who owns those inputs. Thus if under 
the Classical understanding, prices cannot depend just on relative scarcities, since 
they are primarily dependent on the distribution of income, it is still true that 
within neoclassical economics, prices cannot depend on scarcities pure and 
simple, as they are also dependent on the prior distribution of income-generating 
assets,14
14 This is the kernel of Roemer’s (1982) neoclassically-inspired notion of exploitation - 
exploitation occurs when there is an unequal initial distribution of assets.
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We could of course tell some sort of Nozickian story about property 
rights, under which at least some ‘initial’ distributions could be considered 
morally legitimate. There are further difficulties, to do with the fact that hardly 
any actually existing real-world asset holdings could be thought to be the 
legitimate outcomes of such legitimate initial distributions; and there is also the 
somewhat obvious objection that ownership of an asset does not necessarily 
justify the appropriation of the output from the use of that asset. But this is not 
the route we are going to take, as there are massive conceptual problems with 
the whole scheme underlying this line of thought in the first place.
First of all, the Clarkian marginal productivity theory was exploded by the 
Sraffa-inspired critique of the neoclassical concept of capital.15 In the course of 
the Cambridge Capital Controversies, the Sraffian theorists argued that the 
concept of the economy-wide production function cannot serve the purposes it 
is intended for, since one of its arguments - namely, the amount of capital — is 
dependent on the very magnitude that the production function is supposed to 
yield — namely, the rate of interest, equated to the marginal product of capital. 
The input-output schema underlying the Sraffian approach to economics 
demonstrated very clearly that in fact, capital goods are in a very deep sense 
heterogeneous; therefore to aggregate them in a value-denominated concept of 
capital, it is first necessary to determine the prevailing rate of profit in the 
economy. This is a vindication of the Classical approach, which stressed the 
income distribution — division between capital and labour -  as being prior to 
price determination.
While the neoclassical theorists actually explicitly admitted defeat in the 
particular battle over the production function (Samuelson 1966), and hence a 
fortiori over the concept of the marginal product of capital, within the wider war 
the results were not nearly so favourable to the Sraffians. It could be said that
15 Here just as much as in the discussion of the Sraffian critique of Marxian economics, it 
must be said that while Piero Sraffa provided the theoretical foundation for these 
enterprises, he himself did not actually take part in the controversies described, 
meaning that no particular position should or can be ascribed to him personally.
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the neoclassicals simply abandoned the territory, imposing a blockade and a 
trade embargo. Instead of accepting the superiority of the Sraffian paradigm, the 
neoclassical theorists retreated rhetorically (though not in the textbooks) to the 
Walrasian disaggregated general equilibrium, where there is no single production 
function for the economy as a whole, but nevertheless each capital good earns 
its own marginal product as its price (cf. the views of Mark Blaug in Caravale 
1977).
I would now like to argue that this move to disaggregated equilibrium 
cannot in fact save the marginal product concept of profit. Actually, it is 
precisely this defensive move which will make it clear that even if the orginal 
substance concept of capital itself held good, profit could not possibly be 
equated with the marginal product of capital.
The disaggregated general equilibrium system, does no longer allow for the 
recognition of the ‘three (or two) great estates’ of the society, corresponding to 
the landlords, the capitalists and the workers. Abstracting from land ownership, 
there are now only the workers on the one hand, and then the many lathe- 
owners, steel-mill-owners, fleet-of-lorries-owners, and so on. Each of the group 
of owners now constitutes a separate ‘class’.16 Curiously, this is very much like 
the conception Marx considers, and rejects, in the fragment on classes at the 
end of Capital, dividing society into classes on the basis of such disaggregated 
sources of income seems absurd to him.
But whether Marx was right in this or not, such conception is not going to 
fly. First, it is to be noted that in a sense, this will in the end not really help to 
avoid the ‘Cambridge-style’ Sraffian critique. For if it remains the case that 
competition will drive the various rates of profit r;• to the same general level r, 
then the question remains, where exactly does that level of the rate of profits 
come from? Care is needed here: the question is not why the rates of profit 
converge — this is due to competition, as just stated. Rather, the question is, why
16 In fact, to be perfectly precise, the fragmentation of the capital-owning class should go 
as far as division into classes on the basis of ownership of a particular type of capital- 
good, down to its product specifications.
178
Class, Surplus, and the Division of Labour (V)
do these rates of profit settle on the particular value of r,, rather than a different 
one?17
But secondly, in a disaggregated description of the equilibrium, we can 
now see clearly what was originally obscured by lumping all the various 
produced means of production into the catch-all substance of ‘capital’: namely, 
that the marginal product under either conception does not possess the same 
characteristics as the ‘income of the capital-owners’.
If a circulating capital good, a widget, is being used in production, it may 
well be true that the optimum requires it to be used in such a way that the price 
of a further unit is just equal to the value of increased output. But for each such 
capital good, its own price is itself equal to the marginal cost of its production, 
under neoclassical assumptions. What this means is that the revenue of the 
widget-firm is exactly equal to its costs, as per usual in the Walrasian 
equilibrium. But these costs include precisely and only the prices of individual 
inputs into the production of widgets. In other words, for each ‘capitalist’ — 
each producer of widgets — their revenue allows neither to t their consumption nor 
for investment. Which, of course, are the uses of profit, as ordinarily understood.
What is being argued here is that while the amount of widgets being used 
may be regulated by the price and the marginal product of the widget, from the 
point of view of an individual purchaser, that marginal product bears no 
relationship at all to the income of the owner o i the firm producing widgets. The 
‘return on capital’, as distinct from the costs of production, is exactly zero. Of 
course, among these costs may be compensation for whatever productive 
activities the owner happens to undertake - for their supervisory /  managerial /  
labour inputs into production - or for their entrepreneurial activities. Such costs,
17 This is similar to Marx’s objection to ‘vulgar economy’: how can supply and demand 
explain price, since supply and demand can be in equilibrium at any value — what then 
explains the particular value that they settle on? (The marginalists got around this 
problem by invoking the differential calculus, allowing ‘infinitely small’ disturbances of 
equilibrium, which then in turn allowed for the price ratios to be expressed as ratios of 
marginal utilities. Marx unfortunately was not privy to this sort o f mathematical 
knowledge.)
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from the neoclassical point of view, fall under the rubric of labour costs, wages 
and/or rents (depending on the elasticity of supply of these activities). But as I 
have already argued, the class income of capital-owners qua capital-owners is 
conceptually distinct from such costs; that class income is pure profit rather 
than any sort of wage, it is a return on capital Invested, disposable income of the 
capital-producer. Regardless of the magnitude of the price of their product - 
which means, regardless of the marginal product of widgets - that return on 
capital, in the sense of the residual income with which the investor can dispose 
as they see fit, is still zero.
The situation is exactly the same if we now consider the widget to be a 
durable capital good and turn our attention to its owner (as distinct from its 
producer firm). The quasi-rents earned by the widget during its economic life­
time may well be equal to its marginal product, but this only just covers the cost 
of its original purchase (including the appropriate discount factor). Thus, again 
none of this revenue constitutes the disposable income of the widget-owner; if 
it did, then the original purchase price of the widget could not have been the 
equilibrium one (as the value to the purchaser would have to be greater than 
what they in fact paid for it).
Now, in the whole discussion it matters not one iota whether the talk is 
about individual, disaggregated heterogeneous capital goods, or a homogeneous 
substance of capital. As long as capital is understood as the produced input 
(which of course is its defining characteristic), then it must be the case that the 
revenue of its producers just covers the cost of its production. As these costs do 
not include disposable income of the firm-owners18, neither can the revenue 
cover any of that income. In other words, the ratio of the marginal product of 
capital to the total income is equivalent to the cost of producing that capital 
within a given period; not in any sense the disposable income of the capitalist 
class.
18 Unless a compensation for ‘waiting’ is required -  but this is a separate claim that will 
be discussed below.
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There should be nothing all that surprising about this; it is a simple 
consequence of the Walrasian conception. The only way in which the price of 
capital goods could include an element of ‘return on capital invested* is if it 
included a mark-up over actual costs. But such a mark-up is of course 
inconsistent with the neoclassical notion of perfect competition; and thus, we 
have reached the very same conclusion as we started with: namely, that under 
Walrasian perfect competition, no pure profits are possible.
In this connection, it is interesting to note a remarkable property of such a 
Walrasian system. Since it effectively assumes that there is nothing left over 
after all the requirements of production have been satisfied — or in other words, 
that there is no surplus over the amounts of necessary inputs — if such a system 
is to last longer than a single period, then it must be that everything that is 
produced as output is also exactly used up in inputs. What this means is that such 
a Walrasian system comes to look remarkably like the Sraffian system of 
‘production for subsistence* (to be described in more detail in the next chapter). 
And irony of all ironies, in this particular variety of the system, in other words 
one in which there is no surplus produced, it can be demonstrated that the 
prices of all ‘basic’ products are in fact equal to their Marxian labour values.19 
Thus, it turns out that Walrasian perfect competition is in effect equivalent to 
the Marxian ‘simple commodity production’, where goods are being produced 
for the market rather than for direct consumption, but there is (as yet) no 
exploitation, and hence, exactly as is to be expected, no profits.
Profits can only come into play when there is a surplus of labour — and 
hence a surplus of commodities — over the requirements of immediate 
reproduction of the productive relationships. This is the fundamental lesson of 
Marx, one which is clearly visible in the Sraffian system. My critique of the 
neoclassical conceptualisation of profit as marginal product of capital 
concentrated on this point, rather than on the point of heterogeneity of capital.
19 ‘Basic’ here is a technical term of the Sraffian approach -  roughly speaking, all basic 
commodities are used in the production of each other, though not necessarily directly; 
they are ‘price-determining’ rather than ‘price-determined’.
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In my opinion, this critique is more general, since it is independent of the exact 
nature of capital (although I in no way deviate from the view that capital is, in 
fact, heterogeneous).
Thus, I conclude that the attempt to conceptualise profit as the marginal 
return of capital is unsuccessful. It may be that within a partial equilibrium 
framework, the marginal productivity theory can serve as an epistemological 
tool to find the required ‘demand for capital goods’, although the serviceability 
of the partial equilibrium framework itself is questionable. But as far as general 
equilibrium is concerned, if such an equilibrium is reproducible20, that is, if it can 
persist through time, then marginal products are simply unnecessary; the 
equilibrium prices of individual capital goods can be found directly from the 
productive requirements of the economy, as the Sraffian analysis demonstrates.
As the reader will have noticed, in this part of the discussion I have been 
using the term ‘Sraffian’ rather a lot more than the term ‘Marxian’. Yet there is a 
widespread view according to which, while perhaps growing out of similar 
roots, Marxian and Sraffian viewpoints are ultimately incompatible. I do not 
believe this to be the case; but the precise description of the relationship 
between the two approaches will have to wait until the next chapter.
It may still be objected at this point that I have in fact misidentified what 
the intuitive idea of profits corresponds to in the Walrasian equilibrium. After 
all, without expected ‘normal profits’, no production would really take place. 
However, what exactly is the nature of these ‘normal profits’, if they are not 
understood as the intuitive ‘revenues minus costs’? As I hope to have 
demonstrated, if they are understood as a special kind of wage, then they cannot 
be a return on capital, and hence do not correspond to the intuitive idea of 
profit. On the other hand, as has been just shown, if they ^ in d e e d  a ‘return on 
capital’, then they cannot be the disposable income of a particular group of 
people. N or can they be understood as a type of rent, since under perfect 
competition, they would be competed away. If these ‘normal profits’ are not to
20 The term is Roemer’s (1981, p. 41)
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be a complete mystery, the only remaining way of explaining them is to consider 
them a compensation for the sacrifice of ‘waiting’. This is the idea to which I 
now turn.
Profit as Interest
Interest theories of profit have probably the longest pedigree of all the 
neoclassical explanations of profit. All of them share the same essential idea, 
that of ‘agio’ or ‘time preference’. It is argued, or sometimes simply assumed, 
that human beings prefer present consumption to future consumption. If 
possible, they would like to use their income now rather than wait for later.21 
This means that, assuming full employment of labour, if there is to be any 
investment (which requires postponed consumption) at all, and thus any use of 
capital at all, there must be a ‘reward’ attached to it, which balances out the 
‘sacrifice’ undertaken in waiting for consumption. This reward is profit, or 
interest, depending on the precise terminology used.
This basic idea has been around for a very long time. “We find versions of 
it in Smith, Ricardo, and Mill. Whether it is called an abstinence theory or an 
impatience theory or a waiting theory is unimportant” (Bliss 1990, pp. 227-8) It 
was formulated explicitly in terms of ‘sacrifice’ and ‘reward’ by Nassau Senior 
(1951). Similarly for Marshall (1898), the ‘real cost of a thing’ was the ‘efforts 
and sacrifices’ undertaken in obtaining it, where labour falls under the rubric of 
effort, while ‘waiting’ is a sacrifice.
On the basis of this simple idea, neoclassical theorists derive the rate of 
interest, as essentially equal to the marginal rate of substitution between the 
present and the future (at least on ‘the first approximation’ — Fisher 1930). This 
means that, given their income and a market interest rate, an individual decides 
whether it maximizes their utility to borrow or to lend. One individual’s action 
has no effect on the interest rate, but if at a given rate there are too many loans
21 To be sure, cases to the contrary are sometimes considered; Fisher (1930) does discuss 
a few factors which promote ‘patience’ rather than ‘impatience’. In general, however, it 
is impatience that is deemed relevant.
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demanded or offered, the interest rate adjusts until an equilibrium is reached, in 
which the individuals are just indifferent between further lending and borrowing 
— or in other words, the marginal rate of substitution is precisely equal to the 
interest rate.
Moral/Pragmatic Justification of Profit as Interest
First of all, let us make the obvious point that if all that mattered was really 
the time dimension of production, then interest could not be a reward purely to 
the profit-makers. The early theorists with their doctrine of the Vage-fund’ may 
have been assuming that wages are an advance paid to the workers before 
production is finished; but such an assumption is clearly arbitrary, when we look 
at the real world. In hundreds of cases, the workers are waiting, too — if the point is 
really waiting; the fact that production takes time affects the workers just as 
much as the capitalists. The difference is that while for a pure profit-maker, 
waiting is the only ‘sacrifice’ they have to make, the worker must also put in his 
blood and sweat before getting any income from the co-operative enterprise of 
production.
Thus, if all that mattered for the existence of profit was the fact that 
production takes time, wages would have to include a portion of the reward for 
waiting just as much as the income of the profit-maker. Note that since time 
flows for both the workers and the profit-maker equally, so would have the total 
final ‘reward for waiting’ have to be equal for both. But in addition, wages 
would of course have to include also the second component, the compensation 
for the disutility of work. This implies that the workers’ income would have to 
be always strictly greater — probably far greater — than any income of the profit- 
maker.
Now of course, the obvious objection at this point is that the waitings that 
the profit-maker and the workers are not equivalent, and so neither are the 
rewards for them. For the workers do not own anything, unlike the profit-maker;
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and it is the ownership right in capital goods that implies the reward for waiting 
accrues to the profit-maker rather than the workers.
But note that now we are no longer talking about any moraljustification of 
profit. For the fact that the profit-makers have a legal right to dispose with 
some material goods as they see fit has nothing to do with being rewarded for 
sacrifice in terms (f time. That sacrifice is equivalent for both the profit-maker and 
the workers; if ownership makes any difference to the rewards, then we should 
concentrate on that, and forget the ‘time dimension' altogether.
However, what about the case where wages are in fact paid in advance? 
The underlying picture is that while the workers needed to be paid at the 
beginning of the period of production, simply in order to survive that period, 
this was not the case for the capitalist, who could afford to ‘wait'. Clearly 
though, the capitalist did not ‘wait' for consumption during the whole time the 
workers were consuming their income. The profit-maker would consume just as 
much — in fact very likely more so — as the workers during the period of 
production. Thus the very idea of profit as a reward for ‘waiting' involves a 
reward for refraining from extra consumption. In other words, it is assumed that 
the profit-maker owns resources over and above those necessary to withstand the 
period of ‘waiting’ — and that the workers do not possess such resources (if they 
did, they would not need to work for the capitalist).
This of course is nothing but the Marxian description of the functioning of 
capitalism. Without an inequality in the holdings of capital goods — including the 
means of consumption — no profits would be possible. This can hardly count as 
a convincing moral justification for their existence.
It is thus clear that what is really intended by calling ‘waiting’ a sacrifice is 
not simply waiting, but the idea of refraining from consumption which could be 
had already at time t zero. Workers do not own anything, and so have no 
consumption to refrain from; this is not the case for the profit-maker, who 
could (so the reasoning goes) give up on the rigmarole of production altogether 
and simply consume what he has.
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However, why should this understandable point be seen as a moral 
justification of profit? There is nothing particularly moral about the decision 
whether to consume now or later. This may not be easy to see for someone 
brought up in a society where saving is generally seen as a Good Thing; but the 
good in this case is clearly a pragmatic rather than a moral notion. The hunter- 
gatherer societies which (so the theory goes) always consumed as much as was 
humanly possible whenever they could — thus practising the opposite of the 
supposedly ‘virtuous" refraining from consumption — were not in any sense 
immoral. Nor in fact were they being irrational, given that under the 
circumstances of their life it was not actually possible to store goods for future 
consumption.
The very idea of refraining from consumption could become to be seen in 
a positive light only because it became possible on the one hand to physically store 
perishable goods, but even more importantly, because it became possible to 
sustain a claim to goods over time. If there was no way to enforce ownership 
rights — in other words, if the production possibilities of society did not allow 
for the development of protective powers, culminating in the development of 
the state — then it could easily be completely irrational to refrain from 
consumption; for there would be no reason to believe that the goods to be 
consumed will be around tomorrow just as much as they are today.
Thus, not only is saving not a particularly moral act, it is not under all 
circumstances even a particularly rational one. The idea that it should be 
rewarded can only arise if it is presumed that not only is it possible to preserve 
claims to material goods, but in fact those goods were themselves acquired in a 
legitimate way from the moral point o f view. But then the conclusion that profit 
is morally deserved becomes contingent on the particular ‘initial situation". If the 
initial difference between the owners and the non-owners is solely the result of 
violent expropriation, then no profit can be seen as a morally legitimate reward. 
It is, of course, very likely that the initial differences in ownership resulted not 
from any benign legitimate exchanges, but from plunder, pillage and forced
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expropriation (such as, for example, described by Marx under the name of the 
‘primitive accumulation of capital’).
We could of course imagine that the ‘initial situation’ is one of complete 
equality (for clarity’s sake), where some people do refrain from consumption 
and thereby acquire the greater stock of goods, which then allows them to go on 
accumulating. Note that this implies that there was in the society mentioned 
already a surplus over the level necessary for pure survival — otherwise 
refraining from consumption would not have been at all possible. But the more 
salient point is, why should even under such circumstances saving be rewarded? 
If it happens to be a moral thing to do — so what? After all, there is a non-trivial 
view that ‘virtue is its own reward’. We do not reward people for not murdering, 
not cheating or not stealing. Why should we reward them for not consuming?
The real point, of course, which has been floating around in this whole 
discussion, is that ‘rewarding’ profit-makers for refraining from consumption is 
necessary in order to get them to allow their producer goods to be used in 
production. There is thus an assumption made that everybody, or at least all 
profit-makers, has a preference for current over future consumption. This 
assumption itself may or may not be justified — perhaps, on some view of the 
good life, a life-plan should include a limited amount of consumption every day; 
we may not believe that gorging ourselves to the limit of our material 
possibilities is the best lifestyle ever.22
But even if that assumption does happen to be justified, at least in the case 
of the profit-makers, it clearly has nothing to do with morality at all Demanding a 
payment for doing or not doing X may or may not be moral, generally speaking;
22 Ironically enough, if Weber’s (1976) critique of Marx were right -  the critique that it 
was the Protestant ethic of renouncing consumption that spurred the development of 
capitalism, rather than the capitalist social relations bringing forth its own “forms of 
consciousness”, such as Protestantism -  then of course those Protestant capitalists 
ought not have to have been rewarded for deferring their consumption; after all, they 
were doing precisely what they wanted to do. Profit then was not a necessary payment 
to induce them to refrain from consumption, contrary to the view under discussion. It 
becomes mysterious why it should exist at all — and thus the Protestant-ethic type of 
view “explains” the development of capitalism by the pursuit of an unexplained 
variable.
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it depends on the nature of X. But in this particular case, it is much more likely 
that if anything, profits from production are immoral rather than moral.
Consider a situation in which you happen to be lost in the desert; 
exhausted, on the verge of death, you arrive at a well. However, the well 
happens to be guarded by a large, armed man, who tells you that you can only 
drink from the well if for the rest of your life you agree to serve him. “The 
well,” he says, “gets filled up from the underground waters only very slowly; if 
you drink today, I will have to give up part of my own consumption of water 
until tomorrow. This is a sacrifice on my part, and I need to be rewarded for 
that sacrifice.”
The point of the story is not that the payment demanded is out of all 
proportion to the good provided (perhaps you could manage to negotiate a 
discount). N or is the point the question of whether the man has a ‘right’ to 
demand such a payment. The point is simply that unless you agree to pay, you die. 
Your decision in no way concerns complicated questions of moral theory. It is a 
simple pragmatic matter. The payment is necessary to induce the man to refrain 
from consumption — let us assume this really is true — and you happen to be 
really in need of that refraining.
The moral of the story is of course not original at all. In the context of the 
capitalist economy, it just a development of the old Marxist idea that the non- 
owners of producer goods require those goods for their continued existence; 
thus, they find it necessary to agree to work for the owners, at the price 
negotiated. In other words, assuming that it is true that the profit-makers need 
to be paid in order for them to refrain from consumption, this is not a moral, 
but a pragmatic justification of profit. If the non-owners will starve, or even if 
they will just be noticeably worse off23 without engaging in production involving 
the producer goods owned by others, then pragmatically it makes sense for 
them to pay the owners for the privilege — always assuming that such a payment
23 Does anybody doubt that the non-owners engage in the labour for which they have to 
pay the owners non-voluntarily, in the sense that they do not have the luxury of not 
doing so? They certainly do not do it out of the goodness of their hearts.
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is in fact necessary in order for the owners to refrain from simply consuming 
the goods. But there is nothing more moral about it than giving in to blackmail.
A nd just as in the case of blackmail, the whole situation would change f  the owners did 
not possess their bargaining powers. In other words, this pragmatic ‘justification’ of 
profit relies on the very fact that the producers’ goods are in fact owned by 
people other than the ones who require them for production. Thus at bottom, 
profit-makers extract profit simply ‘because we can’. Profits are only necessary 
because there is a capitalist class which can extract them. Thus, if we ask the 
question ‘why do profits exist?’, this line of thinking eventually arrives at an 
answer which reduces to ‘because the capitalists exist’. This of course is true and 
no radical theorist would reject it; but it is not very enlightening, and in no way 
it constitutes a justification of profits.
Pragmatic justification comes also in other guises, such as the idea that 
accumulation allows for technological progress, which ultimately benefits 
everybody. Again, there is no moral element involved here — there is no moral 
reason why technological progress should be attained through the actions of 
private profit-makers; the only reason can be precisely only pragmatic — 
‘because it works (and nothing else does)’. This is in itself arguable, of course. 
But most of all, it is clear that all this sort of argument does is to establish why it 
is better for everybody for there to be profits; it does not answer the question 
where they come from, what thy are.
The Ontological Failure of Interest Theories of Profit
The fundamental difficulty with pure interest theory of profit is that it 
completely fails to capture the essential characteristic of capitalist profit. In 
terms of the distinctions we made at the beginning of this chapter, it has 
nothing to say about the ontological dimension of profit. It completely bypasses 
the fact that profit represents a claim on new valuables; that it is ontologically 
speaking a surplus over the value that has existed before production took place.
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This failure is due to the fact that pure interest theory of profit 
concentrates exclusively on the distribution of income, to the neglect of its origin. 
This is obvious when we consider the inspiration of such theories. Interest, that 
is, additional payment for an advanced loan, has existed since time immemorial. 
But capitalism has not. It may well be true that practically speaking, advancing 
money, for whatever purpose, under many historical circumstances attracts 
interest payments. However, only under the capitalist mode of production can 
those interest payments be thought o f as resulting from production, as being 
profits. Thus, pure interest theories of profit do not address the real problem at 
all, as they fail to distinguish between ‘pure exchange economies' and 
‘productive economies’ — and only in the latter does it make any sense to talk 
about profit.
Thus, we see that profit is not a necessary condition for the payment for 
‘waiting’. Nor, of course, is it a sufficient one. The Soviet-type economy may 
have been grossly inefficient in many ways, but it did survive for quite a 
considerable amount of time, and its dissolution was due to a complex of social, 
political and economic factors, rather than a straightforward economic collapse. 
Nevertheless, and despite the fact that ‘human impatience’ was hardly abolished 
by the Soviet power, there was no market for capital in that type of economy, 
and thus no interest payments of the relevant sort. There was, of course, an 
economic surplus being produced, new valuables coming into existence; but 
these did not manifest themselves in the form of interest.
Profit is then neither necessary nor sufficient for interest payments. 
Moreover, it is quite obvious that neither is ‘waiting’ itself a sufficient condition 
for the existence of profits. While production does take time, it is the production 
that is relevant for the existence of profit, rather than the time. All the waiting in 
the world will not bring forth any profits, if all we do during the time we wait is 
wiggle our thumbs. And conversely, even if time played no role, if production 
were able to produce a surplus, there would still be profits. Indeed — suppose 
that the time dimension of production were reversed: that is, even though
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labour and capital goods would need to be employed for a particular amount of 
time, finished commodities would appear instantaneously at the beginning of the 
production process rather than at the end of it.24 Would anyone believe that in 
this case, profit would disappear? Clearly, as long as more valuables would result 
from production then were put in, profits would continue to exist, quite 
regardless of when that result occurred.
The problem was sometimes glimpsed, but hardly ever properly considered 
by the neoclassical theorists. Boehm-Bawerk tries to address the issue by 
inventing the teleological fiction that capital goods — including the means of 
subsistence of the workers — really are ‘future commodities; and since goods to 
be obtained in the future are undervalued in the present, the resulting difference 
between the price of those goods now (i. e. wages and generally speaking costs) 
and the price in the future (the value of the finished commodity) is profit.’ 
(Boehm-Bawerk 1891, pp. 299-300)
But of course, capital goods are not future goods. Capitalism is not a time 
machine. The only sense in which they can be thought of as ‘future 
commodities’ is that they are destined to produce such commodities (and be used 
up in production). But even that is clearly false, as Boehm-Bawerk himself well 
realises: “This is not to say, of course, that, to make present goods out of future 
goods, it is sufficient that time should elapse and the future become the present. 
The goods themselves must not remain stationary. On their part they must 
bridge over the gap which divides them from the present, and this they do 
through the production which changes them from goods of remote rank into 
finished and final products. If there is no production process, if the capital is 
left dead, the means of production always remain undervalued future goods.” 
(Boehm-Bawerk 1891, pp. 302-303) So there is no ‘destiny’ that capital goods 
must follow; it is only if they are actually used productively that they produce 
profit. Which of course makes perfect intuitive sense, but clearly has nothing at
24 If such an idea seems utterly beyond the wildest imagination, think of examples
where the ‘sacrifice’ is indeed brought only quite some time after the ‘reward’ -  such 
as suffering a hangover after being pleasantly drunk.
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all to do with any time preference, whose existence is completely independent 
of this issue.25
Irving Fisher, whose theory of the interest rate as ‘the internal rate of 
return over cost’ (Fisher 1930) underlies neoclassical thinking to this day, does 
not even come close to addressing the problem. At a first glance, it appears that 
his theory is designed to cover both grounds of time preference and 
productivity, as Boehm-Bawerk tried to do before him. The theory of ‘human 
impatience’ and ‘investment opportunity’ give rise to the ‘first’ and ‘second 
approximation’ respectively.26 Thus, Fisher envisages a two-stage process, in 
which first each individual maximises maximizes the present value of their 
income, by appropriately ‘investing their capital’, using the market interest rate, 
while in the second stage, they lend or borrow to smooth their consumption 
path in line with their preferences. In order to maximize their income, 
individuals compare in a pair-wise fashion all their ‘investment opportunities’, 
using the market interest rate and their own ‘rate of return over cost’, which is 
meant to express how much gain one alternative brings relative to the cost on 
giving up the other. Similarly to the first approximation, the market interest rate 
adjusts, until an equilibrium is reached, in which marginal rate of substitution 
between periods is equal to the ‘marginal rate of return over cost’ which is equal 
to the interest rate.
Pasinetti (1969) criticised Fisher’s concept of the ‘marginal rate of return 
over cost’ as being just as vulnerable to the Sraffian critique as the marginal 
product of capital, in the sense that only under very restrictive assumptions can 
it be thought of as independent of the Sraffian concept of the rate of profit.27
25 Incidentally, notice how capital goods “bridge over the gap which divides them from 
the present”, how they “do” things; elsewhere Boehm-Bawerk talks of capital 
“maturing” and “ripening” into finished consumption commodities. All these 
metaphors of course deflect attention from the fact that capital goods do not 
themselves do anything, much less “ripen” into anything — that they are passive 
elements with which the work is done, rather than active agents of production.
26 There is also the ‘third approximation’, in which risk is included in the calculation, 
and where the interest rate is thus increased to reflect the level of risk.
27 And moreover, that there are really two concepts involved in Fisher’s reasoning, one
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Without disputing this critique, I would like to concentrate on the dimension of 
Fisher’s theory mentioned above. The point is that when Fisher considers the 
maximisation of income streams, there seems to be no awareness of the fact 
that there is anything to be discussed about this very possibility of maximisation. 
How come there are ‘opportunities to invest? Why will any effort undertaken by 
an individual result in more income than there was available before — crucially, 
more than a compensation for the effort undertaken? Assuming that effort was 
at all involved, of course, rather than just ‘letting one’s money work’, which 
makes the process even more mysterious.
Fisher simply does not touch on the issue we are concerned with. He 
assumes the existence of profits, rather than explaining them. The procedure he 
describes may or may not be adequate for finding out the numerical value of the 
rate of interest; but it certainly has nothing to say about why profits are even 
possible.
The Marxian Alternative
I hope to have shown that none of the theories above answer the ontological 
question of how profit is possible. For profits are just one expression of the 
following amazing fact about human productive activity: it is productive. In 
some sense, more comes out of the production than went into it. The output is 
more than just the sum of the inputs; the economy grows; people get richer. In an 
important sense, we are getting something out of nothing: ‘something’ appears — 
additional income — that did not exist before. How is that possible?
Marx’s theory is the only one that even attempts to answer this question. 
The neoclassical theory cannot even begin to answer it, for as I have pointed 
out, in the Walrasian steady state there are no pure profits and there is no 
income over and above the ‘factor prices’, i. e. what really has existed in the
of which considers ex ante comparisons between various investment alternatives, 
whereas the other one is based on comparisons of ex post switching between 
alternatives. As Pasinetti points out, not only are the rates o f return in the two cases 
different concepts, but the first one might in general not even exist.
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world already in some form. Even if we take into account the ‘normal profits’, 
under the very understanding that the theory dictates, namely that they are a 
compensation for sacrifice, the total amount of wealth in subjective terms could 
not have increased at all! This is because the interest acquired only just 
compensates the sacrifice, or in other words, if production were not undertaken, 
nor would the sacrifice occur and thus exacdy the same ‘psychic income’ would 
be available. The only way some additional income could arise would be the 
outcome of Knight’s ‘uncertainty’. But these random fluctuations either have a 
mean of zero28, in which case again there is really no additional income, or else 
we do get a positive increment — but the theory is completely silent about where 
it comes from. The failure to answer the ontological question of profits is 
endemic to the neoclassical theory.
As is well known, Marx's explanation of profits turns on the distinction 
between labour and labour-pomr. The worker gets paid a ‘fair price’ for their 
labour-power — that is, the amount that is needed to reproduce this labour- 
power to the point at which it was before production began. But labour-power 
as an ability to work is itself capable of producing more than is necessary for its own 
reproduction. This is the answer to the riddle of profits — and also to the more 
fundamental riddle of surplus output.
This, in turn, can be seen as the further development of the characteristics 
of life in general. While modern physical theories are postulated on some 
version of the second law of thermodynamics, and thus contain the notion that 
over time, the universe progresses towards a more disorganised state, the 
phenomenon of life seems to constitute a local exception to this general trend. 
It is the basic characteristic of organic things that they are more complicated, 
more organised objects than inorganic things. N ot only that, but these living 
things from the beginning were able to reproduce themselves, to create new 
versions of themselves, and thereby increase the amount of order existing
28 O f course, ‘uncertain’ results are by Knight’s definition incalculable ex ante; however 
they certainly can be recorded and their mean calculated ex post.
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within the environment. Biological evolution further emphasised this basic 
characteristic by producing organisms with ever more complicated internal 
structure.29 Finally, with human beings, life arrived at the stage where more 
order, more design was the result of conscious deliberation. The coming into 
being of life itself, its ‘extended reproduction’ and propagation, its resulting in 
the coming into being of conscious beings, and their own creative activity, are 
all increases in order rather than disorder, thus running counter to the general 
tendency of entropy to grow.
The fact that human labour-power is capable of producing more than is 
necessary for its own reproduction — over historical time, of course, since this 
would be impossible without the development of productive forces — is thus an 
expression of this general trend in the development of living beings. Profit is a 
historical form of the outcome of this capability of surplus production. It is the 
result of a long period of historical development of human productive 
instruments, without which people would often not be able even to reproduce 
themselves (as in fact had sometimes been the case in history).
From this wider philosophical perspective, we can see clearly why Knight’s 
characterisation of the labour theory of value as taking profit ‘narrowly literally’ 
as all income accruing to capital (i. e. more or less identifying it with interest) is 
thoroughly misguided. For this is understanding the question of profit as a 
purely distributional issue; but the point of Marxian theory goes much deeper: it is 
concerned with the very production of additional income (with profit being only a 
particular form of it). It is not that the fact that this surplus is appropriated by 
the capitalist is unimportant; it is of course of enormous social significance — 
after all, it was the very reason why Marx undertook his investigation in the first 
place. But the theory says more and of even greater significance, connecting the 
purely capitalist form of production to the wider biological world of humans 
and this is its decisive virtue.
29 To be sure, under some circumstance evolution may favour organisms with simpler 
internal structure than those already in existence; however all that matters is that 
sometimes natural selection will lead to more order appearing in the world.
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Now these general points about surplus production do not discriminate 
among the two schools of ‘surplus economics’, the Marxian one and the 
Sraffian one. On a closer look, however, it seems that there is a major difference 
between the two. It is a vital part of the Marxian theory that there is a one-to- 
one mapping between surplus labour and the value of the surplus commodities. 
By contrast, the Sraffian theory makes do with the description of the 
composition of the physical surplus of commodities30 and is completely silent as 
to its origin.
However, the difference is more imagined than real. There is hardly a 
plausible interpretation of the Sraffian surplus that would not account for it in 
terms of surplus labour. Profit is no result of some sort of mystical ‘productivity 
of capital’, at which already Marx himself was poking fun — and not just because 
for Sraffa, there is no ‘capital’, properly speaking. As is clear to everybody but 
the neoclassical economists, non-living things are just matter without any sort of 
productive capability at all. It is of course straightforwardly true that very few 
kinds of labour can go on without productive instruments, and next to none 
without an object on which labour is performed. But even though observations 
of ‘marginal return’ can then be performed, ‘productivity of capital’, or any non­
living thing, remains a pure abstraction without any corresponding ability in the 
real world. On the other hand, necessary labour and surplus labour are hardly 
abstractions of the same kind -  it makes a clear intuitive sense to say that if the 
workers have produced everything that is needed in order to live for another 
period, and yet keep producing, the labour performed constitutes surplus 
labour.
The only real alternative is that in some productive processes, there 
appears a ‘manna from heaven’ — useful articles which, however, are not 
themselves part of the bundle of goods necessary for labour-power reproduction,
30 The word ‘physical’ is not strictly correct, as there is nothing in Sraffa that requires 
commodities to be of physical nature; services as well as goods are admissible. The 
point being made is that Sraffian economics proceeds from the description of actual 
input and output coefficients rather than the corresponding labour values.
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and which happen to be an unavoidable by-products of necessary labour. Under 
such conditions, the surplus could be constituted partly or completely by such 
‘manna from heaven’, in which case there would be less or no surplus labour at 
all.31 It seems clear, however, that such cases would be literally miraculous; even 
if, stretching our credulity, we granted that sometimes such cases might occur, it is 
beyond belief that they could possibly constitute the underlying basis of the 
modern industrial economy.
The real differences between the Marxian and the Sraffian theories of 
the economy will be discussed in the next chapter. For now, I would like to 
conclude that the superiority of the surplus view of profit over the 
neoclassical one has been sufficiently demonstrated, and that therefore, the 
claim that the wage labour — capital relationship is the basic class relationship 
of capitalism has also been confirmed.
31 Roemer (1981, p. 48) considers this possibility, giving the example in which the 
workers’ labour produces ‘bread and diamonds’, with the diamonds being 
unnecessary for subsistence but at the same time valued by the capitalists, who 
appropriate them — Roemer shows that if no productive process produces such 
‘diamonds’, this is a sufficient condition for the Fundamental Marxian Theorem to 
hold.
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Chapter VI
W hat Price Value?
The Transformation Problem 
and the Sraffian Critique
It may well be that attack is the best defence, as it is sometimes claimed; 
and I have been on the offensive in the previous chapter, trying to prove the 
virtues of the Marxian theory by attacking the available alternatives at their weak 
points. However, to prove the relevance of the Marxian theory, it is necessary 
also to attend to the wounds it has itself sustained over the years. The question I 
shall want to answer is thus whether the problems of the ‘Labour Theory of 
Value* are so serious that despite all its proclaimed merits, a theory of classes 
can no longer be based on it.
The Transformation Problem
The main line of attack on Marxian economics over the years concentrated 
on the so-called ‘Transformation Problem*. This results from the fact that in 
general, prices of individual commodities diverge from their labour values — that 
is, from the amounts of labour embodied in them.1
Marx, just like Ricardo before him, was very well aware of this divergence. 
Nevertheless, again just like Ricardo, Marx did use the proposition that 
commodities do exchange at values. However, the purposes of the two theorists 
were qualitatively different.
For Ricardo, the proposition just mentioned was at least sometimes a good 
approximation of reality — hence the whimsical moniker ‘93% Labour Theory of
1 I am not referring here to the market prices, that is, the actual prices at which
commodities are sold and which fluctuate with temporarily deviations in supply and 
demand, but rather to the so-called ‘prices of production’, which can be thought of as 
the long-term averages from which the market prices randomly deviate (the mean of 
these deviations being of course zero).
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Value’2. For Marx, however, the proposition was not intended to play any 
empirical role at all. The claim that commodities exchange at value — so that 
‘price equals value’ — was used in the first volume of Capital as a simplifying 
assumption in order to reveal what had been hidden, not as an actual 
approximation to reality. The idea was that the relationships revealed under the 
simplifying assumption would remain unaltered — invariant — even when it was 
dropped.
But dropped it had to be. At least if Marx was to follow the general 
assumption made by his Classical predecessors, Smith and Ricardo, that the 
profit rates in all industries tended to equality; and if he was to keep his own 
assumption that the rates of exploitation in all industries were also equal. The 
first proposition follows from the consideration that under free competition, 
capital would move from branch of production to branch of production in 
search of the highest rate of profit, until all such possibilities were exhausted, 
and hence all the rates must have been equalised. Analogously—Marx thought— 
workers would also move from trade to trade in the attempt to minimise the 
rate of exploitation, until all such possibilities were exhausted, too, and all 
workers were exploited to the same degree. This of course assumes that workers 
can somehow see the effects of exploitation; but that assumption followed from 
empirically justifiable conditions of an equal-length labour day, competition 
among workers driving the money wage per hour to the same level.3
2 Stigler (1958)
3 Strictly speaking, this is only true as long as all the workers buy exactly the same
goods with their money wages. If this is the case, then the labour embodied in those
goods is the same for all workers; and since the labour day is of equal length, the ratio
of paid to unpaid labour (i. e. the rate of exploitation) will also be equal.
However, if the composition of the consumption bundle purchased by the money 
wage is different among different workers, then there is a problem -  in fact, it is 
exactly the same transformation problem that I am about to discuss, the one that 
bedevilled Marxian economics in the context of capital goods. Namely, if it is not in 
general the case that prices are proportional to labour values, it follows that equally 
priced but differently composed consumption bundles may contain different amounts 
of labour. This implies that for workers purchasing such different consumption 
bundles with their equal money wages, the ratio of paid to unpaid labour would in 
general not be equal in all industries. Marx’s second assumption would then turn out
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However, if these two assumptions hold, and profit is nothing but surplus 
value transformed, then prices will in general necessarily diverge from labour 
values. For if they did not, the capitalists employing a large amount of labour 
relative to capital would also receive a large amount of surplus value relative to 
capital — or in other words, a high rate of profit; while conversely, their 
competitors in relatively capital-intensive industries would receive a low rate — 
and so the rates of profit could not be equalised.4
Marx’s solution to this riddle is based on the fundamental idea that 
competition redistributes the surplus value among the capitalists, so that in the 
end the rates of profit are equalised. The process occurs precisely through the 
adjustment of prices, which thus necessarily diverge from values.
In Baumol’s (1974, p. 53) image, it is as if all the surplus value accumulated 
by the individual capitalists was concentrated in a giant storehouse, from which 
it is then doled out back to them precisely in proportion to the capital they have 
invested. The idea has a pleasing property that it makes exploitation clearly a 
class phenomenon, in that it is not simply the result of the relationship of an 
individual capitalist with their workforce, but instead of all the capitalist with all 
the workers.
Between the theory of the ‘transformed’ prices and the original theory 
which made the ‘laws of motion’ of capitalism clear on the basis of equality of 
prices and values (as well as of profits and surplus values) a link is maintained 
through two quantitative conditions. Since competition can neither create nor 
destroy value, it is postulated that the sum of prices must be the same before 
and after the transformation of prices; and for the same reasons, the same is 
true of profits and surplus values.
The transformation problem then is the problem of showing exactly how 
the original values are transformed into the new ‘prices of production’, so that 
the two conditions above hold. The sketch of this solution in Capital, Vol. Ill
to be unjustified.
4 This exception to this would occur if in fact the capital to labour ration — or the 
‘organic composition of capital’ — were in fact the same in all industries.
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involves five different branches of production; to arrive at the price of 
production, Marx multiplies the cost of production (C + V) — that is, the sum 
of the constant and variable capital invested — by (1 + r), where r is the 
economy-wide equalised profit rate. This profit rate, according to Marx, is equal 
to the ratio of the total surplus value S  and the value of the total invested 
capital, (C + V). In other words, we get that for each individual good i, the price 
pi is equal to
So for the economy as a whole, it is the case that
i ; . ,A  -  Y J c .  + ♦  r ) .  (1 + r ) J J C ,  + V,. ) - (l + ^ ^ ( C ,  ♦ ^ ) -  
C + K + ^ i ; . , ( c , ^ ) = f £ ^ l ( C ^ ) = ( C  + F + 5)c + v c + v
or in other words, the sum of all prices is equal to the sum of all values. 
This is the first of Marx’s two famous ‘conditions of invariance. On the other 
hand, since the profit □ i made on an individual good / is capital invested times 
the rate of profit, i. e. (C + V) r, then
or, the sum of all profits is equal to the sum of all surplus values — the 
second of Marx’s conditions.
The trouble is that if this sketch is understood as all there is to the solution 
of the transformation problem, then, as a long line of critics has claimed, it is
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decidedly faulty. The defects of Marx’s procedure, as first formulated by 
Bortkiewicz (1968), and repeated many times since, are as follows:
First, in Marx’s solution, the capital invested is reckoned in value terms—i. 
e., it is understood to be (C + V) as above. But this implies that the capitalists 
are buying their inputs at value. However, the output is reckoned in terms of 
price; in other words, the selling goes on at the transformed prices of 
production. But if values are transformed into prices generally, for every 
capitalist, then Marx’s sketch cannot be the whole story — because then all 
capitalists need to be buying their inputs at price, and yet at the same time 
Marx’s procedure implies some are buying the inputs at value. This is a 
contradiction. The proper solution requires that the transformed prices are 
equilibrium prices — the same for all the capitalists — and hence they must in 
some sense appear on both sides of the equation, both where the individual costs 
are being described and where it is revenues that are concerned.
Secondly, the solution based on Marx’s sketch recognises no distinction 
between the use to which the various outputs are put. But this cannot be 
correct, the critics claimed. In particular, there is a difference between luxury 
goods and capital/wage goods. Marx’s procedure makes the final prices of 
production dependent on the values of luxury goods. However, the luxuries do 
not constitute an input into any branches of production, and so their prices 
cannot influence the prices of other goods. Whether they go up or down, this 
causes no increase in any capitalist’s cost, and hence cannot have any impact on 
the price of their output, either. This is what Marx’s procedure fails to take into 
account.
Thirdly, as Steedman (1977, p. 30) argued, the equalised profit rate cannot 
S
in general be equal to q + y  • This is because the observable rate of profits -
that is, the one that influences the capitalists’ behaviour in shifting capital from 
one sphere to another — is determined by the ratio of revenue in price terms to the 
total capital invested also in terms of price. This ratio will clearly be in general
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equal to ~Q~y onty ^  prices are proportional to values — and yet, that is
precisely the situation Marx is trying to get away from. However, if prices are not 
proportional to values, the two ratios can only be equal ‘by fluke’; and so Marx 
was unjustified in using the aforementioned ratio.
The ‘correct’ solution, first devised by Bortkiewicz (1968), removed these 
flaws, but only at a cost of introducing a much deeper problem from the 
Marxian point of view. The solution may be consistent, but in general, it does 
not allow for both of Marx’s ‘invariance conditions’ to hold at the same time. 
What this means is that while mathematically the solution is satisfactory, it ends 
up sacrificing the very conceptual framework within which the transformation 
problem was conceived. If value is not conserved in transformation, then price 
cannot be viewed as just a form of value; on the other hand, if surplus value is 
not conserved, then equally profit cannot be viewed as just a form of it.
There were various attempts to explain this problem away (cf. Seton 1957, 
Sweezy 1968), or to pretend the difficulty was just a sort of unimportant trifle 
(Moszkowska 1929; Steedman 1977, p. 34). Other Marxists were led to propose 
various replacements for the ‘invariance conditions’ (see Laibman 1973). As will 
be argued later, none of these responses were satisfactory and most in fact 
deeply underestimated the significance of Marx’s conditions.
Dual-System View
Bortkiewicz’s solution stood at the beginning of what came to be called the 
‘dual-system approach’ to the Transformation Problem. What this means is that 
the transformation is understood as the mapping between two systems of 
simultaneous equations — one in value terms, the other in price terms — where 
both are understood as different descriptions of the same underlying social- 
physical economy.5 These two descriptions then constitute simply two different 
‘accounting systems’.
5 The somewhat unusual term ‘social-physical economy’ is meant to indicate the fact
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The reason why both of the conditions Marx required for his 
transformation cannot in general hold at the same time is that in the price 
system, there is only one ‘degree of freedom’. That is, the system is 
underspecified to the extent that while relative prices can be derived, this does 
not hold for ‘absolute’ prices. Thus, in order to close the system — to find out 
‘actual’ prices — some sort of numeraire needs to be chosen; and this can be 
done precisely by imposing one — but only one — of Marx’s two conditions.
As if this was not difficulty enough, the dual-system approach leads to an 
even more fundamental problem for the Marxian worldview. If, as we just 
stated, it really is possible to describe the economy in terms of a system of 
simultaneous equations in price terms, then why look at the value accounting 
system at all? After all, as long as we can guarantee that the price system has a 
solution, we can simply derive the prices of production under an equalised 
profit rate from the price system itself. Thus, contrary to Marx’s claim of the 
essential nature of value, prices of production can be derived without any 
reference to value quantities. This is what can be called the redundancy critique of 
the Labour Theory of Value.6
The redundancy critique was already implicit in Bortkiewicz’s solution to 
the transformation problem, in that the solution involved solving a system of 
equations which yielded the transformed prices and the equalised rate of profit 
simultaneously. Thus, the value quantities constituted simply the coefficients of
that while the economy is characterised by the prevailing technical and material 
conditions, these themselves in turn depend on the prevailing social relationships. 
This is a point of some importance in what follows, and one often not noted by non- 
Marxist economists investigating Marxian problems (such as Morishima).
6 One of the standard responses on the part of Marxists used to be along the lines that 
even if the critique is correct in its own terms, it does not touch upon the fact that it 
is the social relations of production that in fact determine the technology and the 
distribution — and therefore, that Labour Theory of Value is still relevant, since it 
describes the processes through which this occurs. I cannot help but at least partially 
agree with Steedman (1977, p.21) -  such a response seems to me obscurantist. 
Granted that capitalism develops pardy under the pressures of class struggle, which 
affect both distribution and the technology chosen by the capitalists. However, I do 
not see what role could the Labour Theory of Value as a theory f  price (as opposed to 
broader Marxian theory of history) play in this process. N ot to mention the fact that 
of course, this response leaves the actual point of Steedmanite critique untouched.
204
Class, Surplus, and the Division of Labour (VI)
the system; if different, equally valid coefficients could be found, then values 
would drop out of the picture. The redundancy critique was later explicitly 
stated by the doyen of neoclassical economics, Paul Samuelson — twice, in fact: 
with scholarly detachment in (1957) and with cutting sarcasm in (1971). Finally, 
the criticism became one of the cornerstones of the general critique of the 
Labour Theory of Value stemming from the development of Sraffian 
economics.
I would like to note at this point that ‘Sraffian economics’ is not necessarily 
the same as the ‘economics of Sraffa\ In what follows, I generally apply the 
label ‘Sraffian’ to the current of the newly-revived Classical economics that 
became severely critical of Marx’s Labour Theory of Value. It is not so clear, 
however, that Sraffa himself took the same dim view of the theory. In fact, an 
argument could be made that some points in his Production of Commodities... 
(1960) hint at sympathies towards this theory — such as the chapter on the 
‘reduction to dated quantities of labour’ (Sraffa 1960, pp. 34-40).
Nevertheless, I have to say that the views of Sraffa as a historical person 
are much less relevant than the logic of his system. It may be considered an 
irony of fate if the theory of a sympathiser of Marx led to the latter’s rejection, 
an example of the operation of the Law of Unintended Consequences. No 
matter how one might to wish to characterise it, however, if it can be shown 
that the theoretical structure first created by Sraffa can be used in order to 
criticise Marx, then such a demonstration clearly takes precedence over any 
background thoughts or wishes the historical Piero Sraffa might have had. 
Ironic it may be, but that is not a sufficient objection to such a critique.
Thus, Steedman’s (1977, p. 52) rejected not simply Marx’s solution to the 
transformation problem, but effectively the problem itself. Sraffa’s system 
allows the determination of prices of production from the data on the physical 
structure of the economy and the real wage — these provide the ‘different 
coefficients’ for the Bortkiewic2’s solution mentioned above. O f course, if this 
data depended on labour values, then the Marxian viewpoint would still
205
Class, Surplus, and the Division cf Labour (VI)
effectively be justified. But the dependence is exactly the other way round, at 
least according to the Sraffian point of view: if labour value of a commodity is 
the amount of labour used in its production, directly and indirectly, then the 
physical structure and the real wage determine both the price and the value 
accounting system. For this reason, deriving labour values first and then 
transforming them into prices is ‘an unnecessary detour’, as Samuelson had 
claimed. It is possible to find prices without going through the rigmarole of 
transforming the labour values, and so there is no call for transformation at all.7 
Thus Marxian value is redundant. Metaphorically speaking, the Steedmanite 
attitude to the Labour Theory of Value is the same as was Laplace’s, when asked 
by Napoleon what role did God play in his description of the Solar System: “Sir, 
I did not need that hypothesis.”
From the Marxian point of view, these are clearly quite unpalatable 
conclusions. Two ways out of the predicament have recently gained currency, 
which will now be examined in turn.
7 Steedman’s (1977, p. 48) argument is in fact stronger than this; he claims that it is not 
only possible but necessary to go straight from the physical structure/real wage to prices, 
since the calculation through labour values gives the wrong results. However, in 
general this is true only if we either include the ‘luxury goods’ (or the so-called non- 
basic goods more generally), as Steedman did in his numerical example; or if we 
postulate that the wage contains a portion of what Sraffa called the ‘surplus’.
However if care could be taken of the luxury goods problem, and if Marx implicidy 
treated the wage as not containing any part of the surplus (see below), then this 
stronger impossibility critique does not go through.
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The Temporal Single System (TSS) Approach
As we have noted, the reason why only one of Marx’s conditions can hold 
is that mathematically speaking, the system of price equations allows only one 
degree of freedom. And moreover, it is precisely the fact that this system of 
price equations exists that gives rise to the redundancy critique. Thus, a natural 
reaction among Marxists may be to deny that Marx intended a dual-system 
interpretation of the transformation problem.
Accordingly, in the ‘single-system’ view the transformation problem does 
not involve two different descriptions of the same economy, but rather a single 
system in which values and prices both play a role. In particular, the ‘temporal 
single-system’ (TSS) version of this view interprets the relationship between 
prices and values as one of time: values come first, and are then transformed into 
prices; so values appear on the left hand side of the equation, only to turn into 
prices of production on the right hand side.8 Then the so-called logical defects 
of Marx’s procedure disappear — why this is so will be described below — and 
since there is only one system, the redundancy critique also vanishes.
While I have some sympathy with the single-system views, I believe that 
the TSS also possesses some serious deficiencies. First of all, the TSS theorists 
effectively attack the equilibrium methodology of the Sraffians, explicitly 
claiming that the transformation is fundamentally a disequilibrium sort of 
process. I think this emphasis on disequilibrium is mistaken.
O f course, it is hardly disputable that Marx was not employing a 
completely clear-cut idea of equilibrium, since such a clear-cut idea was the fruit 
of later developments. Similarly, it is entirely correct to say that much of his 
thinking did involve obvious disequilibrium situations. And finally it is 
undoubtedly true that the transformation as a real process — the process through 
which competition adjusts prices — occurs as a disequilibrium phenomenon.
8 The TSS approach is presented, for example, in Kliman and McGlone (1988,1999) 
and in the contributions to Freeman and Carchedi (1996).
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Despite all that, however, the result of the process is at least notionally one 
in which a position of rest was reached — after all, the prices adjust so that the 
rates of profit are equalised; and there is no reason for them to move any 
further. The postulation of an equal rate of profit is thus an equilibrium 
condition if anything is. And Marx’s sketch of the procedure clearly does 
involve this equilibrium condition — the rates of profit are all supposed to have 
Sbeen equalised to Q + y  • Now this clearly indicates that whatever the nature of
the process, the nature of Marx's transformation procedure is not one of a description 
of a disequilibrium. It is hardly coherent to use a magnitude which implies that 
the ‘final’ position of rest has been reached, while at the same time insisting that 
the prices are still undergoing change. Conversely, if we really are out of 
equilibrium, then clearly the profit rates could be as different as we like.
On the other hand, the TSS theorists effectively also assert the primacy of 
labour value over the socio-physical description of the economy. This second 
claim is not so explicitly prominent in their writings, yet it is fundamental. For 
the TSS view to be correct, it must be that the labour values are what 
determines the socio-physical structure of the economy, rather than the other 
way round. It must be that somehow, the labour values cause the structure of the 
economic relationships. For nobody can deny that writing up a TSS 
interpretation is possible; the question is whether this leads to the right sort of 
results. But the Sraffian approach to economics, which starts from the socio­
physical description, was after all not developed as a way of solving the 
transformation problem; it is a way of understanding the economy in its own 
right, even if a critique of Marx’s transformation procedure is implied by it. 
Thus in order to defeat the critique, it is necessary to prove that the Sraffian 
conceptualisation is somehow wrong, and that the approach which starts from 
labour value is in some way superior.
I do not believe this is possible. I do not believe that anybody would like to 
claim that labour value is an actual physical entity doing some real work in the
208
Class, Surplus, and the Division <f Dab our (VI)
world of nature. But if that is not the case, then it must be a theoretical term, 
required because it can do some real theoretical work for us, in getting down to 
the real empirical phenomena. Granted that perhaps such theoretical work 
involves just general abstract explanation of phenomena such as exploitation 
(although I do not believe that is the case). However, if ‘labour value’ is a term 
that is meant to serve as a variable in an algebraic theory of price, then the 
calculation of socially necessary labour time is essential, as we cannot observe it 
directly. But then to reject the only known way of doing this, which involves 
precisely reading off the labour values from the structure of the economy, is 
inconsistent with the desire to make the term labour value actually useful — that 
is, useful for anything other than metaphysical hand-waving. As Schefold writes, 
“ |l]abour values were (...) introduced as ‘technical’ magnitudes in the same sense 
as the input—output structure of the economy is today regarded as ‘technical’. 
The labour values served as a conceptual tool because they could be used to 
explain prices at least approximately and because they could be thought o f as 
given, although they could not be calculated mathematically from the input- 
output structure prior to the development of linear algebra.” (Schefold 1989, p. 
8) Arguing against the validity of the Sraffian approach thus ends up defeating 
the very purpose which motivates such arguments, in my opinion.
The ‘N ew  Interpretation’ Approach
O n the other hand, instead of denying the validity of an equilibrium 
approach, it is possible to avoid the dual-system interpretation by denying that 
labour values are determined by the underlying economy in the way that that 
approach claims. Instead, the N ew  Interpretation’, due to Dumenil (1984) and 
Foley (1986), claims that Marx intended labour values to have precise monetary 
equivalents; he was moving freely between specifying value in terms of money 
and in terms of labour. It follows that there is an equivalence between the 
money unit and a certain amount of labour — which is what Foley (1986), 
claiming to follow Marx, calls ‘the value of money’.
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Furthermore, the TSfew Solution’, as it was originally called, makes an 
assumption that it is not the real wage that is fixed during the transformation, 
but instead the ‘labour contained in money’, or simply the labour commanded 
by the money wage. Then the Bortkiewiczian solution is denied the crucial 
assumption of the value of labour-power remaining the same before and after 
the transformation.
These two assumption dispose of the redundancy critique. Labour value is 
independent of the socio-physical input-output matrix, since it is calculated 
through an equivalence of total labour time in an economy and the total amount 
of money in circulation; and furthermore, there is no prior specification of the 
real wage, without which the Sraffian price system cannot get off the ground. 
Adding the assumption that Marx’s two conditions apply to /^/rather than gross 
output — which effectively means that the total value of the wage goods plus 
profits equals their total price — the proponents of this approach show that 
Marx’s two conditions do in fact hold.
The trouble is that as the proponents of this approach themselves admit 
(Foley 1986), this is because Marx’s two conditions are under this approach 
effectively simple accounting identities. Or in other words, if we postulate that 
the total amount of labour in an economy just simply is equivalent to the total 
amount of money in circulation, then given that prices are in equilibrium and 
thus stable, the total labour is then tautologically the measure of expenditure on 
the net output (since expenditure on intermediate goods — which is nothing but 
constant capital — cancels out). So total net value is equal to total net price by 
definition. Similarly, defining the real wage as money wage multiplied by the value 
of money means that the real wage in terms of labour will always be dependent 
on profits in terms of prices — since the total expenditure on money wages is 
equal to total net price minus total profits. Then it is no wonder that given a 
stable Value of money’, the real wage will always accommodate itself to make 
total surplus value exactly equal to total profits. Given the identity of total net 
value and total net price, and the postulated identity of total money wage bill
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with total value of labour-power, the differences between the value and the 
price magnitudes also have to be the same.
Thus, the ‘New Interpretation’ seems to be solving the transformation 
problem by a definitional sleight of hand. It is hard to see how one can consider 
a series of accounting identities a theory of prices. To interpret total labour value 
as a straightforward equivalent of the money total seems to rob the Marxian 
theory of all explanatory power, for it means simply a dogmatic assertion of 
rather than an argument for the relevance of the labour values for the economy.
Moreover, the fact that real wage does not stay constant during 
transformation should be ringing alarm bells for any thoughtful Marxist. For as 
I have argued, the concept of subsistence level of consumption, and hence 
subsistence wage, is both well-defined and necessary for the Marxian project. 
There is a one-to-one correspondence between the equilibrium level of 
subsistence and the equilibrium amount of labour expended. Different amounts 
of labour-power expenditure require different amounts of replenishment—and 
conversely, different consumption bundles will allow only definite, different 
uses of labour-power. Therefore, one cannot tamper with the real wage without 
thereby affecting also the total amount of labour performed in the economy, 
which would disturb the whole of the picture of transformation. In effect, the 
argument is that far from being ‘neo-Ricardian’ in spirit,9 the assumption of a 
constant real wage is a vitally important one from the Marxian point of view.
Finally, while it is arguably correct that Marx asserts the equivalence of 
money and value, he also quite obviously asserts value to be embodied labour­
time. After all, if he did not, where did the ‘traditional’ interpretation, which 
used to be accepted by Marxists just as much as non-Marxists, come from? It is 
one thing to claim that this traditional interpretation is one-sided and that even 
Marx’s followers neglected his monetary analyses (as Brunhoff 1990, pp. 32-35 
does). It is quite another to simply plump purely for the claim to the neglect of 
embodied labour-time. What seems clear, in fact, is that Marx intended both
9 Loranger (2004).
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interpretations of labour value — which means, very simply, that he took money 
to be the expression of embodied labour time. We can hardly reach the right 
‘Marxian’ solution while accepting only one part of the claim.
And a claim it is, in the sense of something to be demonstrated, rather 
than simply postulated. The theory should show how it happens to be the case 
that if labour value is labour-time embodied in commodities, this will mean that 
there is a definite correspondence between the monetary unit and a certain 
amount of labour. If we simply dogmatically assert this correspondence, it is not 
even right to claim that the monetary part of the claim dominates — since on this 
basis it is not even possible to calculate the labour-time embodied in 
commodities, and thus cannot begin to verify the equivalence between money 
and embodied labour-time.
Due to all these defects, I believe it is necessary to reject the TSIew 
Interpretation’ approach to the transformation problem, and look for the way 
out of the difficulties elsewhere.
TSS and the Substance View of Value
Now despite the criticisms levelled at the TSS interpretation, there is 
something to the single-system view. Unlike the vast majority of the critical 
discussions, it does seem to at least partially grasp Marx’s basic vision of the 
economy. Labour value in Marx’s understanding is not just any old labour time; 
nor in fact simply the ‘socially necessary labour time’. It is a theoretical term 
designating a substance, something flowing through the channels of the economy 
— which in turn are shaped and formed by this substance.10 (It might help to
10 Mirowski’s (1989) is a very perceptive work in this respect, in that it not only
correctly identifies Marx’s theory as a substance theory of value, but also points this 
out as the major feature separating it from the marginalist “field theory of value”. 
Elson (1979), with whom I otherwise disagree in many respects, provides a very good 
and careful discussion of the various conceptual distinctions that are applied to 
labour by Marx before we actually arrive at the concept of the substance of value — 
an exposition which I find second in importance only to the description of this 
progression in Chapter 1 of Capital Vol. I itself.
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imagine Philips’ and Newlyn’s11 hydraulic model of a Keynesian economy.) For 
this reason, it has some properties touched upon by the TSS interpretation, 
which the critics of Marx’s transformation procedure mostly fail to note.
It is not surprising that economists of both Neoclassical and Sraffian bent12 
find the image of labour value substance flowing through the economy alien 
and irrelevant for their work. Yet without understanding Marx’s view of the 
economy, we cannot properly grasp just what it is that is going on in the 
transformation problem, nor see why Marx’s mistakes are not as obvious or as 
illogical as it might at first seem.
First of all, if we take the view of value as a substance seriously, then it 
becomes very clear why Marx did not seem to have spotted the ‘obvious’ fact 
that he did not transform inputs.13 For what transforming inputs effectively 
means is that strictly speaking, values disappear from both sides of the equation. 
What we have done is effectively to turn the problem into one of finding 
equilibrium prices — which has indeed been proclaimed as the virtue of the 
‘correct’ solutions — and equilibrium prices are all that our equations really
11 While generally called simply ‘Phillips hydraulic machine’, the prototype was in fact 
built together by Bill Phillips and Walter Newlyn (Leeson 2000, p. xiii)
12 Or to be more precise, the theorists of anti-Marxist Sraffian bent -  economists such 
as Ronald Meek (1973) or Maurice Dobb (1973) found, on the contrary, that Marxian 
labour value and Sraffa’s system actually seemed to complement rather than 
contradict each other.
13 There is of course the argument, appealing to a well-known passage in Capital\ 
according to which he did in fact spot this, but fudged the inevitable conclusion: “We 
had originally assumed that the cost-price o f a commodity equalled the value o f the 
commodities consumed in its production. But for the buyer the price of production 
of a specific commodity is its cost-price, and may thus pass as cost-price into the 
prices of other commodities. Since the price of production may differ from the value 
of a commodity, it follows that the cost-price of a commodity containing this price of 
production of another commodity may also stand above or below that portion of its 
total value derived from the value of the means of production consumed by it. It is 
necessary to remember this modified significance of the cost-price, and to bear in 
mind that there is always the possibility of an error if the cost-price of a commodity 
in any particular sphere is identified with the value of the means of production 
consumed by it. Our present analysis does not necessitate a closer examination of this 
point.” (Marx 1966, pp. 164-165). In my opinion, this passage is not nearly as 
straightforward in meaning as it might seem to the critics of Marx’s procedure — 
precisely because under the substance view of value, the procedure makes a certain 
amount o f sense, as will become immediately clear.
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contain.14 In other words, we are already in the second of the two schemes of the 
dual-system approach. As we have already pointed out, this is implicidy so 
already in the Bortkiewicz’s solution, and the point is sharpened to perfection in 
the version of the critique stemming from Sraffian economics. But this, as we 
also already know, is not so much a solution to the problem as a refusal to be 
bothered with the problem at all.
If, however, we did want to solve the transformation problem, as Marx 
most certainly did, then this could not be a satisfactory sort of approach. In fact, 
taking value to be the substance of the economic activities then almost forces 
our hand in not transforming inputs. The key word is ‘transformation’. If we 
want to transform values, then they need to be included, so that the work can be 
done on them. To take an analogy, when transforming wood into furniture, a 
carpenter needs to work on the wood; it would make no sense to demand that 
furniture itself be transformed. Thus, it seems a perfectly logical step to place 
values on the left-hand side of the process, to be transformed into the results on 
the right-hand side. Values flow, they are split up and joined depending on the 
shape channels within the economy; but it is their flow that is important, and 
hence we must in some sense be starting from them.
This is not to say that the criticism to the effect that “if we do not 
transform input prices then we commit the absurdity of assuming that the price 
paid from a commodity by the immediate purchaser can differ from the price 
received by the immediate seller” (Steedman 1977, p. 31) is necessarily 
incorrect. At this moment we just want to point out that there is a rationale 
behind Marx procedure, and that just because it conflicts with other 
considerations it does not mean it is automatically wrong.
14 ‘Equilibrium’ is here — as elsewhere in this chapter — meant to be defined by the
condition that all profit rates are equal — in other words, ‘equilibrium prices’ are those 
prices of production that allow for this condition to hold. I do believe that at such 
prices, demand and supply would also be balanced, however that is a separate 
argument from the present one.
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Now there is actually an approach to the transformation problem which 
seems to take that rationale seriously, and yet arrive at the Sraffian prices. This is 
Shaikh’s (1977) iterative solution. In effect, what the solution says is that Marx’s 
procedure is indeed just a sketch of the right approach; that the substance of 
value is re-distributed through competition not just once, as the sketch seems to 
suggest, but repeatedly, until an equilibrium is reached — an equilibrium in which 
prices of course coincide with the Sraffian ones.
There are two problems with the iterative solution. On the one hand, 
despite appearances labour values still turn out to be irrelevant after all. This is 
because we do not need to know them in order to employ the iterative 
procedure — the starting point of the algorithm is in fact arbitrary. As Hodgson 
commented, we could start with “the number of letters in the name of the 
commodity when that name is translated into Serbo-Croat” (quoted in Howard 
and King 1992, p. 276). This should not really be all that surprising. If the 
iterative solution is a logically equivalent procedure to the Sraffian calculations, 
in that both necessarily arrive at the same conclusion, then if the knowledge of 
labour values is unnecessary for the former, the same can be reasonably 
expected to be the case for the latter.
Secondly, under Shaikh’s procedure, Marx’s two conditions do not in 
general both hold, again just like in any other solution of the Bortkiewiczian 
lineage. But, as we said above, contrary to the claims of some Marxists, this 
constitutes a deep problem indeed. For if we take the substance view of value 
seriously, then the two conditions of transformation — ‘total value equals total 
price’ and ‘total surplus value equals total profit’ — are not at all arbitrary, cannot 
be easily replaced, and should not be even understood simply as ‘invariance 
conditions’.
The reason is that these conditions come from a simple application of the 
conservation principles15 to the substance of value. According to Marx, new
15 The role of the conservation principles in the development of economics was 
described very thoroughly by Mirowski in More Heat Than Light (1989).
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value comes into being solely through the human activity of labour. Then it 
immediately follows that whatever happens in the sphere of circulation, it 
cannot affect the total amount of value in existence. Much less can the total 
amount of value be affected by symbolic manipulations of the theorist. Hence, 
however competition redistributes the individual portions of value — or in other 
words, whatever the final production prices are — the total amount of value 
must have remained constant. Prices are just so many vessels carrying the 
substance of value; but pouring the substance in and out of these vessels cannot 
affect how much of it there will be in the end. Hence if we add up the individual 
amounts at the end of the process — when we have arrived at prices of 
production — the total must be exactly equal to the total at the beginning. And 
so, total price = total value. Nothing has been gained, nothing has been lost.
The exact same reasoning applies to surplus value and profit. Once we 
accept that profit is surplus value, in the deep ontological sense, then no sort of 
re-distribution can affect the amount of it. Hence, in the end, we must end up 
with exactly the same amount of the substance of value (in this case, surplus 
value) as we had at the beginning.16
This goes to show why thinking about the two principles as ‘normalisation 
conditions’ is utterly wrongheaded. Normalisation implies an essentially 
arbitrary choice of numeraire, a pure matter of convenience of an essentially 
epistemological nature — we choose any one of an infinity of normalisation
16 Cockshott & Cottrell (2004) mistakenly assert that Mirowski (1989) has claimed that 
Marx’s difficulties stemmed from his confusing a ‘substance’ and a ‘field’ theory of 
value, as a consequence of which Marx asserted ‘one principle of conservation too 
many’. While the last phrase is indeed to be found in Mirowski, it is not supposed to 
have followed from the alleged conflict between a substance and a field theory of 
value, but simply from the mathematical properties of the dual-system solution. 
Moreover, the conflict that Mirowski sees Marx as being a victim of is between a ‘real 
cost’ and a ‘historical cost’ labour theories o f value, both f  which are substance theories. 
Cockshott & Cottrell simply confuse the main argument of Mirowski’s book, which 
asserts that neoclassical economics is an attempt at formulating a field theory of value, 
with the passage on the transformation problem, which is tangential to this main 
argument. Finally, as will become clear, I also reject Mirowski’s own conclusion — 
Marx did not assert one conservation principle too many, but precisely as many as 
were needed by his theory.
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conditions because we happen to be interested in what the system looks like 
from a particular point of view. But Marx’s conditions have nothing at all to do 
with such a purely conventional approach. Instead, they are an organic part of 
the theory. If the two conditions do not hold, then the whole system comes 
crashing to the ground. For either the substance of value is then not conserved 
in circulation, or surplus labour is not the only source of surplus product and 
hence profit. Both avenues open up the frightening possibility of profit arising 
from processes other than exploitation (whether from exchange, ‘productivity 
of capital’, manna from heaven, or whatever). Hence replacing them by some 
other ‘invariance conditions’ is, from a Marxian point of view, a pointless 
exercise — the skies will already have fallen, regardless of whether some solution 
to the transformation problem ‘works’ under such replacement invariance 
conditions.
We have now arrived at the point where the approach to be taken in the 
following pages can be spelled out. What I am going to argue is that in failing to 
take value as a substance seriously, the line of criticism stemming from 
Bortkiewicz (1968) and reaching through to Steedman (1977) and beyond also 
failed to notice that a very important substantive claim is implied about the 
economy by Marx’s theory. For when the critics note that only one of Marx’s 
two conditions can be imposed -  note the word! — on the price system, they fail 
to understand a very simple, yet fundamental point. Quite obviously, the fact 
that there is only one degree of freedom in the price system is just a formal 
mathematical property of a system of equations. It is not a consequence of any 
known economic fact; it would be true o f the system even if a completely different 
interpretation were given to the set of equations, or indeed, none at all. But 
Marx’s two conditions are not formal — if they apply to anything at all, they 
must apply precisely to the actual underlying economic system, completely regardless 
of what formulation is chosen to represent it. To take the formal mathematical 
property of a system of equations as a disproof of Marx’s substantive theory of 
the economy is a non-sequitur of the highest order. Granted that Marx’s two
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conditions are not general in the mathematical sense of the word; now the 
question should clearly be answered, can they nevertheless be true about that 
subset of the systems of equations that can sensibly represent the real 
economies?17 And if not, just what it is about Marx's substantive theory of the 
economy that is wrong?
Thus, I charge that ironically, despite claiming that the socio-physical 
economy underlies both the value and the price schema, Marx's critics failed to 
investigate just what it is that makes Marx's conditions fail in that underlying 
economy. And by focusing simply on the price system, as the redundancy 
critique directs, they failed to notice that there is something to be investigated. 
Such an investigation is precisely what will now be undertaken.
Elson’s Explication of the Substance View
Before we can proceed to say just what makes the conservation of value 
principles fail in a Sraffian-type economy, it is first necessary to grasp what 
exactly is meant by Marx's ‘substance of value’. I will advance a particular 
interpretation of this substance, one which is never found in Marx explicitly, yet 
one which I believe to be almost necessarily implied by his postulations.
First of all, let us repeat that contrary to the naive view, the substance of 
value is not simply identical with labour-time. In the first place, value is 
understood by Marx to be specifically bound up with the capitalist mode of 
production, not with production in general. Hence labour-time, even socially 
necessary labour-time, does not exhaust the description of the nature of value, 
as both of these terms apply to all the different (class) modes of production in 
history. Furthermore, even within the capitalist economy, not all labour-time is
17 Incidentally, this also gives us another indication that the TSS interpretation is
misguided. The TSS theorists want to give up on the dual-system view partly because 
they believe it prevents the possibility of Marx’s two conditions holding. But if we are 
correct in arguing that the formal property of the number of degrees of freedom of a 
formal system does not coincide with the scope of Marx’s conditions, which relate to 
the properties of the underlying real economy, then this motivation for rejecting the 
dual-system interpretations vanishes.
218
Class, Surplus, and the Division cf Labour (VI)
understood by Marx to be contributing to the production of value — as is well 
known, the ‘unproductive workers’, the bank clerks, the accountants etc., who 
contribute to the running of the sphere of circulation, are not meant to be 
producing value. Now as these workers do not produce value, a fortiori they 
cannot produce surplus value, and hence they are incapable of being exploited. 
However, this does not mean that they cannot be ‘hard done by’, or economically 
oppressed, as Carchedi (1987) puts it — this happens if the labour time contained 
in their consumption bundle is less than the labour time they put in during their 
work hours. The mechanism of oppression is in fact identical to exploitation, 
with the difference that the labour-time of unproductive workers does not 
count as value. Now this is something that both indicates the difference of the 
substance of value from simple labour time, and calls into question the broader 
Marxian class theory, as we shall see later.
But if value is not straightforwardly labour-time, then just what is it? In 
order to clarify the matter, I will help myself to the explication provided by 
Elson in her (1979). Now I should point out that I disagree with Elson on many 
counts, indeed with the whole tenor o f her argument. First of all, she argues that 
the point of the Labour Theory of Value is to be neither a ‘proof of 
exploitation’ nor an explanation of prices in the conventional sense. Against the 
first notion, she argues that it fails to give the notion of value its proper due, 
since it is being made synonymous simply with labour-time. Such a notion of 
value, however, is entirely redundant, just as the Sraffian critics claim. For under 
such an interpretation, the capitalist exploitation could be equally well 
understood by thinking solely in terms of the division of the surplus product, 
which is in fact precisely what the Sraffian critics do. The second view, namely 
that LTV is “one of a number of theories of equilibrium price” (Elson 1979, p. 
116) she attributes to the majority of the Anglo-Saxon Marxist economists. 
Against this view, she argues that the point of the LTV is not to be such an 
explanation of the price magnitudes; rather, its purpose is political. Thus, while
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in its own terms the Sraffian critique is quite correct, it is also irrelevant to the 
Marxian theory.
Now I do agree that Marx’s theory could hardly be understood as a ‘proof 
of exploitation; instead, it starts from the postulation that exploitation does 
indeed exist under capitalism, and proceeds to identify the mechanism through 
which it occurs. Nevertheless, as will become clear, I do not think that the 
redundancy critique arises simply from identifying labour-time with value. And 
secondly, I do believe that that Marx intended his theory to be, among many 
other things, also an explanation of equilibrium prices (of production). This was 
necessary in order to demonstrate the bankruptcy and ideological nature of the 
alternative, burgeois theories. While Marx was a ‘constructive critic’ of political 
economy, he intended to be a ‘destructive critic’ of vulgar economy, that is, of 
price theories based on supply and demand. He was attempting to demonstrate 
that without the understanding of the basic social structure of capitalism — that 
is, without understanding capitalist exploitation and the social form it takes — a 
scientific understanding of the economy is simply impossible. But if this was so, 
then he necessarily required a theory of prices superior to the one he was 
denigrating. It is true, of course, that Marx’s concerns were far wider than this 
one, rather technical, issue; he was criticising not just the answers, but also the 
questions of political economy. But he was well aware that exclaiming ‘the grapes 
are sour!’ is a very poor sort of criticism indeed.
Nevertheless, at the same time I think that Elson provides a brilliant 
discussion of Marx’ analysis, which contains much that is illuminating and useful 
for our purposes. In the first place, Elson contrasts two pairs of distinctions — 
private vs. social labour and concrete vs. abstract labour. She is insistent on the 
point that all four of these properties are simply aspects of human labour, 
present in all social epochs (albeit due to their particular ways of producing 
different epochs give prominence to different aspects.) She is equally insistent 
that private labour should not be conflated with concrete labour, nor abstract 
labour with social labour.
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Instead, she argues that private labour is work in its aspect as undertaken 
by a particular individual, without the knowledge or consciousness of its being a 
part of the mosaic of the overall social co-operation. Concrete labour, on the 
other hand, adds to this the notion of labour as an interaction between a human 
being and nature, which brings out the diversity of various kinds of human 
labour. Concrete labour is concrete, because it has its own particular object — 
whether it happens to be the making of coats or adding up of accounts.
Abstract labour - understandably enough — abstracts from these peculiar 
individual characteristics of human work and takes only what they all have in 
common, namely the fact that they are all expenditures of human active 
capabilities over a period of time. It is labour, rather than say an art or a hobby, 
because it is also understood to be undertaken as a part of the co-ordinated 
activity within the economy. Thus far the concept coincides with social labour 
as well. The difference between the two is that abstract labour focuses on the 
quantitative dimension of labour — its magnitude, the portion of the whole 
social total expended, while social labour is mainly concerned with the 
qualitative aspect.
All four aspects of labour are always present; however, in different modes 
of production, they are represented in different ways. As Elson argues, for Marx 
it was labour in its abstract aspect that is dominant in capitalism. This because 
only in its abstract aspect can labour be understood as being exchangeable — as 
labour reduced to its common denominator. This abstract labour becomes 
objectified in capitalism in the substance of value.
Note the word ‘objectified’. What Marx wants to say is that the labour 
becomes materialised, that it takes on a physicalform, that the commodities it turns 
into are crystals of value. Thus commodities may be taken as equivalents for each 
other in exchange — an equivalence which is strictly speaking an objectified 
representation of the social relations.
Elson describes the substance of value as ‘the human self-activity, the 
human energy, embodied in the commodities\ Now what I want to argue is that
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more precisely, the ‘objectified abstract labour’, the substance of value, should 
in fact be understood as representing the generalised productive capability of the 
given human society (in its aspect as a capitalist economy). It is the capability of 
creating new, more organised forms of matter — but a capability that occurs under 
capitalist productive relations.
In the first place, one needs to note that the notion of an economy 
producing a surplus, and therefore also the existence of surplus labour, 
presumes a certain stage of development of productive technology. Within the 
mathematical treatments of Marxian economics, this requirement comes out 
clearly under the simple name of the condition of ‘productivity’ (c. f. Morishima 
1973; Fujimori 1982) — the economy must be capable of producing more of the 
outputs than there were inputs, otherwise it achieves at most a subsistence level 
of development. Human beings are capable of producing more than is necessary 
for their own survival, but in order to do this they need material means of 
production, which only become available as history unfolds itself; for countless 
millennia, human societies had been living close to the subsistence level. 
Capitalism presupposes a certain level of technological development, and thus 
the notion of objectified abstract labour in quite an obvious sense depends on 
this level having been achieved. This, however, is only a minor point, since the 
condition applies to any surplus-producing economy, not just capitalism.
However, as we know, value — labour embodied in a particular commodity 
— consists of both direct labour and labour embodied in the material inputs. 
Now for Marx this was a theoretical postulation, without any way of making the 
idea operational. However, the development of the input-output approaches of 
Leontief, von Neumann and Sraffa allowed exactly the sort of calculation 
necessary, provided only that we take labour values to be the socially necessary 
labour time expended under conditions of general equilibrium.
But while the procedure of solving a system of simultaneous equations 
describing production has become canonical, the full import of it has rarely 
been spelled out. What is being implied by it is that the particular productive
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relationships operational within the economy determine collectively the labour 
values embodied in the individual commodity. Before the advent of the input- 
output schemas, it might have been tempting to think of labour value of a 
commodity as being primarily determined by its own production process. The 
canonical way of calculating of labour values, however, makes very clear the 
implicit point that since indirect labour enters into labour value just as much as 
direct labour, all the interconnections and dependencies within theproductive relationships <f 
the economy as a whole play their part in determining value cf a single commodity. For 
instance, an improvement in some of the productive technologies might easily 
lead to changes of the labour values of many commodities which themselves 
have nothing to do with those technologies; similarly, the total value in the 
economy would also be changed.
Thus, what I would like to urge is that if value is to be understood as a 
‘substance’, it is the substance that in some sense expresses the generalised 
capability of the economy to produce. The smaller the ratio of total living 
labour to total value, the more productive, more sophisticated and intricate the 
economy. Individual commodities are then ‘crystals of value’ in that they 
represent fractions of this overall productive capability, portions of it that were 
surrendered to their existence. Their ‘value’ represents in some sense how much 
productive effort went into organising those particular bits of matter in just the 
right way.
The full import of the fact that it is abstractlSboun we are talking about thus 
becomes clear. It is not just that we are abstracting from any qualities of labour 
other than its duration and the fact that it is expenditure of human productive 
capabilities. The point is rather that if we take the necessity for including direct 
and indirect labour seriously, actual human labour and ‘crystallised’ labour 
embodied in the commodities must fuse together into a homogeneous, highly 
abstract substance, which has little to do with the everyday image of labour 
(effectively equivalent to the private and/or concrete labour). It is for this 
reason that it is suggested that this ‘labour’, the amount of which is determined
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by the productive structure of the economy, is in fact an expression of the 
productive capability of that economy — its Value’. 18
Now if the substance of labour value is understood in this way, as a sort of 
summary representation of the productive capability— whether total productive 
capability, or that ‘used up’ in the production of particular commodities — then 
focusing on the role of value means focusing on the role of productive 
relationships. So if one wants to say, as Marx did, that without value, it is 
impossible to understand exchange-value, and hence also the particular types of 
exchange-value represented by prices of production, this is effectively a claim 
that it is the productive relationships of the economy that in some sense 
dominate over the exchange relationships. And moreover, if it is the case that 
Marx’s two conditions hold in an economy, this in fact implies that the 
exchange relationships under capitalism (prices of production and the profit 
rate) are fully determined by the productive side f  the economy.
The Sraffian System
To see the significance of this interpretation for the transformation 
problem, one needs to understand what difference it makes to the critiques of 
the Marxian procedure. In order to do this, we have to comprehend the nature 
of the Sraffian alternative. Therefore, let us now describe the basics of the 
Sraffian prices of production system,19 which will also yield several other 
interesting points along the way.
The Sraffian system is based on the input-output schema already 
mentioned several times. This schema in effect represents a (very sophisticated)
18 This would suggest that, as surplus value is effectively the result of the living beings’ 
productive capability, really full automation, that is production with no human inputs 
at all, implies the organisation of the inorganic matter to the level where in a clear 
sense it has become ‘alive’. It is an intriguing possibility, but it is tangential to the 
main discussion.
19 N ot all elements of Sraffian analysis are important for our purposes. In particular, we 
need not go into the construction of the ‘invariable measure of value’ in terms of the 
Standard commodity, nor in fact into the relations between the wage as conceived by 
Sraffa and the rate of profits.
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refinement of the notions inherent already in Quesnay’s tableaux economiques, 
developed further by Marx in his reproduction schemes and by Bortkiewicz in 
his critique of Marx’s solution to the transformation problem.
Sraffa (1960) starts from a simple physical description of a subsistence 
economy — that is, an economy capable of producing only the precise amounts 
of physical inputs and means of subsistence that are needed in order for the 
economy to persist through time. This description is carried out in terms on an 
input-output table such as the following:
au +  « 2 1  +  a» + ■ •• +  a . ,  —  2”. A
a,2 + a22 + a32+--- + anl — 2 ".,a2,
a i n + a 2 n + « 3„ + • • • + « „ „
where aty is the amount of good i required for the production of the good j.
If we assume that this is a market economy, then the various products 
need to be exchanged between their producers. The equilibrium prices are the 
generalised exchange ratios which make it possible to exchange the products 
(outputs) of the processes in exactly such a way that all the processes can end up 
with the inputs required to repeat the cycle. So the input-output table is used to 
produce a set of simultaneous equations of the following sort:
p tau + p 2a2l + p 3a„ +••• +p„a„, - Pi^/Vu
P f l a  +  P ia n  +  P i a 32 + ' '  • +  Pna m  =  P i
PA*  + Pia2,  + + -  + P A ,  -  /». 2".
wherep up2, • •. p„ are the relative prices and ^  is the amount of good i required 
for the production of the good j.
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It can be seen immediately that under the conditions of subsistence, these 
‘prices of production’ are exactly equivalent to labour values. Indeed — given that 
labour value of a commodity includes both the direct labour and the labour that 
went into producing the physical inputs used in production, to calculate labour 
values we would use the input-output table in precisely the same way as for the 
calculation of the prices — the only difference being the label that we give to the 
unknown we wish to calculate.
Now, at this point we should draw attention to the fact that this 
corresponds exactly with the claims we have made in the previous section for our 
interpretation of the substance of value. In a Sraffian subsistence economy — 
that is, Simple Commodity Production under Simple Reproduction — the 
productive relationships only just make it possible to exactly repeat the 
economic cycle. Thus productive relationships are decisive also for exchange. 
They are, so to speak, ‘tight’; there is no leeway for prices to deviate from 
values. If the economy is to go on, the exchange relationships must 
accommodate themselves precisely to the requirements of production. This is 
why the calculation of labour values and the (Sraffian) prices of production is 
identical in such an economy. The exchange relationships are determined 
completely by the requirements of production and no deviation is possible.
Next, Sraffa moves to the consideration of an economy producing a 
surplus. This, in fact, is the fundamental building block on which all the results 
of his analysis rest.
Now there is something very significant about the term ‘surplus-producing 
economy’. For as Sraffa conceives of it, this economy does not fall under any of 
the Marxian categories of Simple, Extended, or Expanded Reproduction. In 
other words, while the economy is developed beyond the level of simple 
subsistence, the surplus is not used to increase the scale of the economy, nor to 
improve the available technologies themselves. Thus, unlike in Marx’s analysis, 
in Sraffian economics surplus is not used for investment. As will become clear, 
this is a point of enormous importance.
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Once we admit the existence of a surplus — a certain amount of 
commodities above the level necessary for the simple reproduction of the 
system — room appears for commodities which in fact do not enter as inputs 
into production at all. The classic example of such commodities is luxuries — 
which of course makes perfect sense, since an economy only becomes capable 
of producing luxuries if it is able to rise above the subsistence level — the very 
definition of a surplus-producing economy. Sraffa generalises this notion to all 
commodities which do not enter into production of all other commodities, 
whether directly as inputs, or indirectly as inputs of inputs (etc.) Such 
commodities are called non-basics, and their significance is that they do not enter 
into the process of equilibrium price determination. This is because their prices 
will passively adjust to the prices of their inputs, but will not themselves affect 
the prices of all other goods in the system. While basic commodities are locked 
into a mutually determining causal chain, non-basics are like dead-ends hanging 
immobile from this chain.
As we have said earlier, it was precisely the luxuries that caused one of the 
difficulties for Marx’s transformation procedure; as Sraffa’s exposition makes 
clear, the same problem arises from the existence of non-basics generally. Now 
is a good time to say that here, the Marxian camp would be well advised to shift 
ground.
Marx wanted to make the prices of production and the equalised profit rate 
dependent on luxury-producing industries, since he postulated that exploitation 
— extraction of surplus value — is going on just as much here as anywhere else; 
and since profit is meant to be nothing but transformed surplus value, he did 
not want to leave this industries out of transformation.
Yet, by having recourse to a device of Marx’s own invention, the 
bothersome conclusion that the values of luxuries enter the transformation 
procedure can be avoided. The device I am referring to is the idea of 
unproductive labour (and the concomitant possibility of economic oppression). 
It is quite easy to postulate that the workers in luxury industries do give in
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surplus labour-time, but not in fact surplus value, which is not being produced 
in these industries. This would fit exactly with the interpretation of labour value 
we have advanced above. The luxury industries do not produce inputs for 
production; since labour values of commodities express the fractions of 
productive capability that is embodied in them — as outputs and inputs, due to 
the circular nature of the economic process — luxuries in themselves do not 
possess any value other than that of their inputs.20
Of course, this manoeuvre has as a consequence that all workers in luxury- 
producing industries are turned into unproductive ones. If we accept that there 
was a political point intended by Marx’s distinction between productive and 
unproductive workers, namely that clerks, accountants etc. were to be excluded 
from the working class whose mission it was to bring about a revolution, then 
we may well be very unhappy about this re-drawing of the boundaries of the 
unproductive workers.21 However, from the economic point of view this step is 
unobjectionable. And since we are currently engaged in trying to formulate a 
theory of classes more faithful to empirical reality, we would do well not to 
prejudice the issue by insisting on Marx’s original demarcation just at this point.
To return to the Sraffian system — the other consequence of the existence 
of the surplus is that there is now room for profit— or more precisely, for a rate- 
of-profit, which in the Sraffian system is the logically prior notion. The idea is 
that the surplus produced should be allotted to the individual processes (or, if 
we jump ahead, to the owners of the means of production of those processes) in 
equal proportion to the means (f production advanced in those processes. Since that 
proportion is postulated as equal in all cases, this effectively means that the rate
20 What of the profits earned in the luxury-producing industries? Our suggestion leads 
to the conclusion that they cannot be understood as transformed surplus value, 
which seems to invalidate the whole of the Marxian conception. This is in fact not 
entirely correct, as will become clear below.
21 Of course, precisely such a political reading of the distinction between productive 
and unproductive labour is used by Poulantzas (1975a) in his discussion of the ‘new 
petty burgeoisie’.
228
Class, Surplus, and the Division of Labour (VI)
of profit is equal in all industries — and hence that Sraffa assumes from the start 
that which was the final stage of Marxian analysis.
The set of simultaneous equations which results looks as follows:
(l + rXp,an + p 2a2l + p3a31 +••• + />„<!„,)= />,«,
(l + r jp ,a a + p 2a12 + p ,a ,2 + • • • + p„an2 )= p 2a2
(l + r Xp,a,„ + p 2a2„ + p,a,„ +... + p„a„„ )= p„a„
where ris the equalised rate of profit,p up2, • •. p„ are the relative prices, ^  is the 
amount of good i required for the production of the goodj  and ax,a2, ... an are 
the respective outputs (in this case greater than the simple sums of the relevant 
inputs tfjj., since this is production with surplus).
At this point of the analysis, Sraffa makes a very important statement: 
“We have up to this point regarded wages as consisting of the 
necessary subsistence of the workers and thus entering the system on 
the same footing as the fuel for the engines or the feed for the cattle.
We must now take into account the other aspect of wages since, 
besides the ever-present element of subsistence, they may include a 
share of the surplus product. In view of this double character of the 
wage it would be inappropriate, when we come to consider the 
division of the surplus between capitalists and workers, to separate 
the two component parts of the wage and regard only the ‘surplus’ 
part as variable; whereas the goods necessary for the subsistence of 
the workers would continue to appear, with the fuel, etc., among the 
means of production.
We shall, nevertheless, refrain in this book from tampering with 
the traditional wage concept and shall follow the usual practice of 
treating the whole of the wage as variable.” (Sraffa 1960, p. 10)
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The significance of this passage is manifold. First of all and most 
significandy, understanding wage as being entirely paid out of surplus implies 
that the ‘necessaries of life’ now fall into the category of non-basics — since they 
will have to fall out of the equations specifying the means of production, as 
Sraffa himself says (Sraffa 1960, p. 10). But while to understand this as a theory 
of wages would be most unfortunate, it is acceptable as an expository device — 
especially since the more general case of the two-part concept of the wage has 
in fact been explored by some authors.22
Secondly, the difference between the subsistence wage and ‘surplus-wage’ 
has been sometimes understood as a difference between wages paid in advance 
and in arrears. I think this interpretation must be rejected decisively. The time 
dimension of the payment is entirely irrelevant here; what matters is rather 
whether the amount to be paid to the workers is known (i. e. agreed to) in 
advance or not.
Thirdly, there is no theory of the division of the surplus in Sraffa — or in 
other words, no theory of the surplus wage. As the amount of surplus going to 
the wages is a critical variable of Sraffa’s system, this is significant. Since an 
economic theory of the surplus division is lacking, the wage has often been 
interpreted as the result of the class struggle between the workers and the 
capitalists. This is of course a very appealing sort of interpretation from the 
Marxian point of view, which moreover seems to correspond to clear empirical 
realities — trade-unions and employers do in fact negotiate and/or fight over the 
amount of the wages; in fact, over the decades of the development of the trade- 
union and the socialist movement, this has become a sort of canonical form of 
‘class struggle’ (while at the same time decried as pure ‘economism’ from a more 
theoretical Marxist standpoint). Assuming that we adopt a two-part concept of 
the wage rather than the pure surplus concept, the Sraffian analysis seems to be 
offering an elegant way of refining and illuminating Marxian ideas on the wage — 
when Marx says that beside subsistence, wages always include ‘a historical and
22 Roncaglia (1978), Abraham-Frois and Berrebi (1979).
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moral element’ (Marx 1954, p. 171), this is part of the surplus wage Sraffa
describes, the part that is the result of class struggles.
However, the statement about the ‘historical and moral element’ is at the 
same time a sort of fig leaf that tends to be used to cover the nakedness of the 
Marxian theory of wages. Because for the most part, Marx tended to use the 
assumption that ‘the value of labour-power’ is indeed equal to the value of the 
means of subsistence — which is just the same as saying that he was using the 
subsistence concept of the wage, as did other Marxists after him.
But if this is so, then not only do Sraffian ideas about the division of the 
surplus represent a welcome explication of Marx’s thought; they are in fact an 
extension of quantitative analysis into an area which Marx did not cover. And 
since the surplus division is a determining variable for prices in the Sraffian 
system, this in fact means that there is no equivalent to the Sraffian problematic in Marx. 
Sraffa investigates how prices vary as the labour portion of the surplus changes 
from zero to hundred percent; but since for Marx, the wage is treated as 
subsistence-level bundle, this investigation cannot even begin. To put it simply, 
from the Sraffian point of view Marx is stuck at zero.
This is the real reason for the impossibility critique of the Marxian
transformation algorithm, briefly mentioned above — the claim that the value 
schema will in general not lead to the correct prices of production. The point is 
that in the value schema, the workers’ wage is treated as necessary labour; while in 
the Sraffian price schema, it is understood to be at least in part a portion of the 
surplus. Thus, the fully general Sraffian solution to the transformation problem 
must necessarily diverge from the Marxian one — or to be more precise, why the 
Sraffian schema must give different results from the Marxian one (since was 
noted, the Sraffian approach means that the Transformation Problem turns out 
to be a non-problem). The profit rate and the prices are influenced by the 
division of the surplus, but there is no such division in Marx. To restrict our 
attention to cases where it is possible to go from the value schema to the price 
schema means effectively to claim that the surplus portion of the wage is zero.
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Now it is of course possible to do this; but at this stage, such a step appears to 
be an abandonment of a very important contribution to the theory of prices.
Sraffian versus Neoclassical Econom ics
Now it is important to realise just what the Sraffian schema describes. It is 
not any real economy, which of course never simply reproduces itself exacdy — 
due to technological progress, investment, but also crises and tribulations. The 
Sraffian schema instead represents a fictitious economy which has achieved an 
equilibrium position such that on the one hand, profit rates are equalised, and 
on the other hand, the equilibrium is stable and persists through time.
The Sraffian schema thus is a step on the way to the description of the real 
world, embodying the important principle that to be sensible, economics must 
take into account the necessity of reproduction of the social world. However, it 
is not the final step. Thus Sraffa’s subtitle, ‘Prelude to a Critique of Economic 
Theory’, could be understood to mean precisely that — that the full description 
of the economy would have to take into account also the changes and processes 
going on in the economy, finally perhaps disposing even of the very notion of 
equilibrium.23
If we abstract from investment and technological progress, however, we 
could also view the Sraffian schema as specifying the average amounts of each 
commodity needed in order for the economy to be a self-reproducing one. The 
real economy, on its way to such a Sraffian equilibrium, would then be 
experiencing crises of overproduction and underconsumption of inputs — of 
some, there would not be enough to secure the full reproduction, while of 
others there would be too much — which would then lead to both price and 
quantity adjustment.
But if the Sraffian approach is to be at all relevant for the Marxian 
transformation problem, we also need to think of a different cause of for
23 By this I mean disposing of it as the general requirement; the theory should be 
sufficiendy general to describe both the equilibrium and the non-equilibrium 
situations.
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price/quantity adjustment. Namely, we need to understand the story behind the 
equal rate of profit used in the Sraffian system — we need to have an idea of 
how such an equilibrium rate of profit could be actually established. It turns out 
that this story has deep implications for the relations between Sraffian and 
neoclassical economics.
As was mentioned in the beginning, on the process of achievement of 
equal rates of profit Marx was at one with Ricardo.24 The equilibrium equal rate 
of profit is a result of competition — as some industries experience higher rates 
of profit, capital moves from one sphere to another in order to achieve the 
maximum profit rate available. This then pushes up prices of the commodities 
in the ‘low rate’ industries, as given the same level of demand, there is now lack 
of sufficient quantities of their products; conversely, the prices of the products 
of the ‘high rate industries’ goes down, as there is a relative abundance of 
them.25
Let us note here that we should take the wage here as consisting of the 
subsistence and the surplus part; it is then clear that the subsistence bundle of 
wage goods is itself a requirement for the continuation of the system. Of course, 
it is possible that on the way to the equilibrium, the elements included in this 
bundle shift and change, just as much as the amounts of capital goods change. 
This is not a problem; the only requirement is for the subsistence bundle to be 
stable once we arrive at the equilibrium — which, by definition, it must be.
24 There is now a large literature on whether the process can in fact work as the 
Classical economists — including Marx — have understood it (e. g. Nikaido 1983, 
Steedman 1984, Dumenil and Levy 1987, Flaschel and Semmler 1987). It turns out 
that this is so under some special assumptions, which really is quite predictable. It is 
the opposite conclusion which would be surprising, namely, that the competitive 
mechanism could work its magic under any conditions whatsoever.
25 Broome (1979) claims that this Classical conception of competition leading to the 
equalisation of the profit rates implies an assumption of constant returns to scale. I 
do not see this. It does not matter whether the new capital arriving in an industry 
earns the same rate of return or in fact a lower one than the capital originally 
employed; all that matters is that eventually, there is convergence. More work is 
certainly needed to show what the conditions of this convergence are, but it does not 
seem a priori clear that the only possibility is constant returns to scale in all industries.
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Now if this is the process leading to the Sraffian equilibrium, we should 
realise that this in fact constitutes an answer to those critics from the 
neoclassical side who charge that, as Lichtenstein (1983, p. 114) puts their 
contention, “only in the very special case of perfect competition with constant 
returns to scale will changes in consumer demand have no impact on the long- 
run equilibrium price”(for a particularly arrogant expression, see Samuelson 
1991). Since on the way to the Sraffian equilibrium, there is both price and 
quantity adjustment, depending on the supply and demand in every particular 
non-equilibrium period, then the final socio-technological coefficients of the 
Sraffian economy must be the equilibrium quantities demanded, and supplied.
Thus, the charge only demonstrates the inability of the neoclassicals to 
think outside of their own paradigm. What the Sraffian system describes is an 
equilibrium, and as we have seen, both ‘demand* and ‘supply*, understood as the 
long-run requirements of production and consumption, do of course enter into 
the determination of this equilibrium. But what Sraffa has demonstrated is that 
in order to find the equilibrium prices, we as economists simply do not need to 
know anything about the demand and supply ‘functions* of neoclassical 
economics. The meaning of the demonstration is that under the two 
assumptions of a self-reproducing society and an equal rate of profit, the 
equilibrium quantities are enough to determine the equilibrium prices. As there are no 
changes involved — the economy is in equilibrium — neither neoclassical supply 
nor neoclassical demand are required at all.
Of course, i f  what we wanted to say was that at some point prior the 
establishment of the equilibrium, there was a change in ‘consumer preferences*
— understood as the change in their utility functions — then of course this would 
lead to a different set of equilibrium prices. But, obviously, also to a different set f  
equilibrium quantities. Thus, the correct way to approach this situation would be 
to specify these different quantities — i. e., a different socio-technological matrix
— and read the prices off that. To try to ‘solve’ the problem by ‘bringing in 
demand’ instead would be like saying that in order to solve a mathematical
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problem, we need to ‘bring in a hammer’. The neoclassical demand is an entirely 
different sort of animal, which has no relevance in the given context.
The fact that Sraffa’s system in fact describes a ‘reproducible equilibrium’26 
allows us to describe the relationship between the Sraffian and the neoclassical 
theory in yet another way. What we should see clearly is that both theories do in 
fact have the same object — or, to be more precise, aim at the same goal. This 
goal is a description of a general equilibrium of the economy. The first 
difference between them arises from the fact that while the neoclassical 
approach is subjective, attempting to do this by using the general description of 
unobservable ‘utility functions’ or ‘preferences’ of the individual producers and 
consumers, the Sraffian approach is objective, using quantities which are in 
principle observable.
There is no doubt that the neoclassical approach can lead to a description 
of a general equilibrium, as Arrow and Debreu (1954) have demonstrated. The 
difficulty is that such an equilibrium is one in which all future trades are 
assumed to have been carried out — or, alternatively, where all such future trades 
are assumed to be known in advance. N ot only is such an assumption drastically 
unrealistic; but it has the consequence of hiding the difference between two 
radically different sorts of futures. In the first one, the subjective preferences of 
the individual actors lead to a future where all trades have been carried out, 
because no more trades are possible — production and consumption stop and 
the society fails to continue to exist. In the second case — which contains a 
much narrower, but far more important set of futures — the society does go on, 
because it so happens that the subjective preferences of the individual actors 
ensure its continuation.
Let us leave aside for the moment the obvious point that preferences are 
likely to be endogenous for any society which does manage to keep reproducing 
itself — it would be an accident of cosmic proportions for the preferences to be 
exogenously given and yet exactly match the requirements for the continual
26 John Roemer’s (1981) term.
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survival of the economy.27 Nevertheless, it is clear that even assuming 
exogeneity, the neoclassical approach has no way of distinguishing between the 
non-reproducible and the reproducible solutions; this conditions has to be 
imported into it from outside.
The description of those equilibria which can go on reproducing 
themselves is precisely what Sraffa provides, since the requirement of 
continuous reproduction is a condition for his equilibrium.28 Thus, we can see that 
the second difference between the neoclassical and the Sraffian approach lies in 
the fact that the first is much more ‘general’ — but only in the negative sense of 
including an enormous number of utterly uninteresting cases, namely those 
where the subjective preferences of the individual actors run the economy into 
the ground. By specifying the reproducibility of the economy as a condition of the 
equilibrium, Sraffa is surely restricting our attention to the only cases which are 
actually interesting from the economic point of view.
An important lesson follows from this comparison. In the discussion of 
the relative merits of neoclassical and ‘modern Classical’ economics, two very 
separate issues are often confused — namely, the causal and the epistemological 
importance of a particular set of factors. The neoclassicals criticise Sraffa for 
not invoking their favourite notions, which they take to be the causal 
determinants of the economic process. But the Sraffian schema is an 
epistemological tool designed to reveal the relevant facts of the economy, for which 
purpose it serves perfectly well. Thus, it is one thing to assert that ‘the general 
equilibrium is causally determined by the adjustment of supply and demand’, 
where supply and demand are understood in some simple pre-theoretic sense. It
27 N ot to mention the fact that preferences are in fact being manufactured on a daily 
basis in advanced capitalist economies.
28 It is possible to take a Sraffian equilibrium and, given certain assumptions, to derive 
the neoclassical ‘inputs’ into the epistemological process (initial stocks of goods and 
preferences) which need to exist in order for the neoclassical equilibrium to be 
identical with the Sraffian one. This is precisely what Roemer does in his Analytical 
Foundations <f Marxian Economic Theory (1981), and what Eatwell (1982) reproaches him 
for. But in fact, it is an answer to a not completely uninteresting question -  which of 
the subjective neoclassical equilibria does it actually make sense to investigate at all?
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is quite another to say that ‘it is epistemologically necessary to use the 
neoclassical constructs of the supply and the demand functions to derive the set 
of equilibrium prices’. The first statement is quite possibly true, and as we have 
seen, it is reflected in the story behind the Sraffian equilibrium. The second 
statement, however, is quite definitely false, as the Sraffian approach 
demonstrates.
Why the Law of Value Does N ot H old in a Sraffian Economy
Before we proceed, let me summarize what we have discovered so far. 
First of all, we pointed out that Marx necessarily needed some sort of 
transformation procedure which allowed the amount of the substance of value 
to be remain constant — both in its total and in the sub-total of surplus value — 
and that no other ‘invariance conditions’ would do. Secondly, we argued that 
the substance of value should be understood as a representation of the 
‘augmented labour’ of the economy, of the total productive capability of the 
economy. Finally, we have described the journey to the Sraffian equilibrium, 
which consists of equilibrium quantities, equilibrium prices, and an equilibrium 
— equal — rate of profits.
Now we have the basic elements in place to establish why Marx’s ‘Law of 
Value’ — the two conditions of preservation of the value totals — do not hold in 
a Sraffa-type economy. The answer is that prices in a Sraffa-type economy are, 
despite appearances, not completely determined by productive relationships -  
and it is the interference of a particular type of consumption that makes all the 
difference.
To begin with, imagine that we are given the description of a Sraffian 
economy which looks as if it were based on the input-output table o f a 
subsistence economy mentioned in the Chapter I:
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pw 240 qr. wheat + pi 12 t. iron + pp 18 pigs = pv 450 qr. wheat 
^ 9 0  qr. wheat + p , 6 t. iron + ^ 1 2  pigs = p i 21 t. iron 
p w 120 qr. wheat + p{ 3 t. iron + pp 30 pigs = pp 60 pigs
However, despite the formal appearance of a Sraffian ‘subsistence 
economy’, I claim that this could be equally well interpreted not as a 
subsistence/Simple Reproduction type of economy. Instead, all branches of 
production produce a surplus — but it so happens that the owners <f the means of 
production do not sell that surplus at all, and instead just consume it themselves. 
Simply, whatever surplus is produced is put aside while trading is going on; 
therefore the only quantities that influence the equilibrium prices are the same 
as they would be in a subsistence economy — and hence also the final prices are 
the same. (Of course, we are still and will remain in the equilibrium situation — 
both the necessary and the surplus parts of the output are themselves 
equilibrium quantities.)
The divergence of prices from their subsistence magnitudes is thus not 
caused by the surplus as such, but by the fact that this surplus is traded. In fact, 
this shows that it is not entirely legitimate to simply automatically use the socio- 
technological matrix for the calculation of the equilibrium prices, as Sraffa does, 
for by the same reasoning, it is only that part of the surplus produced which is 
actually traded that makes any difference. If we postulate the straightforward 
use of the matrix to produce a system of simultaneous equations, we should be 
aware of the fact that what we are doing is implicitly postulating an exact 
equality between the amount of surplus actually produced and traded — so the 
owners of the means of production in any industry do not consume any of their 
own surplus.29 It is notxhe. case that the owners simply ‘buy’ the relevant portion 
of the surplus from themselves. This can easily be seen by a comparison with 
the faux-subsistence economy case just described. There, all the surplus is
29 Until further notice I shall be assuming that all of the surplus goes to the capitalist — 
in other words, the ‘surplus portion of the wage’ is equal to zero.
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‘bought’ by the owners themselves; but including it in the equations would 
cause a divergence of the prices from their appropriate levels, and would in fact 
prevent the economy from reproducing itself. We could, of course, evaluate the 
non-tradeable surplus in terms of the equilibrium prices; but this is a completely 
different procedure from allowing it to determine those prices. In the first case, 
independently determined prices are used to reckon the notional value of the 
surplus; in the second, the surplus exerts an influence on prices, even though it 
never appears on the market at all.
The Sraffian surplus-producing economy then amounts to a situation 
where all the surplus produced is sold on the market, just like the necessary 
portion of the output. However, we also know that it is only this necessary 
portion of the output that makes any contribution to the productive activities. 
By definition, the Sraffian surplus does not enter into production. Hence, the 
only reason why it is being traded must be for the purposes of consumption. 
This is not what Sraffa himself says, o f course. The point I am making is that 
such a conclusion necessarily follows from his assumptions; it is implicitly 
present, even though not explicitly stated.
Now, we know from the description of the journey to the Sraffian 
equilibrium that this must be in a sense an ‘equilibrium level of consumption’. 
While the price and quantity adjustments were going on, prices were going up 
and down not solely because of the need to equalize the rate of profit, but also 
because they were responding to the demand for the goods constituting the 
surplus. The final equilibrium is thus in a sense implicitly determined by the 
preferences of the surplus owners. These preferences thus enter into the actual 
determination of equilibrium values o f our variables — even though we do not 
need them to find out these equilibrium values.
And so we have at last arrived at the reason why Value does not rule the 
Sraffian economy the way Marx wanted it to. In Sraffa’s economy, we get
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something which that may be called consumptive surplus?® For the Law of Value to 
hold, we would have to have the substance of value circulating through the 
economy and being exactly preserved at every stage. But in a Sraffian economy, 
it is not; some of it ‘disappears’, is consumed, in an act of ‘unproductive 
consumption’ (as it used to be called in the writings of Classical economists).
We can see the difference this makes very clearly if we split the Sraffian 
economy in two parts: the one of ‘productive consumption’ (PC) and the one of 
‘unproductive consumption’ (UC).
Within the PC part, calculating prices will of course give the exact same 
magnitudes as if this was a subsistence economy — hence, if the PC part was in 
fact a self-contained productive system, the prices would be equal to values and 
the Law of Value would hold exactly.
On the other hand, within the UC part, the surplus constitutes the ‘initial 
endowment’ of its owners. No production is going on here at all, and the 
owners solely engage in exchange. Hence what we get is in fact a description of 
a Walrasian pure-exchange type of economy — and prices will be here 
determined by the size of the endowments and the preferences of the owners.
The peculiar nature of the Sraffian economy consists in the fact that these 
goods for production and for unproductive consumption are not in fact sold on 
two separate markets, but together at the same time on the same market. Hence 
we get ‘interference’; the productive relationships of the economy no longer 
fully determine the relevant variables.
The fact that the distribution of income is exogenous in the Sraffian model 
has been taken to mean by some neoclassicals as a defect, in the sense that it 
seems inferior to the neoclassical equilibrium, in which all prices and factor 
incomes are determined simultaneously.
30 The term ‘surplus consumption’ which offers itself is confusing, since it seems to 
suggest consumption above some necessary level. As we shall see later, it may in fact 
be the case that consumption surplus constitutes precisely surplus consumption; but 
equally this may not be the case. It is possible that the surplus is consumed by ‘pure 
surplus appropriators’, for whom there is not in fact any necessary level of 
consumption, as they are not necessary for the existence of the system at all.
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However, our considerations show that this seeming defect dissolves upon 
the proper conceptualisation of the terms. As we have said, the ‘income’ of the 
Sraffian system is in fact pure surplus consumption; and, if a separate market 
could be arranged for it, it would be equivalent to the neoclassical pure- 
exchange economy.
In other words, the ‘arbitrary’ division of income is in fact nothing but the 
equally ‘arbitrary’ primary distribution of resources, before trading happens, in 
the neoclassical market. It is, to be sure, under-determined, in the sense that all 
we get to know is the aggregate amount of resources assigned to labour and to 
capital; but in principle, there would be nothing stopping us from making a 
more detailed assignation. The crucial point is that the Sraffian need for the 
description of the division of the surplus between the two groups is in principle 
no different from the need for the neoclassicals to describe the initial 
distribution of resources. The only difference — obviously not a major one — is 
that in the neoclassical system, we are talking of a ‘one-shot game’, whereas the 
Sraffian system reproduces the division of resources (which in the meantime 
have been consumed) repeatedly in each period.
Now we see the significance of the fact that Sraffa’s ‘surplus-producing 
economy’ is neither a Simple Reproduction nor an Extended/Expanded 
Reproduction one. For if we look at the latter taxonomy closely, we see that it 
assumes either no surplus, orits productive investment. It is then no surprise that 
Marx’s approach cannot allow for the substance of value not being the 
determining factor of the economy; he simply never seems to have considered 
seriously the possibility that instead o f being re-invested, the major part of the 
surplus could be simply be consumed.
Indeed, his statements to the effect that surplus in capitalism is there for 
this precise purpose — investment — are well known:
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“Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets! “Industry furnishes 
the material which saving accumulates.” (...) Therefore, save, save, i.e, reconvert 
the greatest possible portion of surplus-value, or surplus-product into capital! 
Accumulation for accumulation’s sake, production for production’s sake: by this 
formula classical economy expressed the historical mission of the bourgeoisie, 
and did not for a single instant deceive itself over the birth-throes of wealth.
(...) If to classical economy, the proletarian is but a machine for the production 
of surplus-value; on the other hand, the capitalist is in its eyes only a machine for the 
conversion f  this surplus-value into additional capitals (Marx, Capital Vol. I, Chap. 24 — 
emphasis added)
Thus, I conclude that the Sraffian critique is in fact the result of a different 
set of assumptions from those of Marx. This is not to say that the critique is 
somehow irrelevant; on the contrary. But its precise implications are yet to be 
spelled out. These will be the subject of the next chapter.
242
Chapter VII
Beyond the Transform ation Problem  
The Sraffian Framework As 
a Basis for Class Theory
In the last chapter, I claimed that the productivist notion of value explains 
why the Marxian approach fails in the case of a Sraffian surplus-producing 
economy. I would now like to argue that it is possible to buttress this 
conclusion by pointing to a positive confirmation that under this understanding, 
the Law of Value holds where we would expect it to hold. Such a confirmation 
can be found in the von Neumannian model of the general equilibrium (von 
Neumann 1945).
Von Neum ann and Sraffa: A Comparison
Similarly to Sraffa, von Neumann uses the same fundamental idea a 
‘circular flow’ of commodities. There is not a one-way road from production to 
consumption; instead, commodities arising as outputs may in general be 
understood also as inputs in the next round of social reproduction. In other 
words, the idea of an input-output schema underlies both of these conceptions.
Unlike Sraffa, however, von Neumann does not start from the final social 
equilibrium. Nor, however, does the von Neumann method of arriving at the 
equilibrium mirror the actual social procedure of reaching it. That is, the 
mathematics does not concern the process of competition through which the 
rates of profit are equalised in an economy. Instead, it is a proof that such an 
equal rates equilibrium will exist.
Unlike Sraffa, then, von Neumann starts from a list of all the possible 
social technologies. Since in general, more than one method might be used to 
produce a given commodity, a question then arises what technologies will 
actually be chosen — which ones will form a part of the final equilibrium
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description of the Sraffian type and which ones will not. In order to decide this 
question, von Neumann employs the so-called profitability rule. This rule 
specifies that if, under the equilibrium prices, the profit rate by using the 
technology is smaller than the going rate, the process will not be used.1 
Similarly, it is possible that a given process will produce more than one output— 
in fact, under the canonical representation of fixed capital, this is necessary -  
and so it has to be decided which goods will actually be bought and sold and of 
which there will be an excess. This is done through the Tree goods’ rule, 
specifying that goods in excess supply will have an equilibrium price of zero. 
(Note that this rule, used in order to take advantage of the mathematical 
‘duality’ properties, is in reality quite problematic; since by excess supply, von 
Neumann understands supply over the requirements of the productive 
processes, his approach implies that luxuries will be free goods!)
This forms the basis of the von Neumannian ‘semi-inequalities’ approach, 
where the inequalities ‘bite’ just in case the processes are not used or goods are 
not priced, and where the equality occurs just in case the processes and goods 
are part of the Sraffian ‘basic’ production schema.
The other major difference between Sraffa and von Neumann, however, is 
the use to which the surplus is put. In the original von Neumann schema, none 
of the surplus, or the profit, is ‘consumed by the capitalists’, much less by the 
workers; all of it is in fact devoted to investment. Thus, Sraffa and von 
Neumann lie at the opposite extremes: while for the former, all of the surplus is 
‘consumed’, for the latter, all of it is re-invested. Von Neumann specifies that 
this occurs in a particular way: the economy expands, but its ‘structure’ remains 
the same — or in other words, none of the productive processes used change. 
What this describes is of course what Marx termed ‘extended reproduction’,
1 Actually, the original formulation of the condition is in terms of no profit under 
equilibrium, rather than an equal positive profit rate. This is because von Neumann 
works under the neoclassical conceptualisation, in which what we call the profit rate 
is termed the interest rate; thus the condition can equivalently be expressed as we 
have done above.
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where the economy grows over time, but no technological progress occurs. For 
this to happen, the assumption of constant returns to scale is needed, as well as 
the assumption that such a way of expansion is at all possible — i. e., that the 
goods constituting the surplus come in just the right proportions as to fit the 
requirements of expansion.
Now it is a well-known fact that in the von Neumann model as originally 
specified — that is, where all the profit is ‘saved’ and none of it is ‘consumed by 
the capitalists’, Marx’s two conditions — the quantitative Law of Value — hold 
exactly. On the basis of this, Morishima (1973) even called this sort of model 
the ‘Marx-von Neumann model’. However, for the most part this came to be 
seen as just a curiosum, as a sort of accident without any deeper meaning. Yet, I 
would like to argue that this fact constitutes in fact a striking confirmation of 
our interpretation, and conversely, that the interpretation can make sense of this 
seemingly arbitrary result.
The reason why Marx’s Law of Value holds exactly in the original von 
Neumann model is precisely because there is no ‘unproductive consumption’ at 
all. Any consumption that occurs is strictly for the purposes of production.2 
Thus, given the understanding of value as a substance representing productive 
capability, we can see why it is necessarily the case that it is conserved in the 
system — any consumption of it is necessarily at the same time some sort of 
production. Or to put it differently, the constraints on the reproduction are now 
once again ‘tight’, they do not allow exchange-values to deviate from what is 
necessary for productive relationships to continue — albeit at a higher level, 
which explains why the individual labour values do not coincide with prices — 
and thus it is once again the case that it is the productive relationships that fully
2 While this is usually interpreted as capitalists saving all their income, this need not be 
so, if we assume that the owners of capital do play some active role in production — e. 
g. as managers, supervisors or entrepreneurs -  in which case they are ‘entitled’ to the 
replenishing consumption in the model; their consumption constitutes part of the 
necessary inputs just as much as the consumption of the wage-workers.
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determine the exchange relationships, precisely as is required for Marx’s 
conditions to hold.
Thus, we have arrived at the conclusion that Marx’s vision of the economy 
is one where the relations of reproduction are fundamental. That in itself should 
not be surprising; it is just the full implications of this that seem not to have 
been realised heretofore. The Marxian claim, effectively, is that the phenomena 
such as unproductive consumption (including luxury consumption) are 
negligible, unimportant for the determination of the laws of motion’ of 
capitalism.
The Sraffian point of view in its original formulation can now be seen to 
stand at the opposite extreme to Marx. Profit is not seen to be used for 
investment at all; the productive constraints are ‘slack’, and thus prices cannot 
be simply read off the productive relationships pure and simple. But the case in 
which there is zero investment is of course only a special one; and thus the right 
way to view the Sraffian-von Neumannian approach is as a generalisation rather 
than a rejection of Marx — a generalisation to the case where unproductive 
consumption of the surplus is allowed. If Marx is superseded by Sraffa, then it is 
in the same way in which Einstein’s theory superseded Newton’s — while the 
underlying conceptualisation is different (geometry of space vs. forces in the 
former case), the older theory’s equations live on as a very important special 
case. Indeed, such an important one that it is Newton rather than Einstein who 
is taught in Physics courses below the university level.
This view allows us to read Capital as a coherent and logical whole, 
disregarding as flawed only those passages where unproductive consumption 
seems to be considered (such as including luxuries in the transformation 
algorithm), which effectively go counter to the general flow. Indeed, we could 
even view the theory of Capital as an essentially correct approximation to reality, 
as long as we adopt the view that the unproductive consumption, whether of 
the capitalist or the working class, is dwarfed in importance by the investment 
requirements of the system. What we would then be saying, by way of analogy,
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is that while Einstein’s equations are closer to reality than Newton’s, for the vast 
majority of practical purposes the three laws of Newtonian mechanics are fully 
sufficient.
Now it is true that the original von Neumann ray of balanced growth is 
unstable — it possesses what has been termed the Harrodian ‘knife-edge’ 
property. That is, its path through time is so finely balanced that disturbance 
— the loss of the smallest nut or bolt — will send it gyrating further and further 
away from the original path. This is one of the main reasons why the fact that 
Marx’s Law of Value holds on the von Neumann ray has been considered 
uninteresting. I would argue that this is not so. We should always try to bear in 
mind that the models are at best the descriptions of general conditions, rather 
than exact matches of the empirical reality; they are only true ‘on average’ — 
which, after all, is one of the recurring themes of Marx’s philosophical critique 
of political economy. So the input-output equilibrium is only the description of 
average conditions, rather than a requirement of actual perfect balanced growth. 
To come closer to reality, we should be looking for mechanisms which ensure 
that these average conditions do in fact occur — which, of course, may be 
through crises and struggles, rather than smooth corrections. Richard Goodwin 
(1989) is a good example of what I have in mind.
Wage, Rent and Profit
The fact that it is consumption out of surplus which makes a difference to 
whether the economy can be described in terms of the substance of value 
suggests the following threefold classification of incomes to the holders of the 
various inputs:
In the first place, there is ‘wage’. This should be understood as ‘subsistence 
wage’; but the best and most precise way of putting it is that this is the pure 
reproduction price. In other words, this is the exact price that allows for the exact 
reproduction of each input, given the existence of a particular bundle of surplus
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commodities (in other words, given a particular level of extraction of surplus 
labour).
For any material input, the pure reproduction price is what must be paid to 
the industry producing it for it to be able to produce that same amount of its 
product plus the required surplus. As we shall see, the neoclassical ‘return to 
capital’ is in fact best understood as precisely this pure reproduction price — 
from which it immediately follows that it in no way represents the ‘profits’ 
consumed or invested in reality by capitalists, since no part of the pure 
reproduction price can be used for anything other than just that — pure 
reproduction — without the system failing to reproduce itself.
For non-material inputs, that is, human activities, this is the wage which 
will just allow their actors to reproduce, that is, to be as able to perform their 
activities tomorrow as they were today (hence subsistence wage) — always 
bearing in mind that one actor may be performing multiple of the various 
activities.
Secondly, there is what we shall call ‘capitalist rent’ (or just rent for short). 
This a claim to consume (unproductively) a part of the surplus produced. Thus, 
Sraffian surplus consists in fact entirely of rent, while Marx was not counting on 
the existence of the rent at all.
We should point out that this concept of rent differs from some other 
concepts known in economic theory. First of all, rent was in the first place 
ascribed to /zo/z-reproducible resources, such as land. Sraffa’s treatment explicitly 
introduces that sort of rent, as a deduction from the surplus produced (same as 
Marx). But the rent we have in mind is closer to the so-called ‘monopoly rent’, 
that is, a surcharge extracted on the basis of restricted access to resources which 
in themselves may not be non-reproducible at all.
But it is important to realise that despite this superficial similarity to 
‘monopoly rent’, the ‘capitalist rent’ is really quite a different sort of animal. This 
is because it has nothing to do with the neoclassical concept, in which rent is a
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payment over the market-clearing price. Our sort of rent is income over the pure 
reproduction price, with the market-clearing price fluctuating around this level.
The reason why the name ‘rent’ was chosen is that this part of the surplus 
shares an important characteristic with the view of ground rent in the writing of 
the Classical economists. Just like the rent received by the landlords, this 
portion of the surplus represents a deduction from the total fund available for 
investment; it is used for simple ‘unproductive consumption’. This definition of 
rent then implies that aside from the Sraffian surplus (which concerns only the 
system of basic commodities), all luxuries fall into this category.
And so finally, there is the ‘real economic profit’. This is that part of the 
surplus which is used for extended or expanded reproduction, or in other 
words, for investment. All of the surplus present (implicitly) in the original 
formulation of the von Neumann model constituted profit, which is why it 
allowed the Marxian Law of Value to hold.
There is a good reason why Marx did not consider the existence of 
capitalist rent at all. For while the capitalist profit allowed for the consideration 
of surplus labour as surplus value, and thus for a particular special theory of the 
capitalist mode of production as being governed by the laws of the substance of 
value, ‘rent’ does not, as we by now know, allow for the consideration of the 
substance of value, and thus has to be considered as brute surplus labour, on 
par with the surplus labour extracted by the feudal lords. Such a notion was 
quite alien to Marx’s mode of thinking, since he was looking for laws of motion 
specific to capitalism and therefore unlike anything he could find in the previous 
modes of production.
Sraffian paradigm thus constitutes an extension of Marxian thinking to 
include the element of rent.
The net income of the ‘pure capitalist class’ — i. e. after the pure 
reproduction price of the material means of production has been deducted — 
thus in general consists of three parts. On the one hand, there is the ‘capitalist 
wage’. This is simply the pure reproduction price of ‘capitalist labour’ — that is,
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all those productive activities which the capitalists happen to undertake 
themselves, ranging possibly from actual manual production to highest levels of 
strategic planning. Just like any other human being, the capitalist needs to 
reproduce themselves, and the capitalist wage just allows them to do that.
Secondly, there is the capitalist rent. As we are now talking about the ‘pure 
capitalist class’, we will ignore the possibility of the rent accruing to special skills 
or knowledge. In this context, the capitalist rent accrues purelj thanks to the 
monopoly of the capitalist class over the material means of production, just as 
Marx postulated. (Of course, this applies to the capitalist profit as well.) The 
capitalist rent thus covers all that champagne and caviar consumed by the 
capitalist class.
Finally, there is the capitalist profit, over which the capitalist class exercises 
power. Power over investment thus turns out to be the defining characteristic of 
the ‘pure capitalist class’; while it is conceivable, in an ‘Accumulate, 
accumulate!/Protestant Ethic’ type of capitalism, that the capitalist rent is %ero, 
without the capitalist profit there is no investment, and thus no capitalism at all.
The ‘pure working class’, on the other hand, receives just the subsistence wage 
and nothing else. Thus, the model of ‘pure capitalism’ which involves just these 
two ‘pure classes’ turns out, unsurprisingly, to be the von Neumann-Marx 
model.
Actual vs. Counterfactual Approach to Exploitation
Given the discussion so far, it is now possible to deal also with some other 
objections that have been raised against the Labour Theory of Value. The first 
of these — the so-called co-existence of positive profits with negative surplus 
value under joint production — gave rise to a debate which is actually important 
for quite an independent reason: namely, because it demonstrates the inferiority 
of the counter-factual as opposed to the actual approach to exploitation.
The counter-factual approach is the basis of John Roemer’s non-causal, 
game-theoretic definition of exploitation, which I have criticised above. But
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such tendency to understand claims about the existence of exploitation as 
counterfactuals in fact is not limited to Roemer. I t does not always play such a 
prominent role as in his case. But nevertheless, it is hard to avoid thinking about 
surplus labour as that part of the total labour time that ‘would not have to be 
there’, if only social relations were different. This is precisely the sort of 
counterfactual thinking I have in mind. To spell it out, the tendency to interpret 
exploitation counterfactually means to make exploitation dependent upon a 
feasible alternative arrangement, involving possibly a re-organisation of the 
division of labour, under which the exploited class would perform only labour 
equal to that necessary for the satisfaction of its subsistence requirements.
Now, the tendency to bring in counterfactual thinking is in a sense quite 
understandable. It is closely bound up with the problem of moving from the 
definition of exploitation, that is explaining what it means, to making it operational, 
that is finding out whether and to what extent it exists. The two tasks are of 
course of quite a different nature. To take an analogy, it is one thing to define 
what temperature is -  a measure of the average kinetic energy of particles in a 
piece of matter; it is quite another to propose a way of measuring temperature.
It is here that the counterfactual approach comes into play. Let us recall, 
once again, the classical definition according to which exploitation exists when 
one group of people aside from the labour necessary for subsistence provides 
also surplus labour for another group’s subsistence and possibly luxury. This 
may be clear enough a definition in itself. However, it does not help us 
straightaway to decide whether any particular situation is exploitative. In order 
to do that, we have to try to identify whether some particular group fits the 
characteristics of the exploited, and another of the exploiters.
Now if it is true that one group of people supplies not only necessary 
labour to produce their own subsistence, but also surplus labour to provide 
subsistence or even luxury for another group, then it follows that i f  surplus 
labour were eliminated, the exploited group would be better off. Nothing seems 
more natural, therefore, than to say that workers under capitalism, for example,
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are exploited because i f  there were no capitalists, they would not have to work 
as much.
It is then easy to go straight to the conclusion that the exploited is the 
group of people who would otherwise be self-sufficient, were it not for the 
existence of the exploiters; while the exploiters would definitely not be self- 
sufficient, were it not for the existence of the exploited. Hence, we get an 
operational criterion for determining the existence of exploitation in a particular 
society. If we want to know whether anybody is exploited, we just look around 
to find a group that would be self-sufficient f  the complementary group were 
eliminated.
Thus, it seems that even the canonical notion of exploitation seems to be 
in accord with the counterfactual notion. In fact, I do not believe this to be the 
case. I would like to use the rest of this section to argue that we should reject 
the counterfactual notion in favour o f an ‘actual’ one.
Although highly visible in Roemer, it was actually introduced into the 
Marxian context by Michio Morishima (1973), in the course of the discussion of 
the similarities and contrasts between Marx’s verbal reasoning and John von 
Neumann’s mathematical model of economic growth (von Neumann 1929). Up 
to a point, von Neumann’s input-output model corresponded to Marx’s 
description of the economy quite closely. Unfortunately, because it introduced 
certain generalisations absent from Marx’s thinking, under some of those 
generalised conditions the model did not allow the traditional calculation of 
labour values of commodities.
These generalised conditions were to do chiefly with ‘joint production’, 
that is, the case where a single production process had more than one output. 
This was not analysed by Marx, who made the assumption that every process 
had as its output a single commodity. Indeed, actual multiple-product processes 
could appear to be mere curiosa - such as the ‘production’ of wool and meat 
from the rearing of sheep. In the context of input-output analysis, however, the 
case of joint production turns out to be significant for theoretical reasons. Joint
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production was introduced in order to model the existence of fixed capital, that 
is, the sort of input that was not completely used up during production. Marx 
treated the depreciation of capital in a similar way to the neoclassicals, namely as 
a sort of constant-rate ‘radioactive decay’. However, there are good reasons to 
think that the joint production approach, common to, or at least easily 
compatible with, the models of all the main exponents of the input-output 
approach (Sraffa, von Neumann, Leontief), is far superior as a model of the real 
world.
The second generalisation that creates problems for Marxism is the 
possibility that more than one process can be used to produce the same 
commodity (commodities). Once joint production and ‘multiple realisation’ are 
admitted, it is clear that in the real world, the number of commodities actually 
produced and the number of processes actually used may not be equal. In terms 
of the model, this means that the ‘production matrix’ may not be a square, 
which in turn implies that there is no way we can calculate the labour values 
from the technological requirements specified.
It was in order to get around this difficulty that Morishima came up with 
the counterfactual approach (although he did not call it that). Instead of finding 
out the actual amount of labour embodied in the commodities, he proposed to 
calculate the minimal amount of labour needed to produce the commodities that are 
actually produced. These he called ‘optimum value”, as opposed to Marx’s 
‘actual values’. Thus, the optimum values expressed the amounts of labour that 
commodities embodied when processes were chosen in such a way as to make it 
their production maximally efficient from the point of view of labour.
Later, Morishima (1976) augmented his definition further, one of the 
reasons being that ‘optimum values’ were not unique — the inequalities 
postulated were satisfied by more than one possible set of labour values. The 
‘true value’ was no longer even defined in terms of individual commodities, but 
rather in terms of the labour value of the whole output. In other words, the true 
value expressed the minimal amount of labour needed to produce the total
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output, regardless of how that labour was distributed among the individual 
commodities. Roemer inherited this approach when he wrote his Analytical 
Foundations cf Marxian Economic Theory (1981), and further extended it in GTEC.
This is a counterfactual approach, for as pointed out by Morishima himself 
(1973 p. 187), there is no particular reason to believe that the processes selected 
by the labour minimisation procedure are the same as those selected by profit- 
maximising capitalists in an actual capitalist economy. Thus, what the 
counterfactual approach to values specifies is the labour content of 
commodities (or total commodity) under the best possible conditions for the working 
class. It does not say what the labour content of commodities, and thus 
exploitation, actually is; it specifies what it would be if work and capital were re­
distributed to minimise labour expenditure.
I think we should strongly resist this counterfactual understanding. The 
first reason is that it is closely tied with the ‘moral’ understanding of 
exploitation: workers could be better off, so it is unjust that they are not. However, 
I believe that Marx intended his concept to do scientific explanatory work, 
rather than to play a role in the discussions about morality. For this purpose, 
what we need is a concept that can be used when looking at an actual reality. 
And to understand how that actual reality works, we need to look at the facts 
about that reality. Although counterfactual approaches might also be using such 
facts, by definition their relevant features occur outside the scope of facts, in the 
virtual reality they imagine.
Secondly, I think that even on its own terms, the terms of moral 
discussion, this approach fails. For it makes the existence of exploitation depend 
on the existence of the superior alternative. However, what if no such 
alternative exists? Under the classical notion of exploitation, this is perfectly 
possible. It might be that there is no alternative arrangement under which the 
exploited class could achieve the existing standard of living with less work. In 
absolutely commonplace Marxist terms, we would describe this situation as one 
in which the exploitative mode of production had not finished its historical
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work, and thus any other feasible mode of production would necessarily be less 
productive.
But we would still not describe this situation as one in which exploitation 
does not exist. We might say that the existence of exploitation is in some sense 
justified, or perhaps even beneficial. But that is a very different sort of claim 
from the one that says exploitation does not exist. Prima facie morally 
objectionable actions can sometimes be excused, justified, or perhaps in some 
situations of conflict between moral norms even beneficial. But that does not 
stop them from being morally objectionable in the first place.3 To illustrate the 
point graphically, the amputation of a limb may sometimes be necessary, even in 
a sense beneficial for the patient. But that does not mean that the amputation 
does not happen, and that the patient happily runs about afterwards the same way 
as before. The same goes for exploitation: perhaps there is no better way, but 
that does not stop us from describing the situation as exploitative.4
But perhaps most important is the final objection that the counterfactual 
approach simply does not always pick out what we intuitively think of as 
exploitation. To see this, let us now consider the article that led Morishima to 
move from individual ‘optimal’ values to global ‘true’ value.
In a provocative paper, Steedman (1975) exploited a feature of the joint 
production model to drive home a lesson for the Marxian Labour Theory of 
Value. For the existence of joint production allows the possibility that some 
commodities will have negative ‘values’, if values are calculated in the way that 
was commonly used in the case of single-product technologies. Now under 
some specifications of social technology, these negative ‘values’ cause a perverse 
result: the value of labour-power turns out to be greater than the total value of 
the commodities produced, and hence the ‘surplus value’ accordingly turns out 
to be negative. Yet, on the level of ‘appearances’, nothing strange occurs: both 
prices and profits are positive.
3 See Gibbard (1985).
4 Roemer does attempt to address this point, but in my opinion unsuccessfully.
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Morishima (1976) reprimanded Steedman for not using the ‘optimal’ values 
that the former proposed in his book (1973), since it was postulated there that 
under the conditions of joint production only such values make sense. 
However, this criticism was of course beside the point, as it was precisely 
Steedman’s intention to demonstrate that the classical Marxian definition does 
not work under the conditions of joint production, and hence Morishima’s 
‘optimal’ values had no place in his article (as he in fact pointed out in his reply, 
Steedman 1976a).
Wolfstetter (1976) rejoined with a different set of objections, the most 
important of which for our purposes is the point that Steedman’s result requires 
the employment of a strictly inferior technique — that is, the net product of one 
of the processes used must be strictly smaller for all the commodities than for 
an alternative process. It might then be argued, as in Desai (1979) that Steedman 
made a mistake in proving that such an inferior process would be used in a 
competitive equilibrium of a capitalist economy.
However, in a culmination of the debate Hosoda (1993) proves a 
remarkable result that if there are more than two processes in the economy, no 
particular process needs to be inferior for the positive profits to coincide with 
negative surplus value. It is enough to require that there exists a combination of 
processes used in production which is superior to another combination. 
Intuitively speaking, the superior combination is really like a single superior 
process, and vice versa for the inferior combination. Thus, although each 
process on its own is non-inferior, if we combine them in the ‘wrong’ way, we will 
get Steedman’s result. In other words, we get positive profits with negative 
surplus value only i f  there is what we might call a Hosoda-inferior combination of 
productive processes in the economy. So far, nobody has advanced a reason 
why such an inferior outcome could not occur in a capitalist economy.
Now suppose we use the counterfactual approach to calculate the degree 
of exploitation in a joint production economy with Hosoda-inferiority, or labour- 
wise inefficiency in force. I think it is quite obvious that we would be badly misled.
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For we would disregard precisely the one important issue about such an 
economy that makes the counterfactual approach appear at all plausible: namely, 
that aside from exploitation, the workers are also sujferingfrom labour-wise inefficiency.
But labour-wise inefficiency is quite a different sort of animal from 
exploitation. It is of course at least as important as exploitation, but in quite a 
different way. Under LW-inefficient conditions, there may be no exploitation in 
the classical sense — no separate exploiting class appropriating the fruits of 
labour of the exploited class. Yet, there will be ‘surplus’ labour in quite a 
different sense — labour over the amount which is necessary given the 
technological conditions. In other words, although the technology dictates only 
so much labour to be expended, more is actually performed, due to its inefficient 
use.
I believe that neglect of the separate existence and meaning of LW- 
inefficiency is precisely one of the flaws of Marxian critiques of the ‘actually 
existing socialism’. Focusing solely on exploitation, the Marxian critics tended to 
emphasise the surplus-appropriation by the ruling strata of the Communist 
Party. I do not want to deny that such an argument can be made. To the 
population of the ‘Communist’ countries, however, it might have been far more 
significant to advance a Marxian critique of the inefficiency of the economic 
system, and the attendant wasted labour. For although there were differences in 
the living standards of the ruling and the ruled, they fell far, far behind the 
inequalities common in the capitalist societies; and thus the existence of 
exploitation was not necessarily all that plausible.5 On the other hand, the 
existence of inefficiency and hence the existence of completely poindess 
expenditure of labour was painfully obvious to just about any inhabitant of the 
former Soviet bloc.
This is not to say that LW-inefficiency is some sort of speciality of the 
Soviet-type regime, of course. It may well be, for example, as Marglin (1974,
5 Of course exploitation may have been far more important in terms of accumulation, 
but that was not what was perceived as a particularly pressing problem.
257
Class, Surplus, and the Division cf Labour (VII)
1975) suggests, that capitalists force a division of labour which is not necessary 
from the purely technological point of view, but which does make it easier for 
them to keep their power. In such a case, it is very likely that the actually 
existing capitalist economy is far more LW-inefficient, from the point of view of 
employment of labour, than its technological possibilities would allow for.
Either way, my main point is clear. LW-inefficiency is plainly a distinct 
issue from exploitation. Since the counterfactual approach does not allow us to 
distinguish the two, lumping as it does surplus labour and ‘dissipated labour" 
(the deadweight loss due to LW-inefficiency) into one category, it cannot serve 
us to identify exploitation.
Instead, we should go back to the original definition of exploitation, which 
was in the background all along. Exploitation exists when there is actual surplus 
labour over labour that is actually expended on the production of subsistence for 
the labouring group. If we want to turn this into an operational concept and try 
to decide whether some individual or group is actually exploited, all we need to 
do is to look at the amount of labour needed to produce their subsistence 
bundle, given the technologies actually employed, and the amount of labour that is 
actually provided. If optimisation methodology cannot serve for this purpose, 
then a different way should be investigated; but the counterfactual approach is 
not really much help here.
Marx as an Inheritor of the Classical Substance view
and Sraffian Transcendence
I am now in a position to answer the charge of irrelevance of the Labour 
Theory of Value. The investigation leads to the conclusion that while prices can 
be determined without any recourse to labour values, and indeed, in case the 
wage contains a portion of the surplus, they must be so determined, this does 
not mean that the substance of labour value is an economically entirely 
irrelevant concept. On the contrary — refusing to pay any attention to it leads us
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to overlook a major conceptual question: just what is it that is the dominant 
feature of the economy?
For Marx, the fundamental answer to this question was that it is 
re/production, re/productive relationships that are the source of all the 
important economic facts. That is just what the Labour Theory of Value in its 
Marxian form effectively expresses. We could thus view all claims about labour- 
value-determined economies as claims about the capitalist economies where 
production is dominant in this fundamental way. We do not need to believe in 
labour value as an actual metaphysical substance any more than neoclassical 
theorists need to believe in the existence of utility. Indeed, that is precisely the 
relevant comparison: just like a ‘utility function* can be said to exist where some 
relatively simple conditions6 are satisfied, a ‘labour value substance* can be said 
to be determining prices where other simple conditions — namely 
productiveness and non-existence of unproductive consumption —are satisfied.
The problems of the Marxian theory that were brought to attention by the 
various critiques, culminating in the Sraffian attacks, stem at bottom from the 
fact that Marx inherited a ‘cost of production’ theory of prices from his Classical 
predecessors. O f course, this term is a little misleading, since it seems to imply 
that costs of production of a commodity are somehow fixed regardless of what 
its own price turns out to be. This is the case for the Sraffian non-basic 
commodities, but not generally, as prices of all basic commodities influence 
each other.
This was not yet clear to the Classical economists — hence the traditional 
triad of wage, profit and rent, the ‘primary prices*, or rewards to the 
fundamental factors of production, into which all other prices were meant to 
resolve themselves.
6 The simplicity is meant in mathematical terms. It is not being suggested that the 
conditions are so simple that their validity is generally to be expected -  on the 
contrary, a large psychological literature now exists demonstrating their widespread 
and persistent failures in real-life human beings.
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But even with this faulty conception of an ‘unmoved mover’ — the initial 
triad — there still remained the problem of the ‘unchangeable measure of value’, 
since the prices needed to be expressed in something— something that itself did 
not change as the prices changed. This was where the Ricardian labour theory of 
value came in.
Effectively, the search was for the underlying ‘substance’ that could 
represent the productive relationships, those which were held to be the final 
determinant of prices.
Marx took this theory and added the very significant observation that, 
absent technological change, the only way this substance could increase — the 
only way there could be growth, or equivalently through which the productive 
relationships of the economy could change (by increasing the stock of capital) 
was through surplus labour, which in the economy under consideration had to 
take the form of capitalist exploitation (involuntarily extracted unpaid labour).
Thus, the theory of prices and the theory of surplus production through 
exploitation were joined together. The amazing ingeniousness of this 
construction lay in the fact that for quite independent reasons, the same substance 
— labour value — was seen to be the main object of both theories. This must rate 
as a ‘dialectical’ achievement of the first rank, and no doubt so it must have 
seemed to Marx.
What the modern input-output analysis, in its Sraffian and von 
Neumannian guise does is to finally make clear that the ‘substance’ which Marx 
termed ‘abstract labour’ represents the productive relationships within the 
economy. Where these productive relationships are dominant, the ‘Law of 
Value’ holds and the economy is a productive cycle without any ‘consumptive 
surplus’. These are economies to which, assuming their fully efficient use of 
labour, Marx’s theory applies fully.7
7 By ‘fully efficient’ is here meant ‘labour-wise efficient’ — meaning that it is required 
that the techniques chosen are such that the expenditure of labour is minimised; this 
condition arises from the debate on ‘positive profits with negative surplus value’, 
considered below.
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Unfortunately, the input-output analysis also demonstrated that there are 
conceivable economies in which the Law of Value does not hold. These are the 
economies which possess a consumptive surplus. For this reason, they depart 
from the simple productive determination of prices; ‘unproductive 
consumption* also plays a role, and hence Marx’s theory does not hold; here we 
must use the Sraffian generalisation.
The fact that a generalisation is required should hardly seem a spectacular 
surprise. After all, successive generalisations, albeit of a different kind, were the 
very kernel of Marx’s method.8 The Labour Theory of Value in its simple form 
was not and could not be the theory of prices of a well-developed capitalist 
system. That much is obvious already from the fact that it assumes unrestrained 
competition. Instead, it is to be understood as an initial model of capitalism, 
which at the same time describes the deep structure of the capitalist economy.
It is the initial model in that on the basis of it, we can describe the 
conditions for the continued existence of capitalism in that simple form, that is, in 
the form of capitalism of free competition and equal exchange. But Marx’s 
theory is dynamic — it shows that the conditions it describes are unlikely to 
persist precisely because of the continued development of capitalism, because of 
the growth of oligopolistic tendencies within the economy. Thus, we produce a 
series of other models which take these tendencies into account, hoping to 
eventually arrive at a sensible description of the capitalist economy as it actually 
exists.
On the other hand, the Labour Theory of Value still does describe the deep 
structure of the capitalist economy, precisely because it abstracts from various 
complicating developments. Because it assumes no market imperfections, no 
barriers to competition, no lack of information on the part of economic actors, 
no government interference, no supernormal profits, no technological change,
8 Harcourt and Kerr (1996) provide a very suggestive image of this method by likening 
it to an onion, where at the centre there is the simplest, most pure, most fundamental 
model of the capitalist system, while the outer layers correspond to the successive 
complications being added to the basic model.
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no non-capitalist power relations, etc., and yet still arrives at profit as the 
outcome of surplus labour, it shows that even In the best possible world capitalism is 
still based on exploitation. Effectively, it is saying that if the reformers of every 
stripe — from dyed-in-the-wool Austrians to the most collectivist-minded Social 
Democrats — had their way, the end result may well be better than the situation 
today, but the fundamental fact of exploitation, and thus of social division into 
classes, would still not go away.
Theory of Exploitation vs. Theory of Prices
In the last two chapters, the question of whether a theory of classes can 
still be based on the Marxian theory has effectively been answered. From what 
has been said, it should be perfecdy clear that the objections to the Marxian 
price theory do not invalidate the Marxian theory of exploitation.
Indeed, at least the following six propositions can be distinguished in what 
is usually unproblematically thought to fit under the single name of the Labour 
Theory of Value:
Q u a l i ta t iv e  T h eory  of V a lu e :  Commodities are crystals cf abstract 
human labour.
This is the basic assertion that the phenomenon of value, non-existent in 
pre-market economies, does not arise due to the subjective characteristic of the 
usefulness of commodities, but the objective characteristic of their being products 
of human labour under particular conditions. Thus, it is not the ‘use-value’ of 
commodities that allows their generalised exchange. Exchange due to use-values 
would allow at most a kind of limited barter, where the exchanging parties could 
direcdy compare the usefulness they would see in the commodities on offer. 
However, generalised exchange, manifested through the existence of money, is 
due to the fact that all commodities are reduced to their common denominator,
i. e. the fact that they are products of abstract human labour.
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T h eory  o f S u rp lu s  P ro d u c tio n : Absent technological change, the 
surplus of goods and services above the level necessary for maintaining the 
direct producers is always and solely due to their surplus labour.
This is the claim that there is no ‘manna from heaven’, nor ‘productivity of 
capital’, nor any other way that goods and services above the necessary level 
could come into existence without involving additional labour (the only other 
such possibility is technological progress).
Q u a l i ta t iv e  T h eory  o f P ro f its :  Profit bundle cf goods and services is 
the result f  capitalist exploitation.
This proposition asserts that profit is not the result of direct coercion; nor 
is it due to ‘theft’, whereby the workers would be paid less than their labour- 
power was worth (under the laws of the capitalist economy). Rather, workers 
take part in the process with a very particular characteristics (described below), 
which nevertheless results in the extraction of surplus labour.
T h eory  of C a p i ta l i s t  E x p lo i ta t io n :  Under capitalism, there is 
extraction and appropriation f  surplus labour which is
1. involuntary;
2. due to differential ownership <f the means f  production;
3. guaranteed in the last instance by force;
4. extracted through the wage contract;
5. contested during the production process
The surplus labour under capitalism is involuntary, unlike the surplus 
labour needed to support the sick and the aged, for example, which would 
be voluntarily given under Marx’s Communism (see Marx 1951, p. 21).
263
Class, Surplus, and the Division cf Labour (VII)
It is due to the differential access to the means of production 
(conceptualised in capitalism as their ownership) because unless the workers work 
for the capitalists, they will starve, or at any rate live at a level below that 
considered worth living in the society.
It is guaranteed in the last instance by force, since the differential 
ownership of the means of production is not a law of nature and could be 
challenged by the non-owners — on the small scale by crime (theft, robbery, 
extortion, etc.), on the large scale by a forced re-distribution (land reform, 
expropriation of traitors, A.ryanisation’9 etc.), or even by a social revolution 
(changing the very mode of production itself, rather than just the personnel of 
the propertied classes). To prevent these events, a police and an army force are 
needed.
It is extracted through a wage contract, i. e. the labour market, rather than 
through direct coercion or other forms of manipulation, such as for example the 
credit market, or other types of blackmail.
And finally, it is contested during the production process, because (as is 
well known), the wage contract is never complete — labour must be extracted 
rather than being resignedly given.
T h eory  of E x c h a n g e- V a lu e  ( L a w  o f  V a lu e  P a r t  1 . *): Prices 
are values transformed so that the sum f  values is equal to the sum <f 
prices.
Under capitalism, labour becomes abstract and labour-power a commodity 
being bought and sold. The prices of individual commodities are just so many 
vessels of the general substance, abstract labour. This proposition thus asserts a
9 The reason for including this strange term is to point out that re-distribution need 
not always have positive connotations from the point of view of justice. During 
World War II, Slovakia had been a puppet state of Na2i Germany; under the ruling 
clero-fascist regime, a policy of so-called ‘Aryanisation’ was introduced, whereby 
Jewish businesses had been confiscated from their owners and given over to non- 
Jews (thereby purportedly becoming ‘Aryan’).
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quantitative relation between the total labour value and individual prices of 
commodities.
Q u a n t i ta t iv e  T h eory  o f P r o f its  ( L a w  of V a lu e  P a r t  2 . *):
Profits are surplus values tran formed so that the sum f  profits is equal to 
the sum f  surplus values.
This proposition asserts a quantitative relation between the observable (in 
principle) volume of profits and the unobservable volume of total surplus value.
Now these are distinct propositions which do not necessarily imply each 
other. In particular, for our purposes it is very important to realise that the 
existence of capitalist exploitation, as stated above, needs to be postulated 
independently of the other five propositions. It is not actually logically implied by 
them. To see this, note that it is perfectly logically possible for an economy of 
simple commodity production at a subsistence level to exist. This would be an 
economy where all commodities would exist as values — thus proposition 1 
would be satisfied. As we know, it would also be an economy where all 
exchange-values were exactly equal to prices10 — hence proposition 5 would be 
satisfied. Assuming no self-exploitation, i. e. work over the necessary level, there 
would be neither surplus labour nor of course profit; hence the total magnitude 
of both would be zero and thus trivially the proposition 6 would be satisfied. 
For the sake of the argument, we may assume that proposition 3 is correct, 
although given that there are no profits in this economy, it has no bearing one 
way or another. Finally, we may also safely assume that that there is no 
possibility of ‘manna from heaven’ in this economy — thus, should products 
which are surplus to requirements ever appear, it would have to be through 
additional exertion of the productive powers of the direct producers — hence 
proposition 2 is satisfied. But, clearly, no capitalist exploitation goes on in this 
economy; hence the other five propositions are not enough to generate it.
10 Sraffa (1960, p. 12).
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Conversely, I would like to claim that capitalist exploitation itself does not 
imply four out of the five of them (on Marxist view).
Capitalist exploitation does assume that proposition number one — the 
Qualitative Theory of Value — does hold. Marx described capitalism as the mode 
of production based on the exchange of abstract labour; without such an 
exchange, there is no possibility of a labour market, hence no possibility of a 
wage-contract and the capitalist wage-labour exploitation.
On the other hand, the fact that some capitalist exploitation exists clearly 
does not mean that there are no other kinds of exploitation, which could in 
theory fall under the observable category of profit. For example, slave-owners in 
the pre-Civil War South of the USA were slave-producing their cotton for sale 
on the market and thus for profit. Hence observable profit is not necessarily 
always a result of capitalist exploitation (contrary to proposition 3).
On the other hand, the existence of a degree of capitalist exploitation does 
not in itself mean that there could not be any ‘manna from heaven’, a bundle of 
goods and services which just appears without any effort on part of anyone. We 
may be rightly sceptical about such a possibility, but that would be on grounds 
independent of the existence or non-existence of capitalist exploitation. Its 
existence thus does not imply the theory of surplus production (proposition 2).
Finally, and crucially, the existence of capitalist exploitation in itself has no 
particular implications for the numerical values of either the total price or total 
profit. All the characteristics of that exploitation from a) through to e) may be in 
place, and yet the numerically speaking, there may be no connection between 
labour values and prices, nor between surplus values and profits.
This is an enormously important point, since it calls attention to the fact 
that no theory of prices is in itsef enough to disprove the existence of Marxian exploitation. 
Thus not only is the existence of exploitation independent of Marx’s particular 
theory of prices of production, as critics from Joan Robinson to Steedman have
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claimed,11 but conversely, even the subjectivist marginalist theory of prices does 
not show that capitalist exploitation does not exist!12 The contrary impression 
arises only because the marginalist theory is usually inextricably intertwined with 
the assumption of perfect competition — and as we have seen in the last chapter, 
this effectively amounts to the assumption of simple commodity production, an 
economy with no surplus, no surplus labour, no profits — and thereby of course 
no capitalism.
It can thus be again clearly seen that the criticisms of an undifferentiated 
‘Labour Theory of Value’, aiming at the Marxian theory of prices of production, 
do not in any way touch upon the Marxian theory of surplus production and 
exploitation. It might thus seem that the more-or-less sympathetic critics of the 
Joan Robinson variety are right, nothing essential is lost when the ‘metaphysical’ 
concept of value is jettisoned, and that all is well on the Good Ship Marx. 
Unfortunately, that is not quite so.
From Ethics to a Conception of History
The theory of exploitation on its own gives rise at most to moral 
indignation. But it was not Marx’s intention to fashion an ethical theory. On the
11 Joan Robinson (1942, p. 20): “.. .Marx shows that the development of the capitalist 
system is founded on the existence of a class of workers who have no means to live 
except by selling their labour-power. Capitalism first expropriates the peasant and the 
artisan, and then exploits their labour. The possibility of exploitation depends upon 
the existence of a margin between total net output and the subsistence minimum of 
the workers. If a worker can produce no more in a day than he is obliged to eat in a 
day, he is not a potential object of exploitation.”; Joan Robinson (1942, p. 27): “I 
hope that it will become clear, in the following pages, that no point of substance in 
Marx’s argument depends upon the labour theory of value.” (Robinson; Steedman 
(1977, pp. 47-48): “[ojne can derive values and surplus value, showing how the values 
of commodities other than labour-power depend only on the (...) physical conditions 
of production, while the value of labour-power and surplus value depend, in addition, 
on the real wages of the workers. The nature of exploitation is thus revealed (...) One 
can also derive from the physical picture of the economy a coherent theory of prices 
and profits. In doing so, however, one finds that, in general (...), profits and prices 
cannot be derived from the ordinary value schema”.
12 In a rhetorical form which carries something of an opposite implicature to what is 
being suggested here, this is a point also made by Steedman (1977, p. 58): “N eo­
classical economists do not commonly invoke the concept of surplus labour but they 
could do so without causing the slightest inconsistency with their theory.”
267
Class, Surplus, and the Division of Labour (VII)
contrary, the Marxian insistence on the historicity of moral norms should be 
indication enough how litde relevance was attached to the abstracdy ‘ethical’ 
content of the theory. Instead, the idea was to provide a scientific theory of the 
objectively existing reality. Exploitation was meant to be descriptive of a real 
process, rather than just provide a basis for some abstract ‘theory of justice’. Once 
such a shift in understanding towards ethics occurs, there is no telling where we 
are going to end up — there are, after all, multiple theories of justice, argued for 
on grounds which do not necessarily have anything to do with exploitation at 
all; and thus even the ‘ethical’ idea o f exploitation might eventually easily be 
abandoned altogether. Indeed, the development of Roemer’s ‘Analytical 
Marxism’ seems a perfect exemplification of just such a process. Without an 
anchoring in the objective reality of capitalist economic relations, that is, in the 
theory of prices, the idea of exploitation thus remains a pure spirit over the 
waters, which can be blown away by the winds of philosophical fashion.
Hence, I believe there was a reason why Marx insisted on the fusing 
together of an apparently ‘ethical’ theory of exploitation and an ‘objective’ cost- 
based theory of capitalist prices. Indeed, it was a reason which stemmed from 
the very core of the Marxian theoretical belief.
For Marx, the determining characteristic of each exploitative mode of 
production was the way in which surplus labour was pumped out of the 
exploited classes. This is a fundamental, non-negotiable part of the materialist 
conception of history. But then if this is to hold generally, it must hold for 
capitalism in particular. Hence it must be that the capitalist exploitation is 
inextricably linked to the determining ‘laws of motion’ of the system. And since 
the development of the capitalist economy is determined by the observable 
economic variables, such as prices, wages and profits, there is simply no way 
exploitation could be added as an optional extra to whatever theory of prices we 
happen to favour. The whole validity of the materialist conception of history 
hinges on the possibility that price-formation is wholly dependent on the 
mechanism of exploitation.
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Thus, it is true that the theory of capitalist exploitation is logically distinct 
from other parts of Marx’s theory, as we have claimed above. And it is also true 
that there is no deep problem with basing a conceptualisation of classes on that 
theory. The difficulty is that without being embedded in a broader Marxian 
theory, which necessarily involves the theory of prices as well as profits and 
other phenomena of capitalist reality, this conceptualisation of classes will 
threaten to become just a description on a par with the so-called stratification 
theories. No particular consequences for the development of capitalism will 
follow. O f course, there is nothing stopping us from putting forward a 
description of this type anyway, but the best we can squeeze out of it will be a 
notion of class struggle, voluntaristically conceived, rather than a theory of 
capitalism.
Is there a way out? I believe there may be. What the Sraffian approach 
shows is that in general, that is if we believe in the possibility of unproductive 
consumption, the Marxian notion of exploitation cannot be joined with the 
Marxian value theory. But that does not mean that exploitation is not relevant 
for the explanation of the laws of motion’ of capitalism. All it means is that it is 
not relevant in the way Marx intended. What the Sraffian approach in fact 
demonstrates is that exploitation is indeed the determining factor for capitalism, 
generally conceived — for it is the existence of the capitalist surplus (profit) that 
is its basic notion. The difference with the original Marxian theory is that it does 
not require exploitation to exist purely because the relations of production, 
including the investment relations, effectively demand its existence. Exploitation 
can now be conceived to cover also the totally unproductive consumption. 
Now, admittedly, this is closer to the Ricardo-inspired idea that the capitalists 
are ‘stealing’ part of the value that the workers produce than to Marx’s much 
more sophisticated account; but there is nothing doing, the logic seems to be 
pointing this way. Given this similarity with the Ricardian ideas, and given what
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we know about Sraffa’s own left-wing political leanings,13 we could perhaps with 
our tongue in cheek term Sraffian economics the unintended great modern re­
statement of Ricardian Socialism.
Of course, many Marxists would likely be unhappy with such a conclusion, 
and not just because of the cheeky designation we have just given it. The more 
fundamental point is that while the ‘cost of production’ theory of value is not 
identical with the theory of exploitation, there is clearly a close affinity between 
a cost-based conceptualisation of value and the materialist conception of 
history. So close in fact that the two may easily become confused. For as I have 
argued, what the cost-based theory of value suggests is that it is the productive 
relationships which are the dominant feature of the economy; it is not difficult 
to see the similarity of this idea with the notion that it is the material conditions 
of human reproduction that are the determinants of social development.
Nevertheless, while there is again a pleasant ‘dialectical’ feel to this 
similarity, it should be pointed out that the two notions are in fact quite distinct. 
Even if we wish to believe that the economy is somehow the ‘material base’ 
determining the ‘superstructure’ of the society — an idea that is itself severely 
problematic, as will be argued in later chapters — it would still not be necessary 
for the economic variables to be determined solely by the productive 
relationships. The direction of determination ‘economy - society’ does not also 
require that ‘production - economy’.
But there is a far more important point to be made about the Marxian 
notion of exploitation and its relation to the ‘laws of motion’ of capitalism. For 
the relationship between the requirement to use the notion of exploitation and 
the Marxian theory of value is not nearly as straightforward as it would seem, 
and the pleasing dialectical match between the cost-based theory of value and 
the theory of exploitation will turn out not to be so pleasantly close after all.
First of all, recall that the materialist conception of history postulates that it 
is the way in which the exploiting class extracts the surplus labour from the
13 See e. g. Sen (2003).
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exploited class that determines the nature of a mode of production. O n the 
basis of this conception, Marx undertook to examine the mechanism through 
which exploitation occurs in capitalism, where there is no direct coercion of the 
sort occurring in the pre-capitalist societies.
However, in arriving at the explanation of this mechanism through the 
extraction of surplus value, Marx in fact abandoned the conception that led him 
to search for this mechanism in the first place! For as we have already pointed 
out, surplus value and surplus labour are not identical in capitalism, on Marx's 
own theory. The workers who do not themselves produce any value, yet who 
are an integral part of the capitalist mode of production, might be ‘economically 
oppressed', but they are not ‘capitalistically exploited'. Yet, the initial definition 
of exploitation involved precisely simply surplus labour — no ifs, no buts. So on 
that initial notion, it is the surplus labour that is relevant, rather than just the 
subset that falls under the rubric of surplus value.
Thus, it would seem that there are at least two notions of exploitation in 
Marx’s thinking, and there is a deep contradiction between Marx's ‘General 
Theory’ of society and his ‘Special Theory' of capitalism.14 Either exploitation is 
the extraction of surplus labour, as the General Theory would have it, and then 
the extraction of surplus value is just one form of exploitation under capitalism, 
contrary to the Special Theory; or exploitation in capitalism is solely extraction 
of surplus value, in which case capitalism does not seem to be one of the 
societies described by the General Theory.
The culprit, of course, is precisely the productivist, cost-based theory of 
value. It is only this theory that leads inexorably to the identification of the 
‘relevant’ surplus labour in capitalism with surplus value — since the mechanism 
of exploitation that Marx identified relies on the fact of the difference between 
the value produced and the value consumed by the worker; and that value is ‘cost- 
based’, or in other words determined by the productive relationships. This is 
what leads to the ‘unproductive’ workers being left out of the loop.
14 These very useful terms are due to Roberts (1997).
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Now an argument could be made that Marx was mistaken in claiming that 
the labour in the sphere of circulation is unproductive of value. In fact, I have 
already advanced quite a different interpretation of ‘unproductive labour’ as 
labour involved in the production of non-basic goods. Indeed, we might even 
extend this designation to the whole of that labour which brings into the 
consumptive surplus (to the cries of horror from traditional Marxists no doubt). 
Either way, what should be clear is that the logic of the productivist 
interpretation of value means that some workers will indeed not be producing 
value by definition, despite being involved in surplus labour. Although Marx did 
not adopt this interpretation, he should have adopted it, I think. He might have 
done if the full implications of his own theory of value were clearer.
But if this is so, if the ‘capitalist exploitation’ in terms of surplus value 
does not even in Marx’s own description of capitalism coincide with his own 
notion of exploitation generally, then there seems little harm done in 
postulating that it is exploitation in this general sense which is relevant for 
the laws of motion of capitalism, and that it is fairly represented in the 
generalised Sraffian-von Neumannian approach — with the so-called Labour 
Theory of Value representing just one, albeit possibly empirically the most 
relevant, special case of that exploitation.
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PART IV
INTEGRATING TH E  
TWO CONCEPTS OF CLASS
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Chapter VIII
A B east of M any Faces 
Complex Exploitation, the Sphere of Necessity 
and the Sphere of Freedom
In this chapter, I would like to use what I found valuable in the work of 
other theorists to try to build up a theoretical picture capable of integrating the 
surplus- and the division-of-labour-oriented approaches to class. I am afraid 
that the reader may find the chapter somewhat slow-going, since there is quite a 
large amount of various distinctions that need to be made in order to be able to 
proceed with the analysis. I have tried to make these introductory passages as 
readable as possible, and I can only ask the reader to bear with me — in the end, 
I certainly hope it will have proved worth the wait.
Class Structure vs. Intra-Class Reproduction
I will try to come up with a satisfactory theory of how classes work in a 
modern society, but I have to point out that I will of necessity leave out a whole 
category of issues which ordinarily fall under the heading of class. These are the 
issues to do with intra-class reproduction, or in other words, first, how family 
background of individuals influences their class position, and second, whether 
an individual is indeed confined to a single class position throughout life, or 
whether there is a certain class trajectory they can be expected to take. Or to put it 
in yet another way, there will be no discussion of ‘social mobility’, either 
between generations or within them.
The reason for this has been stated at the very beginning. I am for the 
most part examining a simple model without individual birth, death, or disease; 
without sexual reproduction; without socialisation; without growth and 
development. Effectively, I am abstracting from all the features concerning the 
biological reproduction of individuals (simple and extended). This procedure is 
defensible, in fact required in my view, as long as the model is viewed as
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concerning the perfect reproduction of classes as aggregates of individuals, so 
that when a proletarian dies, another is just ready to take their place in 
production, etc. While still an abstraction, I think it makes sense to proceed in 
this way, since as I am arguing, class-like features of human existence arise from 
the need for material reproduction, rather than other biological characteristics; 
while there are other kinds of reproduction associated with them, conceptually 
they point to a distinct problem area.
The cost associated with this abstraction is precisely that I have nothing to 
say about intra-class reproduction. That is, I will need to leave out issues which 
tend to be most closely tied to the problem of class in most people’s minds, 
such as what standard of education they can achieve for their children 
(individually or as citizens and voters) and thus how they can improve their life- 
chances; what social networks exist that allow the high-status families to 
reproduce this status (Bourdieu’s notion of ‘social capital’); what sort of 
healthcare will be available to the members of the working class, if any; how 
extended will be the pension system in the society; etc.
I do not think it would be a very difficult exercise to try to extend the 
model in these directions. However, in order to do it, inevitably it would be 
necessary to bring into play problems of sex and gender; of biological age; and 
of the genetic lottery allocating potential for skills and acquirement of 
knowledge. All of these interact with the ‘simple’ class model to produce a far 
more complicated picture: it would be necessary to consider whether and how 
to apply the notion of exploitation within the traditional man-woman household 
partnership; how gender inequality is reproduced within the society and what 
implications this has for the social status of men and women when their class- 
and gender-status diverge, in the sense of possessing high status in one 
dimension and low in the other; how biological age interacts with the societally 
conventional ‘social age’ (with students, productive workers and pensioners 
playing the roles of the societally young, mature and elderly); to what extent is 
the development of skills the result of social and genetic advantages
275
Class, Surplus, and the Division <f Labour (VIII)
respectively, etc. These issues are of course enormously interesting, however 
there is simply no way they can all be considered within the scope of this work. 
All I would like to do is to provide the conceptual tools for analysing the 
questions of class in its simplest form, which might then serve as at least a part 
of the toolkit for the more detailed analysis.
I will confine myself to noting that we can think of the class structure of 
society as more or less rigid depending on how much intra-class reproduction 
there is. If an individual is fated to be born and die in the same class, never 
having left it, and if this is the same class as that their parents lived in, then this 
is effectively a caste society. To such a society, my analysis would apply best, 
since leaving and entering classes and the costs and benefits associated with 
these processes do not complicate the picture — so while classes may shrink or 
swell somewhat over time depending on their rates of natality and mortality, the 
abstraction that they remain exactly the same is reasonable. With extreme 
changes in their natality/mortality, this would no longer be true — but then this 
would very likely mean a change in the mode of production, since the old order 
could probably not accommodate such drastic changes.
On the other hand, if there is zero intra-class reproduction, this is still 
consistent with individuals ending up in the same position as their parents — as 
long as the probability of arriving at the position is independent of the the 
agents’ origins. In other words, it is not intra-class reproduction that causes such 
an outcome; it may be the result of the agents’ own, genuinely free choice, or 
some other influences — but not of the dead weight of class. This would be a 
society o f what we could justifiably call perfect social mobility. O f course, no society 
on Earth is really like this, although some may be closer to this ideal than 
others.
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However, it needs to be pointed out that even if such perfect social 
mobility existed, this would not render the society classless. Let me discuss the 
issue first with respect to unchanging technology and then with technological 
progress bringing increases in productivity.
First, absent change in the technology of a given society, social mobility is 
a zero-sum game: if the same jobs need to be done tomorrow as are done today, 
then whoever manages to climb up to a better position must necessarily push 
someone else down to their own previous place. It is simply not possible for 
everyone to escape degrading class positions; someone has to be ‘taking out the 
trash*. Thus, this would still be a society of class conflict, since the inferior 
places would always be occupied by someone.
Secondly, if there is technological progress, this does indeed mean that 
people as a whole could, in theory, escape the inferior positions, as those 
positions would be simply ‘left behind* as no longer necessary. However, if such 
technological progress benefits all class positions equally, then this means that 
the relative class structures would remain exactly the same — the same hierarchy 
of classes would continue to exist, even if all of the classes in this hierarchy 
would be better off than before. To this relative class structure, the same applies 
as above: the only way to move up on the class ladder would be to knock 
someone else down. On the other hand, if technological progress did /^/benefit 
all the classes equally, it is hardly too much to expect that it would benefit the
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higher classes more than the lower ones, rather than the other way round. It 
would be of course nice if a society decided to try to become more classless and 
thus, analogically to Rawlsian inequality (Rawls 1971), would devote itself to 
technological progress which benefits those at the bottom the most. However, 
if a society really could do that and would decide to do it, then it already lacks 
perhaps the most significant features of a class society — namely, that classes 
attempt to at least maintain their position, if not improve it.
The gap between the rich and the poor in the developed countries, 
especially the ones with the most pronounced capitalist features, which seems to 
be widening despite all the promises and even real measures of various 
governments, could be thought of as embodying precisely this process. The 
rules of the game are such that while there is indeed a constant stream of 
technological innovations, all these increases in productivity benefit those 
already advantaged the most; those with little claim on society’s resources are 
thus being left relatively ever further behind. As a simple corollary, unless there 
is a very uncompromising sort of progressive taxation, ensuring after-market 
redistribution of incomes, this process can be expected to continue as a matter 
of logic: the control over the technological progress is in the hands of the 
wealthy, and thus it is inevitable that the fruits of this progress (absent strong 
class struggle of those below) will also be falling mainly into their laps. No 
amount of ‘improved education’ and ‘workfare reforms’ can change the fact that 
ultimately, society progresses by the development of productivity, and unless 
those gains in productivity accrue to different classes in a more balanced way, 
the top will be moving ever further away from the bottom.
Distinctions Regarding the Division of Labour
One of my main themes is the role played by the division of labour in class 
determination. I have mentioned some of the relevant factors in the earlier 
chapters. However, I have not yet provided a complete description of what I 
believe are all the characteristics of the division of labour which are significant
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for class relations. This is what I will do now. At this point, these descriptions 
will necessarily have a feel of a kind of laundry list’, since I will only be able to 
tie them properly together on the basis of later analysis — although even now a 
partial reduction to some common bases can be achieved.
Of course, just because the analysis has not yet been supplied does not 
mean that the list should be simply accepted. I will not provide far-reaching 
arguments for inclusion of particular features, but I hope that the reader will 
find my choices intuitive enough to be seriously considered.
In order to make the selection less arbitrary, I will start off by presenting 
examples of two class positions, a miner and a CEO of a large corporation, 
which are meant to represent polar opposites. The description will be somewhat 
stylised; it is likely, for example, that some education as well as quite a high level 
of skill is required in reality in the miner’s job, unlike what will be the case in my 
specification. The point is that my description is only intended as a concentrated 
illustration of certain characteristics, an ideal type rather than a precise 
description of reality. After describing the two examples, I will try to come up 
with an abstract formulation of the relevant characteristics.
A miner, then, is engaged in hard labour, strenuous physical activity, whose 
purpose is to move matter. They have no subordinates to order around. No 
higher education is required for the job. In general, miners could be skilled or 
unskilled; let us for the purposes of the argument say they are unskilled. In a 
harshly exploitative society, the miner would be at or near the subsistence level 
of wages. Finally, the miner works in a dirty, dark, unpleasant environment, 
characterised also by a significant element of physical danger.
The top manager is involved in predominantly mental activity, interspersed 
with human interaction (attending meetings and giving out orders). By 
definition, they are at the top of the organisation hierarchy. Generally speaking, 
higher education is a must; equally we can assume quite a high level of particular 
skills. The top management can not only award themselves massively large 
salaries and bonuses, but also may actually own shares in their own or other
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companies. Finally, the working environment is pleasant to the point of luxury. 
There is no physical danger, although there usually is a fair amount of stress 
involved.
The relevant characteristics can be described on a high level of abstraction 
as falling under five headings:
1. Objective of the job
2. Lower of the agent
3. Requirements on the agent
4. Environment in which the job is performed
5. Responsibility carried by the agent
I would like to further analyse these highly abstract terms. To begin with, 
let me tweak the names of the five headings as follows:
(1) Objective <f activity
(2) Capacity to act
(3) Personal requirements
(4) Conditions <f the job
(5) Weight <f burdens
These terms are not particularly significant in themselves — they are simply 
a useful way of organising the salient characteristics themselves. These are 
enumerated below in terms of a series of polar opposites, with the exception of 
the very first heading.1
1 It is important to note that the names given to the characteristics are by way of 
orientation only; they are to be understood in the technical sense described below, 
which does not necessarily correspond perfectly with their everyday use.
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O b jec tive  o f A c t i v i t y
Material Transformation 
Symbolic Manipulation 
Human Interaction
From the materialist point of view, of course, all work is really 
transformation of matter. However, from the point of view of human society, 
the objectives of various activities may be significantly different. Material 
transformation proper can be defined as that activity whose main purpose is to 
change the physical characteristics of the environment — house-building, 
transport, factory work, etc. Symbolic manipulation, on the other hand, is that sort 
of work whose purpose is to operate on and with meaning — ranging from data 
entry through business planning to pure mathematics. Finally, human interaction s  
work whose objective is to provide a service by being directly involved with 
another person or persons — customer service, nursing, coaching, politics, etc.
Of course, all work really probably contains all three facets just described. 
However, it is nevertheless useful to distinguish between them, since their mix 
in various jobs will be quite different and frequently one or another will be 
dominant. Thus, the labour of a factory worker at the conveyor belt may be 
thought of as a paradigmatic case of material transformation; the work of the 
pure mathematics is a paradigmatic case of symbolic manipulation, while the 
activity of a call-centre operator may be understood as a paradigmatic case of 
human interaction.
C a p a c ity  to A c t
Authority vs. Subordination 
Power vs. Impotence 
Autonomy vs. Rigidity
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Authority vs. subordination, in the technical sense used here, refers to the 
direct personal relationship of command and obeisance, or in other words, the 
respective positions of two agents in a hierarchy.
On the other hand, power vs. impotence refers to the general scope of 
activities available to an agent. This is not power in the Weberian sense of being 
able to force others to bend to one’s will; the former includes the latter, but it is 
not limited to human relationships. For this reason, ‘authority’ and ‘power’ in 
my sense do not stand in the traditional Weberian relationship to each other. An 
agent may have quite extensive power without having any authority over 
anybody, and conversely, it is possible for an agent’s power to be much greater 
than their circumscribed authority. As an example of the first possibility, 
consider a driver of a bulldozer; they possess quite a lot of power, in the sense 
of being able to transform material reality in much more extensive ways than a 
generic individual. Yet they have no human subordinates at all. On the other 
hand, the prime minister of a representative government has the authority over 
their subordinates, but does not qua prime minister have authority over a 
generic individual citizen. For example, they cannot command an individual 
person in a restaurant to stop smoking (even though they may possess the 
power to push through legislation which forbids smoking in restaurants 
generally).
Finally, autonomy vs. rigidity refers to the degree of freedom an agent has in 
the performance of their job. Here I would like to refer to Wright’s (1985, p. 55) 
example of the contrast between an airline pilot and a janitor — as Wright claims, 
the former has much less autonomy than the latter. That is the technical sense 
of autonomy that I want to use. Again, note that the relationship between 
authority, power and autonomy may be quite complex. Wright’s pilot may have 
little autonomy, compared to the janitor; yet the power at the disposal of the 
former is far, far greater than is the case for the latter; and equally, the authority 
over the pilot is presumably much more circumscribed than in the case of the 
janitor. Rigidity may in fact occur in many situations where the agent in fact
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possesses a great amount of power, and precisely because of that power — if it can 
be easily misused, even by simple negligence, then the autonomy of the agent 
may well be gready circumscribed. Hence there is litde space for autonomy not 
just of airline pilots, but also surgeons, nuclear plant workers, etc.
P e rso n a l 'R equ irem en ts
Routine vs. Creation 
Primitive vs. Skilled 
Ignorance vs. Knowledge
All of these distinctions are fairly self-explanatory — routine vs. creation refers 
to the issue of how far does the activity allow for creative self-actualisation; 
primitive vs. skilled concerns the level of physical skill involved, or more generally 
‘knowledge how’, while ignorance vs. knowledge is intended to describe the level of 
cognitive ‘knowledge that" which is required for the activity.
C o n d itio n s  of the Job
Exertion vs. Ease 
Clean vs. Dirty 
Danger vs. Safety
Exertion vs. Ease refers to the degree of physical strenuousness of the 
activity. Clean vs. Dirty concerns the quality of the environment in which the 
activity takes place; it is intended not just literally, but also metaphorically — a 
‘dirty’ environment is thus meant to include not just the possibility of the 
presence of ‘dirt’, but perhaps also other sorts of unpleasant environmental 
features, such as noise, noxious fumes, blinding light etc. Danger vs. Safety is 
meant to include the degree of the direct physical danger present — other, 
indirect types of threats are considered below.
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W e ig h t o f B u rden s
Risk vs. Security
Responsibility vs. Non-Involvement
Stress vs. Calm
Unlike above, there is a problem here that there is a certain degree of 
overlap between these distinctions; at the same time, however, they refer to 
sufficiently different features to merit their separation. Thus, risk vs. security is the 
non-physical equivalent of the distinction just mentioned — a high degree of risk 
involves the possibility of great non-physical losses, while security entails the 
opposite. Responsibility vs. Non-Involvement concerns how many ‘assets’ and of 
what sort a person is obliged to maintain; although obviously this may entail a 
degree of risk, as defined above, this is not necessarily the case. It is possible to 
be responsible for fairly valuable assets which nevertheless are not normally 
threatened by many adverse circumstances — think of a shepherd in charge o f a 
large flock of sheep (abstracting from the possibility that a wolf lives in the 
woods!). Finally, stress vs. calm refers to the degree to which the circumstances 
of the job increase the person’s internal tension; again, both risk and 
responsibility are clearly related, but again, do not exhaust the possible space of 
stressful conditions — stress can be caused by a large amount of low-risk, low- 
responsibility tasks; on the other hand, responsibility may not disturb the 
person’s calm — think of the shepherd again — and a situation which is inherently 
a high-risk one may not involve extreme levels of stress for someone highly 
trained for just such an eventuality.
As I have said at the beginning of this section, this list unavoidably appears 
to be somewhat arbitrary at this point. I beg the reader’s patience; it will turn 
out that the distinctions made are significant and can be integrated nicely into a 
more general picture of what characteristics of the division of labour are 
relevant for class determination.
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Two Questions
I started off with two problems embodying the difficulty of grasping the 
class structure of modern capitalism: the ‘separation of ownership from control’ 
and the ‘embarrassment of middle classes’. The first causes difficulties because 
for the most part, there are no longer capitalists of the sort Marx was describing. 
The second is problematic because neither does the whole of the people 
nominally engaged in wage-labour resemble proletariat of the sort Marx was 
describing.
In a sense, the answers are obvious. In the first case, the single capitalist 
simply diverged into the stock owner on the one side and the top manager on 
the other side. In the second case, differences in access to income, education, 
opportunities for employment etc. created a cleavage between the middle and 
the working classes.
The problem is how to fit these ‘obvious’ answers into the Marxian 
framework — since, as I have argued earlier, as it stands the Marxian picture 
necessarily recognises only two polarised classes within a single mode of 
production; basically the exploited and the exploiters.
The Embarrassment of the Middle Classes
To the latter question, I want to give a short shrift at the moment. What I 
have to say on it is not particularly original; it is only in combination with the 
answer to the first question that matters become more interesting.
So, to begin with, let me say that the orthodox Marxian picture, under 
which it is only the exploiters who benefit from surplus labour, is clearly 
inoperative in modern society. In the advanced capitalist countries, almost no 
one engaged in productive labour can be regarded as being paid subsistence 
level wages, in the sense of wages that just suffice for reproducing their labour- 
power. Hence it must be the case that the vast majority of producers do actually 
share in the surplus they produce. For this reason, it is impossible to
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differentiate the exploiters from the exploited purely on the basis of the 
appropriation of surplus vs. receiving subsistence.
Equally, it is not possible to simply divide the producing group into class­
relevant subgroups on the basis of the amount of income/surplus that they 
receive. This would be a regression to the simple stratification view of classes, 
where division into classes depends on the arbitrary decisions of the theorist as 
to the relevant income bounds and where classes stand in no particular relation 
to each other.2
The relevant factor for this dimension of class is not what income the 
various groups of people achieve, but how they achieve it. In particular, I would 
like to distinguish between three different subgroups, roughly corresponding to 
‘capitalists', ‘professionals' and the ‘proletariat'.
Starting with the professionals, this is the group of people whose salary 
includes an element of rent. The reasons may be varied. It is possible that they 
possess a special natural talent which makes them exceptional and this is the 
reason for their favourable position in the labour market. O n the other hand, 
they may have special skills which are acquired rather than inborn, or finally, the 
access to the resource due to which they extract rents is artificially restricted, so 
that the supply of the skill is lower than it otherwise would be.
This group of people could be quite appropriately termed the ‘new petty 
bourgeoisie' in some respects, since it has one thing in common with those who 
had this label attached to them in the past. Namely, this stratum possesses the 
specific ‘internal means of production' (talents, skills etc.) that makes it possible 
for them to extract the rents, whereas the old petty bourgeoisie possessed 
material means of production which allowed them to operate outside the 
mechanism of capitalist exploitation.3 In both cases, the important point is that
2 There may be a certain role for the income segmentation later on -  given the different 
amounts of income, people have access to different consumption experiences, which 
in turn makes similarly earning individuals also similar in their experiences of life.
This would mean that there is a relational aspect to income segmentation after all. 
Nevertheless, the question of boundaries would remain.
3 This idea of the (new) middle class as based on special skills or talents is of course
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the possession of such means of production allowed a relative independence of 
the capitalists, but never a complete one. This is obvious in the case of the 
‘new’; but even the ‘old’, given that they had to operate within the capitalist 
market, where they were acted upon by forces of much greater magnitude, 
could hardly be understood as the proud independents of their own 
imagination.
Below the ‘professionals’ are the ‘proletarians’, who in this abstract picture 
by definition possess no special talents or skills whatsoever — they are to be 
thought of as able to perform only the lowest possible form of labour. This 
group thus cannot achieve rents through individual distinction in the market 
place. The only way in which they can partake in the surplus is then through 
collective action — extra-economic activity which allows them to negotiate with the 
employer from an improved position. Basically, it is only unionised activity and 
in particular the threat of striking that can guarantee them a share of the surplus.
Finally, the ‘capitalists’ are those whose portion of the surplus is neither 
due to their scarce personal characteristics nor due to collective bargaining, but 
simply to their claims of ownership of non-human resources (and in a monetary 
economy, access to finance).
Obviously, in real life there the dividing lines will not be as sharp as in the 
abstract picture. However, the concepts do provide us with a way of looking at 
the sources of income and thus deciding on the closeness of a particular 
position to one or another of the three extreme positions.
The point here is not that this is an exhaustive definition of the three 
classes. Such a full description still awaits us below. Rather, it is a suggestion of 
how a simple distinction of the sources of economic power can be made to 
work even within the context of Marxian exploitation to carve out three, rather 
than just two classes.
not anything new; it can be found e. g. in Giddens (1983, p. 107), where it is in fact 
inspired by the discussion of Weber’s views.
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Managerial Control: Operation of Power vs. Conceptual Activity
As I have argued above, the responses to this problem are all to do with 
the division of labour, or more precisely, with distinguishing managerial activity 
from the rest of production.
There are essentially two kinds of answers. One may either concentrate on 
the power aspect of the managerial position, or on its conceptual aspect.4 We may 
want to say that the managers and supervisors are actually engaged in functional 
and/or active exploitation, and thus ‘really’ either belong to the capitalist class, 
or at least to some third grouping. Or we may want to claim that the managers 
monopolise the decision-making, skilled intellectual activity, and/or co­
ordination tasks in the enterprise and therefore arise above the workers 
themselves as a separate grouping.
I hope I am not misrepresenting anyone’s position too much if I say that 
the first type of answer more or less corresponds to the views of Wright and 
Carchedi, while the second to the ideas of Poulantzas, Bahro and Albert & 
Hahnel.
While I think that conceptual or mental work is indeed a significant part of 
the managerial activity, I believe that the authoritarian nature of the capitalist 
organisation of production is far more significant. This is because the so-called 
‘mental labour’ occurs in many capitalist contexts other than management, and 
hence cannot be thought to be the determining feature of this sort of position. 
On the other hand, the position of authority within capitalism pretty much 
defines the managerial position (notwithstanding the fact that authority also 
occurs in non-capitalist contexts; I promise that the issue wall be dealt wath 
below).
4 I will be using terms such as ‘power’, ‘authority’ etc. fairly loosely and 
interchangeably.
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Authority: Nature, not Function of an Activity
I have already argued against Carchedi’s position previously (Chapter I). 
Here I will briefly repeat that according to this author, the management 
intermittently performs both the ‘function of labour’ and the ‘function of 
capital’; the first one corresponds to the necessary organisational tasks, while the 
second is the activity of creating surplus value, i. .e active exploitation.
My argument against this position was that authority cannot be identified 
with the activity of exploitation, both because it occurs in non-capitalist 
contexts and because the ‘function of capital’ requires the activity of others 
beyond the managers (such as accountants, secretaries, sales and marketing 
workers, etc). Here I want to generalise this argument and thus further extend it.
The basic objection to the view that the authoritarian direction is 
tantamount to the ‘function of capital’ is simply that it confuses the function, or 
the purpose of the activity, with its nature or content. To distinguish between 
authoritarian co-ordination and other sorts of work is to talk about what is being 
done, what characteristics the activity possesses. These characteristics are to a 
large extent independent of the purpose which they serve. That is why the 
managers in the former Soviet-type regimes did not perform actions 
significantly different from their Western counterparts, even though their 
function was not to achieve profits.
Equally, it could be argued that the function of every worker in capitalism is 
to contribute to the accumulation of capital. Granted, this may not be what the 
workers themselves wish to do, nor do the non-managerial strata need to 
identify with the company the way the management for the most part does; but 
these are side issues. The fact remains that in order for profit to be achieved, 
production must go on and every participant in it must put in their hours — and 
so each of them does contribute to the purpose of capital accumulation. That 
managers are somehow different from other workers is clear, but the distinction 
is hard to make in terms of purposes (other than subjective ones). This is also 
why Carchedi has been attacked for failing to explicate properly his distinction
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between the function of labour and the function of capital (Cottrell 1984, pp. 
84-87) — the former seems to not refer to function in the sense of purpose but 
rather in the sense of activity, which is not the case with the latter.
Moreover, there is even a more telling objection to the idea that 
authoritarian co-ordination can be identified with exploitation. This is that 
authority can be delegated, and it can be delegated even to the exploited themselves— 
that is to those who undoubtedly do belong to the exploited classes and do not 
cease to belong to them in virtue of acquiring the authority. For example, slaves 
of antiquity apparently could be charged with the role of a supervisor (Marx 
1966, pp. 384-385), without thereby ceasing to be slaves; they were still just a 
‘talking tooP to be dealt with as the master happened to wish at any point in 
time. They did not turn into masters in virtue of their authority over other 
slaves. Even more clearly — and gruesomely — from among the prisoners in the 
Nazi extermination camps, who most definitely were providing more labour 
than they were receiving back in the form of sustenance and thus were exploited 
in the technical sense, the camp officers had selected the so-called kapos, who 
were charged with responsibility for groups of other prisoners. While the kapos 
had certain privileges and the capacity to mete out punishment to their fellow 
prisoners, this did not make them equal to the SS guards; their fate for the most 
part was just as sealed as the fate of their ‘underlings’.
Finally, authority can at least theoretically exist without any (parasitic) 
exploitation whatsoever. Think of the ideal-type Protestant Ethic type of 
capitalism, in which the bourgeois deprives his wife and children of everything 
but the most necessary subsistence in order to plough all the profits back into 
production; here, consumption of all the producers involved is more or less the 
same, and yet some possess authority over the others. We can even imagine a 
pure subsistence society — one in which nobody consumes above the level just 
necessary to survive and no surplus exists above the level of necessary inputs — 
in which nevertheless an internal hierarchy exists with the chief at the top. 
Traditionally the Marxist view would be that such a society is strictly speaking
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impossible, primitive communism being the rule in the conditions of 
subsistence, but this requires an argument rather than just an assertion.
My view is that within the capitalist social formation, the managers both 
perform the function of capital, in that they organise, supervise and enforce 
production for the purpose of achieving profit, and that they do it by being 
engaged in an activity of an authoritarian nature. It is the coincidence of both of 
these features that is chiefly responsible for delineating their particular positions 
in production. As argued above, many if not all workers can be thought of as 
‘working in the interests of capital’; and conversely, authoritarian activities can 
occur in contexts other than capitalist production. It is when both of these 
features coincide in one locus of positions that we know we are speaking of 
managers.
Authority — in Production and Otherwise
Nevertheless, there is something very distinct about the specifically 
authoritarian nature of production, and it is hardly a coincidence that many 
division-of-labour theorists tended to gravitate towards it as a solution of the 
problem. Authoritarian relationship are very class-like, in that they create a 
polarised structure of the superiors and the subordinates (at least in their 
simplest form), which involves an obvious conflict.5
In fact, there are several such systematic conflicts tied to the authority- 
subordination relationship. On the one hand, the existence of authority can be 
taken as an indication that the subordinated are ordered to do things they would 
otherwise not do — things that they find distasteful. Hence there is a conflict 
that stems from the nature of the orders given. On the other hand, it maybe the 
threat of harm, in case the order is not carried out, that the subordinated find
5 I should emphasise that throughout the discussion, I am not referring to the ‘received 
view’ of authority and power, due to Max Weber (1964) -  although obviously no 
such discussion can avoid touching upon Weber’s points, I do wish to use both 
‘authority’ and ‘power’ in my own way, clarifying the relation to the received view 
where necessary.
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psychologically harmful. This would give rise to a different sort of conflict, 
stemming from the desire to avoid the stressful experience. Finally, it may be 
that it is not the threat of being harmed, but simply the experience of being 
subordinated to another’s will that causes friction. If humans possess an 
‘instinct for freedom’ (Chomsky 1988, p. 155), then it follows that the position 
of subordination will give rise to conflicts even if the particular orders given are 
not particularly distasteful and even if the tacit threats are not causing great 
psychological discomforts.6
The trouble is that these conflicts show the relationship of authority to be 
different from the relationship of exploitation. In line with this, the conflict 
groups associated with the former — the rulers and the ruled — are by their 
nature different from the groups associated with the latter — the exploited and 
the exploiters. In particular, to generalise the objections used against Carchedi, 
authority relationships can exist within the parts of the society that rely entirely 
on the surplus and in which no actual production is taking place — the army is a 
prime example. So in a society with exploitation, there may be groups of 
superiors and subordinated that do not overlap in any way with the exploiters 
and the exploited.7 Conversely, the idea of a subsistence society with an 
authority structure suggests that authority conflict groups may exist even 
without surplus production and thus without any exploitation at all.
All this is very threatening for any theory which tries to claim that it is 
exploitation that underlies class structure. The need to illuminate the nature of
6 The idea that classes should be identified with ‘conflict groups’ arising from the 
relations of authority was propounded by Ralph Dahrendorf in his (1959). 
Dahrendorf, basing himself on the Weberian account of authority, claimed that these 
conflicts can be understood as conflicts over legitimacy of the authority. In fact, even 
a cursory glance at the sort of conflicts I have just described reveals that legitimacy is 
in fact called into question only after some sort of grievance is already in play; and 
conversely, that the conflicts described are present even f  the authority in question is 
considered legitimate.
7 An assumption is being made here that the army is allocated its part of the produced 
surplus by the exploiters, without itself having any input either into its production or 
distribution; such an assumption can, in my view, be more or less justified in various 
places and periods of history.
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the relationship between authority and exploitation, however, arises not just 
from the possibly dogmatic motivation of subsuming the one concept under the 
other. It may well be that the two phenomena are connected in another way — 
their relative position in the hierarchy of importance may be the other way 
round, or both could be just effects of a third cause. However, unless one is 
satisfied with a theory which simply declares every conflict-generating process 
within the material reproduction as creating a type of class relationship, one is 
simply bound to ask about the real nature of those conflict-generating 
relationships.
The classical Marxist view, of course, was for the most part that authority 
relations are dependent on the existence of exploitation. As Engels put it in the 
famous quote,
“men must first of all eat, drink, have shelter and clothing, and therefore 
m ust work, before they can fight for domination, pursue politics, religion, 
philosophy and so on” (Engels 2002, p. 69; bold emphasis added.)
from which it can be easily deduced that if the ‘eating, drinking, having shelter 
and clothing, is primary, and everybody’s time is fully taken up by making sure it 
is secured, then of course, there are simply no resources for the ‘fight for 
domination*. This was fully in line with the widely-shared expectation within the 
socialist movement that the advent of communism would do away with all sorts 
of oppressions and social ills; the brotherhood of human race would have no 
need for authority structures and the State itself, as their most pronounced 
embodiment, would wither away.
However, a rather different view was expressed by a much later Engels in 
his On Authority (1951), written in polemic with the anarchist currents within the 
working-class movement and within the First International in particular. There, 
it is strongly claimed that a revolution — itself authoritarian in nature, in that it 
forces the will of one part of the population on another — would not do away
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with authority at all; in fact, the modern factory would be impossible without it. 
It is fascinating (as well as depressing) to see how closely this argument 
resembled Lenin’s views in the row with the Workers’ Opposition within the 
Bolshevik Party after the Russian Revolution (Lenin 1965b); the Soviet leader 
was absolutely adamant that ‘one-man management’, in other words an 
authoritarian organisation of labour within a factory, was an absolute necessity, 
and rejected any idea of the trade-unions ‘interfering’ with the manager’s 
prerogatives (Lenin 1966, pp. 188-189).
Thus it can be seen that the issue of authority was not at all an 
uncomplicated one for the Marxists, not least in the very real terms of 
government. The results are well-known and seem to strongly support the view 
that authority can in fact give rise to relations which are almost indistinguishable 
from the class relationship.
For all these reasons, I would like to examine more closely how authority 
stands in relation to exploitation, which is the purpose of the next section.
Authority in a Subsistence Society
The tool I want to use in this analysis is the notion already alluded to 
several times, namely, a subsistence society with an authoritarian hierarchy, just 
because its structure is relatively uncomplicated.
How could hierarchy arise in a society without surplus production? Well, it 
need not be such a society from the beginning. Authoritarian organisation is a 
specialised work-role, and as with all specialisation, it requires initial investment, 
so that the work undertaken whoever is becoming the specialist can leave their 
previous work without that disrupting production. In other words, imagine that 
a society reaches a stage where surplus becomes possible; this surplus is indeed 
produced and usurped by a chief; the chief then directs production in such a 
way that he forces people into unpleasant or dangerous activities that they
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would not have undertaken before (mining, let's say).8 This changes the 
productive structure of the society (the technology used) in such a way that 
fewer people are now direcdy involved in producing food and more are in the 
‘dirty’ production of ‘capital goods’ (tools etc., which are held in common). 
Next, imagine that all this leads to the result that the society does not actually 
produce more than the reproductive needs of its members — this is because the 
mining or even the tool production are more demanding than the activities 
undertaken before, and the agents involved in them require more nourishment 
— thus, despite an increase in productivity, there is in the end actually no surplus. 
Even the chief gets only just enough to survive. Finally, imagine that this 
situation reproduces itself over time, so that it becomes the stable mode of 
existence of this community.
Now, I claim that this is a society without surplus production, in which 
authority nevertheless exists. What was formerly surplus is now a necessary 
input — the chief must be fed, because he has become indispensable; without his 
authority, the unpleasant and dangerous activities would not be performed, or at 
least not to the sufficient degree, which would threaten the survival of the whole 
community. Therefore, while the chiefs ‘slave-driving’ may not very much look 
like necessary labour, it is certainly, for this particular society at this equilibrium 
point, part of the necessary activities.
It would still be possible to declare the chiefs activity ‘non-labour’, as for 
example Carchedi indeed does in his Class Analysis and Social Research (1987). The 
feeling behind such a declaration is obvious and easily shared. However, I still 
think that such a label should be attached to the activity as a result of the 
analysis, rather than become a premise of the argument by fiat. Just what is it 
that makes us feel the chief is not really working — if indeed we do feel that, 
which may not be the case for everybody.
8 Possibly by taking part of the usurped surplus and offering it to a few others who 
then perform the role of the enforcers — this possibility will be considered below.
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The first thing to note here is that regardless of the validity of the 
particular example, there may be good reasons for at least some sort of 
authority to exist — and in fact, not only may that authority not be exploitative, it 
need not even be ‘oppressive’! The point is that if the society requires things to 
be done which bring disutility and thus which are not done to the degree 
required, it may decide, say with the agreement of all its members, to create a 
driving authority that ensures things get done, with the proviso that it can also 
abolish the authority again if it so decides. In other words, as an individual, 
everybody is subordinated to the authority; all members collectively, however, 
have opportunities to decide to get rid of it.9 A different example closer to 
home would be hiring a personal trainer in order to get fit. The trainer is indeed 
an authority over the hirer in a particular dimension, and the authority is 
accepted even when it demands unpleasant things to be done, i. e. things the 
person would likely not undertake of their own free will. And yet, the trainer is 
not a dictator — if the trainee decides to step outside of the context of 
subordination (even just in their mind) and fire the trainer, they are free to do 
that any time.
Authorities of this sort might be claimed to not be ‘authoritarian’ in an 
important sense: while they do require obedience even against their 
subordinates’ will, they are nevertheless accepted voluntarily, since the 
subordinates have the possibility and opportunity to abolish them if they so 
wish. This relationship is thus a special kind of ‘authority game’: while playing 
by the rules, the subordinates must obey the authorities — as in football and 
other games, the players are bound by the decisions of the referee. However, 
the subordinates have no problem deciding that they no longer want to play the 
game and therefore relieve the referee of their duties.
9 Modern representative democracy to some small extent resembles this structure, in 
that it is possible to change the personnel o f the authority structure; however, that is 
a far cry from the situation being described here, for as the anarchists wittily remark, 
‘it doesn’t matter who you vote for -  the government always gets in.’ To collectively 
decide to abolish the whole authority structure of a modern state is simply beyond 
the means of the populace — it cannot costlessly step outside the rules of the game.
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The important point here is that the abolition of the authority is costless for 
the subordinates. It may be a hopeful view of human nature that no dictatorship 
can survive indefinitely, and so in a sense that there is always a possibility of 
stepping outside the rules of the game. But if the gateways leading out of the 
stadium are heavily guarded by merciless killers — to continue the metaphor — 
such an attempt exacts a very high cost. Contrariwise, the situation I am 
describing is one where the opportunity to abolish the authority structure is 
there as a matter of course, as a matter of living and lived right.
If this is the sort of authority that can exist in a subsistence society, then all 
is well. For while there is a notional, even real division into the rulers and the 
ruled, I would argue that there is no real division into classes. True, systematic 
conflicts do arise that arise from material production; but nevertheless, there is 
no obligation on the class of the ‘subordinates’ to accept their position if they 
do not so wish. It is obviously not a society of full equality, but still one where 
the differences between people do not automatically reproduce themselves, i. e. 
where there exists a stable class structure.
On the other hand, this situation — if it ever existed — seems clearly 
unstable and transitional. It may either collapse back into full egalitarianism, or 
the opposite may happen, something which I think we would find all too 
imaginable. That is, the authority may come to abuse its power, in that it 
cements its position in such a way that abolition becomes impossible (other 
than at a high cost, that is). How could this happen? This is where the 
paradoxical nature of the notion of ‘abuse of power’ comes in. Since all power 
involves bending someone else’s will to one’s own, then a single individual may 
be forced to obey even when the authority commands them to do more than 
they bargained for when, as the part o f the collective, they decided to create it. 
In fact, if the authority is to work, then the individual must obey, since it is 
precisely the nature of authority relationship that despite their dislike of the 
order they are obliged to carry it out. Thus, the abuse of power is inherent in 
power itself; since power must not be challenged, a subordinate cannot
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challenge it even when it ‘oversteps the mark’. Thus, the initial ‘non- 
authoritarian’ authority may direct its subordinates to create conditions that will 
prevent them from carrying out the decision to abolish it.
If that is the case, then the Marxian picture Is in trouble, because now we 
have a bona fide authority whose existence and role is nevertheless necessary, 
given the technology used by the given society, and thus which takes part in the 
necessary labour. Classes do seem to be developing without the presence of 
exploitation. What can be done about that?
Authority: Personal vs. Structural, Auxiliary vs. Commanding
There is a possibility of trying a kind of reduction ad absurdum, arguing 
that in fact, the description is deceiving and really, there is exploitation going on. 
In order to make the argument, let me first make a two-fold distinction: first 
between the auxiliary and the commanding authority, and second, between the 
personal and the structural authority.
The second distinction is fairly straightforward and commonly used. One 
can either be an authority because of a place they occupy in some larger social 
structure — like the officeholder of a government, or the manager of a firm — or, 
regardless of social relationships, because they personally possess some 
characteristics which make others ‘sit up and listen’. This is not limited to 
Weber’s ‘charismatic authority’; a gang leader may not necessarily have a lot of 
charisma if they possess enough muscle to keep any individual subordinate in 
line.
The second distinction is really also quite familiar, despite the fact that we 
tend to almost always think of authority as commanding. Yet, it is one thing to 
say that somebody is ‘in a position of authority’, and quite another to say that 
somebody ‘is an authority’ on a particular question.
In this latter case, it is true that the person’s view on that issue is more 
likely to be accepted than somebody else’s (even if that somebody had
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presented exactly the same arguments). In other words, being an authority on 
something gives reasons to follow the authority’s ideas.
However, what it emphatically does not imply is necessity of following those 
ideas. As the anarchist Mikhail Bakunin put it,
“[i]n the matter of boots, I refer to the authority of the bootmaker; concerning 
houses, canals, or railroads, I consult that of the architect or the engineer. For 
such or such special knowledge I apply to such or such a savant. But I allow 
neither the bootmaker nor the architect nor savant to impose his authority upon 
me. I listen to them freely and with all the respect merited by their intelligence, 
their character, their knowledge, reserving always my incontestable right of 
criticism and censure.” (Bakunin 1980, p. 233)
In other words, the proper meaning of the authority of an expert is that we 
accept their position as a trusted advisor. A famous scientist, a deep thinker, a 
seasoned practitioner are figures that are equal to the questioner who demands 
their opinion; they may be superior in knowledge, but that does not make them 
the questioner’s superiors. In short, although authorities, they are not 
automatically ‘in a position of authority’.
This is the type of authority I would like to call ‘auxiliary’ — since its main 
role is to assist rather than to give orders. It may come in the guise of purely 
epistemological authority, one that simply expresses opinions on a particular 
matter, or more involved pragmatic authority, which provides advice on actual 
courses of action.
This second type of auxiliary authority represents a step closer to the more 
familiar, vastly more widespread type of authority, the one I called 
‘commanding’. I think it is quite clear what I mean by that, especially in contrast 
to the auxiliary authority. A word of explanation is needed though to explain 
how a commanding authority is at all possible.
Unlike in the auxiliary case, here the wielder of authority is capable of 
changing either the subordinate’s behaviour, or even their own internal will. The
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first type of enforcement is external, the subject may still preserve the wish to 
act differently, but facing the consequences, decides not to. In other words, the 
authority must be able to wield a threat, some sort of sanction, which would 
result if their will were not obeyed.
The second case is in some ways more interesting. The authority here is 
capable of actually changing the subordinate's mind — but in a very particular way. 
It needs to be emphasised that it is not through rational argument, through 
appealing to the authority’s superior knowledge, or any other means which 
might be considered rational. Those are hallmarks of auxiliary rather than 
commanding authority. The point is important, because this type of 
commanding authority is able to change the subject’s will even i f  they cannot 
rationally convince them to do so. Instead, the authority is capable of evoking 
an emotion that it should be obeyed, regardless of the original wishes of the 
subject. In other words, the subject needs to feel an obligation to obey, and this 
regardless of what they were originally willing to do on their own, and regardless 
of whether they are convinced that the carrying out of the order is rational.10
In the real world, it is likely that purely commanding authority is rare; even 
in the best drilled army in the world, there are presumably times when it is 
simply more efficient to explain the orders given — in other words, to rely on the 
auxiliary rather than simply commanding aspect of authority. However, the 
important point is that the commanding authority does have the recourse to 
sanction and/or obligation, if need be.
10 There is a certain similarity between Weber’s legitimacy and the concept of obligation 
used here, but only up to a point. For it is quite possible to imagine that someone 
feels a certain authority -  such as a country’s government, for example — is legitimate, 
without feeling any particular obligation to obey it. While legitimacy refers to whether 
the exercise of power is accepted, obligation concerns the question of whether the 
subordinates feel a duty to obey. Nor is ‘sanction’ exactly the same as Weberian 
‘power’, despite appearances — since power refers to the ability to make the 
subordinate carry out the superior’s wishes, which can be achieved by instilling 
obligation rather than threatening by sanction.
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Rudimentary Authority vs. Authority Proper
Having made these distinctions, I would like to make the next step in the 
argument, which is to say that neither sanction nor obligation are available to 
the authority "free of charge’, so to speak. Given that commanding authority 
exists in order to make subordinates do what they do not feel like doing, I claim 
there is a natural tendency for it to decrease in efficiency over time. In other 
words, resentment and defiance build up over time and undermine the 
authority’s strength — unless that strength is being maintained. This requires resources. 
I have already suggested this in my example above: that power cannot be held 
indefinitely without investing in the ‘means of power’. Here, it becomes clear 
that either the means of sanctioning or the means of creating obligation must be 
available. In other words, if the sanction available is in the form of a guard of 
armed men who may be called upon to enforce orders or to quell any possible 
rebellion large or small (including crime), then resources must be devoted to 
their maintenance, as well as to the production and maintenance of weapons 
(weapons that cannot be used exclusively for the production of food, as might 
be the case in a hunter-gatherer egalitarian society). On the other hand, if the 
obligation takes the form of religious duty of obedience owed to a certain 
stratum of the society, then again, resources must be devoted towards the 
maintenance of priests and any other members of the religious structure, 
towards the physical maintenance of the places of worship, and to any rituals 
that are used to regularly strengthen the obligation within the subordinates.
The claim is, then, that in a society at a relatively unproductive stage of 
development, where there are relatively few resources available for maintenance 
of such groups of agents not directly involved in the production for immediate 
needs (food, clothing, shelter, etc.), no structural commanding authority can really 
develop. It is possible for a certain ‘rudimentary’ authority to exist. This is either 
auxiliary, as in fact is the case with the ‘Big Men’ described by Sahlins in his 
‘Poor Man, Rich Man, Big-Man, Chief (1963), who acquire their authority 
through superior contribution to the overall production for the community; or
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it can even be commanding, if it is personal authority of a ‘strongman’ who can 
enforce his will through his own sheer physical strength. However, anything 
beyond that is impossible, for the structure required — namely the specialisation 
in sanction and obligation — cannot be maintained; any such attempt would fall 
apart.11 David Graeber (2004), on the other hand, points out the examples of 
‘primitive’ societies which instituted safeguard against the rudimentary authority 
ever becoming structural.
Finally then, the conclusion I would like to draw is that to have a 
structurally stable division into the ruling and the ruled, it is necessary for one 
group of people to provide the material means of subsistence not just for 
themselves, but also to provide enough maintenance for another group not 
directly involved in the production of these means of subsistence — and 
furthermore, the former group is likely to have to be able to produce even 
material goods which serve neither for consumption nor for subsistence 
production (such as weapons and temples).
Now, this is all very well, but what about the objection made earlier? It 
may sometimes or even often be the case that the military rulers/priests are in 
fact exploiters, in the sense that the direct producers of subsistence could easily 
carry on without them. But what if they are not? The possibility must be 
admitted, as before, that in order to overcome the disinclination of the direct 
producers towards unpleasant tasks, a structure of authority might become 
necessary; and so we are, it seems, no further towards the solution of the 
conundrum.
11 Against this, it might be argued that there are counter-examples in the forms of small 
communities of survivors from various disasters, where in fact quite clear lines of 
authorities had emerged even at the subsistence level. But this objection is easily 
rebuffed: for the people in these sorts of communities have been carrying the 
understanding of obligation with them, in their heads. After a lifetime of 
acculturation to the society organised along authoritarian lines, it is no surprise that 
the ‘natural’ way of organisation is authoritarian, too. This is quite similar to how the 
economist, Dean Baker (personal conversation), objected to the famous ‘emergence 
of the market in a POW camp’ paper of R. A, Radford (1945): the market did not in 
any way simply naturally ‘emerge’ under these conditions, it had been present in the 
POWs’ minds from the beginning.
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On the other hand, if instead of talking about necessity I simply described 
a society where a gtoup of soldiers and priests made a mass of peasants work 
for them, hardly anyone of a Marxist persuasion would have a problem with 
seeing this society as clearly exploitative. How can this be possible?
The trouble is, there seem to be two conceptions of exploitation which may 
often coincide, but importantly sometimes diverge. The one I have been 
overwhelmingly using is the ‘Sraffian* one, which is very well defined and counts 
as surplus labour only those activities which go into the production of the 
surplus over the necessary inputs (which include the maintenance for those who 
organise production, and any other inputs required for their continued 
existence, etc.) On the other hand, it could be argued that the proper ‘Marxist* 
exploitation involves surplus labour; where labour is clearly understood not to 
include activities such as enforcing orders or making animal sacrifices in 
temples.
Of course there is something that feels right about this latter, narrower 
interpretation; however the whole reason why I originally adopted the Sraffian 
approach is that the intuitive idea of ‘labour* does not work all the time, and in 
particular does not clarify the position of the troubling groups. Is it possible to 
decide which of these two views is the correct one?
Onwards to Complex Exploitation
I am convinced that the reasons for adopting the Sraffian approach are 
sound. To spell it out, I believe the Sraffian interpretation provides a very well 
defined understanding of what are both the necessary inputs and the surplus, 
and therefore also necessary and surplus labour. It gives us a very clear idea of 
what is exploitation and how it fits together with the particular form of the 
surplus in the capitalist society, namely profit. These are great virtues, compared 
to the vague, intuitive understanding that preceded it.
Therefore, instead of trying to save the allegedly ‘Marxist’ interpretation of 
exploitation, I propose to try to salvage what elements of truth are in it by
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allowing that there is a phenomenon which is similar in its form to exploitation, 
while not possessing all its characteristics, and that it is this phenomenon which 
both explains our intuitive feelings about certain types of activities and underlies 
all the class-relevant characteristics.
What is it that prevents ‘exploitation’ from being a good characterisation of 
the relations between the rulers and the ruled in the sort of subsistence society 
described? I think it is clear by now that while there is a division of productive 
activities which seem relevant to the existence of class, there is no surplus for 
purely parasitic consumption. So, what if we tried to generalise the notion of 
exploitation in such a way as to cover similar cases?
Content and Function
In the course of discussion of Carchedi, I made a distinction in passing 
between the content of labour and the function that an activity plays in the 
economy. I would now like to make this distinction more precise and then try to 
theorise on the one hand, how the content of labour can be integrated within 
the wider theory using the concept of complex exploitation; while on the other 
hand, how the different functions allow for the consideration of agents outside 
of the direct exploitative relationship.
So, if we do believe that the exploitative relationship gives rise to a 
systematic, materially-based conflict between the two classes, then it follows that 
in order for the relationship to persist over time, there must be ways in which 
the conflict is being contained. In other words, the exploitative relationship can 
reproduce itself only under certain conditions. Certain functions must be 
performed in order for the exploiters to keep their position as exploiters, and 
for the exploited to remain exploited.
Now we have already seen Carchedi’s attempt to theorise the ‘function of 
capital’ in terms of the ‘non-labour’ performed in order to extract surplus value; 
this ‘non-labour’ was characterised as the work of surveillance and control. 
Against this attempt, I argued that there is nothing intrinsic in such authoritarian
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work role that makes it a ‘work of exploitation’. An authoritarian division of 
labour can exist even under conditions of subsistence, if such a division of 
labour is the only way for the given society to survive.
The conceptual reason why Carchedi’s attempt does not and cannot work 
is, as I have pointed out, that it tries to run together two different characteristics 
of the division of labour: the function and the content of the work activity. These 
characteristics are on different planes, so to speak. To be functionally necessary 
for a particular mode of production, an activity need not have any specific 
content — it might consist of authoritarian direction of labour, but also of pure 
manipulation of symbols, such as occurs within routine administrative work; or 
indeed of creative thinking, such as that of advertising professionals. All that is 
required of such activities is that they serve the purpose of preserving the 
existing mode of production; there is no prescription as to just how they should 
be doing this. O n the other hand, neither does the content of the activity imply 
anything about its functional role — authoritarian direction of labour may have a 
place within two mutually conflicting modes of production (such as feudalism 
and capitalism), and thus certainly cannot be automatically said to be functional 
for one of them; similarly, both symbolic manipulation and creative pursuits 
may be functional, ^j/jfunctional or indeed quite irrelevant to the prevailing 
mode of production (I leave the examples as an exercise for the reader).
I will now leave the functional division of labour aside for the moment and 
concentrate on the content of activities. Once this has been taken care of, I will 
return to the topic of functions.
Kinds of Work
The idea is that division of labour has consequences which can be 
modelled using a similar sort of mechanism to that of exploitation. In particular, 
the claim is that work, in the sense of productive activity generally, is not just 
running down the stock of labour-power — i. e. the consumption of the labour 
resource — but that it also may be bringing some positive, beneficial effects to
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the agents. Generalised exploitation, or rather complex exploitation, then adds 
to this notion the postulate that these beneficial effects are distributed among 
the agents who all take part in production unequally, and that this inequality has a 
causal character — i. e., some are worse off so that others may be better off.
So the key idea is fairly simple: not all work is drudgery. Some of it may 
actually be quite fun. Or to put it less whimsically and more precisely, some 
sorts of labour include activities which are far from unpleasant, and on the 
contrary, are interesting, fascinating, amusing, empowering, fulfilling.
This is far from an original statement. Personally I happen to have been 
influenced by the way J. K. Galbraith formulated it in his Affluent Society (1976):
“[We] have barely noticed that the leisure class has been replaced by another and 
much larger class to which work has none of the older connotation of pain, 
fatigue or other mental or physical discomfort. And the continuing revolution in 
job quality being wrought by the computer is accelerating its growth. We have 
failed to appreciate the emergence of this New Class, as it may be called, largely as 
the result of one of the oldest and most effective obfuscations in the field of 
social science. This is the effort to assert that all work -  physical, mental, artistic 
or managerial — is essentially the same. (...)
For (...) differences in what labor means to different people could not be greater.
For some, and probably a majority, it remains a stint to be performed. It may be 
preferable (...) to doing nothing. Nevertheless, it is fatiguing or monotonous or, at 
a minimum, a source of no particular pleasure. The reward rests not in the task 
but in the pay.
For others, work, as it continues to be called, is an entirely different matter. It is 
taken for granted that it will be enjoyable. If not, this is a legitimate source of 
dissatisfaction, even frustration. (...) Pay is not unimportant. Among other things, 
it is a prime index of prestige. (...) But in general, those who do this kind of work 
expect to contribute their best regardless of compensation.” (Galbraith 1976, pp. 
260-262)
Also important for my view have been the ideas put forward by Albert and 
Hahnel in their complementary books Loo king Forward (1991a)and The Political
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Economy <f Participatory Economics (1991b). And of course, last but not least, the 
ideas about how the different sorts of labour impact on the individuals’ social 
being — in particular, how conceptual and planning labour extends human 
development — are an important theme of Bahro’s The Alternative in Eastern 
Europe (1978).
Conversely, I also think that the idea behind Marx’s exploitation was very 
much that the ‘labour’ of which the working class was providing a surplus was 
something hard, difficult, demanding, unpleasant and generally to be avoided. 
There was a reason why the workers had to forced into it! While Marx did believe 
that work was human ‘life-activity’, part of the species-being of humankind 
(Marx 1959, p. 75) and that under Communism, it would become liberated and 
human beings would engage in it freely and of their own accord, I think this 
clearly refers to the work liberated also from the constraints of low productivity 
— in other words, work as a creative, fulfilling activity, with the heavy and 
mechanical drudgery being left to machines.
But exploitation, as I have been taking it (and as it is explicated in the 
Sraffian model) requires that one group of people produces enough to provide 
not just their own needs, but also needs and/or luxuries of another group, 
which does not produce.
The reason this concept is unusable for the class effects of the division of 
labour is that these effects manifest themselves only on those agents who are 
part of the division of labour — in other words, they are all involved in 
production. By definition, then, it is impossible to identify a completely non­
productive group here; all the groups are mutually interdependent.
The key to generalising exploitation — that is, to defining complex 
exploitation — is then to allow the possibility that the complex-exploiting group 
may be contributing to production in some way. This means that it might not 
completely live off the surplus, but rather contribute to its own upkeep. So to 
get from exploitation to generalised exploitation, what needs to be dropped is 
the requirement that the production activities produce a surplus which goes to
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agents outside the production itself — or in other words, what needs to be 
dropped is the idea that the complex-exploiters are purely parasitic.
‘Efficiency’ and Exploitation
One way to clarify what this means is using a physical concept of 
efficiency In physics, the second law of thermodynamics implies that it is 
impossible to build a machine which extracts heat from a source and then uses 
up all of this heat energy for work. In other words, some of the energy from the 
source will inevitably be lost. The efficiency of a machine, or a process, is the 
percentage of energy that it actually does manage to use for work. So, for 
example, a process with the efficiency of 10% is very wasteful, since most of the 
energy extracted from the source is dissipated; on the other hand, a machine 
with 90% efficiency is very efficient indeed, with only a small amount of energy 
escaping into the environment without contributing to work.
Now, let me take this concept of efficiency and apply it to work done by 
agents in an economy. Suppose that an agent receives a consumption/leisure 
bundle b. The efficiency of this agent is then the percentage of that bundle 
which is required to reproduce the labour-power used up in production 
(however much work they are doing). Or in other words, the question is how 
much does the agent need in order to be useful for the others in the economy — 
and how much is a luxury which, from the point of view of the others, is simply 
wasted on the agent.
Under parasitic exploitation, the efficiency of the parasitic exploiter is zero 
— that is, although they consume a bundle b, 100% of what this bundle would 
allow them to productively do is wasted — they perform no work at all. On the 
other hand, a parasitically exploited agent surviving on a pure subsistence level 
has an efficiency of one hundred percent — since they receive only just enough 
to be able to reproduce their productive capability, this implies that everything in 
the bundle is purely utilitarian, serving only to let them perform their productive 
work.
308
Class, Surplus, and the Division of Labour (VIII)
The canonical concept of exploitation is effectively one that only 
recognises these two extremes: agents either nearly starve on a subsistence level, 
transforming everything in the bundle they receive into productive work, orthey 
are completely unproductive and the bundle they receive is ‘wasted* on them.
The generalised concept of complex exploitation allows for all of the 
positions in between. Thus, we may say that an owner-manager of a company 
whose work consists in superficial supervision of the its running, with an 
occasional strategic decision to be made, and who otherwise spends their time 
playing golf, dining in premier restaurants, sailing on their yacht etc. does, indeed, 
contribute to production, and therefore would fail to be picked out by the 
canonical concept of exploitation — but their efficiency is very low, since most 
of what they consume is completely unnecessary for their productive role. On 
the other hand, a lowly office clerk on low pay may be getting somewhat more 
than is required for her to reproduce herself on her current level, since the work 
is not particularly demanding — but even though she may thereby fall into the 
category of the complex-exploiters, her efficiency is perhaps quite high and thus 
is pretty close to the the pure proletarian position of 100% efficiency.
Activities vs. Goods
The idea of efficiency, however, suggests that attention must be paid to a 
certain problem. I am introducing the concept of complex exploitation in order 
to deal with the consequences of the division of labour — which means that I 
want to talk about how various productive activities differ and how they are 
differentially distributed among agents. However, the example above used 
instead the concept of a ‘bundle*, which is usually understood as a set of material 
goods (even though leisure clearly also needs to be included in it and indeed 
explicitly was so included).
Since I am not trying to describe a mechanism additional to exploitation, but 
rather, to generalise the concept of exploitation, so that it includes both the 
involuntary unequal distribution in consumption and production, it is necessary
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to find a way of reducing both to a ‘common denominator’. This in turn means 
that canonical exploitation should come out as a special case of the generalised 
mechanism.
I claim that the ‘reduction to a common denominator’ can actually be done 
quite easily and will result in an understanding of complex exploitation purely in 
terms of activities. First, it is clear that consumption itself does include activities: 
the simplest possible example is eating, but in fact, as was commonplace in 
classical economics, all consumption can really be understood as production, 
with the consumption goods taken as inputs. The differential bundles of 
material goods can then be understood as the differential opportunities for 
consumption experiences: owning a sail-boat means one can go sailing, not 
owning one means one cannot12; owning a house means one can live inside it, 
not owning one means one cannot; owning a pair of shoes means one can walk 
in them, not owning them means one cannot, etc.
It may be objected that there is a difference in consumption and 
production in that while consumption bundles involve opportunities to perform 
some activities, they are not rigidly tied to them (sail-boats can be used to live 
in, rather than for sailing — and although houses cannot be used for sailing, 
shoes can be used, say, as paperweights, etc.) For the Sraffian model I am using, 
on the other hand, productive activities are indeed rigidly determined.
However, this objection results from an ‘optical illusion’, in a sense — or 
looking at it from a different way, from mixing up material goods as the 
elements of the model and as they occur in real life. For the production inputs 
in the model, such as coal, wood, stone, or machines and building, can also of 
course be used in many different ways in real life. O r to be more precise, their 
role is not rigidly determined in a disequilibrium situation, which is what ‘real
12 Renting here is to be seen as a special case of part-ownership, limited in time and 
some of the ownership rights -  or perhaps even better, ownership can be seen as a 
special case of rental, where the rental period tends to infinity — and this in itself 
means that the rights of use are expanded to e. g. the right to destroy the object 
owned.
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life’ represents. They are understood as being used in particular production 
techniques — and thus with particular production activities being tied to them — 
only because the Sraffian model is one of equilibrium. Once we see that, it is 
also easy to see that exactly the same reasoning can be applied to consumption 
— certainly, consumption goods can be potentially used in many different ways; 
but in the model, not only necessary consumption goods (that is, inputs into the 
renewal of labour-power), but also the surplus can be seen to be tied to 
particular activities — after all, agents do eventually decide what to do with them. 
We are at an equilibrium once all the relevant decisions have been made — 
whether there was any space for them or not (the latter being the case for 
necessary inputs).
Thus, my solution to the problem involves looking at activities os\ both sides 
of the production-consumption divide, with both production and consumption 
goods being taken for granted, i. e. treated as given. Then it is possible to 
compare the complete ‘bundle of activities’ available to an agent, their beneficial 
and/or degrading effects, and their distribution.
Comparison with Roemer and Further Development
Now the modification of the concept of exploitation that I have 
introduced, namely that the complex-exploited need not provide all the 
consumption goods for the complex-exploiters (since those may take part in 
production themselves) is in effect the same one as Roemer introduced in the 
first part of GTEC. At least, this is correct if it is agreed, as I have previously 
argued, that to every amount of exertion corresponds a specific volume of 
consumption that is required in order to reproduce the agents labour-power. 
For recall that according to Roemer’s modified definition of exploitation, this 
phenomenon occurs when all the agents receive some bundle b, but some 
provide more than the average labour socially necessary to produce this bundle, 
while others provide less than this average amount — with both groups involved 
in production. If it is accepted that, as I have argued, ‘an office clerk requires
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fewer calories than a lumberjack’, then it follows that Roemer’s ‘exploiters’ in 
fact receive more than they need — since they receive the exact same bundle b as 
the ‘exploited’, for whom this is presumably the subsistence bundle.
However, ironically enough it turns out that if this argument is indeed 
accepted, then Roemer’s variant of the modification is unmotivated, unlike the 
one I have presented. This is because Roemer came up with the definition 
because what he wanted to show was that exploitation can occur in a pure 
subsistence society. However my argument was that bis notin facta subsistence 
bundle for the ‘exploited’ — in my terms, their efficiency is less than 100%, they 
do not need all of that bundle just to reproduce themselves, since they do not 
work as hard. In other words, Roemer is not describing a subsistence society.
On the other hand, I needed to modify the concept of exploitation in 
order to deal with the effects of division of labour, which would be impossible 
without allowing complex exploitation to occur inside production, or in other 
words independendy of the existence of surplus.
Of course, since complex exploitation involves the idea of less than 100% 
efficiency — in other words, the ratio of the productively-used part of the 
consumption bundle to the whole — the possibility described by Roemer is not 
the only one. We can also have the opposite situation, in which a group A and a 
group B contribute equally to production, but group B receives a bigger bundle 
than group A. And lasdy, it is of course possible to combine these cases to the 
situation in which group B both works less than A and receives a bigger bundle.
Characteristics of Complexploitation
Why should we believe that this concept preserves the essential 
characteristics of exploitation, however?
I would like to argue that there are three such essential characteristics 
which remain after the requirement of pure surplus consumption is relaxed. 
Namely, complexploitation occurs when
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1. at least one of the groups A , B is dependent on the other 
for its reproduction
2. group A  does more of activity |3 than B, and/or less of 
activity y than B — where (3 can be thought of as in some 
sense ‘bad’, while y is in some sense ‘good*
3. if B does the best they can under the social rules of the 
game, then A  can do no better under these same rules than 
accept the situation described in 2.
The characteristic a) basically specifies that either there is pure parasitic 
exploitation, under which in this case group B depends on group A for 
providing its means of subsistence and/or luxury; or both groups are mutually 
interdependent, as under the relaxed conditions.
On the other hand, b) is really the crucial characteristic of exploitation. The 
idea here is that someone is exploited when they are forced into something they 
would rather avoid — while someone else reaps benefits from this unpleasant 
activity being undertaken. O f course, in itself this condition only describes an 
inequality between the two groups, and if presented on its own, I would not be 
justified in calling it exploitative. For inequalities may exist for many reasons, 
and in fact, there may be inequalities of this sort between groups that have 
never met, never heard of each other, and in fact have nothing in common at 
all. This is why the other two conditions are needed: a) guarantees that I am 
talking about a single, internally interdependent society, while c) is the final 
piece of the puzzle which anchors complex exploitation to the ‘material base’.
The characteristic c) is really the generalisation of Marx’s idea that the 
working class under capitalism is forced to accept the sale of its labour-power to 
the capitalist, if it wants to survive. In other words, under the laws of capitalist 
private property, the working class lacks the possibility of reproducing itself on 
its own. Unless the capitalists are so kind as to simply lend the proletarians their
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capital for free — which, of course, they are not — the proletarians can do no 
better than to accept the miserable deal on offer.
The laws of capitalist private property are the ‘social rules of the game’ in 
this instance — they specify who can do what with which bits of what and under 
what conditions, and they have the backing of physical force behind them. 
These rules are social rather than ‘natural’, because of course, from the purely 
physical point of view, the means of production for the satisfaction of the 
working class needs do exist — they are right there, in front of their eyes. It is 
just that the way the society is structured, they will only gain access to these 
means of production if they accept the conditions of the capitalists. The only 
alternative is to go outside of these rules — individually break them, as in theft; 
or collectively abolish them, as in a revolution.
This applies more generally: complex exploitation means that if the present 
social rules are accepted, then the complex-exploited class will be complex- 
exploited even f  all of its members (maximise their utility) that is behave in the most 
rational way available to them — only assuming that the complex-exploiters also 
maximise their utility. This other condition is needed, because although such 
examples are unknown in history, it is always logically possible that the would-be 
complex-exploiters essentially give up their social position and/or redistribute 
their property. But if they behave as history suggests they do behave, then the 
complex-exploited have no chance under the social rules of the game to escape 
complex exploitation.
Again, the characteristic c) is interestingly mirrored in Roemer’s work, 
since he demonstrates the existence of (his notion of) exploitation under 
precisely the conditions of utility maximisation on the part of all agents. While 
the superficial reading of his models may thus feel outrageous to orthodox 
Marxists, from this point of view it is exactly their great virtue that they use this 
procedure, since they thereby show that proletarians can in no way be accused 
of somehow ‘freely choosing’ their position. Their choice is perfectly
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encapsulated in the tide of the popular version of Roemer’s work — under these 
conditions, they are only ‘free to lose’.
However, for some reason Roemer did not choose to make this 
requirement a part of his definitions of exploitation, which may be one of the 
reasons why he veered far off course, from my point of view. For this condition 
is precisely what allows seeing complexploitation as an actual\ rather than a 
counterfactual phenomenon. It is not the point, as Roemer would have it, 
whether the exploited would be better off if the social rules of the game changed, 
while the exploiters would be worse off. This may or may not be true, 
depending on the technology available as well as on the general stage of human 
mental and social development. Perhaps suffering under an authoritarian yoke 
really is the best the slaves can do — perhaps otherwise the society would fall 
apart completely. Who knows? I am not suggesting that this must be the case, 
only that an argument can be made to this effect.
Thus, the point is not that if everything changed, this might lead to an 
improvement. The point is that if nothing changes, improvement is impossible — 
regardless of whether it might happen otherwise. In other words, there is little 
point in wondering whether there might be a better distribution of labour which 
would make the complex-exploited better off — because even f  there is, it is 
precluded by the current social rules. For all we know, there might not be one at 
the moment; but the point is that the existing social rules of the game simply do 
not allowfor the exploration f  this possibility anyway. To sum up, the point is that if 
the social rules of the game are preserved, then the complexploited are worse off 
so that the complexploiters can be better off.
Complexploitation, Disutility and Utility
Now, how does this help with dealing with the class features of the 
division of labour? As I have said above, what I want to model in the first place 
are beneficial aspects of the division of labour. On the other hand, there is an 
opposing conception, namely the neoclassical one, which sees labour as
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synonymous with ‘disutility’. In fact, there is no problem with admitting that 
labour admits of kinds stretching all the way from extremely disagreeable to 
extremely agreeable. And in fact, for the moment I am even willing to accept 
the talk of utility and disutility, even though I do not believe there is any such 
thing in the sense in which it was originally intended, because these well-known 
expressions are a useful shorthand for things I do want to talk about. I hope I 
will be forgiven for this sin against the materialist, objectively-minded 
worldview. A concept somewhat akin to utility will in fact persist even in the 
completed exposition, since it is true that there are pleasant and unpleasant 
experiences; it is just that there is also much more to be said.
Given these concepts, however, it is very easy to express the meaning of 
complex exploitation. Division of labour is complex-exploitative if of all the 
agents taking part in production, some involuntarily experience more than their 
fair share of disutility, so that other experience more than their fair share of 
utility. Which is nothing but a complicated way of saying that some people have 
bad jobs in order that other might have good jobs.
However, regarding the term ‘beneficial’ — it is easy to see how creative 
activities, for example, can be seen as ‘good’ or ‘beneficial’, bringing ‘utility’ — 
especially compared to the alternative, namely routine activities. But why should 
authority, which for the moment I am taking as ‘the activity of authority’, be 
‘beneficial? To see authority as bringing pleasure is strange — certainly, there 
may be people who enjoy power, but this is commonly regarded as pathological 
rather than normal. In order to do this, we need to drop the idea of utility and 
develop a different account of what is relevant for complex exploitation.
The Sphere of N ecessity vs. the Sphere of Freedom
The way I propose to do this is by using Marx’s concepts of ‘necessity’ and 
‘freedom’ in the ‘realm of necessity’ and ‘realm of freedom’. To modernise the 
usage, but also to indicate my own take on these notions, I will be using ‘sphere 
of necessity’ and ‘sphere of freedom’ instead.
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So, what is the meaning of these terms?
The idea of ‘necessity’ is that humankind as a whole, as well as the 
individual human beings, are subject to forces beyond their reach. This 
originally comes from the exposure of human beings to a hostile natural 
environment, in which they are the ‘toys of the gods’ (of lightning, sun, forests, 
rivers and seas...) — but then can be generalised to include other types of forces, 
like social ones — which means, inter alia, also market forces.
But the way Marx used these concepts is, in my understanding, fairly 
vague. To try to capture the intuition expressed in the concept of the Sphere of 
Necessity, let me say that it involves agents being exposed to the elements, at 
the mercy of arbitrarily hostile forces, of the generalised unknown, feared and 
capricious ‘Other’; having very little knowledge or skill allowing the 
transformation of the environment, and possessing few if any tools to do it 
with. It is a picture of a ‘dawn of humankind’, with the humans cowering inside 
a cold cave while outside a storm is raging with its thunder and lightning.
Thus, the intuition is that the more an individual is constrained by the 
natural necessity, rather than determining their own fate, the more they are 
submerged within the Sphere of Necessity; conversely, the more they are 
capable to act simply of their own volition rather than being tied by the physical 
world, the more they are within the Sphere of Freedom. (Importantiy, as long as 
humans remain humans, none can completely escape the material constraints, in 
that they are living beings and need to reproduce through the process of their 
internal metabolism).
To try to analyse the concept of the Sphere of Necessity in more detail, I 
would like to distinguish between how it applies to activities, the environment 
and to the individual’s capacities.
First of all, I want to say that activities can be divided as between two 
poles: the imposed and the self-determined ones. This is a distinction that roughly 
corresponds to ‘work’ and ‘play’ — if by ‘work’ it is meant that the activity is 
undertaken not for its own sake, but rather to get to some other end (most
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simply a material product), while ‘play’ is an activity that is indeed undertaken as 
an end in itself — even if a useful product does result from it. So the same 
activity might be alternately imposed and self-determined, depending on the 
context in which it is occurring — one agent may be employed in shipbuilding 
and take part in producing a boat, while another might build a boat over a 
number of years simply as a hobby.
Before I can make the next distinction in activities, I need to distinguish 
two different parts of the human ‘co-ordinating mechanism’ — it would be more 
suggestive to say two different parts of the human consciousness, but the 
trouble is that this co-ordinating mechanism is without slightest doubt partly 
unconscious. The distinction I need may seem a little ad hoc, since it is not really 
tied to the ideas of human reproduction that went on before. Nevertheless, I do 
believe a good case maybe made for its existence on independent grounds, and 
so I will use it regardless — especially since it has been recently independently re­
discovered by behavioural economists.
What I have in mind is basically a version of Freud’s idea of a ‘superego’ 
and an ‘id’. I hasten to add that I do not want to be committed to classical 
Freudian psychoanalysis by any means. What I find useful, however, is the 
distinction between the forward-looking, rule-bound, consistence-seeking, will- 
imposing part of the human mind, and the immediate-satisfaction-seeking, 
capricious, live-in-the-momentpart— ‘a far-sighted planner a myopic doer*, as
Thaler and Shefrin put it in their (1991). They actually do happen to mention 
Freud by name, but their purpose is to explain why people may deliberately 
constrain their future choices — which is why I would diverge from their 
concepts and talk about the internal ‘hedonist’ rather than the internal ‘doer’.13
13 Note that I do not claim the ‘planner’ is somehow the rational part, while the ‘doer’ is 
irrational; such a claim is quite untenable, in my view, given that many people’s 
planners include completely irrational rules they happened to internalise while young 
-  and contrariwise, enjoying the present moment to its fullest extent may sometimes 
be the most rational course of action available.
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Given this distinction, I can now say that activities may be also divided 
between those that are compelled and those that are voluntary. This means that for 
an average human, some activities are repulsive to their internal hedonist, whilst 
others are on the contrary attractive.
The reason why I want to be able to use the distinction above is that the 
Imposed activities are not identical with the compelled ones, and conversely, the voluntary 
activities are not identical with the self-determined ones. This is very significant for my 
discussion. This division allows me to explain how some ‘work’ can be also 
‘fun’, even though it is not ‘play’. The explanation is that while an activity may 
be imposed — necessary from the point of view of production of some good or 
other — it may nevertheless still be voluntary, at least up to a point. A journalist 
producing articles for a popular magazine; a food critic visiting a restaurant; a 
pop singer practising their act — they may all be involved in an activity which is 
imposed rather than self-determined, undertaken for reasons other than itself; 
and yet, they may be finding their work still quite satisfying, bringing them 
happiness, even. Granted, all activities are perhaps subject to diminishing 
marginal utility, and if they are imposed, at some point they may turn from 
voluntary to compelled; however, there is still a significant difference between 
jobs that are compelled from the beginning and those which do bring pleasure to 
the average human for at least some of the time.14
What this means that already there are at least two different dimensions in 
which an activity is to be evaluated from the point of view of necessity vs. 
freedom. At one pole, we have activities which are both totally imposed and 
compelled — that is, they are the worst kinds of labour available. At the other 
pole, we have activities which are both completely self-determined and 
voluntary — in other words, those activities outside of the world of work which 
bring the most actual pleasure.
14 Further, it is possible for the activity to be self-determined and yet compelled: think 
of working out in the gym. And of course, any ‘fun’ activity might be both self- 
determined and voluntary.
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Next, there is the question of environment. Clearly, when talking about the 
world of work, the less accommodating the environment is towards the agent, 
the more the agent can be said to dwell within the Sphere of Necessity. It is not 
chosen, since it is part of the imposed activities; and if it is to be endured rather 
than enjoyed, then it fairly well expresses the vision of being ‘exposed to the 
elements’. Thus, ‘dirty’ or dangerous work environments push the agent further 
into the Sphere of Necessity, while ‘clean’ and safe ones have the opposite 
effect.
Finally, I come to the consideration o f individual capacities. Actually, let 
me come right out and say that I would like to talk about individual capabilities. 
Just as I had said before, this may be a little misleading, for although I 
deliberately use the term employed by Amartya Sen (1985), I am not entirely 
convinced that what I have in mind is exactly the same as his notion. For Sen, 
‘capability’ refers to a set of ‘functionings’; while functionings are things I would 
happily take on board, I do not really conceive of capabilities as sets.
Rather, capability should be understood within the context of my argument 
as just that — an ability that an individual possesses. Moreover, I would like to 
make a distinction between internal and external capabilities. The internal kind is 
what I believe is commonly understood under capability — the internal 
characteristics of an individual which allow them do achieve certain states of 
being, for example intelligence or physical strength. On the other hand, the 
external capabilities are those that are not part of the individual’s body — yet 
serve the same purpose; in other words, they are tools which help them achieve 
certain ends. Thus, for example, owning a private jet increases one’s external 
capability; and within capitalism, so does the possession of a great sum of 
money.
There are no prizes for guessing that agents with low capabilities, both 
internal and external, are pushed into the Sphere of Necessity — they can do 
very little to achieve whatever goals they might have and are subject to the 
activities of others, more capable than them. Contrariwise, the agents who
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largely reside in the Sphere of Freedom15 are those who possess a lot of 
capability, both external and internal.
In particular, being in a position of authority or possessing much power, or 
enjoying great autonomy are all, ceterisparibus, shifting one towards the Sphere of 
Freedom.16 Similarly, exercising one's creativity rather than being bogged down 
by tedium, possessing a high degree of skill allowing one to work in an 
extraordinary way, or knowledge that produces similar effects, are all signs that 
there are significant dimensions in which the agent achieved mastery over their 
environment, rather than the other way round.
Environment, Activity, Capability
The analysis has now come full circle, in a sense. Recall that in the 
discussion of reproduction in Chapter III, I talked about those elements of 
reproduction that are significant for the quality of life. These can now be seen 
to capture precisely those elements that I have described as class-producing 
features of the division of labour.
So in particular, the capability of an agent — both external and internal — 
which I originally talked about as the set of options that they have available at 
the start of the reproductive cycle, in fact can be also understood as involving 
the categories under the headings of the ‘Capacity to Act' and the ‘Personal 
Requirements': power, authority, autonomy on the one hand, and creation, skills 
and knowledge on the other are features of the division of labour that expand 
the individual's capability — they provide an expanded universe of options — 
whereas their opposites shrink this capability.
15 From the discussion so far, it should be clear that the ‘freedom’ in the ‘Sphere of 
Freedom’ refers to a very specific sense of this word, distinct from ‘free will’, as well as 
‘political freedom’.
16 Note that Wright’s highly autonomous janitor is not a counterexample — their fairly 
proletarian position is determined by the whole of the relevant properties, such as 
being low-skilled, working a tedious work-routine, etc.; while the fact remains that 
their high autonomy does make them better off than, say, a conveyor-belt worker.
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In other words, when at the beginning of the reproductive cycle the 
individual faces the world, the degree to which they are endowed in all the 
dimensions just enumerated decides just how capable of achieving whatever 
they determine for themselves. With low capacity to act and low standard of 
personal requirements, they are likely to be a toy of fate; with high capacity and 
high standard, they are more likely to be able to impose their will.
Low capability is therefore one of the aspects of deeper submersion within 
the Sphere of Necessity, while high capability allows one to emerge more fully 
into the Sphere of Freedom. Of course, there is no reason why the individual 
should possess the same degree of capability along all the dimensions. Indeed, it 
is precisely differences in the endowments along different dimensions that turn 
the groups of agents between the exploited and exploitative pole into middle 
class&r, rather than a single unified middle class. A professional academic is 
highly capable (in the technical sense) in the area of particular sort of knowledge 
and skills, but may not possess a great amount of power or authority; on the 
other hand, the position of a middle manager does endow them with such 
authority and power, but does not necessarily imply a great deal of intellectual 
knowledge, etc. And of course, when it comes to consumption, under capitalism 
capability is to a large extent determined by income and/or wealth — since it is 
those that allow choice from a great number of options; a high income coupled 
with low embodied personal capacities, say, is thus yet another differential 
middle class position.
The actual activities undergone, along with the environment in which they 
are undergone, determine the actual (as opposed to potential) experience of the 
agent. So if a high degree of physical exertion is imposed on the agent (as 
opposed to being self-determined by them), this means, ceteris paribus, a greater 
submersion in the Sphere of Necessity — it is a compelled experience of an 
unpleasant kind. The difference of working in a clean white office and on a 
dirty, noisy factory floor is also a difference between enduring environments 
that move one more deeply into the Sphere of Freedom and the Sphere of
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Necessity respectively. All of the elements of the ‘Conditions of the Job’ can 
thus be understood as belonging either in the one or the other Sphere: Exertion 
vs. Ease, Clean vs. Dirty, as well as Danger vs. Safety.
The inner environment is affected mainly by the tension which 
corresponds to the features of the division of labour that were enumerated 
under the heading ‘Weight of Burdens’. The level of stress, risk and 
responsibility has a direct bearing on how alert an agent must be, how much of 
their inner resources they must devote to maintaining the inner tension. The 
more this is the case, the deeper the individual can be said to be submerged in 
the Sphere of Necessity, and vice versa. Note that this allows us to explain why 
being ‘on duty’, whether as a doctor or as a security guard, is certainly work, 
even if in many respects of the least strenuous kind (until the call comes in): the 
agent is obliged to maintain a higher level of tension than otherwise would be 
the case; and of course their capability is also limited by the requirement to be 
present and available.
As far as activities are concerned, all o f the class-producing features of the 
division of labour would not of course get their particular placement in the 
Sphere of Necessity if they were freely chosen, i. e. if they were self-determined. 
Working out in a gym is physical exertion, but does not fall into the Sphere of 
Necessity; neither does climbing mountains, despite involving a lot of risk, and 
nor does digging in the garden, although it may well be both tiring and tedious. 
All of these activities are self-determined and hence the question of placement 
in the Sphere of Necessity does not arise.
It is clear, therefore, that the division into the imposed and self-determined 
situations is primary; we have a kind of lexicographic ordering, under which the 
putatively class-producing features are only such if they belong to the sort of 
activity/experience that is imposed on the individual.
This does not apply to the notion of capability, however; which can be 
easily seen if it is simplified in the present context to ‘wealth’: wealth allows 
great possibilities for action in the consumption sphere, while poverty limits
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them down — thus capability is an issue of submersion in the Sphere of 
Necessity even in the area of freely chosen, self-determined activities.
What this means is that the original concept of exploitation, which only 
used the notion of homogeneous labour, can be effectively thought of as 
describing this one essential dimension of complex exploitation: if the activity 
does not fall under the rubric of labour’, i. e. an imposed activity, then it is free; 
otherwise it is part of the Sphere of Necessity. What the notion of complex 
exploitation allows us to do, however, is to then make much more fine-grained 
distinctions among the imposed activities and their combinations (jobs), since 
when all the individual dimensions of the Sphere of Necessity are concerned, 
agents will turn out to have quite different overall positions. And yet, because 
the lexicographic ordering does not apply to capability, it is quite possible that 
an agent involved in imposed activities may nevertheless be much more free 
overall than one who is not, but possesses little capability: this is the class-like 
difference between a well-off white collar employee and a poor long-term 
unemployed.
Complexploitation in Terms of N ecessity vs. Freedom
It is now possible to reformulate the notion of complexploitation as 
follows:
a) at least one of the groups A , B is dependent on the 
other for its reproduction
b) the total potential experience of group A  lies further in 
the Sphere of Necessity than is the social average, while 
the total potential experience of group B lies further in the 
Sphere of Freedom than is the social average
c) if B does the best they can under the social rules of the 
game, then A  can do no better under these same rules 
than accept the situation described in b)
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Let us see what this highly abstract definition means in terms of canonical 
exploitation. What is assumed is simple homogeneous labour —which is thus the 
activity that pushes agents into the Sphere of Necessity—and that the exploited 
class provides both the labour necessary for its upkeep and surplus labour for 
the exploiters, who do not work at all.
Under canonical exploitation, it is thus true that the labour content of the 
goods received by the exploited is smaller than the labour actually provided by 
them. In other words, the social average labour needed to produce their bundle 
is smaller than labour provided by them. The opposite is true for the exploiters: 
since they do not work at all, the average social labour necessary to produce 
their bundle is much greater than the labour provided by them.
If we assume 100% exploitation — that is, that the exploited do not receive 
any portion of the surplus whatsoever, and survive at the subsistence level — 
then the only activities the exploited perform with the goods they receive are 
compensatory ones, allowing them just to reproduce themselves to their original 
level. What this means, all in all, is that all of their activities are completely 
submerged in the Sphere of Necessity. On the other hand, aside from the 
necessity of satisfying their basic material needs, the exploiters are free to act as 
they will with whatever is left over; in other words, aside from the necessary 
physical reproduction, which is an unavoidable part of the human condition, 
they are completely within the Sphere of Freedom.
Putting these two together, it is now clear that for the exploited, their 
experience (in this case actual, since the assumption of homogeneous labour 
takes away the trouble with capability) is far more within the Sphere of 
Necessity than is the social average, while the opposite is true for the exploiters.
There is of course also the opposite case, where in fact everybody works 
equally — thus getting the same (potential) experience of the Sphere of Necessity 
within production — but some are better rewarded than others — i. e., getting 
more opportunities, and therefore greater and qualitatively better potential
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experience within consumption. The disparity between the potential experience 
of the complex-exploited and the complex-exploiters, vis-a-vis the social 
average, arises again.
Lastly, when the two cases are combined, the same result follows.
Given this understanding of the Spheres of Necessity and Freedom, it is 
now possible to identify the complex-exploited pole of the society as the point 
which is in all the relevant respects most submerged within the Sphere of 
Necessity. In other words, it scores lowest along all the different dimensions of 
imposed activity, compelled activity, inhospitable environment, low external as 
well as internal capability. On the other hand, the complex-exploitative pole is the 
one which along all these different dimensions scores the highest: there is the 
least amount of imposed activity (perhaps just the necessary physical 
reproduction, i. e. no actual work), the most voluntary activities, the unchosen 
environment is pleasant and the agent wields the greatest internal and external 
capability available.
I would like to point out again the rationale behind calling these two 
positions complex-exploited and complex-exploitative: the idea is that these two 
poles are mutually dependent, in that the complex-exploited are in their 
position so that the. complex-exploiters can be in theirs; and that this position is 
the best they can do if they want to survive.
Now it is quite possible that empirically speaking, there is no group of 
people at either end of this distribution. However, since the dimensions I am 
talking about allow for all sorts of intermediate positions, we can speak of being 
relatively complex-exploited and relatively complex-exploitative. So within 
capitalism, for example, the lower one scores on a particular dimension, the 
closer one is to the proletarian position on that dimension, and vice versa.
This picture not only allows for the description of the middle classes, but 
even for why it is indeed correct to call them middle class&r, rather than a simple 
‘middle class’. The reason is that while the various presumed groupings score 
fairly high along certain dimensions and thus can be thought of as non­
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proletarian, they are not necessarily scoring along the same dimensions. In 
particular there is a clear distinction between the groupings that possess a lot of 
internal capability in terms of intellect, education and culture, but not a great 
amount of external capability in terms of income and money, and groupings 
that perhaps do not score so high along the internal capability dimension, but 
enjoy the sort of jobs which provide them with a healthy income. Similarly, 
there will be a difference between groupings that wield a lot of power and those 
who do not, etc.
Functional Division of Labour
What can be now said about the functional division of labour?
The simple model distinguishes between the capitalists and the workers, 
between whom there is the relation of exploitation. But the point is that 
exploitation doesn’t just happen; it needs to be mediated somehow.
This is the basic idea behind the notion of the functional division of 
labour. It is in my sense functional for a particular mode cf production — it serves to 
articulate it and also to protect it.
It would be easy to say that this function is performed by a particular 
group of people, who thus constitute a separate class (indeed, in a way this is the 
trap into which Carchedi fell). However, generally speaking, it would be more 
correct to say that the relationship is mediated through an institution rather than 
a ‘group of people’. There are of course people serving the institution, i. e. its 
personnel. But there is nothing so special about any of them; it is the institution 
itself which is important.
So while there may be capitalists as beneficiaries, it is really the institution 
itself — the capitalist firm, the corporation — which in a certain sense does the 
exploiting. The workers do not have directly anything to do with the capitalists 
— the former enter into a contract with the corporation, and it is from the 
corporation that the capitalists get their profit.
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This really was always the case — or we can at any rate abstractly generalise 
it to the earlier eras — in that the capitalist single owner was the full personnel of 
the institution; however, they were not identical with it, even then, which is 
precisely the point.
Analogously, and very significandy, even when there does appear to be a 
direct personal relationship between the exploited and the exploiters, such as 
was the case with the mediaeval nobility and its serfs, again the nobles were in 
fact the embodiments of an ‘office’, so to speak, a ‘position’, rather than persons 
in themselves. It was not the case that the peasants belonged to a particular 
individual X qua X — for if X died, the feudal exploitative relationship was not 
thereby immediately dissolved. The peasants were bound to the land, and the 
land had to belong to somebody — this was the way in which the serfs were tied 
to the landlords. So the exploitation relationship was again working structurally, 
through the institution of feudal land ownership, rather than directly.
Thus, exploitation is the work of an institution — and that institution can 
get internally complicated as much as one likes — it can be differentiated into as 
many specialised function as necessary. The point is that the personnel of the 
institution does not qua its personnel participate in production, even i f  it 
organises production for the purposes of exploitation.
Now the difficulty with the capitalist firm, the one that was defeating 
Carchedi, as well as other theorists, is that there is more than one thing going on 
in the capitalist firm. For although it is organised for the purpose of extracting 
profit, the way in which this is done is through production of goods generally, 
including the necessary production. Thus the capitalist managers organise both the 
surplus labour and necessary labour. Just like Marx said there was no bell 
announcing the end of the necessary labour time and the start of surplus labour 
time in a factory, so there is no bell announcing that up until that point, the 
authoritarian organisation of work is for the purposes of the production of 
necessary inputs and from that point on for the purposes of the production of 
the surplus. So it is not that the necessary labour is organised in a non-capitalist,
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solidaristic, ‘communistic’, democratic way, only after which the capitalist 
managers come in to make the workers produce the surplus — crucially, it is the 
same sort of authoritarian organisation of labour that takes place. Which makes 
it clear that this authoritarian organisation is not identical with capitalist 
exploitation. Rather, it is a particular peculiarity of capitalism that the way in 
which exploitation works in this system is that the necessary production must 
be dominated by surplus production — without producing for (basic) need, the 
capitalist firm could not produce for profit. Thus, what is really going on is that 
a) there is capitalist exploitation, which forces b) the sort of division of labour 
which includes authoritarian complex exploitation of workers, and which is thus 
possibly c) e-inefficient. These things are conceptually distinct. Perhaps there is 
no e-inefficiency, in that labour could not be organised in any other way, at this 
stage of human development, and still produce the same amount of goods for 
direct producers. Then again, the authoritarian complex exploitation can very 
well occur in a non-capitalist context. And finally — and this is the sense in which 
Roemer is right — capitalist exploitation theoretically does not require 
authoritarian complex exploitation, in the sense that if the workers could be 
relied on to fulfil exactly their contractual duties and if there were no need for 
co-ordination, etc., then the capitalist would not have a need for this special 
institution to organise exploitation for them. It is the complicated confluence of 
all these distinct phenomena that creates the capitalist form as we know it.
Other Functions
The analysis of functions as it stands is incomplete. For just like the 
exploitative relationship needs to be mediated, it also needs to be protected 
from challenges. Since it is reasonable to suggest that at least some complex- 
exploitative dimensions will generate resistance on the part of the complex- 
exploited, if not downright attempts to overthrow the relationship, it is almost 
immediate that there are two main functions outside the sphere of production
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proper that must be fulfilled if the exploitative mode of production is to persist: 
the repressive and the ideological function.
These two functions were of course theorised by Althusser (1971) and, 
following him, Poulantzas (1978) as being fulfilled by the ‘Repressive State 
Apparatus’ and the ‘Ideological State Apparatus’. These identifications came 
under sustained attack over the years. I concur with the critics on this point; 
there seems litde to be gained from an over-hasty compression of diverse 
institutional and social arrangements into the single self-contained mould of the 
State. Indeed, such an identification seems downright dangerous, in that it 
suggests a unity of causal mechanisms where there is divergence, identity of 
purpose where there may well be conflict.
Instead, I would simply say that the repressive and ideological functions 
are also carried out by particular institutions — perhaps a wide array of them. 
Within these institutions, we may even find agents who actually appear to be 
strongly complex-exploited, i. e. close to the lowest pole of the social 
relationship (consider, for example, the monks of medieval Church, who aside 
from prayers spent most of their time in the same back-breaking physical labour 
as ordinary peasants.) This is not really problematic, however, since it is easy to 
think of these agents as simply directly providing the surplus labour required for 
the maintenance of these superstructural institutions.
Given the understanding of complex exploitation and the functional 
analysis, it is now possible to shed some light on the questions of authority 
within a subsistence society, as well as the relationship between authority and 
canonical exploitation, that stood at the beginning of this discussion.
As should be clear by now, the notion of complex exploitation implies that 
the very existence of authority is complex-exploitative. Before authority arises, 
whatever compelled activities are performed in whatever horrible circumstances 
have to be self-determined. The existence of authority means that the will of the 
individual producer is alienated — they are now not exercising their own self- 
determination, but rather obeying orders of another will. This may be
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considered justified by the complex-exploited because of increased material 
rewards and thus greater access to the Sphere of Freedom within consumption. 
So the subsistence society with authority may not be genuinely complex- 
exploitative, as long as the social rules allow for the abolition of authority—or in 
other words, as long as the submission to the authority is in some sense 
voluntary.
However, once authority exists, it is capable of cementing its own position, 
by directing the social production towards creating institutions of ideology and 
repression — or as I termed them earlier, obligation and sanction. Once this 
happens, the social rules have been changed and there is now genuine complex 
exploitation, since the producers can no longer be thought of as submitting to 
the authority voluntarily.
And finally, once the structural authority proper exists, there is nothing 
that is stopping it from requiring the production of the surplus of material 
goods, to be appropriated by itself solely for the purposes of luxury — or in 
other words, there is nothing preventing it from becoming at least partially 
parasitical. Thus canonical exploitation appears as a result of original complex 
exploitation.
D oes This Cause Conflict?
I claimed at the beginning that classes are determined by a systematic 
conflict arising from the process of material reproduction. I have now described 
two different ways in which the basic Marxian model may be enriched: by 
arriving at a lower level of abstraction in the micro-direction (complex 
exploitation) as well as the macro-direction (functional analysis). In other words, 
I tried to describe how class-like features can arise from the differences in the 
actual and potential activities performed by various agents, and how the 
complex-exploitative mode of production demands the emergence of new 
institutions and thus new actors not belonging to the original classes. However,
331
Class, Surplus, and the Division cf Labour (VIII)
the question now arises, to what extent do these lower-level abstractions have 
anything to do with conflict?
I claim that the conflicts can in fact be readily identified, objectively 
speaking. Along every relevant dimension, the complex-exploited are 
submerged into the Sphere of Necessity further than the social average precisely 
so that the complex-exploited can further emerge into the Sphere of Freedom. 
Less abstractly put, the complex-exploited experience subordination, unpleasant 
work conditions, hard physical labour, etc., just so that the complex-exploiters 
may have more fun and less be demanded of them.
Importantly, however, this fact alone does not mean that the conflicts are actually 
perceived as such. There is no necessity dictating this. In fact, today it is probably 
true that the large part of the working class serving the needs of Western 
capitalism does not live in the Western countries at all, and has no contact 
whatsoever with its exploiters. Whatever conflicts it experiences on a day-to-day 
level are highly indirect from this point of view. That does not make the conflict 
any less real, objectively speaking.
In other words, just as I claimed at the beginning, the existence of 
structural conflicts does not necessitate class formation along the lines of those 
conflicts. The question of whether, how and when the conflicts become 
manifest and formative of actual class agencies has much more to do with 
empirical study than with conceptual analysis. This, however, does not 
invalidate the latent-conflict based analysis.
This applies even more strongly to the functional analysis. Here I would 
say that it is likely that functionally-based conflicts only become relevant after the 
classes have already become fairly well articulated. The fact that the police and the army 
are repressive forces whose main function is to preserve the existing order may 
not be obvious to the mass of population in a relatively peaceful society; it is 
brought home much more powerfully when the working-class institutions reach 
the thresh-hold of power and threaten the established order — as was the case in 
Chile in 1976, for example.
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Complexploitation, Functions and the Two Questions
I believe I am now in a position to answer the two questions that were 
among the chief motivations of this work.
First, as to the question of the separation of ownership from control:
The top management of a capitalist corporation is a part of its personnel — 
and what is more, its directing part. Its function is thus the function of capital, 
properly speaking, since it is the ‘brain* of the institution whose purpose is the 
extraction of surplus. Moreover, the work that the top management performs is 
highly complex-exploitative, given its environment, its creative nature, but most 
of all, given the external capability — the power over resources, both dead and alive, 
that it holds. Thus, this group of agents is certainly a certain aspect of capital 
personified, even if not capital as a whole (for that the analysis of the banking 
system and the financial markets would be required, which unfortunately is 
beyond the scope of this essay).
The middle management, on the other hand, is in many ways similar, but 
always with the radical difference in that it not only wields authority, but also 
experiences subordination, and also its autonomy may well be circumscribed. 
These agents are certainly performing the function of capital, but they are 
properly understood as a layer of the ‘middle classes’, since they are further 
down along particular dimensions from the very pinnacle of the complex- 
exploitative pole.
This allows us to move to the question of the ‘embarrassment of the 
middle classes’. Now, generally speaking, the ‘middle classes’ are distinguished 
by the fact that they are not completely exploited in material terms — they 
receive a portion of the surplus — and this is functionalfor the system. This may be 
either because in order to give them authority over the workers, it is also 
necessary to provide them with higher incomes, so as to create a sense of 
hierarchy. This would be the case for the positions of authority. On the other 
hand, as regards the ‘professionals’, they reap the rents of scarcity, for which 
there may be many reasons — genuinely rare skills, talents and knowledge;
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artificially restricted supply, such as through the limited granting of professional 
credentials; limited number of exalted positions combined with asymmetric 
knowledge (high incomes serve to attract the ‘best’ applicants and allow the 
employers the choice among them), etc. These are in effect somewhat 
reminiscent of the position of earlier artisans who possessed their own special 
tools of production (as well as skills); so although these groups are often a 
dependent part of the capitalist production, there is some justification in calling 
them the ‘new petty bourgeoisie’.
O f course, it must not be forgotten that these strata are to a certain degree 
also complex-exploiters, in that their conditions of work and its nature are far 
better than at the proletarian pole. In fact an argument can be made that it is this 
rather than incomes that defines their position as ‘middle class’.
Finally, for the ‘workers’, these are the groupings of agents that are closest 
to the proletarian pole of the complex-exploitative relationship. With 
technological progress their role may not be quite as bad as in the more distant 
past; however it is their relative standing at the bottom of the complex- 
exploitative hierarchy that defines them. Furthermore, it is very important to 
note that since their achievement of the surplus proportion of the wage is 
dependent on their collective (trade-union) action, their advancement is dysfunctional 
from the point f  view cf the system. This is because the existence of trade-unions and 
their actions go ‘against the grain’ of the complex-exploitative system, rather 
than ‘with the grain’, as was the case with the groupings described above, where 
the increased incomes were the result of the workings of the system itself. In the 
case of the ‘workers’, the ideal situation for the system is maximal complex 
exploitation. This is precisely what the trade-unions arise to prevent. No wonder 
that from the very beginning they were decried as interfering with the ‘natural 
workings’ of the market and the economy. In an important sense, this is 
precisely correct: these are defensive associations that prevent the complex 
exploitation from being as thorough as it otherwise would be. Thus, whatever 
the situation at a given instant in time, there is a constant incentive on the part
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of capital to do away with such working-class organisations, no matter what the 
official ideological position of the day.
On no account should it be thought that I believe everything relevant on 
the topic of class has been discussed. Far from it. The very existence of 
‘dysfunctional’ institutions in the guise of trade-unions mentioned above leads 
to many questions regarding other possible dysfunctional institutions, such as 
working-class based political parties. Furthermore, this leads also to the thorny 
question of the State and its personnel; and of course, nowadays there is also 
the wide array of non-state organisational actors. All of this before we even start 
to consider the questions of biological and sociable-educational reproduction, 
abstracted from in this work. There is thus no shortage of problems to pay 
attention to. However, I hope that within the parameters of the problem as it 
was set out, at least some progress can justifiably be claimed to have been made.
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Chapter IX
C onclusion  
Building Anew on Old Foundations
At the beginning of this thesis, I posed myself the questions of how to 
explain the existence of apparent ‘middle classes* of the new sort, as well as the 
existence of non-capitalist functionaries of capital. I have claimed that most 
solutions to this problem invoked the idea that class division is at least pardy 
based on the division of labour — the view with which I agree. Hence the 
problem of integrating the two disparate bases of class division.
Before this solution could be attempted, however, the very foundation of 
the ‘old* Marxian notion of class as based on exploitation had to be re­
examined. I argued that the idea of surplus labour provides in fact the only good 
explanation for the ‘deep*, ontological question of the existence of profits. 
Moreover, although I accept much of the critique advanced against the Labour 
Theory of Value, my analysis led me to conclude that it actually represents a 
‘dual theory of exploitation and price* — and that not only does the Sraffa-based 
critique not invalidate the former part, but on the contrary, it represents a good 
explication of the very notion of exploitation.
The solution to the problem of integration of Exploitation and the 
Division of Labour could then finally be proposed. This solution, described in 
the previous chapter, is achieved in two stages. First of all, exploitation has been 
traditionally thought about as the process of production and appropriation of 
material goods. O n the other hand, the class-producing effects of the division of 
labour are straightforwardly the effects of the actions performed during the 
process of production. To integrate the two, it is therefore necessary to come up 
with a ‘common denominator*. This can be achieved once it is realised that the 
material goods appropriated in the process of exploitation are themselves used 
as inputs in the process of consumption — or in other words, that the processes
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of production and consumption both involve exactly same two types of entities: 
on the one hand, material inputs, and on the other hand, activities that use these 
inputs. Thus, it is possible to abstract from the material goods on both sides of 
the input-output schema and consider purely the activities: productive ones and 
consumptive ones. Both exploitation and division of labour class-processes in 
fact involve both kinds: with exploitation, involuntary productive activities are 
undergone in order to allow for the occurrence of unearned consumptive 
activities, whereas both the productive and consumptive activities have effects 
on the reproduction of human beings, depending on what the characteristics of 
these activities are.
Secondly, since the effects of the division of labour are felt inside the 
production process, in the sense that all sorts of empirically differently-class- 
positioned agents take part in production, whereas the canonical notion of 
exploitation strictly separates the producing agents from the exploiting agents, it 
is somehow necessary to relax this canonical notion. This is done by postulating 
that inequality in the amount of productive activities undergone, as well as 
inequality in the consumptive activities undergone, can be thought of as akin to 
the canonical notion of exploitation, as long as there is a causal connection 
between the respective amounts of productive and consumptive activities — or 
in other words, as long the better-off are only better-off due to the worse-off 
being worse-off — and as long as the worse-off only agree to this bargain 
because under the social rules of the game, that is the best position in which 
they can be.
This integrated notion of complex exploitation can be then refined in order 
to provide a more realistic picture of class relations. This is done by analysing 
‘production’ and ‘consumption’ into more fine-grained sets of activities, such 
that each activity possesses different dimensions (aspects) along which it can be 
evaluated. For a given combination of productive activities (i. e. for a given 
‘job5) with its corresponding combination of consumptive activities (i. e. a given
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‘pay7), it is then possible to evaluate the total effect on an individual human 
being, and thus to find their relative position on the class map.
I hope that the concept of complex exploitation or *complexploitation' might 
prove to be a useful conceptual tool for studying class societies. I am clearly 
aware that such a concept is only a starting point, rather than the end result of 
real class analysis. What I have tried to accomplish was to integrate two 
different aspects of conflictual social existence — exploitation and division of 
labour— into one theoretical structure; however, this conceptual preparation can 
only be judged as successful or unsuccessful depending on the test of 
experience. This is even more so, because what I have been doing was using the 
tools of analytical philosophy; but these cannot answer the historically 
significant questions of just why particular types of complexploitation arise in 
different periods of time. It is one thing to say, for example, that the simple 
two-class model of capitalism is inadequate, because it fails to take into account 
the great array of agents who are far from the proletarian pole on many 
different complexploitative dimensions. It is quite another to try to come up 
with a description of a historical development of capitalism that gave rise to 
precisely such an array of ‘middle-class positions’.
Another fruitful avenue for further research is of course the problem of 
interactions between the material and the biological type of reproduction, which 
includes the rich themes of gender, age, socialisation, education, etc. It is likely 
that even the concepts used in this work might be modified in the course of 
such research.
Despite all the unanswered questions and limitations, I hope that the 
attempt proved at least somewhat illuminating — especially for those who try 
their best to overcome the existence of classes, to move beyond the persistent 
conflicts generated by the material necessity and towards a fruitful sharing of 
our diverse and yet common humanity.
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